Geoffrey Paul Belch

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck by a left-turning pickup truck while crossing an intersection at night.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury.

The plaintiff sued the driver, the municipality, and the municipality's electrical contractor, alleging the intersection was in a state of non-repair due to missing streetlights on the median.

The court found the driver 100% liable for failing to ensure the turn could be made safely.

The claims against the municipality and contractor were dismissed, as the intersection had sufficient illumination from other sources and was deemed in a state of repair under the Minimum Maintenance Standards.

Damages of approximately $2 million were awarded against the driver.

This endorsement concerns the costs arising from successful summary judgment motions brought by Eaton Industries (Canada) Company and The Corporation of The City of London against Albert Bloom Limited (ABL).

The motions dismissed ABL's claims as statute-barred.

ABL conceded entitlement to costs but disputed the quantum, alleging duplication and excessiveness, particularly given Eaton's prior cost award in a related third-party motion.

The court found the claimed costs reasonable, noting the significance of the litigation, Eaton's efforts to avoid duplication, and ABL's failure to disclose its own costs for comparison.

The defendants, Eaton and the City of London, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's environmental contamination claims as statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged that historical manufacturing operations on the defendants' former property caused TCE contamination that migrated to the plaintiff's property.

The court found that the plaintiff had actual or objective knowledge of its potential claims against the defendants more than two years before seeking to add them to the action.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the ongoing migration of contaminants constituted a continuing tort or a continuing spill under the Environmental Protection Act.

The motions for summary judgment were granted and the claims against Eaton and the City were dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from the City of Toronto to the City of London.

The plaintiff's action alleged a conspiracy in awarding contracts for forestry operations in the City of London, seeking $31 million in damages.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that all enumerated factors favoured the transfer, as the events, damages, subject-matter, and witnesses were all located in London.

The motion was granted and the action was ordered transferred.

Danforth (London) Ltd. ("Danforth") sued the City of London ("City") for $53 million in damages, alleging negligence and failure to act fairly and in good faith regarding a proposed development and rapid transit (RT) routing.

Danforth's related company had applied for a zoning by-law amendment in 2015, but withdrew it after City staff requested significant street dedications for a then-proposed RT route.

In 2017, the City approved a different RT route that did not require these dedications.

Danforth claimed that an earlier routing decision would have allowed its development to proceed.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing no duty of care was owed in negligence and that Danforth could not complain about the exercise of discretionary power as the application was withdrawn before a council decision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the City's RT routing decisions and the pre-approval process were "core policy" decisions, immune from negligence claims, and that no private law duty of care was owed.

The claim of unfairness or bad faith also failed because no final decision was made by City council, and there was no evidence of bad faith in staff's earlier requests.

The court also noted statutory protection under the Municipal Act, 2001.

Nortel and Nagata appealed a Director's Order requiring work to be done at a contaminated site.

Nortel, under CCAA protection, reached a settlement with the MOECC to pay approximately $3,000,000 to address outstanding environmental issues.

The Tribunal accepted the withdrawal of Nortel's appeal and the revocation of the Director's Order against Nortel, finding the settlement consistent with the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest.

The appellants appealed a Director's Order requiring them to submit a clean-up plan for groundwater contamination.

During ongoing settlement discussions, Freightliner and the City of London requested party status, which was unopposed.

The Tribunal granted party status to both entities for their respective sites and extended the stay of the Director's Order to allow settlement discussions to continue.

The moving party, acting under a s. 38 BIA order in the bankruptcy of a general contractor, moved for a final order that a release executed by the bankrupt's trustee did not bar a claim for damages against the respondent municipality.

The moving party also sought an order nunc pro tunc for leave to amend the bankrupt's statement of defence to add a crossclaim against the municipality.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the action had already been dismissed following a settlement, and a crossclaim could not stand alone under the Construction Lien Act.

Furthermore, the comprehensive release executed by the trustee barred the crossclaim, and the court declined to exercise its discretion under s. 37 of the BIA to reverse the trustee's decision.

In a wrongful dismissal trial involving an employer's just cause defence, the plaintiff moved for directions altering the ordinary order of proof and limiting cross-examination until later stages of the trial.

The court held that departures from the general rule against case splitting are discretionary and reserved for unusual cases where principle and convenience clearly justify modification.

