CITATION : L.M. v. K.P., 2024 ONSC 2959

COURT FILE NO.: FC-992-20 DATE: 2024-05-28 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

L.M. Applicant – and – K.P. Respondent

Applicant, Self-Represented Heather Alexander, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: December 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 2023, January 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 2024

AMENDED JUDGMENT

The Honourable Madam Justice L. Bale

OVERVIEW

[1] This family trial took place over the course of thirteen days. The primary focus of the trial related to parenting issues regarding the child, “L”, now age five. The court is asked to decide the issues of decision-making authority, parenting time, incidents of parenting time, child support, and spousal support on a final basis.

Background Facts

[2] The following timeline will assist in the organization of the evidence given at trial:.

1. The parties met and began dating in the summer of 2015.
2. The Applicant father received a conditional offer of employment with the Fire Department in February 2017.
3. The parties were engaged on March 4, 2017.
4. The Applicant father was officially hired by the Fire Department on April 2, 2017. He began working 24-hour shifts, 7 days per month.
5. The parties were married on June 9, 2018. They moved into the home of the maternal grandparents until September 2018, at which time they moved into the matrimonial home together.
6. The only child of the marriage, L, was born in March 2019.
7. L was baptized in June 2019. The parties separated for approximately one month following the baptism. The Respondent mother and L resided in the home of the maternal grandparents during this time. The parties thereafter reconciled, and the Respondent mother and L returned to the matrimonial home.
8. The parties separated for a final time on July 1, 2020. The Respondent mother moved out of the matrimonial home with L on or around July 20, 2020. She returned to reside in the home of the maternal grandparents where she has remained to date.
9. Initially, the father’s parenting time with L took place in the home of the maternal grandparents. On July 12, 2020, the father started exercising parenting time three times per week for 2-hour durations, in the home of the paternal grandparents.
10. In October 2020, the father’s parenting time was expanded to three times per week for 3-hour durations.
11. This court proceeding was commenced on October 16, 2020.
12. In December 2020, the father’s parenting time was expanded to four times per week for 4-hour durations.
13. The Temporary Order of Chappel J. dated March 4, 2021, was made on consent regarding child support.
14. In April 2021, the father’s parenting time was adjusted to three visits per week for 8-hour durations.
15. The Temporary (Without Prejudice) Order of Standryk J. dated August 13, 2021, was made on consent, regarding parenting time, spousal support and the release of proceeds of sale from the matrimonial home. In particular: a. The father’s parenting time was expanded to 8-hour visits, twice per week, and one 24-hour visit per week, to be scheduled between the parties; and b. The Applicant father commenced paying spousal support to the Respondent mother in the amount of $1,600.00 per month, effective January 1, 2021.
16. The Temporary Order of Lafrenière J. dated February 2, 2022, was made on consent, regarding incidents of parenting.
17. In January 2023, the Applicant father’s work schedule changed to a standard Monday to Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., weekday schedule.
18. On January 27, 2023, the court heard a motion brought by the Applicant father for increased parenting time. The motion was dismissed “based on a deficiency in the evidence rather than a determination on the merits”. The father’s request for a suspension of spousal support was also dismissed. Costs were ordered payable by the Applicant father.
19. On February 9, 2023, this case was scheduled for trial on the trial sittings of May 8, 2023.
20. On May 1, 2023, the case was adjourned to the trial sittings of November 2023, on consent.
21. On June 23, 2023, the father brought another motion for increased parenting time. His motion was dismissed, and costs were again ordered in favour of the Respondent mother.
22. The Applicant father moved into the home of his fiancé, K.D., in August 2023.
23. On August 25, 2023, the father brought a third motion for increased parenting time. The court was not prepared to entertain argument due to the proximity of the upcoming trial. The Temporary Order of Justice Standryk was varied on consent and Justice Walters made a further Temporary Order which provided parenting time for the Applicant father on Wednesdays and Thursdays from 4:15 p.m. until 7:15 p.m. and every Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday at 9:00 a.m. “given the child’s anticipated school attendance in September 2023”.
24. The child did not commence Junior Kindergarten in September 2023 as anticipated. The parties have remained unable to agree on where the child should be enrolled in school.
25. The child started spending overnights in the home of K.D. commencing on September 17, 2023.
26. This trial commenced on December 7, 2023 and concluded on January 19, 2024.

[3] Hamilton Police Services were involved with the Applicant and Respondent on the following occasions:

1. Call # 1 to Police – the ‘wedding ring’ incident: On April 22, 2019 (Easter Weekend 2019) an argument took place between the parties. The Respondent mother contacted the Hamilton Police Service and police attended at the matrimonial home regarding a ‘burglary turned domestic call’.
2. Call #2 to Police – the ‘kidnaping’ incident: On June 5, 2019, the father threatened to call police to report the mother kidnapping the child. The mother called police to report this statement.
3. Call #3 to Police – the ‘release into maternal grandmother’s care’ incident: On August 21, 2021, both parties contacted police regarding a dispute surrounding a parenting exchange. The police negotiated the release of the child into the mother’s care.
4. Call #4 to Police – the ‘mediated agreement’ incident: On August 12, 2022, both parties contacted police regarding a dispute surrounding a parenting exchange. The child remained in the father’s care until 4:00 p.m.
5. Call #5 to Police – the ‘moving day’ incident: On September 17, 2022, the Applicant father contacted police regarding a dispute surrounding a parenting exchange. The exchange of the child into the father’s care was made prior to police arrival.
6. Call #6 to Police - the ‘New Years’ Day’ incident: On January 1, 2023, the mother called police to report a dispute surrounding a parenting exchange. The child was returned into the mother’s care. On January 4, 2023, the father called police with regard to further follow-up relating to the January 1, 2023 police event.
7. Call #7 to Police - the ‘harassment and defamation of a minor’ incident: On September 5, 2023, K.D. called police to report various claims against the mother relating to her son, M.
8. Call #8 to Police - the ‘dog cage’ incident: On November 18, 2023, the father called police to report a disclosure allegedly made by the child that he was locked in a dog cage.

[4] Three child protection files have been opened and closed in relation to this family by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton:

1. August 2021 to October 2021;
2. February 2023 to March 2023; and
3. August 2023 to approx. November 2023.

[5] The child protection investigations will be explored more fulsomely below.

Law and Analysis

[6] The parenting and support issues in this case are governed by the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) (“Divorce Act”).

Parenting Issues

[7] In making any parenting order under the Divorce Act, the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage, as enumerated: s. 16(1), and s. 16(3). The court’s primary consideration must at all times remain the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being: s. 16(2).

[8] Application of the ‘best interests’ test is a flexible and fact-driven exercise, tailored to the needs and circumstances of the child’s whose well-being is under consideration – “case by case consideration of the unique circumstance of each child is the hallmark of the process”: Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 at para 13. The analysis must remain centered on the rights of the child, from a child-centred perspective – the ‘rights’ of a parent are not a criterion: Young v. Young at para. 42. Since parenting decisions are “pre-eminently exercises in discretion, the wide latitude under the best interests test permits courts to respond to the spectrum of factors which can both positively and negatively affect a child”: Young, at para. 74.

Decision-Making Authority

[9] The court’s jurisdiction to make an order for decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage is found in s. 16.1 of the Divorce Act. This includes the discretion to allocate decision-making authority between parties: s. 16.1(4)(b), and 16.3. Unless a court orders otherwise, a person to whom parenting time is allocated:

a. has exclusive authority to make, during that parenting time, day-to day decisions affecting the child: s. 16.2(2); and b. is entitled to request and receive information about the child’s wellbeing from care providers s. 16.4.

[10] The leading case in Ontario with respect to the appropriateness of joint parenting regimes in circumstances of conflict and communication issues between parents is Kaplanis v. Kaplanis. In Kaplanis, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside the trial judge’s decision to award joint custody as (a) there was no evidence of historical cooperation and appropriate communication between the parents and (b) it was inappropriate to order joint decision-making in the hope that it would improve the parenting skills of the parties: at para. 2. In the years that have followed, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly been asked to consider the appropriateness of joint parenting regimes in circumstances of conflict and communication issues between parents. In general, orders for joint decision-making should only be made where parents demonstrate an ability and willingness to cooperate and communicate on important issues relating to the child. The presence of pervasive conflict and mistrust militates in favour of an order for sole decision-making, with recognition that:

a. One parent cannot create problems with the other parent and then claim sole decision-making on the basis of lack of cooperation: Lawson v. Lawson, at para. 15; b. In some cases, safeguards are necessary where power imbalances exist. For example, where one parent attempts to limit the other’s relationship with the child, or to prevent access to information, or appears to be primarily responsible for the conflict between the parties: Khairzad v. Macfarlane, 2015 ONSC 7148 at para. 21, Levesque v. Windsor, 2020 ONSC 5902 (Div. Ct.) at para. 22, and Y.Y. v. L.F., 2019 ONSC 1718 (Div. Ct.).

