Pruitt v. Pruitt, 2025 ONSC 3405

Court File No.: FC-25-00491-H000
Date: 2025-06-16
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
Tony Alan Pruitt (Applicant)
– and –
Sophie Aline Pruitt (Respondent)

Appearances:
Steven Bookman and Gillian Bookman, for the Applicant
Michael Stangarone and Tiffany Guo, for the Respondent

Heard: June 5-6, 2025

Amended Application Pursuant to the Hague Convention
The text of the original application was amended on June 16, 2025 and the description of the amendment is appended.

McVey J.

Introduction

[1] This is an application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 25 October 1980, Can. T.S. 1983 No. 35. The Applicant father, who lives in Michigan, United States, seeks the return of his nearly three-year-old daughter from Ottawa, Ontario. He argues that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to her wrongful removal to Canada.

[2] The Respondent mother opposes the return, asserting that the child’s habitual residence at the time of removal was Ontario, and that Ontario therefore has jurisdiction over parenting matters concerning the child. Alternatively, she claims that returning the child to Michigan would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation, as contemplated by Article 13(b) of the Convention.

[3] For reasons given below, the Application is granted.

Background

[4] Before their marriage, the Applicant lived in Michigan, and the Respondent lived in Ottawa. They met while on vacation in Mexico and maintained a long-distance relationship before marrying on September 3, 2021, in Michigan. At that time, the Respondent was living in Michigan on a student visa while attending Jackson College.

[5] In November 2021, the Respondent left Michigan and returned to Ontario because she was unhappy in the marriage. She was pregnant at the time. The parties reconciled in late December 2021. In January 2022, the Respondent attempted to return to Michigan with the Applicant but was denied entry at the border because her student visa had expired. She immediately applied for permanent resident status so she could live in Michigan with the Applicant.

[6] The parties continued their relationship long-distance for the next two years while waiting for the Respondent’s immigration application to be approved. During this time, the Respondent gave birth to the parties’ child on June 25, 2022, in Ontario because the Respondent was still unable to travel to the United States. The Applicant visited the Respondent and his child in Canada monthly for approximately one week. Additionally, he provided financial support to the Respondent.

[7] The Respondent secured her permanent visa around January 2024, and she and the child promptly moved to Michigan. In March 2024, the Respondent began working full-time in Michigan as a dental hygienist. During the two to four weeks it took to arrange daycare, the Applicant took care of the child during the workday. In May 2024, the Respondent left her full-time job and began working part-time.

[8] In July 2024, the Respondent took the child to Ontario without informing the Applicant in advance, again due to her unhappiness in the marriage and what she alleges was the Applicant’s abusive conduct. She stayed in Ontario with the child for about six weeks before reconciling with the Applicant and returning to Michigan at the end of August 2024. After returning, the Respondent stayed at home full-time to care for the child.

[9] On November 19, 2024, the Respondent told the Applicant that she and the child were going to the gym. Instead, she traveled to Ontario with the child and never returned to Michigan. For the two to three weeks that followed, she did not communicate with the Applicant. When she eventually contacted him, she refused to disclose the child’s whereabouts, though she did regularly facilitate FaceTime contact between the Applicant and the child.

[10] In early December 2024, the Applicant obtained a temporary Order from the Michigan courts granting him full custody and primary residence of the child pending a full hearing. Since the Applicant did not know where the Respondent was and she had not been in contact with him, his motion was made without notice to her. He subsequently hired a private investigator, who successfully located the Respondent, and the Applicant served her with the court order in late December 2024.

[11] The matter returned before the Michigan courts several times in 2025, and the Respondent was represented by counsel during those proceedings. On May 16, 2025, the Michigan court issued a final Order declaring that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to her removal from the United States.

Issues

[12] This Application requires me to resolve two issues:

1. Was Michigan the habitual residence of the child immediately prior to November 19, 2024?
2. If Michigan was the child’s habitual residence, should I nonetheless decline to order the return of the child because there is a grave risk that doing so would expose her to physical or psychological harm or place her in an intolerable situation?

Habitual Residence

[13] I have no difficulty concluding that Michigan was the habitual residence of the child immediately prior to her removal from the United States on November 19, 2024.

