Kristy Ann Maurina

An application to vary a Texas divorce decree recognized in Ontario under section 41 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant father sought to impose a geographical restriction on the respondent mother's ability to relocate with the children outside the Region of Peel, Ontario, and sought child support.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the mother's pattern of conduct including misrepresentation of her address, interference with parenting time, false allegations to police and child protective services, and coaching of children.

The court imposed a geographical restriction, ordered child support, and found the mother in breach of the order, awarding costs.

A costs decision in a family law matter concerning decision-making responsibility for a child.

The parties initially reached a mediated agreement in December 2021, which was rejected by the court due to concerns regarding family violence.

Following an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation and trial commencement, the parties reached a consent agreement on the third day of trial providing for joint decision-making responsibility with consultation requirements and dispute resolution mechanisms.

The respondent sought costs as the successful party, while the applicant opposed costs on grounds of financial hardship and the extraordinary circumstances.

The court declined to award costs, finding that the unusual circumstances, including the court's rejection of the initial consent agreement and the OCL's strong support for the applicant's position, compelled the applicant to proceed with litigation, and that awarding costs would be contrary to the child's best interests.

This Ontario Court of Justice decision addresses a retroactive child support claim involving three children, focusing on the appropriate start date for support, the imputation of income to the father, and the payment of arrears.

The court applied the framework from Colucci v. Colucci for retroactive support, determining the presumptive start date as February 1, 2021, based on effective notice of dissatisfaction with support.

The father’s income was imputed at minimum wage levels due to lack of medical evidence supporting his claimed inability to work full-time.

The court fixed arrears at $30,000 and ordered a payment plan balancing the father’s financial limitations and the children’s needs.

The mother’s claim for section 7 expenses was denied due to procedural and evidentiary deficiencies.

The Father applied under The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the parties' child, Miraya Devi Chawla, to Champaign, Illinois, alleging wrongful retention by the Mother in Ontario.

The Mother argued that Ontario was the child's habitual residence or, alternatively, that returning the child to Illinois would pose a grave risk of harm due to alleged domestic violence and her uncertain immigration status.

The court found that Miraya's habitual residence was Champaign, Illinois, and that she was wrongfully retained.

The court also found that the Mother did not meet the high threshold for the Article 13(b) exception regarding grave risk of harm, especially with the Father's undertakings to mitigate risks.

The application for the child's return was granted.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a 9-day trial concerning contact between a child and the maternal family.

The applicants, the maternal aunt, uncle, and grandmother, sought full recovery of costs based on their success at trial and the respondents' unreasonable and alleged bad faith approach.

The respondents, the child's father and paternal grandparents, sought no costs, claiming divided success.

The court found the applicants were the clearly successful parties, having obtained an order for regular in-person and unsupervised contact that met or exceeded their settlement offer.

While the respondents' conduct in limiting contact was deemed unreasonable, the court did not find it constituted bad faith.

The court declined to award costs for prior steps in the litigation, citing the presumption against such awards unless specifically reserved.

Ultimately, the court awarded partial recovery of costs to the applicants.

This is a supplementary judgment addressing outstanding issues from an appeal of family arbitration awards concerning property, spousal support, and costs.

The court recalculated the lump sum spousal support, reducing it from $227,185.00 to $170,816.00, based on revised asset bases due to a successful equalization payment appeal and correction of a calculation error regarding the retirement age/duration.

The arbitrator's costs award, which ordered the wife to pay the husband $67,500.00, was set aside, with the court finding divided success and an erroneous approach to assessing reasonableness based on settlement offers.

No costs were awarded for the arbitration or the appeal.

The applicant father brought a motion under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the return of the child to France, alleging wrongful removal by the respondent mother.

The mother argued the child was habitually resident in Canada and that returning the child to France posed a grave risk of harm.

The court found that the child was habitually resident in France immediately prior to the removal and that the mother's evidence did not meet the high threshold for the grave risk exception under Article 13(b).

The court ordered the child's forthwith return to France.

This motion concerned a Hague Convention application brought by the mother for the return of the child to Costa Rica.

The father opposed, arguing the child's habitual residence was Canada or that the parties had agreed to the child residing with him.

The court found both parents engaged in discreditable conduct, discounting their affidavit evidence.

Based on objective evidence, the court determined the child's habitual residence was Costa Rica at the time of travel to Canada and that no agreement to change residence existed.

The child was ordered to be returned to Costa Rica forthwith.

No costs were awarded due to both parties' unreasonable conduct.

The applicant father sought to re-open an already decided appeal based on new text message evidence from the respondent mother, which he argued undermined her previous narrative regarding their child's residency in Dubai.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application, reiterating that re-opening an appeal is a rare event reserved for cases of "very serious injustice." The court found the new evidence irrelevant to its original decision, which focused on the need to respect a U.K. Consent Custody Order and for the father to pursue the matter in the U.K. first, rather than making credibility findings.

Costs were awarded against the father.

The father brought an application under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) seeking the return of their child to Dubai, claiming wrongful retention in Ontario.

The application judge ordered the child's return to Dubai, erroneously applying the Hague Convention framework despite the UAE not being a signatory.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error, as s. 40 CLRA is distinct from the Hague Convention, particularly regarding the concept of "habitual residence" and the court's broad discretionary powers.

The appeal was allowed, the lower order set aside, and the father's application stayed on condition he commence proceedings in the UK, where a prior consent custody order existed.

