Lionel J. Tupman

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision to rectify his mother's will by adding a remainderman clause that gifted two properties to his niece and nephew upon the termination of his father's life interest.

The drafting solicitor admitted to accidentally omitting the clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not exceed his jurisdiction as a court of construction, as the will could be interpreted to achieve the same result without adding words.

The Court also held that the application judge did not err in his application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act or in his reliance on admissions against interest as extrinsic evidence of the testator's intentions.

The cross-appeal challenging the remedy and costs was also dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 27, 2025.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a judgment interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport.

The application judge found that a specific bequest of the Hopewell Avenue property to the testator's predeceased son passed to the son's wife pursuant to section 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the anti-lapse provision), rather than lapsing into the residue of the estate.

The appellant argued the will showed a contrary intention and that the solicitor's evidence should have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the anti-lapse provision or the will's terms.

The court also upheld the occupation rent requirement, finding it was properly raised and calculated.

This endorsement consolidates three applications concerning the guardianship and estate administration of Teresa Opalinski and Alexander Opalinski Sr. The disputes involved allegations of elder abuse, undue influence, and breaches of fiduciary duty among family members.

The court addressed motions for dismissal of a guardianship application (rendered moot by death), a motion for access to Alexander Sr., and an application for the removal of Joanna Opalinski as estate trustee of Teresa's estate.

The court dismissed the guardianship application and the access motion, and granted the application to remove Joanna as estate trustee, directing the appointment of an independent trustee.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found a beneficial interest of 26% in a house for a deceased's estate, based on a purchase money resulting trust.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in applying the legal requirements for a resulting trust, particularly the "acted as a purchaser" requirement and the onus of proof regarding loans versus gifts.

It also considered the application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the presumption of resulting trust places the onus on the title holder to rebut it by proving the money was a loan or gift, and that the "acted as a purchaser" requirement applies only at the time of advancement.

The court found no reversible error in the trial judge's findings on the resulting trust or the application of s. 13, as the trial judge rejected the loan evidence on credibility grounds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Gilmore J. dated July 26, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party, fixed in the amount of $7,000.

The plaintiff, Solina Bradshaw, sought elevated costs from the defendant, Jack Hougassian, following a successful judgment in an estate matter.

Jack Hougassian sought costs, arguing divided success, and Sona Shea, self-represented, also sought costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $125,000.00 in all-inclusive costs from Jack Hougassian, finding the plaintiff was the successful party and that Jack's conduct warranted an elevated award.

The court dismissed Jack's and Sona's claims for costs, noting Sona did not meet the criteria for self-represented litigant costs.

The plaintiff, acting as estate trustee for her deceased mother, brought an action against her brother claiming the mother's estate had a beneficial interest in a property registered solely in the brother's name.

The mother had contributed $10,000 to the down payment when the property was purchased in 1980, and lived there until her death in 2018.

The court found that the brother failed to rebut the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust regarding the $10,000 contribution.

The court awarded the estate a 26% beneficial interest in the net sale proceeds of the property, amounting to $115,900.44, plus $10,000 in damages for the brother's improper disposal of the mother's personal property.

Claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were dismissed, and the action was found not to be statute-barred.

The applicant estate trustee brought a motion for an order appointing section 3 counsel under the Substitute Decisions Act for her father.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the underlying proceeding was not brought under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the motion, holding that the plain wording of section 3(1) and relevant case law require the underlying proceeding to be under the Substitute Decisions Act for the court to have jurisdiction to appoint such counsel.

Multiple appeals arose from a complex family estate dispute following the death of a spouse whose estate passed to the surviving spouse under mirror wills.

Two sons alleged that a handwritten document and surrounding circumstances created both a mutual wills agreement and a secret trust requiring equal distribution of the estate among the three sons after the surviving spouse’s death.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not establish a binding mutual wills agreement or the elements of a secret trust, emphasizing the absence of a transfer of property and clear contractual intent.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s treatment of certain inter vivos transfers and confirmed that a joint tenancy in a condominium had been severed through the parties’ course of dealings.

All appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought to remove his brother as co-Estate Trustee of their late father's estate and sought directions on the apportionment of the estate.

The respondent brought a cross-application seeking compensation for personal care services, interest, and other payments.

The court found the respondent to be in an irreconcilable conflict of interest due to his unauthorized use of estate funds, failure to comply with a prior settlement agreement, and procedurally flawed claims against the estate.

The court removed the respondent as an Estate Trustee, dismissed his cross-application, and directed that specific amounts be deducted from his share of the estate to reimburse the applicant.