[14] In determining the child’s habitual residence, I must look at the center of her life—her family and social environment immediately before she was removed or retained. This involves considering her connections to and circumstances in Michigan, the nature of her move to Ottawa, and her situation in Ottawa. I must examine all relevant factors, including her nationality, the duration, regularity, and reasons for her stay in Canada, and the circumstances and intentions of her parents: Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680, at para. 40.

[15] The child is at the center of the analysis, and parental intentions are only considered to help understand the child’s ties to a particular country: Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 SCC 16, at paras. 34-44, 51 and 68. There is no rigid formula or single decisive factor in this determination. However, it is important to clarify that while I am to consider the full range of the child’s circumstances leading up to the removal, I am not conducting a best interests analysis. My focus is solely on determining habitual residence; the question of what arrangements and parenting time best serve the child’s interests will be decided by another court.

[16] Before the child was removed in November 2024, her home was undeniably in Michigan. The parties were married there and lived together there as a family with the child since January 2024. The parties had always intended to raise the child in Michigan and had never discussed living elsewhere. The child was enrolled in daycare in Michigan and held dual citizenship, an American social security number, and Michigan photo identification. She also saw her paternal grandmother regularly and spent time with her two half-siblings, in respect of whom the Applicant shares 50:50 custody with his prior partner. By November 2024, the child’s life was firmly rooted in Michigan, where she lived full-time with both parents. Although not determinative within the hybrid approach adopted by the Court in Balev, the parties had a clear, shared intention to raise the child in Michigan.

[17] I recognize that the child spent the first year and a half of her life in Ontario; however, this was due to the Respondent being denied entry at the border in January 2022. Once the Respondent’s green card was approved in January 2024, she and the child moved immediately to Michigan to join the Applicant. In oral submissions, the Respondent’s counsel candidly acknowledged that raising the child in Michigan had always been the parties’ plan.

[18] Upon returning to the United States, the Respondent found full-time work in Michigan, obtained U.S. citizenship for the child, enrolled her in daycare, and updated her vehicle registration to Michigan, solidifying her new home state. The child formed connections with her paternal grandmother, likely with her daycare providers, and certainly with her half-siblings. Notably, as I emphasize throughout my reasons, there was no continuing dispute between the parties about where they intended to raise the child.

[19] After relocating to Michigan, the Respondent and the child maintained significant ties to Ontario. The Respondent’s family and close friends are based in Ontario, and she will always have strong roots here. As for the child, she was born in Ottawa and spent the first 18 months of her life in Ontario, though this was not by choice. During that time, as one would expect, the child was cared for by extended family and close friends at various times, received medical care, participated in activities like playgroups and swimming lessons, and developed bonds with family members. Still, her life after moving to Michigan was similarly rooted in community and family: she formed a close bond with her paternal grandmother and half-siblings, attended daycare, and took swimming lessons.

[20] Despite the parties’ shared intention to raise the child in Michigan and the clear reality that, as of January 2024, the child’s life was established there, the Respondent highlights that for a very young child, the center of their environment is closely tied to the primary caregiver. As observed in Balev, at para. 44, “the environment of a young child is essentially a family environment, determined by the reference person(s) with whom the child lives, by whom the child is in fact looked after and taken care of.” In other words, the focal point of an infant’s environment is driven more by their primary caregiver than by a specific geographical location and surrounding community.

[21] Based on this reasoning, the Respondent argues that, since she was the primary caregiver—a point disputed by the Applicant—the child’s center of life is linked directly to her, rather than the broader community where the child lived before being removed. She contends that, given the child’s young age, the child’s dependence on her mother should drive the analysis of habitual residence. She also stresses that the new framework established in Balev does not bar one parent from unilaterally changing the child’s habitual residence.

[22] The Respondent places significant reliance on the decision in J.M. v. I.L., 2020 NBCA 14. In that case, the parties had one child together. The father lived in Texas, while the mother lived in Canada. The father had no intention of moving to Canada. The parties had agreed that the mother and child would live in Canada during the school year, since the mother worked as a teacher, and return to Texas to live as a family unit during the rest of the year. As planned, the mother left Texas with the child at the end of August 2018, but never returned. The wrongful retention date was deemed to be February 6, 2019.

