David M. Lobl

The appellant sought to prove the validity of a holograph codicil executed by the deceased testatrix, purportedly leaving the most valuable estate asset, a home farm worth approximately $20 million, to the appellant alone.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances relating to both the testatrix's knowledge and approval of the codicil's contents and her testamentary capacity, and concluded the appellant failed to discharge her burden on either issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of suspicious circumstances, no misapplication of the legal standard for knowledge and approval, and no improper reliance on the family doctor's clinical notes.

The court also found the reasons for decision were sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Costs of $100,000 were awarded to the respondents.

An estate trustee brought an application for court opinion, advice, and direction regarding the sale of estate real property subject to successive purchase options in a testator's will.

The respondent had purported to exercise his first right of purchase by email within 30 days of receiving notice, without submitting a formal offer or proof of financing.

The court held that the respondent validly exercised his option through informal notice, as the will imposed no formal requirements.

The court further held that fair market value was to be determined as of the date the respondent gave notice of his intention to purchase, not as of the date of the life tenant's death, and accepted the estate trustee's appraisal valuing the property at $1.8 million following a municipal by-law exemption permitting separate conveyance of the two lots.

The respondent was afforded 30 days to submit a written offer at the appraised value or be deemed to have waived his rights.

Following an eleven-day trial regarding the validity of a holograph codicil and the ownership of investment accounts, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought to have her costs paid from the estate, arguing she acted reasonably in seeking to administer the estate.

The court rejected this argument, finding she procured the invalid codicil in suspicious circumstances and for her sole benefit.

Applying the 'loser pays' principle, the court ordered the applicant to personally pay the respondents' costs, fixed at $2,217,768.69, taking into account the complexity of the proceeding and the respondents' offers to settle.

The moving parties, Lynn Stewart and Winfield Clayton Stewart, sought a stay of a lower court order pending appeal.

The lower court order had interpreted the will of William Archibald Stewart and authorized the estate trustee to sell two farm properties to satisfy substantial tax liabilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions for a stay, finding that the moving parties failed to establish a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

Consequently, the estate trustee remains authorized to proceed with the administration and potential sale of the properties to address the outstanding tax debts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Ilinka Armstrong and Dean Tully from an order removing them as estate trustees for the estate of Dan Muscat and denied leave to appeal a related costs order.

The court found that Armstrong was in a conflict of interest due to her romantic relationship with a potential purchaser of the estate’s business, failed to disclose this conflict, and did not undertake proper due diligence.

The court upheld the application judge’s decision to remove the trustees and order them to pay costs personally.

This decision interprets the will of William Archibald Stewart, focusing on the vesting and abatement of gifts of farm properties to his sons, Robert and Winfield, and the impact of subsequent events including the assignment of a mortgage to William’s widow, Edith, and her own testamentary dispositions.

The court addresses whether gifts vested at William’s death or Edith’s, the effect of the mortgage assignment, the abatement of gifts to pay estate liabilities, and related issues of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and executor liability for tax consequences.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for an equalization payment of $320,713.66 from the defendant corporations, arising from a prior trial decision regarding the division of corporate assets between two siblings.

The defendants brought a cross-motion seeking to recalculate the equalization payment to include the value of preference shares, which would result in the plaintiff's principal owing $2,625,000.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, finding that the calculation of the equalization payment and the exclusion of the preference shares had already been determined in prior proceedings and were therefore res judicata.

The court also resolved several ancillary issues, including the transfer of burial plots and the return of original documents, and prohibited the parties from commencing further litigation without leave.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from two motions in an estates matter: one brought by Royal Trust Corporation of Canada (Estate Trustee) to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as Litigation Guardian for Raymonde Haddad, and a cross-motion by Doris Haddad-Bejjani seeking her own appointment.

Royal Trust's motion was granted, and Doris's motion was dismissed.

The court, applying the modern approach to costs in estates litigation, found Royal Trust, the Children's Lawyer, and Rosemary Whelan to be successful parties.

Doris Haddad-Bejjani, as the unsuccessful party whose conduct complicated the proceedings, was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the successful parties from her testamentary trust.

The balance of Royal Trust's and the Children's Lawyer's full indemnity costs were ordered to be paid from the capital of the Estate.

This endorsement addresses competing motions for the appointment of a litigation guardian for Raymonde Haddad, a mentally incapable beneficiary of the Estate of Paul Haddad.

Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, as Estate Trustee, sought to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as litigation guardian for Raymonde in ongoing estate proceedings (Interpretation Application and Passing Application).

Raymonde's daughter, Doris Haddad-Bejjani, who had been purporting to represent Raymonde under a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property, brought a cross-motion to be appointed as litigation guardian herself.

The court found Raymonde to be a party under disability based on extensive medical evidence.

Doris's motion was dismissed due to a clear conflict of interest, as her personal interests in the estate's distribution were adverse to Raymonde's.

The court granted Royal Trust's motion, appointing the PGT as Raymonde's litigation guardian, emphasizing the PGT's role as a guardian of last resort when no other proper person is willing and able to act without conflict.

This appeal arose from a dispute between siblings over inherited family companies.

The trial judge found that the parties had an agreement regarding company ownership, that the appellant breached his fiduciary duty to the respondent, and was unjustly enriched.

