COURT FILE NO.: FC-20-102 (Simcoe) DATE: 2023/05/26 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Robert Joseph Duwyn Applicant

– and –

Lyndsey Leeanne Ross Respondent

Counsel: Andrew A. Nicolls, for the Applicant William R. Clayton, for the Respondent

HEARD: October 26, 27, 28, 31, 2022 November 1, 2, 3, 4, 2022 March 9, 10, 2023

The honourable Justice M. J. Valente

Reasons for Judgment

[1] The central issues in this trial focused on decision making responsibility and parenting time respecting the parties’ child, Matthew David Michael Ross, born September 17, 2019 (‘Matthew’). These issues and all related unresolved collateral issues were hotly disputed. The parties are unfortunately acrimonious.

Background Facts

a) The Applicant Father

[2] The Applicant, Robert Joseph Duwyn (the ‘Father’), is 49 years of age and lives alone in a 5 bedroom newly constructed home on Highway 3 in Simcoe (the “Highway 3 Property”). The Highway 3 Property is a short drive from the home of the Respondent, Lyndsey Leanne Ross (the ‘Mother’). The Father has been employed by the federal government since 2000. He has had several promotions throughout the years and currently is a senior programme advisor in the government’s temporary worker programme. The Father can, and does, work from home when he cares for Matthew during the working week.

[3] The Father’s parents are deceased, but he has a twin brother, Kristian, who lives in Toronto and with whom he shares a close relationship. The Father has a second brother as well. His relationship with this sibling is, however, strained.

[4] The Father described himself as being “joyful” when he learned the Mother was pregnant and testified that Matthew’s birth was a “milestone” in his life.

b) The Respondent Mother

[5] The Mother is 37 years of age and is both university and college educated. She is a respirologist by profession and the majority shareholder of Absolute Respiratory Services Inc (‘Absolute’) which specializes in home care respirology services. The Mother is also the majority shareholder of a land holding corporation, MDMR Enterprise Incorporated (‘MDMR’). MDMR is the landlord of Absolute. The Mother is a successful, self made professional, who like the Father, has flexibility to work from home. She testified then whenever Matthew is not with his father, he is with her at home where she devotes her time and attention to Matthew.

[6] The Mother and Matthew currently live with the Mother’s parents, Melanie Ross, and Michael David Ross (‘Michael’). The Mother lived with her parents before the parties married and returned to the family home upon separation. Matthew has his own bedroom and bathroom in his grandparent’s well-appointed home.

[7] The Mother is an only child. Since the summer of 2021, she has been involved in a romantic relationship with Brian Jones who admitted in his examination that he was incarcerated in 1996 for 18 months in the United States because of mail and wire fraud convictions. Based on Brian Jones’ testimony, I assess him as a rehabilitated individual. The Mother’s relationship with him is not a factor in my decision.

[8] The Mother’s father, Michael, is a general contractor. Michael began the construction of, but did not complete, the Highway 3 Property in which the Father lives. Although the Father testified that as a condition to the Mother becoming pregnant, she insisted that Michael build “her dream home” on the Highway 3 Property, I have no difficulty concluding that today the Mother is entirely devoted to her son who is very much the centre of her life and with whom she shares a loving emotional bond.

[9] By way of further background, the parties met online in 2015, were married on September 23, 2017, and separated on May 16, 2019, some 20 months later. The parties divorced on December 14, 2021. Matthew was born 4 months after his parents separated and has only ever known his parents to live in separate homes.

Litigation History

[10] Prior to reaching trial, several orders were issued by this Court. The following is a summary of those orders, and where applicable, contextual facts:

1. Temporary Order, dated October 27, 2020 – Prior to the issuance of the October 27, 2020 Order of Justice McLeod, the Mother permitted the Father supervised parenting time with Matthew at the public library 3 times per week for approximately 1.5 hours per visit. These visits, supervised by the Mother, lasted from shortly after Matthew’s birth until the beginning of the COVID-19 Pandemic (the ‘Pandemic’) in March 2020. Once these supervised visits ended, the Mother offered the Father virtual visits, and later in September 2020 mid-morning supervised visits in a local park. Both offers were rejected by the Father because in the first instance, he saw little value to virtual visits given Matthew’s age, and in the second instance, a mid-morning park visit conflicted with his work schedule. Instead, the Father requested unsupervised parenting time. This proposal was rejected by the Mother and resulted in a contested motion before Justice McLeod. In his Order of October 27, 2020, Justice McLeod ordered unsupervised parenting time in favour of the Father on a staged basis which resulted in one weeknight access visit of 3 hours and Saturday and Sunday parenting time of 6 hours per day. Justice McLeod also ordered that the exchanges take place at the local Tim Horton’s restaurant, adjourned the matter to be continued before him to December 21, 2020, and ordered the Mother pay costs of $3,000.

2. Temporary Order, dated December 21, 2020 – Parenting-time remained an issue when the matter was again before Justice McLeod in December 2020. At this time, the Father was looking for generous overnight access and the Mother was opposed to any overnight parenting time. Justice McLeod ordered access on December 30, 2020, from 10:00am to 6:00 pm; every Wednesday from 4:00pm to 7:00pm and overnight access each Saturday from 4:00pm to Sunday at 4:00pm. At this point, Matthew was approximately 15 months old.

3. Consent Temporary Order, dated March 10, 2021 – This consent Order of Justice MacNeil required, among other things, the Father to pay the table amount of child support of $745 per month commencing April 1, 2021 and permitted both parties to obtain information directly from Matthew’s service providers, including his doctors. Until this time, the Father had not paid any child support and had had trouble in obtaining information from Matthew’s physician.

4. Consent Final Order, dated March 10, 2021 – This consent order confirms that the parties are the parents of Matthew notwithstanding that Matthew’s statement of live birth, completed at the Mother’s direction, fails to acknowledge the Father as Matthew’s parent.

5. Consent Temporary Order, dated December 2, 2021 – The December 2, 2021, consent order expands the Father’s parenting time to include every Wednesday from 10:00am to Thursday at 1:00pm and each Saturday from 4:00pm to Sunday at 4:00pm.

6. Consent Final (Partial) Order, dated February 22, 2022 – The February 2, 2022, Order of Justice McLeod, among other matters, settles parenting time for such annual holidays as Christmas, Easter, Thanksgiving and Mother’s and Father’s Days, confirms that no equalization payment is to be made and fixes the child support arrears of the Father at zero as of September 14, 2021.