[23] The application judge considered the child’s social and family environment, focusing, however, on the child’s dependency on his mother, who was found to have borne the greater share of caregiving responsibilities both in Texas and in New Brunswick. The judge ultimately concluded that the child’s habitual residence was in New Brunswick, despite the parties’ shared intention to raise the child together in Texas during part of the year. This conclusion was upheld on appeal.

[24] However, the finding of habitual residence in J.M. cannot be separated from the broader context in which it arose, a point that the Court of Appeal for Ontario has similarly emphasized, as I discuss below. In J.M., the conclusion regarding the child’s habitual residence was not based solely on the mother’s role as the primary caregiver and the idea that the child’s residence was simply “with her.” Instead, in that case, the child lived full-time in New Brunswick during the school year and had clear, ongoing connections in New Brunswick. The father had no caregiving role for the child for at least half of the year, and even when in Texas, the mother carried the primary caregiving burden.

[25] I cannot accept the proposition that, when dealing with an infant, the location of the primary caregiver alone should determine habitual residence, without reference to the child’s home environment immediately prior to their removal. Such an approach, in my view, conflicts with the objectives of the Convention. While I acknowledge that the Respondent’s argument is more nuanced given the child’s ties to Ottawa, the broader concern is that if an infant’s habitual residence is driven almost exclusively by the primary caregiver’s location, it would permit that caregiver to move the child at will, effectively transferring custody issues to another country that may not be best placed to resolve them. This creates significant unfairness for the left-behind parent and is contrary to the aims of the Convention and the child’s best interests.

[26] In Parmar v. Flora, 2022 ONCA 869, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized—albeit implicitly—that habitual residence cannot be determined solely by the location of the primary caregiver. In that case, the father was American, and the mother was Canadian. They married and had a child while each maintained homes in their own countries. The mother did not want to move to Florida, and the father had no intention of moving to Toronto. The child spent substantial time in both countries, including a period when the mother and child were stranded in Florida during the COVID-19 pandemic. Once safe to travel, they returned to Canada with the father’s consent. The father subsequently visited them in Toronto several times. The parents could still not agree on where they would permanently raise the child. The father eventually filed for divorce in December 2021 and sought the child’s return to Florida under the Convention.

[27] The application judge concluded that the child’s habitual residence prior to the alleged wrongful retention was Toronto. This decision was partly driven by the child’s young age and her dependence on her mother, who was clearly her primary caregiver, as well as the child’s ties to Toronto. On appeal, the Court noted that the weight given to the mother’s role as primary caregiver and its impact on the child’s “focal point” could not be separated from the overall context, that being that the parties had no shared intention about where the child would live long-term, and the child had been moving back and forth between Toronto and Florida with both parties’ agreement: Parmar, at paras. 25-26. In other words, the mother’s role as primary caregiver was viewed against the backdrop of considerable uncertainty about the child’s permanent residence.

[28] In my view, the present matter differs from Parmar and J.M. in two important ways. First, in those cases, the mothers were not only the primary caregiver for significant parts of the year, but the sole caregivers to their infant children during much of that time, with the agreement of the other parent. In contrast, while I acknowledge that the Respondent took on the primary childcare role as a stay-at-home parent from September 2024 to November 19, 2024, the Applicant was part of the child’s daily life. The parties and the child lived together full-time. I am satisfied that the Applicant was involved in caring for the child on a consistent basis after January 2024, when the Respondent and the child moved to Michigan to live with him.

[29] In fact, during a two-to-four-week stretch in March 2024, before the child was enrolled in daycare and after the Respondent had started working full-time, the Applicant was the primary caregiver during the day. Moreover, he cared for the child around the clock when the Respondent went on a multi-day trip to Toronto. The Respondent attempts to minimize the Applicant’s involvement by pointing out that he had help from his mother during these times. However, I see no issue with a parent seeking support from a grandparent, especially when that help is readily available. Ironically, this is the very reason the Respondent cites for returning to Ottawa after she left the Applicant: she wanted to raise the child within a supportive family environment. Yet, at the same time, she criticizes the Applicant for relying on that same type of support.

[30] Second, unlike in Parmar and J.M., the parties in this matter did have a clear and consistent shared intention about where they would raise their child. This intention was longstanding and unwavering. The only reason the child spent substantial time in Ottawa in her early months was due to immigration barriers that prevented the family from living together in Michigan. Though I recognize that the reasons for the child remaining in Ontario do not lessen the significance of the connections she formed there, and those connections are certainly relevant to the question of her habitual residence.