Conflict

[11] In this case, the multiple instances of involvement of the police and the CCAS, at the request of both of the parties, is reflective of the high level of conflict between them. I do not propose to address each topic of conflict in detail. Far too much time was spent at trial by each party attempting to vilify the other parent and to justify their own conduct in relation to each and every significant (and insignificant) incident of conflict between them during their marriage and beyond.

[12] Whether or not the child’s baptism was an open bar or cash bar event in 2019 (one year before the parties’ separation), and who was at fault for the conflict that transpired on that day was a significant focus at trial. The court is still left wondering why. Regardless of the fault and blame that each party levies at the feet at the other, this early child-related event highlights the power struggle and divided family loyalties that have been a pervasive problem for the parties during both during their marriage and separation.

[13] I accept that the parties’ conflict started to increase in the latter stages of their marriage, and both parties resorted to yelling and cursing, at times. The conflict often took place in the presence of young L. I do not find that any of the conflict between the parties, either during their marriage or following separation, rose to a level which would be classified as Family Violence under the Divorce Act. However, I do find that the parties have allowed their parental conflict and control issues to cripple their ability to make important decisions for L in a timely and child-focused way.

[14] I pause here to note that the Applicant father and Respondent mother are both likeable, upstanding people. The Respondent mother is thoughtful, organized and attentive. The Applicant father is active, enthusiastic, and fun. They do not have criminal records or substance abuse issues. They both love and value their families. They both have many positive attributes to share with their son, as do their extended family members. Unfortunately, each has lost sight of the positive qualities of the other, and each has allowed their distrust and animosity to interfere with their ability to focus on the best interests of their son.

[15] The most obvious example of negative consequence flowing to L from their inability to jointly make mature, child-focused decisions, was L’s absence from his first year of formal education. The parents could not decide where L would attend kindergarten during the 2023-2024 school year, so L was deprived of the opportunity to attend entirely. A lesser example, but also with negative consequence, is that L has been deprived of multiple opportunities to vacation with both families.

[16] Another more recent example of harmful conflict is found in the events of January 1, 2023. The fresh start to the New Year culminated in police intervention. Both parties could have and should have behaved differently leading up to and on that date:

1. The mother, for her part, should have accommodated the father’s request to have L in his care until 7:00 p.m. that evening for a special, out-of-town, family event. Instead, she prioritized ordering-in Chinese food for the maternal grandmother’s birthday, over a reasonable request for additional holiday parenting time. I find that the mother’s insistence that the child be returned two hours earlier than requested was unjustifiably rigid, unreasonable, and focused on her own issues of power and control rather than on L’s best interests. L was spending the majority of his time in the care and home of the mother and maternal grandparents. L, age 3, would not have noticed if the family celebrated the maternal grandmother’s birthday one day later.
2. The father, in response to the mother’s unreasonable position, represented that he would return the child by 5:00 p.m., and then did not. It is clear to the court that the father did not plan on honouring his representation to the mother. This escalated the tension and distrust between the parties.

[17] The conduct of both parties set the stage for conflict. The mother sent an accidental text to the father, not intended for him. It spoke to an unknown party of attending separately at the father’s home at the exchange. This concerned the father. He demanded an explanation. The mother refused to provide one. The tension escalated further. Neither party would capitulate. Both were determined to be the aggrieved party. Police were called and young children were exposed to the conflict. At trial, both parties continued to lay the blame for this event completely at the feet of the other. Neither appeared able to identify their own role in the conflict.

[18] An order for joint-decision making authority is not appropriate on the facts of this case.

Different Parenting Styles

[19] It became clear at trial that the parties have many differences of opinion regarding the appropriate usage of curse words, content of social media posts, and expressions of humour generally. The court was left with the impression that the father’s household is one of loud, boisterous activity, and that the mother’s household is more structured and reserved. Despite exhaustive cross-examinations on such topics as vulgar language and volume of communications, childhood spankings, song lyrics, movies and video games, horseplay, pranks, and name-calling, physical humour (e.g. ‘mooning’, ‘air’ hitting, etc.), social media filters, tick-tock challenges and posts, physical activities, etc., I am not left with any concern regarding the appropriateness of the atmosphere in either party’s home, nor in the homes of their extended families. Although their family dynamics are evidently quite different there are both positive and negative features in both homes. Hopefully for L, he will achieve balance by exposure to both.

[20] The mother has established only that the father’s parenting is not perfect. With respect, that is not the standard for any parent. I am satisfied that L is physically, mentally, and emotionally safe in the care of both of his parents.

Unwarranted Intrusions into Privacy

[21] In their testimony both parties expressed feelings of being unduly monitored by the other.

[22] To start, both parties appear to have audio or video recorded their interactions or the other, or the interactions of the other party with the child, without the other’s knowledge or consent. Judges are rarely impressed with efforts to introduce these communications into evidence in a family court trial. In general, this type of behaviour tends to undermine the general objectives of family law and does little to build trust, decrease conflict, or promote the positive restructuring of family relationships: see Fleury v. Budd, 2023 BCSC 1749. Both parties testified to their belief that the other was monitoring their facetime/telephone discussions with the child, and at times, surveilling their homes.

[23] The Applicant father, during the early stages of the parties’ separation, appears to have been monitoring the mother’s whereabouts. In December 2022 he accidentally sent her a photograph of her car, without explanation. The father presented private social media information at trial relating to the mother’s relationship status.

[24] These intrusions however, pale in comparison to the mother’s surveillance. The Respondent mother took an unnecessarily deep dive into the private lives of the Applicant father and members of his extended family. It was evident that every social media post made by the father and his family, for time periods predating the birth of the child by many years, were scrutinized and weaponized in an effort to prove the father and his family as unfit or unsafe. One need only review some of the Exhibits tendered by the mother at trial to understand the hyper-focused and methodical investigation that took place. In addition, the mother photographed or ‘freeze-framed’ the child’s room during a facetime call for the purpose of scrutinizing the background contents (e.g. capturing video game headphones, etc.). She located and contacted K.D.’s former partner, for information. I find that her actions go beyond reasonable inquiry and likely lend support for the father’s assertion that the mother has inappropriately questioned L about his time spent in the father’s care.

[25] This intense level of scrutiny and critique must stop. This is not a police state. Parents should not feel as though they are living in one during their parenting time.

Child Protection and Police Involvement

[26] I find that both parties have resorted to harmful tactics aimed at gaining an advantage in this litigation, to the detriment of their son. Both parties made unwarranted complaints to public agencies in an apparent effort to document their grievances and win approval and support for their positions.

[27] The parties have placed at least eight unnecessary calls to the police. No criminal activity was reported, and no charges were laid with respect to any of the incidents. Both parties come from stable, reputable homes. Neither party nor any of their family members have a known criminal record. It is disappointing that so many police resources have had to be diverted to manage this otherwise upstanding family’s conflict.

[28] Three child protection investigations were initiated at the request of the parties.

[29] The first investigation was commenced in August 2021. The Respondent mother contacted the Society on August 24, 2021. Her reported concerns related primarily to safety concerns: (a) ‘baby-proofing’ in the paternal family home, and (b) the Applicant father’s propensity to sleepwalk. The father had just spent his first overnight with the child, pursuant to the Temporary Order of Justice Standryk. The mother elaborated on these initial concerns to include concerns relating to the paternal family’s dogs, the child’s dirty clothing (and clothing not returned), the absence of Epi-pens in the home to treat the child’s allergies if needed, issues relating to feeding and nutrition, the father’s alleged anger-management problems and propensity to yell, bruises on the child’s shins and knees, and the father’s alleged inability to support the emotional needs of the child, etc.. The investigator conducted an unannounced visit at the paternal family home during a parenting visit with L. The worker met with the father, the child, and the paternal grandparents and observed the home. The worker also received consents and spoke with the father’s physician regarding allegations of sleep issues and mental health stability. With the exception that additional safety locks for the exterior doors had been purchased but not yet installed at the time of the first visit, the worker noted no concerns relating to the child in the care or home of the father and his family. None of the protection allegations made by the Respondent mother were verified. The child was deemed to be safe in the father’s care. The child protection investigation was approved for closure on October 29, 2021. When advised of this outcome, the Respondent mother appeared unhappy with the result and made a complaint to a Society supervisor regarding comments made to her by the investigating worker.