[11] Pursuant to the Minutes of Settlement, dated September 16, 2021, upon which the February 22, 2022 Consent Order is based, the terms of the settlement were conditional upon the Father accepting an offer to settle from Michael respecting a construction lien that he and his general contracting company had registered against the Highway 3 Property in the amount of $96,000. The lien resulted from a pricing dispute respecting the home’s construction. Although the details of Michael’s offer are not in evidence, the offer’s acceptance was confirmed by the parties, paving the way for the issuance of the February 22, 2022 Consent Order.

[12] Whereas the Father contends that Michael’s quoted price for the home build was $350,000 without any markup for profit, the Mother’s evidence on the quoted price is less specific apart from her assertion that a modest profit was to be included. The Court does not have the benefit of Michael’s version of the pricing agreement because he did not testify. From my perspective, however, an examination of the details of the lien dispute is not relevant to the issues before me. What is of some importance is the Father’s reaction to the alleged overcharging by Michael and the Mother’s response to that reaction, both of which are discussed later in this Judgment.

Issues to be Determined at Trial

[13] By the conclusion of the trial, and to the credit of the parties, they resolved two issues. Firstly, they agreed that Matthew will be enrolled at West Lynn Public School for September 2023 to begin junior kindergarten. The Father’s position had been that Matthew should attend St. Joseph’s School, a Roman Catholic French immersion school, for a variety of reasons, including its connection to his mother who had taught French there. The Father maintained this position notwithstanding that St. Joseph’s School is outside Matthew’s school district and West Lynn Public School is located close to both parents’ homes.

[14] Secondly, the parties agreed that should this Court order an equal parenting time arrangement, no child support need be ordered as Matthew’s needs can be satisfied by each parent from their respective incomes without additional support from the other parent. In that event, and given the relative comparable income of the parties, I have no difficulty in accepting this agreed proposition.

[15] Therefore, the remaining substantive issues to be decided by this Court are as follows:

1. The terms of decision-making responsibility for Matthew;
2. The terms of parenting time with Matthew;
3. Should unequal parenting time be ordered, the amount of child support to be paid;
4. The amount of retroactive child support to be paid by the Father, if any, in the face of the February 22, 2022 Consent Order; and
5. A determination whether Matthew’s name should be changed to Matthew Robert Duwyn, Matthew David Michael Ross-Duwyn, Matthew Robert Duwyn-Ross, Matthew Robert David Michael Duwyn-Ross, or some combination, therefore.

[16] The Father seeks sole decision-making responsibility for Matthew, or in the alternative, joint-decision-making responsibility, equal parenting time with Matthew, pick up and drop offs at Matthew’s school commencing in September, 2023, four non-consecutive summer vacation weeks, an order requiring him to be added as the ‘father’ to Matthew’s birth registration as well as an order changing Matthew’s name to include the middle name, “Robert” and the surname, “Duwyn-Ross”.

[17] For her part, the Mother seeks, among other relief, sole decision-making responsibility for Matthew, more than equal parenting time with Matthew, all exchanges to occur at the Highway 3 Simcoe Tim Horton’s, two non-consecutive summer holiday weeks, child support together with retroactive child support.

The Testimony of the Father

[18] The Father described himself as calm, even tempered, and non retaliatory. While for the most part the Father did testify in what appeared to be a well practiced, controlled, and composed manner, he became extremely defensive and angry when unexcepted questions were put to him in cross examination as in the case of questions relating to his expenses and to the suggestion that he reacted as a “drama queen” to the pricing dispute over the construction of the Highway 3 Property. These instances of intense agitation and antagonism towards the Mother’s counsel cause me to conclude that the Father is likely the type of individual who, as the Mother claims, described her in such derogatory terms as “fat”, a “slut” and a “bitch” in the heat of argument.

[19] The Father also strikes me as someone who is overly concerned with money; a concern that almost amounts to an obsession. It is the Father’s obsession with money that explains why he insisted that title to the Highway 3 Property be put in his name alone as the Mother was not contributing financially to its purchase and home construction. It is equally the Father’s preoccupation with money that caused him to declare in a May 12, 2019 text message to the Mother that because of Michael’s alleged inflated pricing of the home construction, he was to lose everything he had worked for, “everything in life” and the Highway 3 Property must be sold. Counsel for the Mother describes the Father’s reaction to the pricing dispute as “unhinged”. I do not disagree with the characterization.

[20] During the Father’s testimony, he confused his interests with the best interests of Matthew. For example, the Father stated that it is in Matthew’s best interest “to bond with his father and his family”. He also rationalized that he would like “equal time” with Matthew “because it is in Matthew’s best interest”. While a closer connection with the Father and his family may indeed be in Matthew’s best interests, I cannot accept, as the Father suggests, that as an infant Matthew’s best interests are served by his seeing his ailing paternal grandmother prior to her passing.

[21] Notwithstanding the Father’s confusion of Matthew’s voice with his own at trial, I have confidence that he can put his interests aside in favour of his son’s best interests given, for example, his ultimate agreement that Matthew should attend West Lynn Public School in the fall of 2023.

[22] In his evidence the Father also demonstrated maturity and respect for the role of the Mother in Matthew’s life. In cross examination he had no difficulty agreeing that Matthew is very close to his mother, that she has strengths as a parent and as a result of the Mother’s influence, Matthew is both happy and thriving. Because of the Father’s unequivocal appreciation for the Mother’s importance in Matthew’s life, I have no difficulty finding that were the Father given decision making responsibility, he would as he testified, involve the Mother in decision-making.

[23] Based on the evidence, I also have no difficulty in finding that the Father has established a strong and positive emotional bond with Matthew and that the anger that was evident in the Father’s cross examination plays no role in his relationship with Matthew. The Father has taken advantage of every available opportunity to be with Matthew and has rearranged his work schedule to maximize quality parenting time with Matthew. Not only is the Father capable of meeting Matthew’s physical needs, as confirmed by the evidence of the Father’s brother, Kristian, and the two Child and Family Services workers, Kayla Bond, and Emily Walraven, but the Father is also able to focus on Matthew’s needs as a developing child. The Father reads to Matthew, teaches Matthew, swims with Matthew, and otherwise plays with him. The Father and son have a close and loving relationship; a relationship in which both Kristian and Kayla Bond independently observed Matthew as happy and thriving.

[24] Finally, although the Mother had very few positive comments about the Father, she did concede in her testimony that the Father has bonded with Matthew and the status quo parenting time established by the Orders of December 2, 2021, and February 22, 2022, is working well. Therefore, it is the Mother’s position that, there is no reason to deviate from the current parenting protocol.