[31] In conclusion, I am not deciding the question of habitual residence in a situation where there was uncertainty about where the child was going to live, or where one parent had little or no regular contact with the child for extended periods. Further, I do not accept that, outside of those types of circumstances, J.M. can be read to stand for the broad principle that a primary caregiver can unilaterally determine the habitual residence of an infant child based solely on the child’s dependence on them. That result would run completely counter to the aims of the Convention. Here, I recognize that the child has meaningful connections to Ottawa. However, despite those significant ties, her “home”—in every sense of the word—immediately before her removal was clearly in Michigan.

[32] I reach this conclusion independently of the Michigan chasing order. Counsel for the Respondent and the Applicant made submissions regarding the weight I should give to the chasing order issued in Michigan dated May 2025. Following written submissions and after providing an opportunity for the parties to present evidence, the Michigan court declared in May 2025 that the child’s habitual residence was Michigan. While such chasing orders are not binding, they can support an application made under the Convention based on principles of international comity. Nevertheless, the Respondent argues that the Michigan chasing order should be given little, if any, weight because the Michigan court’s analysis was focused primarily on determining whether Michigan was the child’s “home state” under their domestic law, rather than on habitual residence as defined by the Convention. The Respondent also points out that I do not have access to the written submissions on the issue of habitual residence that were provided to the Michigan court, nor the court’s reasons for its decision.

[33] In the end, I find it unnecessary to resolve this issue, given that I am wholly satisfied on the other evidence before me that Michigan was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to her removal. In these circumstances, my determination of habitual residence is independent of the chasing order.

Grave Risk of Harm

[34] I must determine whether an exception to returning the child to Michigan is warranted because doing so would put her at “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm or place her in an intolerable situation. An “intolerable situation” is one that is extreme and cannot be reasonably endured, as described in Jabbaz v. Mouamman, para. 23. The burden lies with the Respondent to establish that such a risk exists, and she has fallen far short of convincing me that the child should not be returned on these grounds.

[35] The Respondent alleges that her marriage to the Applicant was marked by family violence and coercive control. She claims that the Applicant forced her out of their family home—where he was the sole titleholder—and told her he did not care if she ended up on the streets. She also says he impliedly threatened her life by telling her their relationship would end up on the “Dateline show,” and frequently reminded her that she had no support system in Michigan. According to the Respondent, the Applicant would take her phone without permission to monitor her calls, interrogate her whenever she left the house, belittle and insult her, and shame her for being “emotional.” She further alleges that he falsely reported concerns about her mental health to her parents, forbade her from speaking her native language, took her car keys, and once physically blocked her in a walk-in closet. The Respondent claims the Applicant’s uncontrolled rage and anger created an unsafe and toxic environment in their home. She also asserts that the Applicant is not a fit parent.

[36] I have no hesitation in concluding that there was ongoing conflict in the parties’ relationship. The Respondent left the Applicant in November 2021 while pregnant and returned to Ontario, and again in July 2024, taking the child to Ontario for about six weeks without notifying the Applicant. The evidence also shows that the Respondent shared concerns about problems in the relationship with friends and professionals long before the Applicant began his application under the Convention. However, I wish to be clear: the fact that the Respondent raised allegations of abusive behavior earlier does not on its own make her allegations more credible. Simply repeating allegations does not make them more likely to be true. That said, the Applicant contends that these allegations were invented to support the Respondent’s position under Article 13(b) of the Convention. In that regard, the Respondent’s prior statements to friends, family, and therapists are relevant insofar as they undermine the Applicant’s suggestion that the Respondent’s claims were recently fabricated.