[30] The second investigation was commenced on February 14, 2023. The child allegedly made disclosures to the mother that the paternal uncle showed him his penis and ‘wiped it on him’. The child had been ‘humping’ the mother’s leg after getting out of the bath and advised that his uncle does that to him. The child also advised the mother, on another occasion, that the paternal uncle had pulled his pants down and slapped him on the bum. The mother reported the child’s statements to the family physician, who under a duty to report, called the Society. A Society investigator interviewed the Respondent mother, the Applicant father, the paternal uncle, and the child. The child made no disclosures to the worker and indicated that he did not remember talking to his mother about these things. Hamilton Police declined to initiate a police investigation after learning of the results of the Society’s interview. The allegations were not verified. The child protection investigation was closed on March 8, 2023.

[31] The third investigation was commenced in August 2023. The father’s partner, K.D. made a complaint on August 15, 2023, regarding alleged harassing conduct by the Respondent mother towards the family unit, and the negative impact this was having on her own son, M. On August 18, 2023, unaware of the allegations made by K.D., the Respondent mother also made a complaint to the Society regarding further incidents of sexualized behaviour exhibited by L. On August 21, 2023, the Society determined that an investigation should be opened as a result of the evident increase in conflict in the family unit. Ms. Kadar, an experienced child protection worker with the Catholic Children’s Aid Society, was called as a witness at trial primarily to give evidence in relation to her involvement in this most recent file opening. A large volume of complaints and allegations were made by both parties. Some of the more notable observations made by Ms. Kadar during this file opening include the following:

1. L appeared to be hesitant to speak freely with the worker in the presence of his mother. Likewise, the mother appeared reluctant to permit the child to be interviewed privately.
2. The child made no disclosures of any inappropriate sexual conduct or touching. He was articulate in discussing body safety and body parts. The mother appeared disappointed that the child made no disclosures.
3. L spoke positively of all of his family members and relationships.
4. Ms. Kadar observed a ‘typical sibling relationship’, and age-appropriate exploration and play, between L and M. Both children appeared happy and comfortable together in their home.
5. Ms. Kadar was concerned that L and M were caught in the middle of adult conflict, and that the heightened level of adult scrutiny over their relationship was unnatural and potentially harmful.
6. The specific allegations made by the parents and K.D. against one another were not independently verified. Rather, the Society formed the opinion that L was at risk of emotional harm resulting from his exposure to post-separation conflict.

[32] None of the observations or conclusions made by Ms. Kadar and the Society were successfully challenged. The parties’ respective efforts to attribute the cause of the risk of emotional harm posed to L solely to the other, was an exercise in futility. I do not share the mother’s position that the Society was “duped” by the father, as argued in closing submissions. Overall, I found the testimony of Ms. Kadar to be thoughtful, responsive, and credible. I did not find her evidence to be reflective of any form of bias or predetermination of the issues raised. I do not share the mother’s concerns regarding the scope or conduct of the investigation. I agree with the Society’s conclusion that L is at risk of emotional harm of the conflict between his caregivers continues at this level.

L’s Statements

[33] Both parties repeated many statements and sentiments during their testimony that were purportedly made to them by the child during the course of this litigation. In high-conflict family cases, the reliability of children’s statements made to interested parties, and tendered at trial in hearsay form, attracts special scrutiny. In this case, I do not doubt that L has made concerning statements to both of his parents about the other parent or their extended families. However, I am also alert to the potential that children in high-conflict families may tailor their statements to a caregiver to fit the narrative they perceive the caregiver wishes to hear, or may make statements to deflect blame, avoid trouble, etc.

[34] The Respondent mother is concerned by spontaneous utterances made to her by the child, and sexualized behaviours she has observed him to present, as per the second and third child protection investigations referenced above. In November 2023 the Applicant father made a report to the police that L disclosed being locked in a dog cage at the mother’s home. This report was not investigated by the police or the Society.

[35] The justice system treats allegations of physical and sexual abuse against children with the highest level of concern. The justice system also takes repeated and unfounded allegations of physical and sexual abuse against children seriously. With respect to some of the more serious statements the parties assert they received from L, I make the following observations and findings:

1. Paternal Uncle: This court was not privy to the content of the interview which took place between the Society investigator and the paternal uncle during the second child protection investigation. The investigating worker and the paternal uncle did not testify at this trial. The court is aware that the child made no concerning disclosures regarding any conduct of a sexual nature when interviewed by the Society worker and as a result the concerns were not verified. I suspect that the child’s utterances and behaviours (e.g. wiping his penis, humping actions, slapping his bottom) are more a reflection of the types of body humour engaged in by the father and his younger brothers in the paternal home than actions of a nefarious nature, however it would have been helpful to the court for the paternal uncle to testify at this proceeding to directly address the concerns raised. The court is left with little information. The father testified that the paternal uncle is one of L’s favourite people, but that he is never left in a caregiving role. Notwithstanding the Society conclusion that protection concerns were not verified, in these circumstances I accept that an order which prevents the paternal uncle from acting alone in a caregiving role is a minimally intrusive condition warranted in the best interests of L at this time. This restriction may be reviewed in future as L ages and is better able to articulate his experiences.
2. Step-sibling: Ms. Kadar specifically testified to the third child protection investigation. She interviewed both L and M and shared the results of those interviews with the court. I am not satisfied that there were any deficiencies in her investigation. I accept the Society’s conclusion that there is appropriate parental supervision in place with respect to L and M, and that there is nothing inappropriate in their relationship – physical, sexual or otherwise. I share Ms. Kadar’s observation that the children appear to have been drawn into adult conflict, that they appear to be engaging in age-appropriate curiosity and exploration, and that the scrutiny that their sibling relationship has been subjected to is unnatural and potentially harmful.
3. Dog Crate: I reject that there is any truth the allegation that the Respondent mother has ever locked L as a form of punishment or otherwise. I do not believe that the father himself believes there is merit to this allegation. I find that the father reported this statement to the police as a form of retaliation for the investigations he and his family have been subjected to as a result of the mother’s reports.

[36] The Applicant father is also very concerned by negative statements the child purportedly repeats about the father and paternal family, initially made by the Respondent mother. In the context of this litigation, I accept that these are legitimate concerns. However, I am likewise concerned that there are paternal family members who are also engaging in negative messaging in the presence of the child (e.g., calling the mother derogatory names, etc.). Both sides must stop. Both sides are causing emotional harm to L.

Extended Families

[37] The court heard evidence from extended family members on both sides of this family during the trial, and often had an audience of related parties. I am satisfied that both sides of the family love L deeply and have many positive attributes to share with him. L is safe and happy in the homes of both his maternal and paternal family members. What a gift it would be for him to be able to share his life experiences freely, in both homes, without fear of offense or repercussion.

[38] The court heard evidence that, at times, the parties called upon their respective parents to assist in resolving marital disputes between them. On one hand, this practice demonstrates that the parties recognized that outside help might be required in resolving their disputes. On the other hand, bringing in partial intermediaries, at times, may have exacerbated the disputes and generated more hard feelings between families already in conflict.

[39] Unsurprisingly, the extended family witnesses from both families appeared quite aligned with their own family units. I heard very few positive sentiments expressed towards the unrelated parent or family by the witnesses called. L, by all accounts, is a smart and perceptive little boy. He is no doubt alert to the dislike and distrust that flows between his homes.

[40] Both parents clearly value the input of their families. However, it appears that it will be very difficult for these families to bridge the divide that has occurred. Family therapy for any adult relatives willing to work together on improving these family relationships would be of great benefit to L. Perhaps there are adults in L’s life, on both sides of his family, who are willing to work together with a professional to bring peace into his world.

Day to Day Decision Making

[41] The right to make day-to-day decisions while L is in each parent’s care is presumptive. I am satisfied that both parents are loving, intelligent, and capable caregivers. I decline to impose many of the restrictive qualifications the mother seeks in her draft order with respect to day-to-day care. But for the presence of parental conflict, the Applicant and Respondent are both, in my view, responsible caregivers. I do not accept that the father requires the detailed level of parental oversight and control that the mother seeks to impose.