The Testimony of the Mother

[25] The Mother testified in a controlled, articulate manner such that her testimony appeared well rehearsed. She impressed me as a no-nonsense businessperson who values accuracy in all matters financial. She explained with precision the financial statements of both Absolute and MDMR. I find the Mother to be a confident and strong-willed individual who is determined to succeed in all that she undertakes. In this respect, I also find the Mother to be a positive role model for Matthew who is the centre of her life and to whom the Mother is devoted.

[26] The Mother’s confidence nonetheless was shaken when on cross examination the suggested narrative was not favourable to her position. Such was the case, for example, when she broke down in tears at being pressed to acknowledge that she may not be a victim of the Father’s alleged abusive conduct. While such a response may ordinarily be natural and expected, my observation was that the Mother’s tears were initiated to divert the line of questioning.

[27] The Mother also proved to be difficult, defensive, and argumentative in discussing Matthew’s relationship with his father. She refused to confirm that her former spouse loves his son but instead expressed the hope that the proposition was true. She was also very reluctant to agree with the obvious reality that Matthew currently spends significantly more time with her than his father. Finally, she was incapable of any empathy for her former spouse. When asked how she might respond to not seeing Matthew for some 7 months, as was the Father’s experience beginning in March 2020, the Mother responded: “I do not know. I cannot imagine myself in this position”. More striking than the Mother’s lack of empathy for the Father, were her anger for and distrust of the Father. These feelings were palpable throughout the Mother’s testimony.

[28] No doubt the Mother’s feelings of anger and distrust explain why she sought to limit the Father’s parenting time with Matthew after his birth and remains reluctant to expand access today. On May 14, 2019, when the Father responded to the construction cost dispute by insisting that the Highway 3 Property be sold, the Mother threatened in a text message that she, their yet to be born child, and the house were a “package deal”. It was the Father’s “choice”: “All or nothing”. When the parties’ marriage broke down immediately thereafter, the Mother followed through with her threat by actively restricting the Father’s relationship with Matthew.

[29] It is the Mother’s position that her early imposition of limited supervised parenting time was justified and her opposition to any expansion of access continues to be well founded for a variety of reasons, including:

i. the risk of the Father absconding with Matthew to Belgium; ii. the Father’s physical and emotional abuse, including his death threat of Michael; and iii. the Father’s flagrant disregard of Pandemic protocols and the corresponding threat to Matthew’s health and safety.

[30] Each of these issues merit further analysis, not only to examine the basis for the Mother’s past conduct but also to determine Matthew’s best interests now and in the foreseeable future. Indeed, these issues touch directly or indirectly on certain of the factors mandated by section 16.3 of the Divorce Act, RSC, c. 3 (the ‘Divorce Act’) for this Court’s consideration in determining Matthew’s best interests in making a parenting or contact order.

Mother’s Allegations

a) Father is a Flight Risk.

[31] The Father is of Belgium heritage and has dual Canadian and European citizenship. The Father is undeniably proud of his Belgian ancestry and spoke to the Mother about the possibility of vacationing in Belgium after not visiting that country for many years. On these facts alone, the Mother concluded that the Father was a flight risk and advised the police of her concerns. To my mind, the Mother’s conclusion defies logic particularly when one considers that there is no evidence to suggest that the Father has any family or friends in Belgium or the ability to earn an income in that country. Rather the Father’s world is in Ontario. He owns property here; he is employed here; his family and friends live here; the Father’s roots are in Ontario. There is simply no rational basis to conclude that he may abandon his existing world to abscond with Matthew to Belgium. To my mind, the only reason that the Mother might suggest this possibility is justify her opposition to the Father having generous parenting time with Matthew.

b) Physical Abuse

[32] The Mother testified to three separate incidents of alleged physical abuse early in the parties’ marriage. In two of these incidents, the Father allegedly pushed the Mother against a bedroom door, and in one such instance, with such force that the door handle made an impression in the wall. The Mother also testified to a further incident on the occasion of an access visit at the Simcoe library when the Father allegedly slapped her hand while retrieving Matthew’s fallen shoe. As a result of the Father’s physical abuse, the Mother’s evidence is that she is fearful of the Father.

[33] For this part, the Father denies each of the abuse allegations.

[34] I find that on the balance of probabilities that the Father did not physically abuse the Mother and I reach this conclusion for a variety of reasons. Firstly, although the Mother testified that she advised friends of the alleged abuse, no witnesses were called to corroborate the Mother’s testimony.

[35] Secondly, the Mother did not dispute the statement in the Ontario Provincial Police report of February 22, 2020 (the “February 22 Police Report”), in which the alleged hand slap assault is reported, that prior to February 22, 2020 “her ex has never been physical with her”.

[36] While the Mother does deny telling the police in February 2020 that “she believed the slap was meant as a joke/reaction to her request for the shoe as she outstretched her hand”, I find it difficult to accept that the police misinterpreted the Mother’s recitation of the library events to the extent that she would have this Court believe. Furthermore, if the police did so, I cannot accept that the Mother would not have requested an amendment to the February 22 Police Report given her attention to detail and accuracy. To my mind it is also telling that the Mother did not want the police to contact the Father regarding the alleged library assault. The Mother’s evidence is she wished only the alleged hand slap to be recorded in the February 22 Police Report, and nothing more, because any police follow up would likely make the Father more hostile. However, were the Mother truly fearful of the Father, I would have thought she would have welcomed police intervention. The Mother did not fear the Father because there was no reason to be afraid. Were the Mother fearful of the Father, she would not have met her alleged assailant alone with Matthew soon after his birth while her own mother was available to accompany her. Finally, in my opinion, it is not logical for the Mother to describe the Father as a “pussy” during their time together and as someone who ran away from arguments throwing “hissy fits” were he an individual prone to violence.

c) Emotional Abuse

[37] I have already concluded that the Father likely called the Mother a number of degrading and demeaning names during the course of their marriage but to my mind absent anything more, such name calling does not amount to emotional abuse. In the heat of an argument people often and unfortunately call each other names that they regret once emotions cool.

[38] The Mother’s allegations that the Father threatened to kill Michael, her father, is another matter. The Mother testified that on May 15, 2019, while she and the Father argued about Michael’s pricing of the Highway 3 Property’s home construction, her former spouse threatened to kill Michael. Just as with the allegations of physical abuse, I find that on the balance of probabilities the Father did not threaten to kill Michael, or, if the threat was made, the Mother knew that the threat was without substance and made in the heat of an argument.

