Heather Dawn Alexander

This decision addresses outstanding issues following a contentious family law trial, specifically concerning child support calculation, parenting orders, and costs.

The court dismissed the applicant's attempt to re-litigate the child support offset calculation and section 7 expenses, finding no arithmetical errors and no new evidence.

It clarified parenting orders, incorporating some of the parties' agreed-upon terms and making mutual orders for activity attendance.

On costs, the court found the applicant was more successful on the critical issues of material change and sole decision-making authority, despite her offer to settle not meeting the Rule 18 criteria for substantial indemnity.

Considering the divided success and the unreasonable conduct of both parties, the court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs of $40,000.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements, payable within twelve months.

The respondent father brought a motion to change seeking expanded parenting time and a reduction in child support.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion seeking sole decision-making authority and reduced parenting time for the father.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the father's inability to prioritize the child's best interests, particularly regarding medical issues and extracurricular activities, and the significant deterioration in the parties' ability to co-parent.

The court awarded sole decision-making authority to the mother and reduced the father's parenting time.

The court also imputed the father's income at $100,000 for child support purposes, finding him intentionally underemployed, and ordered proportional sharing of section 7 expenses for summer camps, while excluding gymnastics and language school going forward.

This family trial addressed complex parenting issues, including decision-making authority and parenting time, as well as child and spousal support.

The court found a high level of conflict between the self-represented applicant father and respondent mother, rendering joint decision-making inappropriate for all matters.

Decision-making authority was therefore split: the mother was granted sole authority over medical and educational matters, while the father received sole authority over extracurricular activities, with religion and mental health decisions remaining joint.

The child's primary residence remained with the mother, but the father's parenting time was significantly expanded to include three consecutive overnights.

For support, the court imputed minimum wage income to the mother due to intentional unemployment.

Child support was adjusted based on the father's income, and spousal support was ordered at the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, set to terminate on August 31, 2026, with no retroactive adjustments.

The judgment strongly recommended parenting coordination to help the parties manage their ongoing conflict.

BMO Trust Company applied to pass its accounts for the Estate of Pauline Medynski and the Guardianship of Andrew Medynski.

The adult daughters of the deceased, particularly Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections.

The court found some deficiencies in BMO's administration, including a failure to claim a $3,800 benefit and communication shortcomings.

While most objections were not monetarily quantifiable, the court ordered a modest reduction in BMO's compensation, specifically $3,800 plus a 6% reduction from the remaining compensation sought.

The court emphasized avoiding turning a passing of accounts into a full trial.

The plaintiff sought continuation of an ex parte interim injunction and a permanent injunction to prevent nearby blasting associated with residential construction, alleging vibrations would disrupt the alignment of satellite earth stations used for communications services.

The court applied the standard requiring a very strong probability of grave future harm before granting injunctive relief.

Expert evidence from the defendants indicated an extremely low probability of damage under the blasting plan, while the plaintiff’s evidence was largely speculative and lacked detailed technical analysis.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to establish a strong probability of harm on the balance of probabilities.

The motion to continue the injunction was therefore dismissed.