[42] With respect to decision-making on major and important issues relating to L’s welfare:

1. I decline to grant the father’s request for an Order for joint decision-making responsibility. It is not realistic to expect these two parents to make child-focused, timely decisions together on L’s behalf. They have demonstrated very little ability to do so to date, to L’s detriment.
2. Likewise, I decline to make an Order granting the mother sole decision-making authority over all aspects of L’s care. I am concerned by the mother’s overly-controlling approach towards the father’s parenting of L. There is very real potential that the mother would utilize a blanket order for sole decision-making authority as a tool to minimize and place unnecessary barriers between the father-son relationship.
3. It is in L’s best interests that he understands that both of his parents are authority figures in his life. He will benefit from having both included in important decisions relating to his care.
4. I find it is necessary to delineate individual spheres of parental decision-making authority on the specific facts of this case.

Medical and Dental Decisions

[43] The parties resided together for only 15 months following L’s birth. I accept the mother’s evidence that during that period of time, she was L’s primary caregiver and was primarily responsible for identifying and meeting L’s specific needs. The Applicant father appeared content with that arrangement at the time.

[44] I am satisfied that the Respondent mother has made sound, healthy choices in relation to L’s medical care since his birth. L’s medical needs are being ably met under the mother’s watchful care and attention and treatment by his physician, Dr. Ambis (who is also the physician for both parents). The mother arranged for L’s routine medical appointments, and special treatments (e.g., a Frenectomy in April 2019). The father sometimes opted to attend.

[45] On the strength of the evidence led at trial, this court is satisfied that the mother has made appropriate decisions relating to L’s medical care, in consultation with his treating physician, including such decisions as to routine childhood appointments and vaccinations, nutrition and allergies, obtaining prescription medications when appropriate, etc. I find that the mother has made informed medical decisions in L’s best interests. I am also satisfied that the mother has made reasonable effort to keep the father informed of important medical issues relating to L. She has attempted to consult with him and to communicate information in clear and organized fashion, attaching relevant materials, where appropriate. The mother attends all of L’s medical appointments. The father has been advised of appointment dates and times, and often attends with the mother and L.

[46] I am not persuaded by the Applicant father’s assertion that the mother was negligent in addressing L’s chronic cough symptoms and a recurrent ear infection. I am unimpressed by the father’s actions in March 2023, in attempting to address his perceived deficiencies in the child’s medical care without consultation with the mother. Specifically, paragraph 5 of the Temporary Order of Justice C. Lafrenière, dated February 2, 2022, required that both parties would advise the other and provide full particulars of any professional appointments involving the child so that both parties could attend appointments. On March 15, 2023, the Applicant father intentionally breached this term, by taking the child to an urgent care clinic and refusing to advise the mother of the location. The father’s written communications on that date are concerning. For example, alleging that the mother was “trying to keep [L] sick” and “you obviously don’t know how to get him better”, and advising the mother “I will tell you when you are picking him up”, and “I’ll tell you when he’s done. You aren’t coming here". Ultimately, the event culminated in conflict at the health care facility, requiring staff intervention, in the presence of the child. At times, the father appears to have given conflicting information to medical personnel treating L. His evidence under cross-examination on this point was confusing. Overall, I preferred the mother’s evidence with respect to L’s overall health and treatment of L’s medical issues.

[47] In this case, it is in L’s best interests to have one parent making important medical and dental decisions on his behalf, in consultation with the other parent. The mother presents as more informed and organized than the father in arranging and implementing appropriate health care treatment for the child. I am satisfied that the Respondent mother is in a better position to make important medical and dental decisions for the child. Detailed provisions with respect to the sharing of information, attendance at medical appointments, etc. will be detailed in the Order section below.

[48] I have specifically considered and decline to make an order that requires provision of a medical note if L is too sick to travel between homes. Instead, I would urge both parties to be guided by the following principles: (1) both parents are capable of caring for L when he is ill; (2) both parents should be sensitive to L’s level of comfort in movement between homes when he is genuinely not well; and (3) if both parties agree that L should remain in the care of one of his parents, the other should receive equivalent make-up time, at a time that is convenient and acceptable to the parent who lost time.

Educational Decisions

[49] As noted above, the parties have been unable to agree on L’s school enrollment for senior kindergarten in September 2024. The father proposes the school in his catchment area, St. Eugene’s Catholic Elementary School. The mother proposes the school in her catchment area, St. Mark Catholic Elementary School. It is surprising to this court that, given the relatively close proximity of the parties’ residences and their shared opinion that L should attend Catholic primary school, that they have both been so unbudging in their positions for the benefit of L.

[50] Before and after-school care appears to be available at both schools. The father asserts that if L is enrolled in the French Immersion program at St. Eugene’s school, that the catchment zone is larger, allowing both parties greater future mobility. Neither party speaks French. Neither party attended French Immersion schooling. The father’s step-son, M, does not attend either of the proposed schools. There is no basis upon which this court should decide that either school proposal is qualitatively superior to the other.

[51] The mother’s evidence is that, except for the period of the parties’ cohabitation in the matrimonial home (under two years), she has always resided in the home of the maternal grandparents. This has been L’s primary residence for almost four years. The mother has no intention of moving. St. Mark school is around the corner from the home. The mother attended the same school as a child.

[52] The Respondent father and his partner have outgrown their home and are looking for larger accommodations. They are presently considering their options regarding location.

[53] The mother and maternal aunt (who is a teacher) described the implementation of the Ontario Junior Kindergarten curriculum in their home as a result of L’s absence from his first year of formal education. Both parents testified to employing math and reading games and learning initiatives in their homes.

[54] I am satisfied that the mother’s plan for school enrollment offers superior stability and predictability for L. I am also confident that the mother’s organized and attentive nature will ensure that the child’s educational needs are met in a timely and child-focused manner. I am satisfied that L’s attendance at St. Mark Catholic Elementary School is the better plan in relation to L’s current best interests. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, it is anticipated that L will continue at St. Mark until his graduation from grade 8, and then he will continue on to attend the secondary school in the catchment area of the mother’s home. The mother will be granted decision-making authority over L’s educational issues. Parameters with respect to the parties’ rights and obligations regarding L’s education, which are self-explanatory, are included in the Order section below.

Religion

[55] Both parties are Catholic and agree that L should be raised in the Catholic faith. Religious ceremonies and celebrations appear to be of special importance to both parties and their extended families. Unfortunately, ceremonies and celebrations in this family have also tended to result in heightened conflict.

[56] This court will attempt to craft an order which permits equal participation by both families in L’s religious milestones, while at the same time managing the potential for conflict. Obviously, in addition to the special provisions which will be ordered by the court, the parties are free to schedule separate celebrations for the child on their own parenting time and at their own expense.

Extracurricular Activities

[57] Both sides testified to the father’s active participation in sports. Both parties explained that extracurricular activities formed an important part of their childhoods. Both parents appear supportive of L’s enrollment and participation in regular extracurricular activities. L has been enrolled in swimming, karate, gymnastics, soccer, playgroup, etc. to date.

[58] I am satisfied that it is in L’s best interests that the Applicant father be responsible for this sphere of decision-making authority on his behalf. The father has evident knowledge of, enthusiasm for, and commitment to leisure activity and physical health. L will benefit from active participation by his father in this area of his life.

[59] Both parties will be entitled to enrol in other extracurricular activities that do not infringe upon the other parent’s time with L, without restriction. Additional terms, as outlined below, relating to management of this area of L’s life, are self-explanatory.

[60] Each parent shall have input into L’s summer camp registration. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, it is anticipated that summer camp registration will begin in 2025. The cost of any such summer camp shall be shared between the parties as a s. 7 expense.

Mental Health

[61] The high conflict nature of this case may necessitate that L receive mental health support in future. If either party believes that therapeutic support is needed, therapeutic support shall occur in accordance with the procedure outlined below. It is important that if counselling or therapeutic services are put in place for L, that both parties have the right to provide input, consult with, and receive information from the care provider.

Official Documents

[62] Both parties will share responsibility for the maintenance and safeguarding L’s official documents. The mother will be primarily responsible for the child’s medical and educational issues. As such, it is logical that the Respondent mother maintain possession of L’s health card, Birth Certificate and religious certificates. The father shall be the custodian of L’s passport. He shall be cooperative in sharing the document with the mother when necessary for travel purposes, as detailed in the Order selection below.