[39] There is no reference to the death threat in any of the text messages between the parties after May 15, 2019. One would have thought that if the threat was made and it was the precipitating event for the Mother to leave the Father, as she asserts, the Mother would have mentioned the threat in her subsequent text exchanges with the Father. Likewise, the Father’s alleged intention to kill Michael appears nowhere in the pleadings. Although the Mother explains its omission was the decision of her former counsel, it is incomprehensible to me that such a threat would not find its way into the pleadings of a custody and access dispute. Furthermore, to my mind it is telling that the alleged threat was not reported to the police until February 21, 2020 following an unrelated argument with the Father at the public library on the occasion of an access visit. Just as in the case of the hand slap, the Mother reported the threat for purposes of creating a record for the parties’ ongoing court proceedings and with instructions that the police were not to contact the Father.

[40] There is also inconsistency in the Mother’s evidence regarding the events surrounding the death threat. In her September 2021 questioning, the Mother testified that after the Father made the threat, as a 4-month expectant mother, she had to physically block the Father from leaving their home to attack Michael. Not only is the Mother’s physical restraint of the Father not referenced in the Ontario Provincial Police report of February 21, 2020, but at trial, the Mother acknowledged that there was no physical contact between she and the Father on the day of the alleged threat.

[41] Moreover, the Mother testified that she has a very close and loving relationship with Michael. In these circumstances, it defies logic that after the threat was made, the Mother would put Michael in harm’s way by asking him to deliver several items to the Father, and later, to attend the Father’s home to take photographs of it. Ultimately, it does not escape me that the uncontroverted evidence is that only a few days following the alleged threat, the Father attended Michael’s home to discuss the house pricing issue without incident.

d) Disregard of Pandemic Protocols

[42] In the beginning of the Pandemic, Michael took several photographs of the construction work being undertaken at the Highway 3 Property. The photographs depict a number of trade vehicles parked on the Highway 3 Property. Based on these photographs, the Mother concluded that with the goal of completing the Highway 3 property construction after terminating his contract with Michael, the Father was not practicing social distancing and other Pandemic safety protocols. The Mother reasoned that the Father’s failure to do so, placed Matthew at risk, and therefore, her refusal to permit the Father in person parenting time with Matthew for several months was justified.

[43] While I accept that with the onslaught of the Pandemic there was significant uncertainty with respect to the spread of the disease and safety was indeed paramount, I reject that based on the photographs alone, the Mother was justified in denying the Father in person visits with Matthew. If the Mother were truly interested in ensuring that Matthew’s best interests were addressed, she would have communicated her concerns to the Father instead of using the photographs to reach a self-serving conclusion. Had the Mother made enquiries, she would have learned that the Father and Kristian were living in a three person “bubble” with their immune compromised mother for whom they were providing care. She would have also learned that the Father was respecting the government mandated Pandemic protocols and work was being undertaken only on the exterior of the Highway 3 Property in the spring of 2020.

[44] To my mind a simple enquiry of the Father would have assured the Mother that Matthew would have been safe in the company of his father just as she was confident that the child was secure in the company of Michael, who after a short hiatus, continued to operate his construction firm during the Pandemic. It is my opinion that the Mother chose not to communicate her Pandemic concerns to the Father because she was searching for a reason to alienate the Father from Matthew. For this same purpose the Mother falsely claimed the Father was a flight risk, an abuser, and a threat to Michael’s life.

[45] I have reached the conclusion that the Mother has sought to alienate the Father from Matthew not easy but based on the above cited evidence and such additional evidence as the Mother’s decision not to acknowledge the Father as Matthew’s parent on the child’s birth registration, the Mother unilaterally naming the child without any input from the Father in circumstances where she knew or ought to have known that the Father was emotionally invested in being a part of the child’s life and the Mother’s failure to share Matthew’s medical information with the Father.

[46] In concluding that the Mother sought to isolate the Father from Matthew, I have also considered that shortly after overnight parenting time had begun and a mere few days prior to a Court attendance, the Mother reported to the child’s physician, Dr. Johnson, that Matthew was not responding well to diaper changes and his penis was inexplicably irritated. I reject the Mother’s position that she raised this issue with Dr. Johnson with no intention of raising the suspicion of sexual abuse on the Father’s part but out of parental concern for her child. Again, were the Mother truly concerned about Matthew’s wellbeing, she would have communicated her worry to the Father before prompting an investigation which ultimately did not implicate the Father in any way.

Decision Making Responsibility

[47] The sole issue before me in determining the matters of decision making and parenting time is the best interests of Matthew. In determining Matthew’s best interests, in addition to the factors enumerated in section 16(3) of the Divorce Act, I must also consider the realities of the case before me. Those realities include parents who harbour resentment and antipathy for one another. Based on the evidence, there is nothing to suggest that over time they will together develop the ability to communicate civilly and adequately with each other to ensure decisions for Matthew are made in a timely and effective manner. This is a situation where the Mother has stated that she is “not comfortable co-parenting” with the Father, and where, I have found that the Mother has taken steps to alienate father and child and therefore put Matthew’s relationship with his father at risk were sole custody granted to the Mother. I also remain mindful, however, that the realities of this case include both a mother and father whom to date have done a stellar job in providing for Matthew’s needs and creating a stable environment for his development into his full potential.

[48] The Mother submits that given her excellent history of de facto sole decision making, there is no reason to deprive Matthew of his mother as the parent with sole decision-making responsibility. The Mother argues that this Court should have no fear that she will alienate the Father in the future if granted sole decision-making responsibility given the Father’s demonstrated fervent desire to be actively involved in Matthew’s life. The Mother further submits that the parties’ agreement to sharing annual holiday and special occasion parenting time belie any notion that she will alienate the Father moving forward.

[49] Based on the historical facts as I have found them and the Mother’s unqualified pronouncement as a fact that children are much more bonded to their mothers than their fathers, I am not convinced.

[50] In my view, the Mother has taken extreme measures to exclude the Father from Matthew’s life, including false allegations of abuse, unreasonable positions on supervised parenting-time and raising deceptive suspicions of molestation: the Mother’s conduct, to my mind, was clearly intended to marginalize the Father and to exclude him from having a meaningful relationship with Matthew. Given the nature of the Mother’s past conduct. I have no confidence that the Mother’s behaviour will change in the future when it is no longer under the scrutiny of this Court. Accordingly, I conclude that the Father’s relationship with Matthew will be at risk if the Mother were to be granted sole decision-making responsibility. Sole decision-making responsibility would permit the Mother to continue to exclude the Father from Matthew’s life. Given that the Father is a loving and attentive parent, I find that this is not in the best interests of Matthew (see Liu v Huang, 2018 ONSC 3499, at paras 114-117; Miller v Miller, 2014 ONSC 6947 (Ontario S.C.J), at para 21).

