Steven Myles Bookman

The plaintiff, CLC Tree Services Ltd., brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery, alleging that the City of London granted preferential treatment in awarding arboricultural and vegetation management contracts to Davey Tree Expert Co. of Canada, Limited to the exclusion of CLC.

The defendant, the City of London, brought a cross-motion seeking answers to undertakings and refusals from CLC's examination, arguing that CLC's allegations were based on rumours and unnamed sources and that the scope of the claim needed to be defined.

The court addressed numerous undertakings and refusals, emphasizing the importance of parties working collaboratively to resolve discovery disputes and the broad scope of oral discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted many of CLC's requests for disclosure while also ordering CLC to provide greater particularity regarding its damages claims and the factual basis for its allegations.

The court granted an application under the Hague Convention for the return of a child wrongfully removed from Michigan to Ontario by her mother.

The judge found that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to removal, rejecting the argument that the child’s ties to her primary caregiver in Ontario were determinative.

The court also found that the mother had not established a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation if the child were returned, and ordered the child’s return to Michigan with undertakings to protect the mother and child’s interests pending further proceedings in Michigan.

This decision concerns an appeal from a family arbitration award regarding the proper method for valuing a foreign property (in Egypt) for equalization purposes under Ontario’s Family Law Act.

The applicant (wife) argued for alternative exchange rate methodologies to avoid a "phantom loss" due to currency devaluation, while the respondent (husband) and the arbitrator applied the statutory approach of using the exchange rates at the date of marriage and the valuation date.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator’s approach correct and consistent with the legislative scheme, and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his application for a certificate of appointment as estate trustee with a will.

The application judge had refused the appointment due to concerns about the appellant's potential unlicensed practice of law, given his professional history and involvement in the will's preparation and subsequent rapid steps to secure his appointment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, confirming the Superior Court's inherent jurisdiction to refuse an estate trustee appointment, even if unopposed, to uphold public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Court also dismissed a motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding it could have been adduced earlier.

This motion concerned the interpretation and enforcement of a Separation Agreement, specifically its security provisions for spousal support, following the Respondent's terminal cancer diagnosis and alleged asset depletion.

The Applicant sought to prevent the Respondent from undermining her beneficial interest in his estate by transferring assets to their son.

The court found the Respondent breached the agreement by terminating a family trust and adding their son as a joint account holder to other accounts with the improper purpose of removing assets from the estate.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation and good faith, the court ordered damages for the trust breach as a first charge on the estate and enjoined the Respondent from further improperly depleting the large investment account or transferring assets to their son by survivorship or gift, while allowing for legitimate personal and medical expenses.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his Hague Convention application seeking the return of his 3.5-year-old daughter from Toronto to Florida, arguing the application judge erred in determining the child's habitual residence.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's finding that the child's habitual residence was Toronto, concluding there was no wrongful removal or retention, regardless of the specific date chosen for determination.

The court also dismissed the father's arguments regarding the application judge's alleged overemphasis on parental intention, inadequate reasons, and allowing the mother to participate without filing an Answer.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This motion concerned the interpretation of "spouse" under section 29 of the Family Law Act, specifically the phrase "are the parents of a child." The applicant, Mr. Elkind, sought a declaration that he and the respondent, Ms. Addeo, were not spouses, arguing their child's death before separation negated spousal status.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the phrase means two people who have a child together while cohabiting in a relationship of some permanence are spouses, regardless of whether the child is alive at the date of separation.

The decision emphasized that economic consequences and mutual commitment arising from the decision to have a child persist even if the child does not survive.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The appellant sought the return of four children to Germany, arguing they were habitually resident there.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing the children were habitually resident in Ontario.

The application judge found the children were habitually resident in Ontario and dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming the application of the hybrid model for determining habitual residence established in Office of the Children's Lawyer v. Balev.

