Paul D. Amey

In a 32-year marriage, the trial judge ordered equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The appellant challenged both awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the equalization determination, finding the trial judge's use of similar multiples for two companies in the same business was reasonable and well-reasoned.

However, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle in determining spousal support by failing to consider the significant effect of the equalization payment on the respondent's compensatory and non-compensatory entitlement and by failing to impute investment income to the respondent based on the equalization payment.

The spousal support was varied from $28,978 per month to $21,000 per month based on an imputed income of $675,000 rather than the full $1,000,000.

The respondent's motion for a non-dissipation/Mareva injunction against the applicants' worldwide assets was dismissed.

The applicants sought costs for the dismissed motion.

The court, applying Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, found the applicants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis, as the respondent's litigation conduct was not egregious.

The court fixed costs at $12,113.88, payable at the conclusion of the trial.

The respondent, Jeffrey, brought a motion to change a 2012 order, seeking sole custody of the children, termination of spousal support, payment of extraordinary expenses, and adjustments to the matrimonial home payout.

The applicant, Denise, sought dismissal of these motions.

The court dismissed all of the respondent's motions, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant changes to custody or spousal support.

The court found the respondent's allegations of the applicant's involvement with biker gangs and drug use to be unfounded and based on incredible witness testimony.

The court also imputed income to both parties at their previous levels, finding no material change in financial circumstances.

The court declined to grant the respondent credit for mortgage payments on the matrimonial home or for extraordinary expenses he unilaterally incurred.

BMO Trust Company applied to pass its accounts for the Estate of Pauline Medynski and the Guardianship of Andrew Medynski.

The adult daughters of the deceased, particularly Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections.

The court found some deficiencies in BMO's administration, including a failure to claim a $3,800 benefit and communication shortcomings.

While most objections were not monetarily quantifiable, the court ordered a modest reduction in BMO's compensation, specifically $3,800 plus a 6% reduction from the remaining compensation sought.

The court emphasized avoiding turning a passing of accounts into a full trial.

The Applicant father brought a custody/access motion, which became complicated by his inclusion of irrelevant and humiliating nude photographs and "sexting" materials of the Respondent mother.

The court struck these materials and found the Applicant's actions constituted bad faith.

While there was divided success on the parenting issues, with the Respondent achieving greater success, the Applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The court considered the principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, and sanctioning inappropriate behaviour.

The Applicant's bad faith conduct specifically impacted the costs award.

The respondent, Laura Reggimenti, brought a motion for a preservation/non-dissipation order against the worldwide assets of the applicants, Joseph Rosati and Linda Rosati, in a protracted matrimonial litigation.

The court reviewed the history of previous non-dissipation orders and their vacating, as well as the applicants' real estate dealings.

Applying the criteria for a Mareva injunction from Chitel v. Rothbart, the court found no real risk of assets being removed or dissipated outside the ordinary course of business.

The court also considered the strength of the respondent's underlying fraud claim, noting admissions made by the respondent in prior proceedings that weakened her prima facie case.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing that execution before judgment is an exceptional remedy not justified by the facts.

On a motion for partial summary judgment in a family law proceeding, the respondent husband sought a declaration that a 2011 agreement transferring the wife’s interest in the former matrimonial home remained valid and binding.

The wife sought to set aside the agreement and brought a cross‑motion for temporary spousal support.

The court found no evidence of undue influence and held the agreement was substantively fair, despite the written document omitting reference to consideration paid for the transfer.

Applying the summary judgment principles from the Supreme Court of Canada, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted the declaration.

The court also fixed retroactive spousal support arrears and ordered nominal ongoing support due to the husband’s limited income.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory procedural order relating to filing, questioning, and refusals to answer undertakings in a family proceeding.

The Divisional Court considered the criteria for granting leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the requirements for leave were not satisfied because the prior consent order cited did not constitute a conflicting decision and the proposed appeal did not raise issues of public importance.