In a long-standing and highly acrimonious family trust dispute, the court considered multiple motions, including motions to dismiss for delay and abuse of process, and motions for a further and better accounting.

The court found that the plaintiffs (two of the sons) had engaged in an abuse of process through a 'scorched-earth' litigation strategy, including failing to produce relevant documents they controlled, changing counsel repeatedly, refusing to mediate, and launching collateral attacks.

Consequently, the court dismissed their actions.

However, recognizing that the trusts still required an accounting for the benefit of the other beneficiaries (the grandchildren), the court ordered the remaining trustees to provide a further and better accounting, and ordered the redemption of the matriarch's shares in the underlying holding company.

A lawyer sought leave to intervene in an appeal of a costs decision that made adverse findings against him regarding his duty to the court and ordered his former client to pay substantial indemnity costs.

The underlying action had settled, rendering the appeal moot.

The court granted the lawyer leave to intervene, finding he had an interest in protecting his professional integrity, especially since his former client was relying on the costs decision in a separate collection action for legal fees.

The court also exercised its discretion to depart from the doctrine of mootness, finding that the issues regarding a lawyer's duty to the court and the costs consequences for a client were of public importance and could otherwise evade review.

The appeal was allowed to proceed on limited issues with amicus curiae appointed to argue the opposing position.

The appellant appealed a lower court's decision, challenging the admissibility of a recording and the finding that a joint tenancy had been severed.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument regarding the recording's inadmissibility, finding it relevant and admissible.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the application judge's decision on joint tenancy severance, as it was a fact-specific inquiry.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the estate, noting the litigation was necessitated by the deceased's actions.

The moving party sought an interim distribution of 25 percent of funds held in trust from the sale of the deceased's residence, pending the resolution of a will challenge.

The funds were held pursuant to a consent order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no grounds to vary the consent order and concluding that an interim distribution was premature as the estate's liabilities were unknown and an earlier will might exist.

The appellant challenged her father's will and an inter vivos transfer of his house to the respondent, alleging undue influence.

The trial judge rejected the claim.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the relationship between the testator and respondent gave rise to a presumption of undue influence that the respondent failed to rebut.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rebuttable presumption of undue influence applies only to inter vivos transactions, not testamentary gifts.

In testamentary matters, the party attacking the will bears the onus of proving undue influence on a balance of probabilities.

Although the trial judge erred in conflating the two tests, this error did not affect the reasonableness of his conclusion that no undue influence occurred, as his findings were firmly rooted in the evidence.

The moving party, in the midst of complex family trust litigation, sought leave to withdraw admissions made in a previous affidavit and to file three new affidavits.

The moving party argued the admissions regarding multi-million dollar shareholder loans were made inadvertently due to confusion and reliance on her former, now-deceased counsel.

The responding parties opposed, arguing the admissions were formal and the new evidence was an attempt to repair her case mid-hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the admissions were likely inadvertent, raised a triable issue, and caused no non-compensable legal prejudice to the responding parties.

The court emphasized the need to decide the case on its true merits rather than a solicitor's or party's mistake.

An appeal concerning the validity of a continuing power of attorney for property executed by an elderly woman in favour of one of her twin sons.

The appellant challenged the validity of the power of attorney on grounds of undue influence and suspicious circumstances, arguing that the respondent son had coerced the grantor into executing the document by restricting her access to funds needed for basic living expenses.

The motion judge upheld the validity of the power of attorney, finding no evidence of undue influence or suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the transaction was rational and explicable by the parties' relationship, and that the motion judge correctly applied the law.

The applicant sought to invalidate a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property granted by his mother to his brother, alleging lack of capacity and undue influence.

The applicant also sought to replace his brother with a professional interim guardian.

The court found that the mother had the requisite capacity to grant the power of attorney and that there was no evidence of coercion or suspicious circumstances to establish undue influence.

The application to replace the attorney was dismissed, but the brother was ordered to pass his accounts annually to ensure transparency.

BMO Trust Company, as Estate Trustee and Guardian of Property, applied to pass its accounts.

The objector, Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections, leading to a contentious hearing.

Following the judgment which passed the accounts with a minor reduction in BMO's compensation, the court heard submissions on costs.

The total costs claimed exceeded $300,000, disproportionate to the summary nature of the proceeding.

The court applied principles of reasonableness, fairness, proportionality, and access to justice, limiting the costs awarded to BMO, payable by Lillian Sawchuk, to $69,000 plus disbursements, finding that an award of the full amount would be excessive and unreasonable.

No other costs were awarded.