Phillipa Catherine Goddard

An estate trustee brought an application for court opinion, advice, and direction regarding the sale of estate real property subject to successive purchase options in a testator's will.

The respondent had purported to exercise his first right of purchase by email within 30 days of receiving notice, without submitting a formal offer or proof of financing.

The court held that the respondent validly exercised his option through informal notice, as the will imposed no formal requirements.

The court further held that fair market value was to be determined as of the date the respondent gave notice of his intention to purchase, not as of the date of the life tenant's death, and accepted the estate trustee's appraisal valuing the property at $1.8 million following a municipal by-law exemption permitting separate conveyance of the two lots.

The respondent was afforded 30 days to submit a written offer at the appraised value or be deemed to have waived his rights.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the respondents sought full indemnity costs, relying on an unresponded settlement offer and rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that costs generally follow the event on a partial indemnity basis unless there is sanctionable conduct during the appeal.

Finding no such conduct, the court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $11,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order that directed estate funds to be paid out of court and removed an estate trustee.

The appellant sought directions and an accounting, effectively attempting to secure funds for a counterclaim against the estate.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the original motion was improperly brought and the appellant had not established the prerequisites for a Mareva injunction to hold the funds as security.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that he owned a two-thirds share of a property.

The property was originally owned by his mother-in-law, who transferred it to herself and her daughter (the appellant's late wife) as joint tenants.

The appellant argued the property was a matrimonial home and the joint tenancy was severed upon his wife's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the transfer raised a presumption of resulting trust which was not rebutted.

Because the daughter held the property on resulting trust, she did not have an interest in the property under the Family Law Act, precluding it from being a matrimonial home.