The appellants challenged these findings, arguing there was no binding agreement, no fiduciary relationship, and that the promissory estoppel claim was invalid and statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the existence of an ownership agreement, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The Court noted that the dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim did not affect the outcome.

The court-appointed Administrator of an estate brought a motion to appoint an investigator to review the accounts and assets of two intertwined family estates.

The estates had been mired in years of acrimonious litigation among the sibling beneficiaries, with allegations of breached fiduciary duties and misappropriated funds.

Finding that the accounts were complex, significant information was missing, and the parties were highly dysfunctional, the court granted the motion and appointed the investigator to provide a neutral analysis.

The appellants, beneficiaries of an estate, appealed a Superior Court order that declared they had no interest in a property, ordered them to vacate, and required them to pay occupation rent.

Their appeal primarily argued that the motion judge erred by failing to grant them an adjournment and by providing insufficient reasons for the denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court noted that it was not the appellants' first adjournment request, they had received legal advice, and the ongoing delay prejudiced other beneficiaries of the estate.

Costs were awarded against one appellant.

Following a lengthy trial regarding the ownership of a family business, the successful plaintiff sought costs of approximately $1.57 million.

The plaintiff had served an offer to settle seven days before trial, which the defendant rejected.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 57.01 to award substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer, finding the offer was reasonable and the defendant's conduct unnecessarily increased costs.

After deducting amounts related to separate actions, the court fixed costs payable to the plaintiff at $1,306,757.90.

The plaintiff and defendant, siblings, disputed the ownership of three real estate holding corporations left to them by their father.

The plaintiff claimed they reached an agreement in 2014 to divide ownership, with the plaintiff taking one corporation and the defendant taking the other two, and that she signed a renunciation of her interest in a family trust based on this agreement.

The defendant argued the agreement was only for a temporary division of management.

The court found that the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, intended to divide ownership, and conducted themselves as sole owners for seven years.

The court granted a declaration that the plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the defendant's shares in the chosen corporation based on contract and proprietary estoppel.

In a long-standing and highly acrimonious family trust dispute, the court considered multiple motions, including motions to dismiss for delay and abuse of process, and motions for a further and better accounting.

The court found that the plaintiffs (two of the sons) had engaged in an abuse of process through a 'scorched-earth' litigation strategy, including failing to produce relevant documents they controlled, changing counsel repeatedly, refusing to mediate, and launching collateral attacks.

Consequently, the court dismissed their actions.

However, recognizing that the trusts still required an accounting for the benefit of the other beneficiaries (the grandchildren), the court ordered the remaining trustees to provide a further and better accounting, and ordered the redemption of the matriarch's shares in the underlying holding company.

The applicant sought to enforce a July 10, 2019 order from the Supreme Court of the State of New York appointing a temporary guardian for the respondent's mother and ordering the applicant, as trustee of a spousal trust, to pay funds for her well-being and investigation of her whereabouts.

The court applied the test for recognizing foreign judgments, finding the New York court had jurisdiction and the funding order was final.

The court recognized the order regarding the funding provisions but declined to recognize the provisions granting access to medical and confidential information due to privacy concerns.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a residential property, an order preserving the property, and an order that the proceeds of sale of another property be paid into court.

The dispute arose between the estate of a deceased sister and the surviving sister over properties originally owned by their mother.

The court dismissed the motion for a CPL and payment into court, finding that damages would be an adequate remedy and the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a serious prospect of ultimate success or risk of dissipation.

The court granted the defendants' cross-motion to permit the sale of the property, provided half the net proceeds are paid into court.

The applicants, children of the deceased, sought declarations of a constructive trust over the survivor's assets based on a mutual wills agreement, alleging breach due to a $200,000 gift and failure to provide information.

The court found that a constructive trust only arises upon breach of the mutual wills agreement, not automatically upon the first testator's death, particularly when the survivor receives assets absolutely.

It was determined that the survivor's gift was not substantial enough to defeat the agreement, nor was her failure to provide information a breach, as the applicants were not beneficiaries under the deceased's will.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant, Rosemary Whelan, brought a motion to transfer a passing of accounts proceeding from Toronto to Ottawa.

The Estate Trustee, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, and other interested parties opposed the transfer.

The court found the motion premature, noting that the application to pass accounts had just commenced in Toronto, and further procedural steps, such as filing objections and a hearing for directions, were pending.

The judge emphasized that a definitive determination of venue, particularly concerning the need for live witnesses, was not yet possible.

The motion for transfer was dismissed without prejudice, with costs reserved to the judge hearing the passing of accounts.

The appellants, estate trustees for two deceased individuals who executed mirror Primary and Secondary Wills, appealed a decision denying their applications for Certificates of Appointment of Estate Trustee.

The application judge had held that a will is a trust and that the allocation clauses in the Primary Wills failed the 'three certainties' test for trusts due to uncertainty of subject-matter.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that a will is not a trust and is not subject to the three certainties.

The Court further held that even if the three certainties applied, the allocation clauses provided an objective basis to ascertain the subject-matter, satisfying the certainty requirement.

The Court ordered the issuance of the requested Certificates of Appointment.