Joseph Maxwell Chapman

The accused was stopped by police while driving on a highway.

The officer detected the smell of marijuana and air freshener, and subsequently observed marijuana shake in plain view, leading to the accused's arrest.

A search of the vehicle yielded significant quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found a s. 10(b) violation because the officer elicited an admission from the accused before providing a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's admission but admitted the physical evidence, finding the drugs and money were discoverable independent of the breach.

The applicant sought to exclude a statement given to police following his arrest during the execution of a search warrant, alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police failed to adequately inform the applicant of the reasons for his arrest and delayed his access to counsel, noting significant deficiencies in the officers' note-taking.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the applicant's statement but declined to exclude the physical evidence seized during the search, as its discovery was unrelated to the Charter breaches.

The accused, Michel Bertrand, was charged with trafficking methamphetamine under section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

An undercover officer sought to purchase drugs from the accused, who stated he did not sell methamphetamine but could introduce the officer to someone who did.

The accused then facilitated an introduction to a third-party vendor, Shaun Gravelle, from whom the officer directly purchased methamphetamine.

The court analyzed whether the accused's actions constituted trafficking or aiding and abetting trafficking.

Applying the principles from R. v. Greyeyes, the court found that the accused's conduct amounted to merely incidental assistance to the purchaser, not the vendor, and therefore did not meet the definition of trafficking.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused brought a pre-trial application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, seeking to exclude drug evidence.

The police had entered a residence without a warrant after arresting the primary tenant outside, fearing the accused would destroy evidence inside.

The court dismissed the s. 8 claim regarding the search of the residence without a hearing, as the accused failed to establish a privacy interest.

The court further held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry under s. 11(7) of the CDSA, and that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused after observing him attempting to flush drugs down a toilet.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug offences in two separate cases, applied for the release of seized funds to pay for his legal defence under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded he was denied legal aid, had no other means, and owned the seized funds, but argued the cases were not complex enough to warrant two lawyers at private rates.

The court found the second case, involving multiple confidential informants, was sufficiently complex to justify two lawyers (a senior and a junior) and approved the requested hourly rates of $400 and $200.

The court ordered the release of $250,000 from the seized funds to cover legal expenses for both cases.

Following guilty pleas to criminal negligence causing death and trafficking in drugs, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine aggravating and mitigating factors for sentencing.

The evidence established that the accused possessed and crushed opioid capsules at a gathering, leaving the drugs accessible for others to ingest.

A guest consumed the drugs and later died from an overdose.

The court found that the accused knowingly made the drugs available and failed to prevent their consumption despite knowledge of the deceased’s substance abuse history.

These circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt as aggravating factors to be considered at sentencing.

The appellant and respondent owned adjacent bush lots.

A dispute arose over the boundary line, with the appellant relying on an old fence and the respondent relying on a recent survey.

The Director of Titles determined that the fence was the best evidence of the original boundary.

The Divisional Court reversed this decision.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the Director's decision, finding that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness and that the Director reasonably applied the surveyors' hierarchy of evidence to conclude the fence marked the boundary.