Robert W. Scriven

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of B. MacFarlane J. dated September 9, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellants appealed the compensation and special benefit assessments under the Drainage Act regarding a proposed municipal drain.

The Tribunal found that the compensation for insufficient outlet was inadequate because the engineer calculated the corridor length based on an arbitrary termination point rather than the actual distance to a sufficient outlet.

The Tribunal increased the compensation from $5,690 to $9,653.

The Tribunal also found that the $5,510 special benefit assessment against the appellants for additional engineering investigations was unjust, as the onus is on the upper lands to justify an insufficient outlet.

Both appeals were granted.

Following a seven-day trial in which the plaintiff obtained judgment for a trust interest of $560,000 and successfully defended a counterclaim, the court determined the costs of the action.

The court held that neither side established entitlement to enhanced costs consequences under Rule 49 because the offers to settle were inconsistent with the theory advanced at trial or were not more favourable than the result obtained.

The plaintiff was entitled to costs as the successful party on both the claim and counterclaim, but only on a partial indemnity basis.

After reviewing the bills of costs and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court fixed costs at $120,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Cattle farmers sought leave to proceed with claims against the Crown and Animal Welfare Services officers for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, abuse of process, intentional interference with economic relations, and defamation arising from the removal of approximately half their herd.

The court granted leave for misfeasance in public office, breach of duty of care, and abuse of process, finding sufficient evidence of bad faith and recklessness based on the Animal Care Review Board's findings that the removal process failed to comply with statutory standards and was not necessary to relieve animal distress.

Leave was denied for intentional interference with economic relations due to inadequate pleading, and leave was not required for defamation.

A farmer and investor (plaintiff) and a younger farmer with access to dairy quota (defendant) entered into an oral agreement to purchase a farm and operate a dairy business together.

The plaintiff provided financing while the defendant contributed dairy quota.

The business failed after less than two years of operation.

The plaintiff sought a beneficial interest in the proceeds from the sale of the dairy quota (held in trust), reimbursement for cattle, custom work, and forage contributions, and damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation.

The court found that while an oral agreement existed, the defendant did not breach its terms, made no actionable misrepresentations, and failed to prove damages.

However, the court found that the plaintiff had a purchase money resulting trust interest in the quota proceeds in the amount of $560,000 (representing his contribution to the quota purchase).

The plaintiff's other claims were dismissed, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The moving parties, Lynn Stewart and Winfield Clayton Stewart, sought a stay of a lower court order pending appeal.

The lower court order had interpreted the will of William Archibald Stewart and authorized the estate trustee to sell two farm properties to satisfy substantial tax liabilities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions for a stay, finding that the moving parties failed to establish a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

Consequently, the estate trustee remains authorized to proceed with the administration and potential sale of the properties to address the outstanding tax debts.

The appellants appealed an order giving directions regarding the distribution of funds remaining in trust after the sale of Driftwood Beach Park Limited's assets and the reimbursement of funds by certain appellants to the company.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s determinations, including findings regarding the purchase and customization of a 2022 Honda, salary for James Kemp, and compensation for Ms. Kemp.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether comments about future ownership of a family farm gave rise to an enforceable assurance under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel.

The trial judge had awarded damages to Tim Metske and Amanda Herlick on the basis of proprietary estoppel, but the Court of Appeal set aside this finding, holding there was no clear promise or assurance, nor reasonable reliance.

The court upheld the trial judge’s findings on unjust enrichment and equitable set-off, resulting in a reduced damages award.

The appellant sought $1,000 in costs against a non-party and a newly added party for an improperly brought motion to be added as a party to a drainage appeal.

The Tribunal dismissed the application for costs, finding no authority to award costs against a non-party and concluding that the added party's conduct was not unreasonable or frivolous.

The Tribunal noted that costs should only be ordered in the most egregious circumstances, which were not present here.

The appellant brought a motion for an order directing the respondent municipality and third parties to produce various planning and environmental documents related to lands within the watershed of a proposed drain.

The appellant argued the documents were necessary to evaluate the drain's impact on its property.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding the appellant failed to provide evidentiary foundation, such as expert affidavit evidence, to prove the requested documents were arguably relevant to the issues of flow and contamination on the appeal.

This decision interprets the will of William Archibald Stewart, focusing on the vesting and abatement of gifts of farm properties to his sons, Robert and Winfield, and the impact of subsequent events including the assignment of a mortgage to William’s widow, Edith, and her own testamentary dispositions.

The court addresses whether gifts vested at William’s death or Edith’s, the effect of the mortgage assignment, the abatement of gifts to pay estate liabilities, and related issues of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, and executor liability for tax consequences.

The court considered two motions in a family property dispute: (1) a motion to strike paragraphs from a statement of defence, and (2) a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration of beneficial ownership of real property, or, in the alternative, damages.