On appeal from trial judge Sutherland's orders regarding spousal support and property division in a separation agreement dispute.

The trial judge found no basis to set aside the separation agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act but applied the Miglin test under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act to award modest lump sum spousal support of $143,933 despite a spousal support waiver in the agreement.

The trial judge concluded the waiver did not substantially comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The father appealed seeking to set aside the property provisions; the mother cross-appealed seeking to uphold the agreement in its entirety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's application of the law to the facts.

The applicant, Scott Henderson, brought a motion seeking a temporary order to fix monthly arrears payments at $3907.10 USD, pending the adjudication of his motion to vary a 2009 final support order.

The respondent, Suzanne Henderson, opposed the motion, arguing it was premature and that Arizona authorities had jurisdiction over arrears enforcement.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding it improper as it sought to amend a final order without a live Motion to Change, and premature as there was no active application to vary the original order.

The court clarified that the proper remedy was a Motion to Change and noted that Arizona authorities, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, were empowered to set the monthly amount to be deducted for arrears.

This case involved two motions within a Hague Convention application concerning the wrongful removal of four children from the Netherlands to Canada by the respondent mother.

The applicant father sought the children's return and parenting time, while the respondent sought an order for the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to investigate.

The court dismissed the respondent's OCL motion, emphasizing the Hague Convention's principle of prompt return and the inappropriateness of using an OCL investigation to delay proceedings or ascertain children's views in this context.

The court found that wrongful removal was established based on a Dutch court order confirming joint parental authority and habitual residence in the Netherlands, and the respondent's misrepresentation of her intent to return.

The applicant's motion for parenting time was granted, establishing a schedule for video calls.

Costs were awarded to the applicant, with payment deferred to the judge hearing the main application.

The father appealed a lower court's order that Ontario lacked jurisdiction over their child, Julia, and ordered her return to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) following the father's unilateral removal of Julia from the UAE.

The father sought a stay of this order pending appeal, arguing serious harm to Julia if returned.

The mother opposed the stay and sought security for costs of the appeal.

The court dismissed the father's motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored Julia's return to her habitual residence in the UAE.

The court also dismissed the mother's motion for security for costs, despite finding the appeal lacked merit, due to the serious nature of the issues involving the child's best interests.

In this family law appeal, the father sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal from a trial judgment concerning custody, access, equalization, and child support.

The mother sought security for costs for both the appeal and unsecured trial costs.

The court granted the father's motion for an extension of time and dismissed the mother's motion for security for costs, finding that neither criterion under Rule 61.06(1)(a) was satisfied.

The father was awarded costs of $1,000 for the extension motion and $2,000 for the security for costs motion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Children's Law Reform Act seeking a declaration that his daughter was habitually resident in Israel and was wrongfully retained in Canada by the respondent.

The application judge found that the parties had mutually agreed to change their habitual residence from Israel to Ontario while visiting Toronto, and that the appellant had subsequently consented to or acquiesced in Ontario as the daughter's habitual residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings as factual determinations entitled to considerable deference, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

A solicitor appealed a motion judge's order regarding the assessment of legal accounts rendered to a client.

The solicitor challenged the characterization of 37 of 38 accounts as interim accounts falling within the limitation period for assessment, and sought production of the client's communications with another lawyer and tax documents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, finding no error in characterizing the accounts as interim based on the retainer agreement, account markings, and transmittal letters.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision to refuse production of the requested documents as irrelevant to the assessment issues.

The applicant father sought the return of his daughter, Naomi Rachelle Unger, to Tiveria, Israel, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The family had travelled from Israel to Toronto for a vacation, after which the mother and child remained in Toronto.

The father argued that Israel remained the child's habitual residence and that the mother was wrongfully retaining her.

The mother contended that the parties had mutually agreed to change the child's habitual residence to Ontario, or alternatively, that the father had consented or acquiesced to her remaining in Ontario with the child.

The court found that the parties had a shared, settled intention to reside indefinitely in Ontario, thereby changing the child's habitual residence from Israel to Ontario.

Consequently, the Hague Convention did not apply.

Even if Israel were deemed the habitual residence, the court found that the father had unequivocally consented and/or acquiesced to the child remaining in Ontario.

The application for the child's return was dismissed.

The endorsement addresses the jurisdictional question of whether a Trial Management Conference (TMC) judge has the authority under the Family Law Rules to direct the sequence in which parties lead evidence at trial.

The Applicant argued for the Respondent to lead evidence first, while the Respondent contended the Applicant should lead in the ordinary course.

The court found that a TMC judge does possess such jurisdiction, citing Rules 1(7.2), 2, and 17(6) of the Family Law Rules, and the Supreme Court's direction in Hyrniak v. Mauldin to expand judges' roles in crafting trial procedures.

The court then requested further submissions on whether to exercise this jurisdiction in the present case.

Following dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal an interim arbitration award in a family law matter, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful party sought full recovery costs or, alternatively, substantial indemnity costs, while the unsuccessful party argued for a reduced amount and sought a set-off due to partial success on the applicable legal test for leave to appeal.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court found the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs but reduced the award due to the other party’s success on the legal test issue and duplication of counsel work.

The court also considered the absence of settlement offers, the reasonableness of counsel’s rates, and duplication arising from multiple counsel attending the motion.

Costs were fixed in a reduced lump sum as fair and reasonable in the circumstances.