[51] Our Courts have increasingly recognized that a form of joint decision-making order is the “less risky path forward” when one parent seeks to marginalize the other parent to ensure that the parent’s continued involvement in the child’s life (see Y v F-T, 2017 ONSC 4395, at para 162 and see Adeel v Afzal, 2014 ONSC 3110 and Bentien v Bentien, 2014 ONSC 7238). As stated by Justice J. D. Walters in Teeple v Millington, 2020 ONSC 896 (‘Teeple’), at paragraph 26 (1):

There has been an increasing willingness in recent years to order joint custody rather than sole custody where such an order is considered necessary to preserve the balance of power between the parties, particularly in cases where both parties are caring and competent parents, but one party has been primarily responsible for the conflict between the parties.

[52] Based on the facts of this case, I find that a joint decision-making order is in the best interests of Matthew. Having said that, I am very much aware that this is a high conflict situation where the Mother is not prepared to cooperate in parenting with the Father. For that reason, I also find that a parallel decision-making order is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

[53] This Court in Ryan v Scott, 2011 ONSC 3277, (‘Ryan’) explains the concept of parallel parenting at paragraph 20 in this way:

In relation to the issue of joint custody and parallel decision-making the case of Madott v Macorig, 2010 ONSC 5458, [2010] O.J No. 4371 (Ont. S.C.J.), Blishen J. best summarizes the relevant principles at paras. 82, 83 and 85:

82. In situations where parents have been distrustful, hostile and uncooperative, joint custody can be an appropriate disposition if crafted as “parallel parenting” instead of “cooperative parenting.”

83. In M. (T.J) v M. (P.G.), [2002] O.J No. 398…Aston J. then indicates” …Consequently, parallel parenting orders have become a form of joint custody, a subcategory if you will, which does not depend upon cooperative working relationships or even good communication between the parents. The concept (consistent with s. 20(1) Children’s Law Reform Act) is that parents have equal status but exercise the rights and responsibilities associated with “custody” independently of one another.

[54] Justice Maranger in Ryan also states, and I agree, that:

85. In a number of recent high conflict cases, the Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld parallel parenting orders made by trial courts where joint decision-making is impracticable or unworkable.

[55] Accordingly, I order that the Mother and Father have joint decision-making responsibility of Matthew subject to the proviso that if the parties are unable to agree, the Mother will have sole decision-making responsibility for Matthew’s education, culture, language, religion and spirituality and the Father will have sole decision-making responsibility for Matthew’s health care and significant extracurricular activities. Having made this decision, I do encourage the parties to work towards effective communication and cooperation regarding all significant decisions to ensure Matthew’s best interests are protected and respected.

Parenting Time

[56] In light of my finding that the Mother has intentionally marginalized the Father and after considering the factors enumerated in subsection 16(3) of the Divorce Act, I am of the view that in addition to implementing a parallel parenting regime, Matthew’s best interests would be served by having Matthew spend equal amounts of time in the care of each of his parents. In this way I have some confidence that his important relationship with his father can be preserved and protected (see: K.M v J.R., 2022 ONSC 111, at para 390). For this, and other reasons expressed below, I agree with the Father’s position that a rotating 2-2-3 parenting time schedule is in Matthew’s best interests.

[57] The Mother submits that the 2-2-3 model is a parent centered model designed to sooth the egos of parents and is not in the best interests of the child. She also argues that there is no evidence that Matthew is concerned in the least that he currently spends more time with his mother than he does with his father. Accordingly, the Mother proposes that once school begins for Matthew in September, the Father continue to have parenting time with the child 2 days per week. The Mother also proposes, however, that the days fluctuate pursuant to a 2-week alternating schedule such that during the first of the two weeks Matthew spent from Wednesday after school to Friday after school with his father. This proposal would have Matthew in the care of his father for those periods before and after school during week 1 of the schedule. In my opinion, a view shared by Justice Walters in Teeple, the Mother’s position demonstrates a lack of insight into the impact of the Father’s absence on Matthew at his young age of three and half (see Teeple at para 44). The Mother’s position is also consistent with the principles of the tender years doctrine, rejected 30 years ago by the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v Young, [1993] 4 SCR 3.

[58] Apart from the Mother’s alienation of the Father, I share the opinion of Justice Broad in Denomme v Denomme, 2021 ONSC 7852 (‘Denomme’), where he addressed the best interests of children three and half and one years of age. Justice Broad found:

It is in the children’s best interests that they have the opportunity to develop close, loving, and bonded relationships with both parents, and that the principle in s. 16(6) of the Divorce Act that the children should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with their best interests should be given effect to by an equal sharing regime (at para 79).

[59] I also agree with Justice Broad that to ensure an equal amount of parenting time for children of younger ages, frequent and shorter contact with each parent by way of a rotating 2-2-3 parenting time schedule is in their best interests (see Denomme, at para 80).

[60] The Court of Appeal in Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548 (‘Rigillo’) stressed the importance of adhering to the maximum contact principle set out in s. 16 of the Divorce Act. In that decision, the trial judge found as a fact that the child had a “loving and strong emotional tie to both parents” (at para 5). In these circumstances, the Court of Appeal determined that the lower court had erred in proceeding on the basis of the status quo (at para 9). Specifically,

The trial judge erred by failing to avert to and apply the maximum contact principle without providing any reason for departing from it, and by proceeding on the basis of the status quo that had developed as a result of a without prejudice order. Given the trial judge’s findings of fact, particularly the finding that, while both parties had misbehaved, the child had enjoyed the benefits of “effective parenting” by both, it was an error to make an order that departed significantly from equal parenting time (at para 10).

[61] The objective of the maximum contact principle is to achieve as much parenting time as possible with each parent. The principle is a guide with a view of benefitting children (see Knapp v Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305 (‘Knapp’) at para 34). While it would be a mistake to suggest that the application of the principle results in equal parenting time in each instance, as every family is unique, I find in the case of Matthew an equal parenting time arrangement with a rotating 2-2-3 schedule is in his best interests.

[62] The Mother submits that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rigillo should not be given significant deference in my determination of parenting time because it was decided prior to the March 2021 Divorce Act amendments. Specifically, she points out that subsection 16(10) of the old legislation, which contains the words “maximum contact”, was replaced by subsection 16(6) which omits this key phrase. I do not agree with this assessment notwithstanding the 2021 amendments.