The court struck one paragraph with leave to amend and another without leave, and dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, particularly regarding the parties' intentions and credibility.

The court made further orders to preserve the status quo and directed that the trial of this action be heard together with related matrimonial proceedings.

This case involved a trial of issues arising from a motion for directions brought by the Estate of John Duncan Maltman against his daughter, Jacquelyne Playter.

The Estate sought disgorgement of funds from a non-registered TD investment account and a TD chequing account, both jointly held by the deceased and Ms. Playter.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust.

It was determined that the deceased intended Ms. Playter to beneficially receive the proceeds of the joint investment account by right of survivorship, based on clear contemporaneous banking documents and witness testimony.

Regarding the chequing account, Ms. Playter acknowledged beneficial ownership by the deceased but sought to deduct costs for her husband's services in preparing the deceased's home for sale.

The court allowed a partial deduction for these services.

The applicant sought an order declaring the enforcement of a second mortgage statute-barred and directing its discharge from title due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The respondent argued that an oral agreement extended the limitation period, relying on promissory estoppel and part performance.

The court found no credible evidence of an oral agreement, determined that promissory estoppel did not apply as there was no unambiguous promise or detrimental reliance, and concluded that the doctrine of part performance was inapplicable.

Consequently, the court declared the mortgage statute-barred and ordered its discharge.

This appeal concerns a failed real estate transaction where both parties mistakenly believed the property was subject to a prescriptive easement.

The purchaser, Roalno Inc., refused to close without a price abatement or extinguishment of the supposed easement.

The vendors refused these terms.

Roalno sued for specific performance with an abatement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding Roalno breached the agreement by refusing to close.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that Roalno had anticipatorily breached the contract by demanding new terms based on a legally erroneous belief, and that the vendors had accepted this repudiation, thereby ending the contract.

The court also clarified that statutory rights under the Road Access Act do not constitute an easement or right-of-way under the agreement's warranties.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Normal Farm Practices Review Board which found that their top-loading manure tank was not a normal farm practice due to significant non-compliance with Minimum Distance Separation guidelines.

The Board had ordered the appellants to cease using the tank within 24 months after finding the respondents were directly affected by an odour disturbance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's assessment of the evidence or its conclusion that the 166-foot deviation from the guidelines precluded the tank from being a normal farm practice.

The applicants, the daughter and son-in-law of the deceased, sought a declaration of their beneficial ownership in two properties that the deceased had transferred into joint tenancy with them for no consideration.

Prior to his death, the deceased unilaterally severed the joint tenancies and claimed the properties were held in trust for him.

The court found that at the time of the transfers, the deceased intended to make inter vivos gifts of the right of survivorship to save on probate fees.

The presumption of resulting trust was rebutted, and the applicants were declared to hold a two-thirds legal and beneficial interest in the properties.

Gough Lewis brought an urgent motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against his mother's home, which his sister, Clarissa Lewis, was selling under a Power of Attorney.

Gough claimed an interest in the property based on constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, alleging he provided extensive care for his mother, Wendy Lewis, and maintained the property for 16 years, with an understanding that the house would eventually be his.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Gough failed to establish a triable issue for an interest in the property.

The judge found Gough's evidence lacked candour and was vague, particularly regarding his contributions and the property's condition, which was contradicted by Clarissa's evidence and photographs.

The court concluded that damages would be an adequate remedy and that the balance of prejudice weighed heavily against issuing the CPL, as it would prevent the sale necessary to cover Wendy's significant nursing home and property expenses.

The net proceeds of the sale were ordered to be held in trust, with provisions for monthly payments to Wendy for her care.

The applicants, Walter Daniel Bross and Linda M. Bross, brought a motion for production of documents from MNP LLP, an accounting firm retained by the respondents, Jeff Bross and Sharon Bross.

The documents were initially provided to the applicants' counsel on a "counsel's eyes only" basis following an undertaking during a cross-examination.

The applicants sought full disclosure after their summary judgment motion (which was granted in their favour, ending the proceeding) was heard.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply to applications or undertakings on cross-examinations on affidavits, and that the documents were no longer relevant as the underlying proceeding had concluded.

Costs of $3500 were awarded to the respondents.

This motion concerned competing applications between two sets of shareholders of a family farm corporation regarding the enforcement of a settlement agreement for the division of corporate assets.

The agreement included a 'tax condition' requiring each party's tax counsel approval in their sole discretion.

One party refused to waive this condition, citing tax uncertainties.

The court analyzed the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith, finding that the refusal was not a good faith exercise of discretion, as the concerns were abstract or previously known.

The court enforced the minutes of settlement and further ruled that a general increase in milk quota, not explicitly addressed in the settlement, should be considered an 'other asset' of the corporation to be divided equally, rather than solely benefiting the party receiving the quota.