The court rejected all grounds of appeal, including allegations of inadequate reasons, misapplication of the hybrid model, factual errors, and procedural errors regarding the involvement of the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The applicant mother sought an order granting the Ontario Court of Justice jurisdiction to decide matters of custody, access, and child support regarding their four-year-old son, and requested a stay of the access provisions of a German court order.

The respondent father sought a declaration that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction and that the German court was the appropriate forum.

The court determined that Ontario had jurisdiction because the child was habitually resident in Ontario pursuant to a consent order from the German court.

The court recognized the German order as valid and enforceable in Ontario but granted the mother leave to amend her application to seek supersession of the order based on material change in circumstances.

This appeal addressed habitual residence under Article 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after a parent retained children in Canada beyond a time-limited consent period.

The Court adopted a hybrid, multi-factor approach that evaluates all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to parental intent and the child's links to each state.

The Court also endorsed a non-technical approach to Article 13(2), requiring proof of sufficient maturity and a genuine objection before discretion is exercised.

Although the matter was moot, the appeal was resolved to clarify national law and emphasize expeditious handling of return proceedings.

This case involved two motions within a Hague Convention application concerning the wrongful removal of four children from the Netherlands to Canada by the respondent mother.

The applicant father sought the children's return and parenting time, while the respondent sought an order for the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to investigate.

The court dismissed the respondent's OCL motion, emphasizing the Hague Convention's principle of prompt return and the inappropriateness of using an OCL investigation to delay proceedings or ascertain children's views in this context.

The court found that wrongful removal was established based on a Dutch court order confirming joint parental authority and habitual residence in the Netherlands, and the respondent's misrepresentation of her intent to return.

The applicant's motion for parenting time was granted, establishing a schedule for video calls.

Costs were awarded to the applicant, with payment deferred to the judge hearing the main application.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by Bielby J., which directed her to pay $10,221.40 to the respondent following a motion addressing access issues.

The applicant argued that the motions judge erred in assessing her offer to settle, misapplied legal principles, and made a disproportionate costs award.

Applying the two-part test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure (applicable via Family Law Rules), the court found no conflicting decisions on matters of principle and no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs order.

It noted that costs awards are discretionary and should only be set aside for errors in principle or if plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The respondent father moved for an interim order to expand access to his two-year-old son and to change the access exchange location.

The applicant mother opposed the expanded access and sought an order for the respondent to contribute to their 17-year-old son's hockey registration fees.

The court dismissed the father's request for expanded access, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant varying the existing consent order.

However, the court granted the father's request to change the exchange location to the parties' respective residences.

The court also ordered the father to contribute $1,000 to the hockey registration fees.

Decision determining costs following competing family law motions involving issues related to the matrimonial home and financial responsibilities.

Both parties claimed substantial success and relied on offers to settle under the Family Law Rules.

The court found success was divided and neither party acted unreasonably.

Considering the factors under Rule 24 and the timing and content of the parties’ settlement offers, the court concluded that neither party was clearly entitled to full costs, though the respondent should make a modest contribution to the applicant’s costs.

In a family law proceeding following separation, the applicant obtained an ex parte certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against a property purchased by the respondent after separation.

The respondent argued that the CPL should be discharged because the applicant had not asserted a direct legal or equitable interest in the property.

The court considered whether claims for equalization of net family property, a vesting order under s. 9(1)(d), and preservation orders under s. 12 of the Family Law Act were sufficient to bring an interest in land into question.

Relying on Nash v. Gilbert, the court held that such claims can ground a CPL because they place an interest in land in issue within the statutory scheme of equalization and preservation of assets.

Although the CPL was discharged by consent to permit the closing of a sale to third-party purchasers, the court ordered that the entire net proceeds of sale be held in trust pending further order.

This endorsement determined costs arising from a security-for-costs motion and a related motion concerning transfer of an interest and continuation of the proceeding.

The court found the defendants had considerable but not complete success on the security-for-costs issue, and reduced the amount sought to account for partial success and duplication in senior-lawyer time.

For the continuation issue, the court ordered each side to bear its own costs.

Overall, the court fixed a single fair and reasonable costs award payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.