[37] While there were clearly significant issues in the relationship, I find that the Respondent has overstated the Applicant’s alleged abusive behavior and downplayed his parenting abilities. For example, the Respondent claims that the Applicant failed to feed the child properly and allowed her to go hungry. I do not accept this claim. It is inconsistent with the Respondent’s own account that she was the full-time caregiver and solely responsible for the child’s care—if that were the case, it is hard to see how the Applicant would have had any opportunity to let the child go hungry for extended periods. Additionally, there are text messages exchanged between the parties at various points in which the Applicant mentions feeding the child oatmeal and pancakes. Furthermore, the Respondent was willing to leave the child in the Applicant’s care for two to three days while she traveled to Toronto, suggesting that she did not have serious concerns about the child’s well-being under his care. The Respondent also deposed that she was the only parent to take the child to the doctor or put her down to sleep. This, too, was proven inaccurate by text messages sent between the parties.

[38] Second, the Respondent describes the Applicant as controlling her every move and interrogating her whenever she left the house. However, the evidence before me does not support this characterization. The Respondent took a trip to Mexico with the child, and the Applicant did not stop her from going. She also went to Toronto for two to three days, leaving the child in the Applicant’s care. Text messages between the parties during that period show the Applicant being positive and supportive, telling the Respondent he was glad she was having a good time. In one such exchange while the Respondent was out, she asked the Applicant if he needed her to come home; he assured her that he was fine with the child and encouraged her to stay out and enjoy herself.

[39] Additionally, the Respondent had no issue taking the child to a hospital in Canada or leaving for Canada in July 2024 without telling the Applicant. She was also able to leave without difficulty on November 19, 2024, taking the child while telling the Applicant they were simply going to the gym.

[40] Third, the Respondent asserts that the Applicant isolated her within the home and was upset that she took a full-time job. This claim is also contradicted by other evidence. On her first day of full-time work, the Applicant sent her private messages that were encouraging and affectionate, expressing how proud he was of her. He also shared a photo and a supportive message on Facebook. Several months later, when the Respondent texted the Applicant from her part-time job saying she was unhappy, the Applicant fully supported her and said he was in favor of her changing jobs and taking on full-time work if that would make her happier.

[41] Fourth, the Respondent alleges that the Applicant subjected her to financial abuse. However, the evidence shows that the Respondent sold her condo in Quebec shortly before moving to Michigan, securing over $200,000 in equity. She did not co-mingle those funds and had full access to them throughout her relationship with the Applicant. The Respondent also had enough money to travel, with or without telling the Applicant.

[42] Relatedly, the Respondent deposed that the Applicant even refused to pay for the child’s medical bills, forcing the Respondent to cover more than $5,000 in costs related to the child’s care. This claim also proved to be inaccurate. A bill was indeed issued for approximately $5,000, but half of that cost was covered by the Applicant’s insurance and the other half by a funding program. The Respondent did not actually have to pay any of those medical expenses. To be clear, I have no doubt that the parties argued about money—most married couples do. However, I am not convinced that the Applicant was financially abusive.

[43] Fifth, the Respondent argues that the Applicant is an unfit parent and lacks the skills to care for a child properly. However, the Applicant’s ex-partner, with whom he has shared 50:50 custody of his two children for the past eight years, does not share this view. The Applicant has successfully co-parented his younger children on a 50:50 basis for nearly a decade. Aside from one disagreement with his ex-partner—who now acknowledges she overstated the nature of the conflict—they have co-parented successfully without significant issue. There is no evidence before me that the Applicant has failed to properly care for his other children.

[44] As I noted earlier, the record makes clear that the parties argued, with the Applicant likely raising his voice in front of the child. This is far from ideal. But married couples argue, and sometimes these disputes unfold in front of their children. Although far from ideal, it is a reality of family life. I am satisfied that the parties argued about typical matters, such as household responsibilities, workload, and finances—issues that commonly arise when cohabitating couples are juggling the demands of raising young children.

[45] In acknowledging this, I do not intend to dismiss legitimate concerns about non-physical abuse. I fully understand that coercive control is a deeply harmful form of abuse, one that can wear down and break a victim’s sense of autonomy and worth. This form of abuse is real and deserves careful recognition. At the same time, we must be careful not to label typical marital conflicts—however regrettable or stressful—as necessarily “abusive” or “coercive,” because such labels carry significant legal implications in family law.

[46] Ultimately, I need not characterize the parties’ relationship dynamics or determine whether their conflict meets the definition of “family violence” under Ontario law. My sole responsibility is to decide whether returning the child would expose her to a grave risk of harm. Based on the evidence before me, this standard has not been met.