Name Change

[63] The court did not hear any compelling evidence that a change of L’s legal name is in his best interests. L’s legal name was selected by both of his parents upon his birth. This is the name he has known throughout his life. The facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Duwyn v. Ross, 2023 ONSC 3168, as cited by the mother. In that case the mother failed to acknowledge the father on the child’s Statement of Live Birth, and unilaterally chose all of the child’s legal names. On the facts of this case, I decline to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction, or discretion in changing the child’s name under s. 17 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. I am not satisfied that such an order is in L’s best interests. Accordingly, neither party shall change his name in the absence of the written consent of the other party.

Parenting Time

[64] The court’s jurisdiction to allocate parenting time between parties is found in s. 16.1(4) (a), and 16.2(1) of the Divorce Act. Again, the only test is the best interests of L.

Progression of Parenting Time

[65] The Applicant father was frustrated by the slow progression of any expansions in his parenting time. He asserts that some of the steps taken by the mother in this litigation are reflective of her desire to interfere with the natural progression and expansion of his parenting time. For example, (1) after only one overnight parenting visit, the mother placed her first complaint to the CCAS; (2) on the first night that L was scheduled to sleep over in the home of K.D., the mother falsely represented that L had Covid-19; (3) within a week of this case being scheduled for trial, the mother raised allegations of sexual impropriety against the paternal uncle. Some of the timing of the allegations are suspicious.

[66] Originally, it appears that the father did attempt to alleviate some of the mother’s concerns. For example, he sent photographs of the child napping at the appropriate time, photographs of his sleeping arrangements, photographs of food in the cupboards, etc.. However, it is evident that the mother doubted the veracity of the information being provided, and eventually the father gave up trying to appease her.

[67] I accept that a graduated expansion of the father’s parenting time following separation was appropriate. However, I find that the expansion progression has been overly cautious and has not progressed sufficiently to this point. L’s relationship with his father is an important one. Increased parenting time is necessary to promote and maintain that important bond.

Mother’s Home

[68] The Respondent mother resides in the home of the maternal grandparents in Stoney Creek. Save and except for a period of approximately 19 months, she has resided in this home for the entirety of her life. Many of her extended family members reside in the neighbourhood. This home has also been L’s primary residence for the majority of his life. L is very closely bonded with his maternal grandparents. The home has many child-friendly attributes, and the child has a structured and healthy daily routine. The mother has no intention of relocating from this residence.

[69] L enjoys stability and comfort in the mother’s home and primary care. He is closely bonded to her. Ongoing stability in this environment must be balanced with L’s need for increased parenting time with his father.

Father’s Home

[70] The Applicant father and K.D. reside together. K.D. has a 5 year-old son, M. The Applicant father and K.D. also have an infant son, Gabriel, together. There is an eight-month age differential between M and L. They each have their own bedroom, but the family is outgrowing the size of the home and is looking to move. K.D. testified that the Applicant father is a very loving and involved parent to all of the children. I accept that L has also bonded with all of the members of this household.

[71] Although they have communicated in writing and have now heard one another testify in court, K.D. and the Respondent mother have never interacted in person. This is unfortunate. K.D. also presents as a caring and capable caregiver. I have no concern about L’s level of safety while in her care.

L’s Age and Stage of Development

[72] L is at an age of tremendous change and development. At this age, L is able to tolerate larger periods of absence from this primary caregiver. He is now accustomed to spending time in the care of his father and K.D.. L will be starting full-time school in the fall, and it is in his best interests that a new and expanded parenting schedule be established well in advance of that transition.

[73] I find that a schedule which provides ongoing primary care for L in the home of the Respondent mother remains in his best interests. However, I find that L is now quite capable of, and should regularly be spending three consecutive overnights in the care of the father. I agree that a significant expansion of L’s time with the Applicant father is warranted. However, I do not agree that an equal and shared parenting arrangement is in L’s best interests.

Incidents of Parenting

[74] The court’s jurisdiction to include requirements, terms and conditions, relating to the incidents of parenting is found in s. 16.1(4) (c) and (d), and 16.1(5) of the Divorce Act.

[75] In cases of high conflict, detailed parenting orders are necessary. All of the orders relating to incidents of parenting below are designed to reduce the level of conflict in this case and to promote L’s overall best interests. Both parties are forewarned that a court order is exactly that: an order, not a suggestion. There will undoubtedly be terms below that each of the parties agree with, and terms below that the parties do not agree with. They should not attempt to ‘cherry-pick’ the terms made in their own favour, and disregard those that are not. Both parties need to adhere to the comprehensive spirit of the order, if they truly wish to promote L’s long-term mental health and wellness. It is hoped that with time and effort, the parties will regain some of their former trust of the other. When they are able to parent cooperatively and peacefully, they may jointly agree to deviate from the strict terms crafted by this court.

SUPPORT

[76] Little focus was given by the parties to the financial issues at this trial.

[77] The Applicant father is employed on a full-time basis as a firefighter. He earned the following incomes in the years post-separation (his 2023 income information was not yet available at the conclusion of this trial):

1. 2021: $107,194; and
2. 2022: $110, 508.00.

[78] The Respondent mother was previously employed as an assistant manager at CIBC bank, a customer service representative at Trans Union, and an ambulance communications officer. She went on sick leave three months before her maternity leave in December 2018 and has not returned to work since that time. The Respondent mother testified that the parties both espoused traditional views and planned that the father would be the breadwinner for their household and the mother would be a homemaker.

[79] The mother has not applied for any positions of employment post-separation. She does not qualify for disability benefits. She intends to apply for full-time employment positions, preferably with the local school board, following the outcome of this trial and with a goal of securing work during the hours of L’s schooling.

[80] On March 4, 2021, Justice Chappel made an order, on consent, which addressed retroactive child support and required the Applicant father to pay ongoing Table child support to the Respondent mother in the monthly amount of $934.00, based upon the Applicant’s 2020 income.

[81] On August 13, 2021, Justice Standryk made an order, on consent, which addressed retroactive spousal support and required the Applicant father to pay ongoing spousal support to the Respondent mother in the amount of $1,600.00 per month.

[82] The court is advised that the Applicant has been paying child and spousal support, as ordered.

Child Support

[83] With respect to child support, the Applicant father does not dispute that he must pay child support to the Respondent mother on L’s behalf in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines: Divorce Act: s. 15.1. L is under the age of majority and the presumptive rule requires the Applicant father to pay the amount set out in the applicable table.

[84] In this case, determination of the Applicant father’s income is easily achieved under s. 16 of the Guidelines, as per the father’s “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency. Neither party argued any adjustments under Schedule III. Both parties appear to be content that the Applicant father’s child support be based upon the preceding year’s income, and adjusted annually in July each year to accord with the applicable Table amount on a go-forward basis.

[85] With respect to the Respondent mother, she too has an obligation to provide financial support for L, to the best of her ability. There is no evidence before the court that the Respondent mother is medically unable to work. There is no evidence of the mother engaging in any job search efforts from the date of separation to present. Although she continues to be L’s primary caregiver, I am satisfied that that she should be earning no less than minimum wage at a full-time position of employment at this time. It is necessary to impute an income to the mother for purposes of her minimum contribution to L’s s. 7 expenses, on the basis of her intentional unemployment, as per section 19 of the Guidelines.

[86] The child support order which follows below is self-explanatory.

Spousal Support

[87] The statutory framework for determination of spousal support in this proceeding is found in s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act. Canadian jurisprudence recognizes three conceptual grounds for entitlement to spousal support: (1) compensatory support; (2) contractual support; and (3) non-compensatory support: Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 at para. 15. In making an order for spousal support, the court must consider the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including the length of time the parties cohabited, and the functions performed by each spouse during that period of cohabitation: Divorce Act, s. 15.2(4) and 15.2(6). An Order of spousal support should:

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; (c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and (d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[88] No single objective is paramount; all must be borne in mind: Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813.