Because the plaintiff had extensive disclosure of the misconduct allegations and the damages issues were intertwined with the just cause defence, the proposed staged procedure risked confusion, inefficiency, and procedural unfairness.

The motion was dismissed and the trial was directed to proceed in the ordinary manner.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for injuries sustained in a slip and fall on an icy, sloped municipal boulevard connecting to a private driveway.

She argued the municipality owed a higher standard of maintenance because pedestrians occasionally cross there, and that the adjacent property owner was an occupier of the boulevard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the municipality's maintenance standard was for vehicles, not pedestrians, and the adjacent owner did not exercise control over the boulevard to qualify as an occupier.

The appellant applied to amend a municipal by-law schedule to permit a second adult entertainment parlour location.

The City refused the application because the proposed location abutted a residential property, contrary to the by-law.

The appellant appealed, alleging bad faith, misinterpretation of 'residence', and procedural unfairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no bad faith, agreeing the abutting property was a residence despite being unoccupied during renovations, and concluding a full hearing would not have changed the outcome.

The complainant, a Black man, alleged that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and colour by the respondent municipality when he attended City Hall to pick up a response to a freedom of information request.

During a dispute over the contents of the information package, a City employee called security, and a security guard subsequently escorted the complainant from the premises.

The Tribunal found that the complainant was loud, aggressive, and banged his fist on the counter during the interaction.

The Tribunal concluded that the decision to call security was based entirely on the complainant's behaviour and that race was not a factor.

The complaint was dismissed.

The complainant requested to add a security officer as a respondent on the first day of the hearing, more than a year after the Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the complainant failed to raise the issue in pleadings or during pre-hearing processes as required by the Rules of Practice.

The complainant provided no acceptable reason for the significant delay, which outweighed any interest in having the issue determined on its merits given the prejudice to the hearing process and the other parties.

The appellants appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision that struck portions of their statement of claim for injurious affection and refused to order the production of certain settlement agreements and reports.

The Divisional Court held that the Board erred in law by requiring an application under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as a condition precedent for production, as the Act does not limit information otherwise available in litigation.

The court upheld the striking of the pleadings due to fundamental flaws but granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of claim to properly plead injurious affection.

The City of London appealed a decision granting the respondents' application to overturn the Chief Building Official's (CBO) refusal to issue unconditional building permits.

The CBO had issued permits conditional on the repair of a defective gabion wall on the property, which was subject to a site plan agreement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the CBO acted outside his statutory authority.

The Court held that site plan approval constitutes 'applicable law' under the Building Code Act, and the CBO lawfully imposed conditions bearing a logical nexus to the property's use and the ongoing maintenance obligations in the site plan agreement.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Divisional Court regarding a matter under the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the reasons of the Divisional Court, and awarded costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant municipality appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its third-party claim for contribution and indemnity against a subdivision developer following a judgment for a homeowner whose basement flooded.

The trial judge found the developer negligent in constructing an asphalt pad without surface water management, but held the municipality's failure to respond reasonably was the proximate cause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to apportion negligence.

The Court apportioned negligence equally between the municipality and the developer, ordering the developer to indemnify the municipality for 50% of the damages and costs.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash the City of London's approval of a site plan for a townhouse development and a letter from the Upper Thames River Conservation Authority (UTRCA).

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the UTRCA letter was not a reviewable decision and that the City Council's approval of the site plan was an intra vires municipal decision that was not patently unreasonable.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a City Council decision granting site plan approval for a condominium development on environmentally sensitive lands near the Thames River.

The applicant attempted to introduce fresh affidavit evidence from experts and herself.

The court admitted portions of the expert evidence commenting on the revised site plan but rejected the applicant's affidavit.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding that the City Council's decision was not patently unreasonable because the developer's environmental undertakings to the Ontario Municipal Board would be enforced by the City prior to the issuance of a building permit.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant contractor appealed a decision limiting the respondent municipality's holdback liability under s. 17(4) of the Construction Lien Act.

The appellant argued that the municipality's holdback should be calculated as 10 percent of the estimated value of the entire subdivision agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the holdback liability under the Act is calculated based on the individual contract between the subdivider and the specific lien claimant, not the overarching subdivision agreement.