[63] The pre and post amendments of the relevant provision read as follows:

Pre-amendment Maximum contact (10) In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.

Post-amendment (11) Parenting time consistent with best interests of child. (6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

[64] While the text of the provision may have been amended, the guiding principle remains the same: a child should have as much contact time with each parent as is consistent with the child’s best interests. Justice Benotto, writing on behalf of the Court of Appeal in the recent Knapp decision, indeed comments that the revised version of the provision sends a more direct message that the guiding principle is to be one of a child-focused approach to achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent (at para 32).

Summer Vacation Schedule

[65] The Mother seeks an order whereby each party shall have two non-consecutive weeks of summer vacation whereas the Father requests that each party be entitled to four non-consecutive weeks of vacation periods. Given that I have found that it is in Matthew’s best interests that he has equal periods of contact with each of his parents, I order that each party shall be entitled to a maximum of four non-consecutive weeks of summer vacation from Friday at 4:00pm to the following Friday at 4:00pm regardless of the regular parenting time schedule. I do agree with the Mother’s position, however, that the summer vacation schedule should not begin until the summer of 2024 given that revised 2-2-3 parenting schedule that I have ordered will not begin in earnest until this upcoming 2023 summer vacation period. In my view, Matthew requires some time to adjust to the new schedule as he prepares for school in September.

Exchange Location

[66] Currently the parenting time exchanges occur at the local Tim Horton’s franchise on Highway 3 in Simcoe. The Mother submits that the status quo should continue for the sake of consistency. She also objects to the Father’s suggestion that the exchanges be moved to Matthew’s school come September 2023 because Matthew likes to bring things back and forth between both of his parent’s homes and exchanges at school would put an unnecessary burden on Matthew to transport his belongings from one place to another. To my mind, the transportation of Matthew’s belongings is not an insurmountable obstacle to the exchange taking place at Matthew’s school when school is in session. Accommodations can no doubt be made with the school to permit both parents to enter the school to assist Matthew as is necessary. Moreover, I am of the view that exchanges at Matthew’s school would be less artificial for Matthew. He, like so many of his classmates, would be dropped off and picked up by a parent. Of lesser importance perhaps, I also am of the opinion that exchanges at school would be more convenient and less stressful for the parties as they begin and end their respective workdays.

[67] Accordingly, I order that while school is in session, that parenting exchanges will occur at Matthew’s school and otherwise they will continue at the existing Tim Horton’s outlet.

Child Support

[68] The parties have agreed that if I order an equal parenting time schedule, as I have so ordered, no child support should be payable as between them. In circumstances where the Father’s income for child support purposes is agreed to be $108,415 and at its highest the Mother’s income is imputed at $136,090, I am satisfied that Matthew’s needs can be fully met by each parent from their own resources without additional support from the other given their respective relatively high levels of comparable income. Accordingly, no child support should be payable by one party to the other.

[69] There is, however, the issue of the child support arrears forgiven by the February 22, 2022 Consent Order from Matthew’s birth to September 14, 2021. These arrears are calculated in the amount of $8,791.50 and are less than they might have otherwise been because the Father began paying child support on October 1, 2020.

[70] The February 22, 2022, Consent Order not only resolves the issue of child support arrears but settles the issues of equalization, parenting time for annual holidays and other issues as between the parties. It was also conditional on the Father’s acceptance of Michael’s offer to settle the lien litigation commenced by him and his company. That offer was accepted by the Father, resulting in the resolution of the lien action.

[71] The Mother submits that notwithstanding her tabling the settlement proposal with Michael’s agreement, she had no right to suggest that the parties agree to waive child support. She was mistaken. Matthew should not be deprived of money that is and not his mother’s to give away. The Mother relies on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24 (‘Michel’) which she submits, and I agree, stands in part for the principle the child support is the right of the child and neither parent has the right to waive it as a part of some arrangement.

[72] This principle enumerated in Michel is, however, subject to legislated exemption. Indeed, the Mother concedes that pursuant to subsection 15.1(5) of the Divorce Act parents may make special provisions for child support in an amount that is different from that determined in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. The Mother’s position is, however, the parties’ waiver of Matthew’s child support fails to meet the test of subsection 15.1(5).

[73] For his part, the Father submits that based on the decision of this Court in Lotko v. Lotko, 2013 ONSC 546 and Natis v. McMillian, 2011 ONSC 2332, the Mother is in no position to challenge the child support waiver because she has failed to bring a motion to change and cannot demonstrate a material change of circumstances. In reliance upon the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Rick v. Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10 and this Court’s ruling in Lee v. Lee, 2010 ONSC 4524, the Mother’s position is that she need not demonstrate a material change because the issue of child support arrears is not res judicata in the circumstances of this case where Justice McLeod did not adjudicate on the matter but merely adopted the Minutes of Settlement of September 16, 2021 into the February 22, 2022 Consent Order on the representations of counsel.

[74] While I am not convinced that the authorities upon which the Mother relies support her position, I am prepared to consider whether the waiver of the child support arrears of some $8,700 benefitted Matthew and whether the enforcement of the Child Support Guidelines would be inequitable.

[75] Certainly, the parties’ waiver of child support did not result in a direct benefit to Matthew but pursuant to the governing legislation, the benefit to Matthew need not be solely direct in nature; the benefit may also be indirect. I find that by agreeing that no equalization payment was to be paid by either party, each of the parties benefitted from litigation cost savings. In addition, the parties avoided potentially expensive valuations of Absolute and MDMR, and in addition, the Mother safeguarded her sources of income from equalization and depletion. Furthermore, the Father achieved greater litigation cost savings by resolving the construction lien litigation. In my opinion, these savings and the preservation of the Mother’s businesses put each of the parties in a better financial position, and therefore, in a better position to support Matthew. This indirect benefit to Matthew existed at the time of the February 22, 2022 Consent Order and continues today.

[76] I also find that were I to vary the waiver of the child support arrears, it would be necessary for me to unwind the entirety of the Minutes of Settlement and the February 22, 2022 Consent Order. I am of this mind because I have no doubt that the parties’ agreement attempted to balance and compromise many issues, including the equalization payment. Further, given the condition to the Father’s acceptance the Minutes of Settlement, the resolution of Michael’s lien action would very likely be jeopardized by the setting aside of the February 22, 2022 Consent Order. For these reasons, I find that the enforcement of the Child Support Guidelines would be inequitable. I am therefore not prepared to require the Father to pay the waived child support arrears of $8,791.50.