[89] Both parties provided support calculations. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines are a useful tool in the determination of spousal support. They suggest a range of both amount and duration of support that reflects the current law. While neither legislated nor binding, the use of SSAG calculations in family law proceedings has evolved from a starting point to a range that should not be deviated from lightly: Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11 at para. 98, Slongo v Slongo, 2017 ONCA 272 at para. 81. The Guidelines use duration to categorize cohabitation: a short-term cohabitation is one of less than five years

[90] In this case, I accept the evidence of the Respondent mother that the Applicant father was frequently absent from the matrimonial home during their marriage, playing sports, socializing with friends and family, etc., and, while they did share in the division of some household chores, the majority of the child’s care was left to the mother. The mother has continued to be the child’s primary caregiver post-separation. There has been economic disadvantage to the Respondent mother in assuming this primary role and responsibility both during and subsequent to the marriage.

[91] A great deal of focus was placed upon the degree to which the maternal grandfather used his influence to assist the Applicant father in securing a position as firefighter. The maternal grandfather’s guidance did likely assist the father in achieving his objectives. However, these circumstances have little to no impact on the spousal support analysis which follows. Far too much time was spent on that issue at trial. I do accept the mother’s evidence that she, herself, was a positive influence and support in the father’s job application process through both her organization, resourcefulness, motivation and encouragement. These pre-marriage contributions have little to no impact on spousal support.

[92] I am satisfied that the Respondent mother has some entitlement to spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.

[93] The Respondent mother claims a retroactive underpayment of spousal support of totalling $28,120.00 for the period of July 1, 2020 to September 1, 2021 as follows:

1. $13,284.00 for the period of July 1, 2020 to December 30, 2020; and
2. $14,836.00 for the period of September 1, 2021 to December 1, 2023.

[94] I am not satisfied that any retroactive spousal support is owing.

[95] On August 13, 2021, the Applicant father paid a without prejudice (tax-free) lump sum payment of spousal support in the sum of $12,800.00. On September 1, 2021, the father commenced paying the current without prejudice monthly sum of $1,600.00. An order for without prejudice spousal support allows a trial judge to make his or her own findings as to entitlement, quantum, and duration, notwithstanding the temporary arrangement entered into between the parties.

[96] The Respondent’s claim for retroactive spousal support is complicated by a lack of evidence. This court heard no evidence as to how the parties shared household and personal expenses following separation, how they untangled their financial affairs, how they divided their property, their respective financial constraints following separation, etc.. This absence of information makes it very difficult for the court to look backwards and assess the parties’ respective conditions, means, needs and other circumstances. While initially it may have been reasonable for the Respondent mother to remain at home without remunerative employment to care for L, at some point in the 3 ½ years that followed she ought to have been looking for opportunities to supplement her income. She made a conscious decision not to. What started out as a potential underpayment of spousal support, in my view, evolved into a potential overpayment of spousal support, during the 3 ½ years post separation. In the circumstances, it would be unjust and not in keeping with the objectives of spousal support to now require the Applicant father to retroactively pay more.

[97] I am satisfied that the amount of spousal support that has been paid from the date of separation to present has adequately addressed the economic advantages, disadvantages, financial consequences, and hardship experienced by the parties during that time period. I am not satisfied that there is any retroactive overpayment or underpayment of spousal support owing between the parties.

[98] With respect to prospective spousal support, the court is concerned by the lack of any evidence of the mother’s efforts to work towards her own support and self-sufficiency. She candidly admitted that she has not sought any employment post separation. Again, I conclude that I must impute an income to the mother, commensurate with full-time minimum wage employment, on the basis of her intentional unemployment for determination of the parties’ respective rights and obligations relating to spousal support. Given that the mother previously earned an income which was significantly more than minimum wage, it will be expected that moving forward her income will continue to increase and spousal support may be further adjusted to reflect the changes means, needs, and other circumstances of the parties.

[99] Based upon the Applicant father earning an income of $110,508.00 and the Respondent mother earning an income of $31,200.00, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggest spousal support for a minimum duration of 2 years and maximum duration of 15 years, in accordance with the following ranges:

1. Low: $507.00 per month;
2. Mid: $981.00 per month; and
3. High: $1,500.00 per month.

[100] The mid-range results in a 50/50 sharing of the family’s net disposable income. I am satisfied that the mid-range level of spousal support is appropriate, at this time. I do not agree with the Applicant father that the Respondent mother’s entitlement to spousal support must now come to an end. I have considered both the circumstances of the father’s expanded family unit and additional dependant children in his care, L’s anticipated enrollment in Kindergarten in the Fall, and the reality that it may take some time for the mother to actually secure a steady income stream at previous levels. In my view, it is appropriate that spousal support terminate on August 31, 2026. If the parties’ financial circumstances change in the intervening period, it is open to both parties to seek a variation of the quantum of spousal support payable.

[101] In conclusion, there shall be a Final Order which requires the Applicant father to pay spousal support to the Respondent mother in the amount of $981.00 per month, commencing June 1, 2024. The Applicant’s obligation to pay spousal support to the Respondent shall terminate on August 31, 2026. There shall be no retroactive spousal support owing between the parties. Any remaining funds from the sale of the matrimonial home owing to the Applicant father, which continue to be held in trust, should be released to him.

CLOSING COMMENTS

[102] This court recognizes that neither party will be fully satisfied, nor feel vindicated by the content of this decision. At this time, the parties can take one of two paths: they can be offended by the court’s findings, scrutinize perceived errors, double-down on their efforts to vilify the other side and continue to champion their own righteousness; or they can choose to pause, reflect, forgive, and move forward in the best interests of their son. The Applicant and Respondent have many years of parenting L together in the future. If the conflict between the parties persists at its current level, this court has no doubt that L will come to serious emotional harm. Moving forward, both parents must decide if they love L more than they dislike each other.

[103] Should they choose to pursue a more positive path, both parents will need to learn more effective techniques and strategies for coparenting L. It is obvious that they have very different parenting styles, significant trust issues, and they struggle to communicate with one another effectively. Conflict over age-appropriate décor, song lyrics, temporary tattoos, trampoline parks, the sharing of children’s clothing, whether or not a child should be permitted to eat an apple or a Timbit, etc., should never see the inside of the courtroom. Mature discussion on these issues, with the assistance of a qualified and neutral intermediary, appears to this court to be the only viable method of improving the odds of L enjoying the positive childhood that he deserves.

[104] For the benefit of the parties, I include the following excerpts from Steps to Justice: Your Guide to Law in Ontario:

Parenting coordination is an alternative dispute resolution, also called family dispute resolution process. Parents can meet with a parenting coordinator for help with following the parts of their court order, family arbitration award, or separation agreement that are about parenting.

A parenting coordinator is a person who helps parents resolve day-to-day conflicts about their parenting arrangements or parenting orders.

A parenting coordinator doesn't decide major things like decision-making responsibility or parenting time. These used to be called custody and access. But a parenting coordinator can decide minor issues like:

• small changes to a parenting access plan such as vacations and holidays
• scheduling activities and arranging for pick up and drop off to activities like ballet, hockey, or tutoring
• children's travel and passport arrangements
• how your children's clothing and school items are moved between your and your partner's homes

A parenting coordinator helps you speak with each other to try and agree on your parenting issues. If you can't agree, they can decide for you. Their decision is based on information they get from the parents, professionals such as doctors, teachers, counsellors, etc., and, if needed, your child.

The process is similar to mediation-arbitration. But the parenting coordinator cannot make major decisions. Their job is to help you follow the parts of your court order, family arbitration award, or separation agreement that are about parenting.

Parenting coordinators are trained to:

• understand the needs of children
• help each parent discuss their parenting issues
• help parents to manage and keep children out of conflicts

Some of the reasons to use parenting coordination are:

• You get professional help that you may need even after you have a court order, family arbitration award, or separation agreement on parenting issues. Children's needs and issues often change as they get older. A parenting coordinator can help parents who find it hard to communicate with each other and want to set up a process for how they will resolve future issues.
• It can be faster than going to court once you have agreed on all of the process details and signed a parenting coordination agreement.
• It can be cheaper than going to court to resolve minor parenting issues.

Community Legal Education Ontario, “What is Parenting Coordination?” (1 March, 2021), online.

[105] It is not within this court’s jurisdiction to order the parties into Parenting Coordination absent their consent. However, it is the view of this court that this family is ideally-suited for the process. Both parties are strongly urged to consider this more child-focused path.

ORDER

[106] On the basis of the above, there shall be a Final Order to go on the following terms:

Decision-Making Authority

1. Decision-making authority over matters relating to the care of the child of the marriage, L, shall be allocated between the parties as follows:

Day-to-Day Decisions

a. Each party shall have exclusive authority to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child during their own allocated parenting time.