[47] The alleged abuse was not “severe” and given the type of harm described and the fact that the parties will be living apart, it is unlikely to recur. The allegations were not life-threatening, and there is no evidence to suggest that Michigan courts are unable to effectively manage the conflict between the parties, e.g., by imposing limits on communication or specifying modes of contact: see Hassan v. Garib, 2017 ONSC 7227, para. 9; Achakzad v. Zemaryalai, 2010 ONCJ 318, para. 97. It is presumed that the courts in a child’s home jurisdiction can put in place measures to protect the child if they are returned. The burden is on the party who wrongfully removed or retained the child to demonstrate that such protections would be ineffective or infeasible: see Ireland v. Ireland, 2011 ONCA 623, para. 48.

[48] The Applicant does not have a record of breaching court orders, nor is there any claim that he harassed, threatened, or mistreated the Respondent after she left with the child. Since late December 2024, he has known where the Respondent and the child were living. I acknowledge that a pattern of breaching protective orders is not a necessary condition for a court to intervene where there is a risk of repeat violence. However, this is not a situation where either the nature of the allegations or the Applicant’s conduct after the child’s removal gives rise to inherent concerns that he cannot be managed through court orders: see e.g., Pollastro v. Pollastro.

[49] Additionally, the Respondent does not claim that the Applicant physically abused the child. Instead, the Respondent alleges that the Applicant once threw a cellphone in the child’s direction, narrowly missing her head. The Applicant denies that this happened. Even on the Respondent’s own version of events, she does not suggest that the Applicant intended to strike or injure the child with the phone. In fact, the incident was audio recorded, and the Respondent’s reaction on the recording does not suggest that the Applicant was intentionally trying to hurt the child. With that said, the incident between the parties was regrettable and should never have played out in front of the child. But the physical nature of that incident appears isolated, and I note that the Applicant has co-parented his two other children for over eight years without any allegations of physical abuse being raised by their mother.

[50] I will address one additional argument raised by the Respondent concerning risk of harm. She argues that the child will suffer significant harm if separated from her primary caregiver. I have no difficulty accepting this principle. The short- and long-term emotional and psychological harm that can result from separating a young child from their main caregiver is well recognized and understood. However, this concern does not affect my decision because the record before me does not disclose that the child will be separated from the Respondent before the Michigan courts have an opportunity to address the matter.

[51] First, the Applicant has undertaken to immediately suspend the Michigan order that currently grants him full custody and principal residence. Second, the Applicant has undertaken to provide monthly financial support to the Respondent until the issue of support can be fully addressed by the Michigan courts. Third, the Applicant will consent to adjourn the existing June 26, 2025, and September 23, 2025, court dates in Michigan, if needed, so that the Respondent has time to retain counsel. Finally, there is nothing in the evidentiary record to suggest that the Respondent will be prevented by immigration authorities from re-entering the United States. Her green card is valid until January 2026, and I have not been presented with any evidence demonstrating that the Applicant’s divorce filing would immediately and automatically jeopardize the Respondent’s current immigration status. Any longer-term issues the Respondent might face regarding her ability to remain in the United States after January 2026, and the implications for future parenting arrangements, can be addressed by the courts in Michigan.

Order

[52] Alixandra Jacob Pruitt, born June 25, 2022, shall be returned to her habitual residence in the State of Michigan, United States, by no later than June 30, 2025.

[53] The following undertakings shall apply to the Applicant subject to any future court order made in Michigan:

a. The Applicant shall provide monthly support to the Respondent in the amount of $3000 CDN until such time that the matter of support is dealt with by the Michigan courts.

b. The Applicant shall immediately seek to suspend the Michigan order that grants him full custody of the child.

c. The Applicant shall agree to adjourn the June 26, 2025, and September 23, 2025 court dates in Michigan should such an adjournment be sought by the Respondent for the purpose of retaining counsel.

Costs

[54] The Applicant shall deliver his costs submissions by June 20, 2025. The Respondent shall deliver her responding costs submissions by June 27, 2025. Written submission shall be no more than three pages excluding an outline of costs and any case law provided.

McVey J.
Released: June 16, 2025

Appendix

June 16, 2025: Paragraph 49 now reads: Instead, the Respondent alleges that the Applicant once threw a cellphone in the child’s direction, narrowly missing her head.