Matthew’s Name

[77] Matthew’s name is Matthew David Michael Ross. When the Mother completed Matthew’s Statement of Live Birth pursuant to the Vital Statistics Act, R.S.O 1990, c. v. 4, as amended (‘Vital Statistics Act’), she did not acknowledge the Father as a parent and unilaterally named Matthew. The Vital Statistics Act permits a mother to choose the surname she wants when she does not acknowledge the child’s father in completing the Statement of Live Birth. While the parties agreed on the child’s forename, “Matthew”, prior to his birth, the Mother also unilaterally chose his middles names. “Michael” is the Mother’s father’s forename and “David” is his middle name.

[78] The Father seeks an order acknowledging him as Matthew’s father in the Statement of Live Birth and an order changing Matthew’s surname to “Duwyn-Ross” as well as amending Matthew’s middle name to include “Robert”, the forename of Matthew’s paternal grandfather and father, while at the same time deleting one of Matthew’s two current middle names at the option of the Mother. The Father submits that the requested changes will reflect joint and equal parental involvement in Matthew’s life as well as Matthew’s familial history.

[79] The Mother is opposed to the name change sought by the Father on the basis that Matthew knows his full name and identifies with his full name. The Mother also argues that this Court has no jurisdiction to change Matthew’s middle name and, and in any event, it is not in Matthew’s best interests to change his name. Notwithstanding this position, the Mother testified that she is prepared to change Matthew’s surname to “Ross-Duwyn” as opposed to “Duwyn-Ross” because in her opinion, the first hyphenated option “scans better”.

[80] Section 10 of the Vital Statistics Act deals with determining the surname of a child at section 10:

10(3) a child’s surname shall be determined as follows:

2. If both parents certify the child’s birth but do not agree on the child’s surname, the child shall be given, i. the parents’ surnames, if they have the same surname, or ii. a surname consisting of both parents’ surnames hyphenated or combined in alphabetical order, if they have different surnames…

3. If the mother certifies the child’s birth and the father is unknown or unacknowledged by her, she may give the child the surname she chooses.

[81] The Mother relies on subsection 10(3)4 of the Vital Statistics Act in support of her position that she was entitled to have registered Matthew’s birth using her surname and to do so without consulting or obtaining the consent of the father.

[82] The Vital Statistics Act of Ontario and the former companion British Columbian legislation are very similar. In Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 34, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, the Supreme Court of Canada found that subsections 3(1) 9b) and 3(6) (b) of the British Columbia Vital Statistics Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 479 were unconstitutional as they constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and are not saved by section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being part 1 of schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11(U.K.). The relevant British Columbia legislation read in part as follows:

3(1) Within 30 days after the birth of a child in British Columbia,

(b) the child’s mother, if the father is incapable or is unacknowledged by or unknown to the mother,

must complete and deliver to the district registrar a statement in the form required by the director respecting the birth.

3(6) If a statement completed by only one parent of the child…is registered, the director must alter the registration of birth application by any of the following persons:

(b) the child’s mother, if the father is incapable or is unacknowledged by or unknown to the mother;

4(1) The surname of a child must be registered as follows:

(a) If only one parent completes the statement under section 3, the surname must be the one chosen by that parent.

[83] While I agree with the Mother’s submission that subsection 10(3)4 of the Vital Statistics Act remains valid in Ontario because no Court has ruled it invalid (despite its similarity to the companion British Columbia legislation), I echo the observations and conclusions of Justice Quinn in Gallant v Lewis, (2008), 295 D.L.R. (4th) 686 (Ont. S.C.J.) (‘Gallant’) who stated:

[24] In my opinion, it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, be manifestly unfair to the father and not be in the best interests of the child, if I were to enforce the child-naming provision on Ontario’s Vital Statistics Act where British Columbia’s virtually identical statute has been ruled unconstitutional as amounting to discrimination on the basis of sex.

[25] The right of a mother to arbitrarily exclude the father in the naming of their child is a breathtaking example of sexual discrimination, leaving the father without recourse (short of the application launched) and rendering him a second-class parent. It is not in the best interests of a child to have his or her parents differentiated in this fashion. There will be obvious instances where it will be entirely appropriate for a father to be unacknowledged and for a child to be given only the surname of the mother – but this is not one of them.

[84] In my opinion, an obvious instance where a father would be unacknowledged is where he has denied paternity or expressed no interest in being a part of the child’s life. This is not the case with this father.

[85] Therefore, like Justice Quinn in Gallant and Justice Maranger in Ryan v. Scott, 2011 ONSC 3277, I am prepared to exercise the parens patriae jurisdiction of this Court, and for the benefit of Matthew, to order that the Registrar General amend the registration of Matthew’s birth to include the hyphenated surnames of the parties in alphabetical order such that the surname of Matthew will be changed to “Duwyn-Ross” in lieu of “Ross”. I also exercise my parens patriae jurisdiction to order that the Registrar General amend Matthew’s Statement of live birth to acknowledge the Father as his father.

[86] Were it not for this Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, I also find that I have jurisdiction to change Matthew’s surname pursuant to section 17 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O 1990, c. C. 12, as amended (‘Children’s Law Reform Act’).

[87] Section 17 of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that any person who is declared a parent of a child may apply to the Court to change the child’s surname to any surname that could have been given under subsection 10(3) or (3.1) of the Vital Statistics Act. Subsection 17(3) provides that any application to change the surname of a child shall be made in accordance with the best interests of the child. Similarly, subsection 5(5) of the Change of Name Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 7 (‘Change of Name Act’) provides that the best interests of the child test must be applied by the Court in determining a request by one parent to dispense with the consent of the other parent to an application for the name change of a child made to the Registrar General.

[88] The case law has developed several factors for determining the best interests of the child in a name change application under both the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Change of Name Act. These factors are enumerated in the decisions of this Court in Hermanson v. Kiarie, 2017 ONCJ 598, Roy-Berington v. Rigden, 2017 ONCJ 730 (‘Roy-Berington’), ML v. JC, 2017 ONSC 7179 (‘ML’) and Cuthbert v. Nolis, 2018 ONSC 4643. In considering the factors that are relevant to Matthew, I have concluded that it is in the best interests of Matthew to change his surname to “Duwyn-Ross” for the following reasons:

(a) The name change would reflect both parents and connect Matthew to his familial roots. The name change will permit both parents to participate in Matthew’s life. (b) This is not a situation where Matthew at almost four years of age will be greatly confused by the name change. I reject the Mother’s position that Matthew identifies with his current full name. The evidence is that he calls himself “Matt” or Matt Ross”. (c) Matthew has a continuing close relationship with both parents and the name change would reflect that relationship. (d) The name change would not have any serious effects on the Mother and will recognize the Father as an involved parent. (e) The name change speaks to Matthew’s identity. (f) Given the young age of Matthew, it is unlikely to me that the name change would cause him embarrassment.