Religion

b. The parties shall have joint decision-making authority over the child’s religious, spiritual and cultural training, subject to the following terms: i. The child shall be raised in the Roman Catholic Faith. ii. If permissible by the Church, each party may select one Sponsor for the child’s First Communion and Confirmation. If not permitted, the Respondent mother shall select the Sponsor for the child’s First Communion and the Applicant father shall select the Sponsor for the child’s Confirmation. iii. Each parent and their invited families and guests may attend the child’s special religious ceremonies, as permitted by the Church. iv. The parent with whom the child is not resident on the date of any special religious ceremony, may select and shall enjoy two uninterrupted hours of time with the child either immediately preceding or following the ceremony. They shall advise the other of their selection a minimum of 30 days in advance of the scheduled ceremony. v. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, the child’s formal religious instruction and ceremonial events shall occur through St. Mark School/Assumption Parish. vi. Each parent may attend church with the child in their discretion on their own parenting time.

Mental Health

c. The parties shall have joint decision-making authority over the child’s mental health care, subject to the following: i. The child shall be enrolled in mental health counselling/therapeutic services within 30 days of a formal request made by either party. ii. The Respondent mother shall suggest three proposed qualified mental health professionals within 30 days of any such formal request. iii. The Applicant father shall select one of the mother’s three proposed mental health professionals within 14 days of receipt of the Respondent mother’s proposed professionals. iv. The selected mental health professional(s) shall be provided with a copy of this written judgment. v. Both parties shall be entitled to consult with and receive information from the child’s mental health professional(s). vi. Both parties shall follow the reasonable recommendations of the child’s mental health professional(s) as it relates to frequency, pacing, and participation by parents in any therapeutic sessions. vii. The cost of any mental health treatment of the child not covered by insurance shall be shared proportionately between the parties as a s. 7 expense.

Extra-Curricular Activities

d. The Applicant father shall have sole decision-making authority over the child’s extracurricular activities, subject to the following: i. Each party may schedule extracurricular events or activities on their own parenting time and at their own expense, without the consent of the other parent, provided these events do not conflict with the scheduled activities referenced in paragraph 1(d)(ii) below. ii. The Applicant father may enroll the child in one organized rep sport, or two organized house-league sports, at any given time, which may infringe upon the Respondent mother’s parenting time/parties’ joint parenting time. iii. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, the sporting organizations or associations referenced in paragraph 1(d)(ii) above, shall be located within the boundaries of the greater City of Hamilton. iv. Each parent shall ensure the child’s attendance at scheduled extracurricular activities on their own respective parenting time, and may rely upon other responsible third-parties to facilitate this transportation when needed. v. In the event that the Respondent mother is unable to arrange transportation for the child to attend an extracurricular activity on her parenting time, she shall provide the father with 24 hours’ written notice, and he shall be responsible for arranging the child’s transportation. vi. The Applicant father shall select and purchase all necessary equipment for the child to participate in the extracurricular activities reference in paragraph 1(d)(ii) above, at first instance, and the Respondent mother shall reimburse her proportionate share as a s. 7 expense. vii. Both parties and their invited guests shall be entitled to attend at the child’s extracurricular events and activities, regardless of the parenting schedule, provided that: 1. they behave respectfully and appropriately to the other parent and their invitees; 2. they maintain a comfortable distance from the other parent and their invitees; and 3. they do not interfere with the resident parent’s right to make day-to-day decisions relating to the child’s care. viii. Each parent may volunteer with the child’s extracurricular organizations and teams in their own discretion (e.g. coaching, managing, etc.). ix. Commencing in 2025, the parties shall have joint-decision making authority over L’s enrollment in summer day camps. In the event of a disagreement, the Respondent mother shall have authority over camp enrollment in the month of July, and the Applicant father shall have authority over camp enrollment in the month of August. The parties shall share the cost of L’s camp registration as a s. 7 expense.

Education

e. The Respondent mother shall have sole decision-making authority over the child’s education, subject to the following: i. The child shall commence full time attendance at Senior Kindergarten at St. Mark Catholic Elementary School in September 2024. ii. The Respondent mother shall not change the child’s school without the consent of the Applicant father or further order of the court. iii. Both parties shall be entitled to consult with and receive information from the child’s educators and school officials, including receipt of copies of the child’s report cards, IEPs, school notices and communications, etc.. iv. Both parties shall be entitled to attend parent-teacher interviews, together or separately. v. The Respondent mother shall be listed as the child’s first emergency contact; the Applicant father shall be listed as the child’s second emergency contact; and the maternal grandparents shall be listed as the child’s alternate emergency contact at the child’s school. vi. Both parents shall be empowered to designate and rely upon members of their extended family as approved pick-up persons for the child from school. vii. Before and after school care, if required by either party, shall be shared as a s. 7 expense between the parties. viii. Both parties and their invited guests shall be entitled to attend at the child’s school events and activities, regardless of the parenting schedule, provided that: 1. they behave respectfully and appropriately to the other parent and their invitees; 2. they maintain a comfortable distance from the other parent and their invitees; and 3. they do not interfere with the resident parent’s right to make day-to-day decisions relating to the child’s care.

Medical and Dental Care

f. The Respondent mother shall have sole decision-making authority over the child’s medical and dental care, subject to the following: i. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties or pursuant to subsequent order of the court, the child’s family physician shall remain Dr. Ambis. ii. Both parties shall be entitled to consult with and receive information from the child’s medical and dental care providers. iii. The Respondent mother shall schedule all of the child’s regular medical and dental appointments. The father shall be entitled to attend the child’s medical appointments, if available, provided that the parties behave respectfully and appropriately with each other during the visits. No other third parties shall attend the appointments, unless specifically agreed. iv. Immediately following all medical or dental appointments relating to the child, the Respondent mother shall advise the Applicant father in writing of the nature of the visit, diagnoses, and any treatment(s) or follow-up measures prescribed by the health care provider. v. Both parties shall implement and follow the recommendations of the child’s health care team, including but not limited to: 1. Compliance with reasonable recommendations relating to nutrition and diet; and 2. The use of prescription and over-the-counter medication. vi. Both parties shall forthwith notify the other parent of any emergency or unscheduled medical treatment required by the child.

Communication

2. The parties shall communicate primarily using the AppClose communication platform.
3. The parties shall utilize the AppClose calendar feature as follows: a. The Applicant father shall forthwith input the child’s extracurricular activities and events into the shared calendar upon receipt of the information from the organizer. b. The Respondent mother shall input all of the child’s scheduled medical and dental appointments, including the time, location, and name of the clinic or health professional, into the calendar immediately upon scheduling the appointment. c. The Respondent mother shall input all of the child’s educational and school activities, PA Days, meetings, special events, etc., including particulars of the event, into the calendar immediately upon receiving notice of the event.
4. The parties will ensure that the other party has, at all times, their current telephone number, email address, and physical address.

Regular Parenting Schedule

5. Commencing immediately, the child shall share regular parenting time with the parties as follows: a. The child shall reside primarily with the Respondent mother. b. The child shall have parenting time with the Applicant father as follows: i. Week One: Wednesday at 3:30 p.m. until Thursday at 9:00 a.m.; ii. Week Two: Wednesday at 3:30 p.m. until Thursday at 9:00 a.m.; and Friday at 3:30 p.m. until Monday at 9:00 a.m.; iii. In the event that the Applicant father’s parenting time falls on a statutory holiday or Professional Activity Day at the child’s school, the father’s parenting time shall be expanded by one full day. For clarity, if the child has a Professional Activity Day from school on the Friday of the father’s parenting weekend, his parenting time will start on Thursday at 3:30 p.m. If the Monday of the father’s parenting weekend is a statutory holiday, his parenting time will end on Tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m. iv. During the months of July and August, the Applicant father’s weekday parenting time shall extend from Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. until Thursday at 7:00 p.m. c. The child’s weekend schedule in the father’s home shall be aligned with the weekends in which the Applicant father’s stepson, M, is resident in his home.

