Lindsay D. Marshall

The respondent T.A. brought a motion seeking re-introduction and virtual parenting time with the child K.A., whom he had not had contact with for nearly 10 years and who was unaware he was her biological father.

The child's mother, E.L., opposed the motion, citing K.A.'s lack of awareness of T.A.'s paternity and the serious criminal charges T.A. faced involving K.A.'s older siblings.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test under the Children's Law Reform Act, dismissed T.A.'s motion for immediate re-introductory parenting time.

Instead, the court ordered that K.A. be informed of T.A.'s biological fatherhood by her mental health worker with the mother's support, emphasizing a cautious approach due to the child's age, lack of prior relationship, and the criminal charges.

T.A. was granted leave to bring a new motion for parenting time after a period of counselling for K.A. and an update on her progress.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple charges including possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, crystal methamphetamine, and fentanyl, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue at sentencing was whether a term of imprisonment should be served in custody or in the community as a conditional sentence.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including general deterrence, denunciation, proportionality, and the unique circumstances of the Indigenous offender as per Gladue principles, acknowledging a history of intergenerational trauma, abuse, and addiction.

Despite significant rehabilitative efforts by the offender, the court emphasized the serious public safety concerns posed by fentanyl trafficking in the community.

The court concluded that denunciation and deterrence were paramount, necessitating a period of incarceration exceeding two years.

A global sentence of three years imprisonment was imposed, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items, while waiving the victim fine surcharge.

This motion concerned a Hague Convention application brought by the mother for the return of the child to Costa Rica.

The father opposed, arguing the child's habitual residence was Canada or that the parties had agreed to the child residing with him.

The court found both parents engaged in discreditable conduct, discounting their affidavit evidence.

Based on objective evidence, the court determined the child's habitual residence was Costa Rica at the time of travel to Canada and that no agreement to change residence existed.

The child was ordered to be returned to Costa Rica forthwith.

No costs were awarded due to both parties' unreasonable conduct.

In a status review trial under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought to admit affidavits from a prior child protection proceeding as exhibits.

The respondent mother opposed this, citing hearsay and lack of cross-examination opportunity.

The court ruled against formally admitting the affidavits as exhibits, stating it would be tantamount to re-litigating a judicially decided matter.

However, the court affirmed its inherent authority and mandate to access and consider the entire prior child protection file to determine the continuing need for protection, especially in the absence of specific findings of fact from the original protection order.

The accused sought release from custody under s. 525 of the Criminal Code, having been detained on serious drug and firearm charges.

He presented a new release plan with multiple sureties, electronic monitoring, and medical evidence of hypertension, which heightened his risk from COVID-19.

The court considered the new plan and the COVID-19 risk but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that the accused's continued detention was necessary on secondary grounds due to a substantial likelihood of re-offending, particularly given his alleged breaches of prior release conditions and continued involvement in the drug trade.

Stephen Ward brought an application for detention review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention by a Justice of the Peace on tertiary grounds.

The application raised three issues: whether the Crown needed leave to cross-examine a surety, whether the Justice of the Peace adequately balanced tertiary ground factors, and the failure to explicitly mention the lack of trial dates due to COVID-19.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding no error in the Justice of the Peace's decision not to require leave for cross-examination of a surety, and that the tertiary ground analysis was functionally sound despite a minor misstatement.

The judge also found no error in the omission regarding trial dates, noting the fluid nature of the pandemic's impact on court operations.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

The respondent M.R. brought a motion to transfer a family law proceeding from Sault Ste.

Marie to Thunder Bay, arguing that the child's ordinary residence had changed to Marathon (near Thunder Bay) following the child's removal from the applicant's care in October 2018.

The applicant C.B., the paternal grandmother, opposed the transfer.

The court found that the child's ordinary residence remained in Sault Ste.

Marie where the child had been residing with C.B. since June 2018 pursuant to a customary care arrangement.

The court held that a unilateral removal of a child by a parent does not change the child's ordinary residence without consent or acquiescence of the person who had established that residence.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

This is a child protection matter involving a motion to strike evidence filed by the respondent father in a summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society.

The society sought deemed custody to the mother and restricted access to the father of two children, ages 7 and 6.

The father moved to strike affidavit material and documentary evidence that he contended would not be admissible at trial, relying on guidance from the Kawartha decision.

The court addressed procedural issues including late-filed motions, the scope of the motion to strike, and the proper application of evidentiary rules on summary judgment motions in child protection cases.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add the paternal grandparents as party respondents in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grandparents had been caring for the two children for seventeen months under a child protection order.

The father consented to adding the grandparents as parties and sought a deemed custody order in their favour.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grandparents had sufficient participatory rights under the statute without requiring party status.

This decision addresses a motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The case involves a non-Indian child (C.C.2) whose mother is a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains complex geographical and personal jurisdictional criteria, including conditions restricting certain services pending consultation with other communities.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS has jurisdiction to provide services on First Nation reserves under paragraph 1 of its designation, as the bulk of child protection services were being provided on a reserve.

The transfer was granted, though the court expressed concerns about the superficial evidence presented and the lack of information from respondents.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of child protection proceedings to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved two children whose father was a registered member of a First Nation band.

The court examined the ministerial designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, the jurisdictional limitations imposed by conditions in that designation, and the statutory framework governing native societies under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court determined that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction over the children as members of the father's First Nation band and granted the transfer motion, while also addressing broader issues regarding the interpretation of ministerial designations and the court's role in adjudicating society jurisdiction in child protection proceedings.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.