[89] I agree with the Mother’s submission that this Court has no jurisdiction under section 17 of the Children’s Law Reform Act to consider a change in Matthew’s middle name. I find, however, that I do have authority to consider this issue pursuant to section 21 and 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. In my opinion, the issue of determining a child’s name, be it the child’s forename, middle name or surname, is an incident of custody (see Roy-Berington and M.L.). Pursuant to sections 21 and 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, this Court has the authority to determine incidents of custody.

[90] Section 21 of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides:

21. APPLICATION FOR ORDER – (1) A parent of a child or any other person including a grandparent may apply to a Court for an Order respecting custody of or access to a child or determining any aspect of the incidents of custody of the child.

Section 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act reads in part as follows:

28. POWERS OF THE COURT – (1) The Court to which an Application is made under section 21,

(a) by Order may grant the custody of or access to a child go to one or more persons;

(b) by Order may determine any of the incidents of the right to custody or access.

[91] In Roy-Berington, Justice Finlayson found, and I agree, that the governing test either on applications to dispense with consent under the Change of Name Act or when claims under section 28(1)(b) are advanced is the best interests of the child test. I find the factors to be considered for a change of a child’s surname apply equally to an application for a change of a child’s middle name. In consideration of those factors, and for the same reasons noted above, I find that it is in Matthew’s best interests to change his middle name to include the name ‘Robert’ following Matthew’s current middle names, “David Michael”. I am not, however, convinced by the Father’s argument that one of Matthew’s two current middle names should be removed at the Mother’s discretion to avoid embarrassment for Matthew and for him to feel otherwise abnormal with three middle names. Accordingly, in the end, I order the Registrar General to amend the registration of Matthew’s birth to reflect the child’s name as Matthew David Michael Robert Duwyn-Ross.

Disposition

[92] Based on the forgoing, I make the following final Order to supplement the Partial Final Order of Justice McLeod, dated February 22, 2022:

1. The Applicant, Robert Joseph Duwyn, and the Respondent Lyndsay Leeanne Ross, shall share joint decision-making authority for the child of the marriage, currently named Matthew David Michael Ross, born September 17, 2019, (‘Matthew’) on such terms that in the event of a disagreement between the parties regarding a decision impacting upon Matthew’s education, culture, language, religion, spirituality, healthcare, and significant extra-curricular activities, then if the decision is regarding: i. education matters for Matthew, including but not limited to the choice of any supportive educational programme such as tutoring, the Respondent shall make the final decision; ii. matters relative to Matthew’s culture, language, religion and spirituality, the Respondent shall make the final decision; iii. medical care or treatment to be administered to Matthew, including but not limited to the prescription of any medication and such preventative treatments such as orthodontics and vaccinations, the Applicant shall make the final decision; and iv. the enrollment of Matthew in regularly scheduled extra-curricular activities, the Applicant shall make the final decision.

2. Within 14 days from the release of these Reasons for Judgment, the Applicant and the Respondent shall spend equal periods of parenting time with Matthew on the basis of the following schedule: a. Week 1: with the Respondent from Monday at 3:30pm or after school, as applicable, until Wednesday at 3:30pm or after school and with the Applicant from Wednesday at 3:30pm or after school until Friday at 3:30pm or after school and with the Respondent from Friday at 3:30pm or after school until the next Monday at 3:30pm or after school, and b. Week 2: with the Applicant from Monday at 3:30pm or after school, as applicable, until Wednesday at 3:30pm or after school and with the Respondent from Wednesday at 3:30pm or after school until Friday at 3:30pm or after school and with the Applicant from Friday at 3:30pm until the following Monday at 3:30pm.

3. Commencing summer of 2024, and each year thereafter, each of the Applicant and the Respondent will be entitled to a maximum of four non-consecutive weeks beginning at 4:00pm Friday to 4:00pm the following Friday regardless of the regular parenting schedule. The parties shall each provide their choice of weeks to the other party by no later than March 31st of each year. If there is a conflict in the chosen weeks, the Applicant shall have priority in the even-numbered years and the Respondent shall have priority in the odd-numbered years.

4. When school is in session, all exchanges of Matthew will occur at Matthew’s school. When school is not in session, including all periods of statutory holidays, the exchanges will occur at the parking lot of the Tim Horton’s outlet on Highway 3 in Simcoe.

5. The parties will at all times put the best interests of Matthew ahead of their own.

6. The Respondent’s claims for child support arrears in the amount of $8,791.50 is dismissed.

7. Each of the Applicant and the Respondent shall support Matthew without financial contribution from the other and there shall be no child support payable by one party to the other.

8. The Registrar General shall amend Matthew’s registration of birth to record the Applicant as Matthew’s father.

9. The Registrar General shall also amend the registration of Matthew’s birth to record the child’s name as “Matthew David Michael Robert Duwyn-Ross”. The Registrar General shall also provide the parties with a copy of Matthew’s amended birth certificate changing his name from Matthew David Michael Ross to Matthew David Michael Robert Duwyn-Ross upon payment of the prescribed fee.

[93] I encourage the parties to agree on the issue of costs. In the unfortunate event, however, that they are unable to agree on costs, I am prepared to consider their written cost submissions.

[94] The party seeking costs shall deliver costs submissions within fifteen (15) days of the release of these Reasons for Judgment and the responding party shall deliver responding costs submissions within ten (10) days of receipt of the submissions of the party seeking costs. Reply submissions, if any, are to be delivered within five (5) days of receipt of the submissions on behalf of the responding party. The initial and responding submissions are not to exceed five (5) pages double spaced excluding cost outlines, offers to settle and authorities. Any reply submissions are not to exceed two (2) pages. All submissions are to be sent to my attention via my Judicial Secretary by email to Brontae.Frook@ontario.ca with a copy to the Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca email address.

M. J. Valente, J.

Released: May 26, 2023

COURT FILE NO.: FC-20-102 (Simcoe) DATE: 2023/05/26 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE Robert Joseph Duwyn – and – Lyndsey Leeanne Ross REASONS FOR JUDGMENT M. J. Valente, J. Released: May 26, 2023