Holiday Parenting Schedule

6. The following holiday schedule shall override the regular parenting schedule: a. School spring break: The child shall be in the care of the Respondent mother over the school spring break in odd-numbered years, and in the care of the Applicant father in even-numbered years. This additional spring break parenting time shall not include the other parent’s regularly scheduled weekend. b. Easter: The long Easter weekend shall be divided equally between the parties, as follows: i. In odd-numbered years the child will be in the care of the Applicant father from after school on Thursday until Saturday evening at 7:00 p.m., and in the care of the Respondent mother from Saturday evening at 7:00 p.m. until Tuesday morning return to school; and ii. In even-numbered years the child will be in the care of the Respondent mother from after school on Thursday until Saturday evening at 7:00 p.m., and in the care of the Applicant father from Saturday evening at 7:00 p.m. until Tuesday morning return to school. c. Mother’s Day: The child shall always be in the care of the Respondent mother from 10:00 a.m. on Mother’s Day until Monday morning at 9:00 a.m.. d. Father’s Day: The child shall always be in the care of the Applicant father from 10:00 a.m. on Father’s Day until Monday morning at 9:00 a.m.. e. Summer Vacation: Commencing in 2024, each parent shall be entitled to take one week of summer vacation with the child, and commencing in 2025, each parent shall be entitled to take two non-consecutive weeks of summer vacation with the child, subject to the following: i. In 2024, the Applicant father shall have first choice and shall notify the Respondent mother of his selected vacation week by June 14th, and the Respondent mother shall notify the Applicant father of her selected vacation week by June 28th. ii. Commencing in 2025, and in odd-numbered years thereafter, the Respondent mother shall have first choice of vacation weeks and shall notify the Applicant father of her two selected weeks by April 1st. The Applicant father shall thereafter notify the Respondent mother of his two selected weeks by April 15th. iii. Commencing in 2026, and in even-numbered years, the Applicant father shall have first choice of vacation weeks and shall notify the Respondent mother of his two selected weeks by April 1st. The Respondent mother shall thereafter notify the Applicant father of her two selected weeks by April 15th. iv. Each party’s selected vacation weeks shall not include any of the other parent’s regularly scheduled weekends. v. Each party’s scheduled summer vacation time with the child may be spent away or at home, in their own discretion. f. Labour Day: The child shall always be in the care of the Respondent mother on Labour Day from 10:00 a.m. to the start of the school term. g. Christmas: The child’s Christmas vacation shall be divided equally between the parties, subject to the following: i. During odd-numbered years, the child shall be in the care of the Applicant father from December 24th at 9:00 a.m. until December 25th at 12:00 noon, and shall be in the care of the Respondent mother from December 25th at 12:00 noon until December 26th at 7:00 p.m.. ii. During even-numbered years, the child shall be in the care of the Respondent mother from December 24th at 9:00 a.m. until December 25th at 12:00 noon, and shall be in the care of the Applicant father from December 25th at 12:00 noon until December 26th at 7:00 p.m.. iii. The parties shall otherwise share the child’s Christmas Break from school evenly in equal and extended blocks of time. If the parties are unable to reach consensus on the division of holiday time by November 25th, the Respondent mother shall have final authority over the Christmas schedule (in keeping with these rules) in odd-numbered years, and the Applicant father shall have final authority over the schedule (in keeping with these rules) in even-numbered years. h. All other holidays shall follow the regular parenting schedule.

Exchanges

7. Where the regular schedule permits, parenting exchanges shall take place at the child’s school at the natural start time/end time of the school day. Where parenting exchanges do not align with a regular school day, the party commencing their parenting time shall be responsible for the child’s transportation.

Miscellaneous

8. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties or pursuant to further order of the court, the paternal uncle, shall not be left alone in a caregiving role to L.

Name Change

9. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, neither party shall change the child’s legal name.

Telephone/Video Contact

10. Both parents shall pre-arrange and facilitate reasonable telephone/video contact between the child and non-resident parent during any period that the child is not in the care of a parent for more than 5 overnights. This contact shall be entered in the AppClose calendar in advance.
11. The child shall have a telephone call or video call with the non-resident parent on his birthday, and on the birthday of each parent, if requested.
12. The child shall be permitted to telephone, email, video, or text both parents without restriction.
13. All telephone/video contact between the child and either parent shall be private and shall not be recorded.

Travel

14. Both parties are authorized to travel domestically and internationally with the child on notice to the other parent.
15. If either party intends to travel outside of Canada with the child: a. They shall provide a minimum of 7 days’ written notice of any proposed day trips in the United States; b. They shall provide a minimum of 30 days’ written notice of any proposed overnight trips in the United States, including particulars of transportation (e.g. border crossing location, flight numbers, times, etc.) and lodgings; and c. They shall provide a minimum of 60 days’ written notice of any proposed trips outside of Canada/United States, including particulars of transportation (e.g. border crossing location, flight numbers, times, etc.) and lodgings.
16. If a party requests a written consent to travel document from the other parent, the travelling parent shall provide a copy of the draft travel consent form to the non-travelling parent. The non-travelling parent shall execute the consent within 7 days. Any costs of executing the travel document shall be borne by the travelling parent.

Official Documents

17. The Applicant father shall be custodian of the child’s Passport: a. The Applicant father shall ensure the child’s Passport remains current. b. The Respondent mother shall forthwith execute any consents or authorizations necessary for renewal. c. The Applicant father shall be responsible for all costs associated with maintaining the child’s passport. d. The Applicant father shall provide the Respondent mother with a current Notarized copy of the child’s Passport. e. The Applicant father shall forthwith provide the Respondent mother with the original copy of the child’s Passport when needed for travel, and by no later than seven (7) days prior to the mother’s departure date. f. The Respondent mother shall forthwith return the child’s Passport to the Applicant father within seven (7) days of her return from travel.
18. The Respondent mother shall be the custodian of the child’s Birth Certificate, Health Card, and religious documents: a. The Respondent mother shall ensure the child’s Health Card remains current. b. The Applicant father shall forthwith execute any consents or authorizations necessary for renewal. c. The Respondent mother shall be responsible for all costs associated with maintaining these official documents. d. The Respondent mother shall forthwith provide the Applicant father with a Notarized copy of the child’s Birth Certificate, Health Card, and religious documents.

Child Support

19. Commencing July 1, 2022, the Applicant father shall pay Table child support to the Respondent mother, on behalf of the child of the marriage, in the amount of $966.00 per month, in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, based upon an annual income of $107,194.00.
20. Commencing July 1, 2023, the Applicant father shall pay Table child support to the Respondent mother, on behalf of the child of the marriage, in the amount of $993.00 per month, in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, based upon an annual income of $110,508.00.
21. In the event of an underpayment of table child support arising from paragraphs 19 and 20 above, the amount shall be paid to the paid in one lump sump payment to the Respondent mother from the remaining proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home presently held in trust. Upon payment, any remaining funds held in trust on the Applicant father’s behalf shall be released to him.
22. The parties shall contribute to the child’s s. 7 expenses in proportion to their respective incomes. Commencing June 1, 2024, the Applicant father’s proportionate share shall be 70% and the Respondent mother’s proportionate share shall be 30%.
23. The parties shall be entitled to incur and seek reimbursement for the child’s s. 7 expenses, as incurred under the spheres of decision-making for which they have been granted decision-making authority above.
24. Commencing in 2024 and annually thereafter, by May 1st the parties shall exchange copies of their complete Income Tax returns, including applicable schedules and attachments, for the previous calendar year, and copies of their Notices of Assessment as issued by the Canada Revenue Agency, forthwith upon receipt. They shall adjust the Table child support amount payable, and their respective proportionate contribution to the child’s s. 7 expenses on a go-forward basis, annually, commencing on July 1st.
25. There shall be no other arrears of retroactive adjustment of child support owing between the parties.

Spousal Support

26. Commencing June 1, 2024 the Applicant father shall pay spousal support to the Respondent mother in the sum of $981.00 per month.
27. There shall be no arrears or retroactive adjustment of spousal support owing between the parties.
28. On August 31, 2026 the Applicant father’s obligation to pay spousal support to the Respondent mother shall terminate.
29. A Support Deduction Order shall issue.

Costs

30. If costs are an issue: a. The party seeking costs shall serve and file Cost Submissions, not exceeding five pages in length, exclusive of a Bill of Costs and applicable caselaw, by June 14, 2024; b. The responding party shall serve and file Responding Cost Submissions, not exceeding five pages in length, exclusive of bill of costs and applicable caselaw, by June 28, 2024; and c. If Cost Submissions are not served and filed by June 14, 2024, there shall be no costs payable arising from this action.

Bale J. Released: May 28, 2024