The matter was characterized as a procedural dispute between family litigants.

Leave to appeal was therefore denied and the motion dismissed.

In a family law motion between separated parents with ongoing litigation concerning custody, access, and support, the moving party sought orders relating to the child’s schooling, interim spousal support, and funding to retain an expert.

The court held that maintaining stability for the child pending trial was in the child’s best interests and ordered continued enrolment at the Montessori school the child had been attending, with the responding party responsible for the school fees.

The court rejected the moving party’s claim for interim spousal support given the short duration of the marriage and absence of a compensatory or dependency basis for support.

The request for interim funding to retain an expert was also dismissed.

The court encouraged improved parental communication and directed that an expedited trial be scheduled if the issues could not be resolved at settlement.

Following a family law motion in which the moving party obtained an award of interim expenses but for a significantly reduced amount, the court determined costs of the motion.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs absent unusual circumstances.

Although the moving party sought full indemnity costs exceeding $16,000, the court reduced the amount to account for partial success and for preparation time related to a separate motion to amend pleadings that had been adjourned.

The court also rejected allegations of bad faith relating to the timing of the opposing party’s cost submissions.

Costs were fixed on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $8,641.

The respondent wife brought a motion for interim disbursements to fund her response to the applicant husband's pending motion for summary judgment.

The underlying family law proceeding involved the validity of two domestic contracts and the applicant's interest in two family trusts.

The court applied the test for interim disbursements under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, finding that the respondent's case had sufficient merit to warrant pursuit and that she was impecunious.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $27,000 to cover legal and accounting fees necessary to respond to the summary judgment motion.

Following a multi-day family trial concerning custody of a child, the court had awarded custody to the father.

The father sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $25,000 for the trial.

The court considered the importance of the custody issue, the parties’ financial disparity, the conduct of the litigation, and a technically non‑compliant offer to settle under the Family Law Rules.

While the offer did not strictly comply with Rule 18(14), it could still be considered under Rule 18(16) in determining costs.

The court concluded that the father had been mostly successful and was entitled to recover his trial costs.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside portions of a consent final order regarding shared custody, arguing her consent was obtained under duress.

The applicant claimed she was coerced into signing the agreement after the motions judge indicated in open court that he would otherwise grant primary residence to the respondent and restrict the applicant to supervised access.

The court found that the motions judge's comments placed illegitimate pressure on the applicant, vitiating her consent.

The motion was granted, the shared custody provisions were set aside, and the prior temporary arrangement was reinstated pending a case conference.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final order to transfer the primary residence of the parties' 10-year-old child to him.

The motion was prompted by the child expressing a strong desire to live with the applicant due to ongoing conflict and turmoil in the respondent mother's home, which included involvement by the Children's Aid Society and police related to the respondent's abusive partner.

The court found a material change in circumstances and applied the best interests of the child factors under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

Relying on the child's views and preferences, the instability in the respondent's home, and the applicant's stable plan, the court granted the motion and ordered that the child's primary residence be changed to the applicant.

Following a family law trial, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent at trial sought costs and relied on a prior Offer to Settle made approximately one year before trial, arguing the result obtained was more favourable than the offer.

The court found the offer triggered the cost consequences under Rule 18(14), entitling the successful party to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and full recovery costs thereafter.

The court accepted counsel’s hourly rates and disbursements as reasonable and noted the opposing party failed to provide costs submissions.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $32,000 inclusive, payable within 30 days.

Following a family law judgment, the parties were unable to settle the wording of the final order concerning life insurance security.

The respondent agreed to maintain a $1 million life insurance policy naming the applicant as beneficiary but argued it should secure only the equalization payment.

The applicant argued the insurance should also secure spousal support obligations.

The court reviewed its notes and determined it had intended the policy to secure both equalization and spousal support obligations, and amended the earlier order under Rule 25(19)(b)(c) of the Family Law Rules to reflect that intention while preventing a windfall.