Murdoch John Carter

Mother sought primary residence and final decision-making responsibility for a child enrolled by the father in school in Elliot Lake pursuant to his existing final decision-making authority.

The court found the father acted within the scope of the existing order, having consulted the mother multiple times over a year before enrollment, while the mother was evasive in addressing the schooling issue and failed to pursue mediation or timely court intervention.

The mother's subsequent unilateral actions regarding medical contacts and vaccinations further undermined co-parenting.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence, maintained the father's final decision-making authority with modifications, and structured parenting-time to maximize the mother's contact including weekends, holidays, and virtual access.

This endorsement addresses the temporary care and custody of a First Nation child, Z.O., who was removed from M.O.'s care and subsequently placed with his biological father, J.K. The court considered the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) and the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis children, youth and families.

The court emphasized the priority of placement with a biological parent under the federal legislation, finding that Z.O.'s best interests were met by remaining with J.K., given no protection concerns and J.K.'s ability to provide cultural connection.

The "without prejudice" term of a previous interim order placing the child with J.K. was removed.

The applicant, a bare trustee, sought an order for the partition and sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The respondent, the beneficial owner, opposed the sale, arguing that the applicant had no independent power to compel sale under their bare trust agreement and that a sale would be unfair given her ongoing efforts to resolve matrimonial issues and retain the home.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant, as a bare trustee, lacked the authority to compel partition or sale, and even if she had such a right, it would be oppressive to order a sale under the circumstances.

This trial decision addresses the sole remaining issue of parenting time for the respondent mother with the child.

The applicant father sought to maintain the existing arrangement where the mother's parenting time occurred during the maternal great-grandparents' court-ordered contact.

The respondent mother sought to expand her parenting time by having the maternal grandmother granted specified contact, allowing the mother to exercise parenting time during that period.

The court found that previous orders granting contact to the maternal great-grandparents were inappropriate as they were not parties to the proceeding and had not filed the necessary affidavit.

The court declined to order specific contact for the maternal grandmother for similar reasons.

The final order maintained the mother's parenting time during the maternal great-grandparents' contact, granting the great-grandparents discretion over who may be present.

The parties, including the maternal great-grandparents, were directed to attend alternative dispute resolution to establish a more permanent long-term parenting time and contact arrangement, with proper notice to the great-grandparents if their contact is to be impacted.

The mother was also prohibited from bringing a motion to change until an outstanding costs order was satisfied and was ordered not to consume alcohol or non-prescription drugs prior to or during parenting time due to past substance misuse.

The Applicant, a paternal grandmother, sought specified contact with her grandchildren.

The Respondent mother sought contact at her discretion.

The court, applying the Children's Law Reform Act, found that while the grandmother had a right to a relationship with the children, her request for specified weekend contact was more akin to a parent's parenting time.

Given the father's unstable lifestyle and the mother's demonstrated willingness to facilitate contact, the court ordered contact for the grandmother at the mother's discretion, primarily during the father's parenting time, with a provision for mediation if contact ceases for an extended period.

The Father applied for the child to reside with him in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario, while the Mother sought to relocate with the child to Schaumburg, Illinois, and have decision-making authority.

The court, applying the amended Divorce Act, found it in the child's best interests to reside permanently with the Mother in Schaumburg, granting her exclusive decision-making authority.

The Father was granted a robust parenting schedule to maintain contact.

The court emphasized the Mother's primary caregiver role and attentiveness versus the Father's relative detachment, while also acknowledging the importance of the child's relationship with his half-sibling.

This appeal concerned the determination of a child's Indigenous background under section 90 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motions judge had found the child to be a First Nations person based on the father's self-identification and his maternal grandfather's identification.

The appellant, Batchewana First Nation, argued that this evidence was insufficient and that a simple statement of self-identification could not establish band affiliation for the purposes of the Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the motions judge erred in law by relying solely on self-identification without a sufficient evidentiary foundation connecting the child to the community, and made a palpable and overriding error by overstating the evidence regarding the lack of contradiction.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add the paternal grandparents as party respondents in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grandparents had been caring for the two children for seventeen months under a child protection order.

The father consented to adding the grandparents as parties and sought a deemed custody order in their favour.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grandparents had sufficient participatory rights under the statute without requiring party status.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to determine whether a child born in 2018 is a First Nations child and, if so, whether the child identifies with the Batchewana First Nation.

The motion also sought orders to add the Batchewana First Nation as a party respondent and to transfer conduct of the proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services.

The court found that the child is a First Nations child based on the father's self-identification as an Aboriginal person with Batchewana First Nation heritage and his maternal grandfather's Aboriginal ancestry.

The court granted the motion, adding Batchewana First Nation as a respondent party and substituting Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services as the applicant.

This is a child protection motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act involving four children and two separate applications.

Application No. 1 concerns three non-Indigenous boys (G., P., and C.) with parents A.W. and M.P. who had a joint custody order.

Application No. 2 concerns an infant (B.) with mother A.W. and father J.S., a member of Batchewana First Nation.

The society sought temporary care and custody of all children.

The court found reasonable grounds for risk of harm based on domestic violence, excessive alcohol consumption, and failure to comply with safety agreements involving J.S. However, the court declined to grant full temporary care and custody to the father for the three boys, instead maintaining the existing joint custody arrangement with conditions on the mother's care.

For the infant B., the court placed her with her maternal grandmother pending consent, with supervised paternal access for J.S.

The applicant sought an interim and final order to terminate spousal support due to retirement and reduced income.

The respondent conceded a reduction but opposed termination, proposing a higher interim amount.

The court found the applicant's retirement reasonable and a material change in circumstances, warranting a variation.

Applying the "double dipping" principle from *Boston v. Boston* to calculate the applicant's income and considering the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court ordered interim spousal support of $600 per month, effective May 1, 2017, to terminate on December 31, 2018, when the respondent would be eligible for Old Age Security benefits.

The applicant's contribution to the respondent's health care plan was also adjusted.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion was dismissed because Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction over the children in question.

The court found that while two of the children had First Nations heritage through their father, the other two children and their mother did not qualify under any paragraph of Nogdawindamin's ministerial designation.

Additionally, Nogdawindamin was prohibited from exercising certain functions under conditions imposed by the Minister that had not yet been lifted.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved two children whose father was a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by conditions in that designation, and the statutory framework governing native societies under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction over the children as members of the father's First Nation band and granted the transfer motion, while also addressing broader issues regarding the interpretation of ministerial designations and the court's role in adjudicating society jurisdiction in child protection proceedings.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.

The mother brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge on grounds of perceived bias.

The judge had previously presided over a summary judgment motion where she determined the children were in need of protection and could not be placed in the mother's full-time care and custody.

The mother argued that the judge's prior findings and exposure to inadmissible evidence would cloud her judgment on the remaining issue of access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no cogent evidence of actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge emphasized that findings regarding full-time parenting capacity were distinct from determinations regarding access rights.

The applicant father sought joint custody and unsupervised access to his child born in 2005.

The respondent mother opposed the claim and sought sole custody.

Following allegations of sexual abuse made by the child in August 2010 (which were not substantiated by police or Children's Aid Society), the mother sought to restrict access to supervised visits.

The court found that the allegations did not meet the threshold of reliability and that the father's credibility was compromised by inconsistent contact with the child, minimization of serious family issues, and involvement with the Children's Aid Society regarding physical discipline concerns.

The court ordered continued supervised access rather than the unsupervised access sought by the father.

A support payor sought an order requiring the Director of the Family Responsibility Office to refrain from suspending his driver's licence due to arrears of support.

The payor had received a First Notice of Intention to Suspend Driver's Licence and had commenced a Motion to Change the underlying support order.

The Director opposed the refraining order on four grounds: res judicata, prior dismissal of a variation claim, lack of evidence regarding need for a licence, and failure to demonstrate clean hands and a prima facie case for variation.

The court granted the refraining order, finding that the prior variation claim was not res judicata as it was based on different grounds, that the payor's need for a licence was not a statutory criterion, that the payor had clean hands, and that he had established a prima facie case for variation based on alleged loss of employment and changed circumstances.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that four children were in need of protection and that their mother was not an appropriate caregiver.

The mother had an extensive history with the Society spanning decades, including her own childhood as a Crown Ward, and demonstrated persistent inability to provide adequate supervision, maintain stable housing, manage substance abuse and mental health issues, and exercise appropriate parenting judgment.

The court found that the children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and that the mother could not be placed in full-time care of the children, though supervised access would continue.

In a high-conflict custody and access dispute involving three children (Dakota, 16; Nathan, 15; and Madison, 9), the court addressed two competing motions.

The mother sought to maintain interim custody of Madison with supervised access by the father through family members.

The father sought a shared parenting schedule with equal time-sharing.

The court found that the boys, being older, should have their residence determined by their own wishes.

For Madison, the court terminated the family-supervised access arrangement and ordered that paternal access be supervised through a professional supervised access facility, finding that family supervision had been inadequate.

The court invited the Office of the Children's Lawyer to become involved and indicated willingness to reconsider the arrangement if family supervisors could provide proper assurances of their understanding of the supervisory role.

The applicant spouse brought an interim motion seeking child support for an adult child attending college, interim spousal support, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent sought an order for the sale of the matrimonial home and livestock located on the property.

The court determined the respondent’s income by averaging several years of earnings due to fluctuating overtime and ordered guideline child support for the summer months while the adult child resided with the applicant, with the issue to be reviewed pending further information regarding educational expenses.

Interim spousal support was ordered based on the parties’ financial circumstances and the applicant’s unemployment, with the court declining to impute income at the interim stage.

The respondent’s motion for sale of the home and livestock was adjourned pending proper valuations to permit accurate net family property calculations.