Brian H. Renken

Gough Lewis brought an urgent motion seeking a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against his mother's home, which his sister, Clarissa Lewis, was selling under a Power of Attorney.

Gough claimed an interest in the property based on constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, alleging he provided extensive care for his mother, Wendy Lewis, and maintained the property for 16 years, with an understanding that the house would eventually be his.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Gough failed to establish a triable issue for an interest in the property.

The judge found Gough's evidence lacked candour and was vague, particularly regarding his contributions and the property's condition, which was contradicted by Clarissa's evidence and photographs.

The court concluded that damages would be an adequate remedy and that the balance of prejudice weighed heavily against issuing the CPL, as it would prevent the sale necessary to cover Wendy's significant nursing home and property expenses.

The net proceeds of the sale were ordered to be held in trust, with provisions for monthly payments to Wendy for her care.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion for summary judgment due to an expired limitation period, the parties could not agree on costs.

The successful defendants sought $30,044.19, while the plaintiff suggested $15,000.

The court considered the principle of proportionality and the timing of the summary judgment motion, ultimately fixing costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants at $20,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff purchased a sunroom installed by the defendant in 2001 and experienced severe problems with it during the first winter.

The plaintiff commenced an action for rescission of the contract in December 2010.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the cause of action was discovered by the end of the winter of 2001/2002, making the six-year limitation period under the 1990 Limitations Act applicable.

Even under the 2002 Limitations Act, the court found the action was out of time, as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known that a legal proceeding was appropriate by February 2007 at the latest.

The father applied for sole custody of the parties' child, while the mother cross-applied for sole custody and child support.

The court found the father's evidence unreliable, noting his history of conflict, inappropriate parenting choices, and deliberate underemployment.

The court rejected the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendation to limit the mother's access, finding it unsupported by the evidence and detrimental to the child's relationship with his half-sister.

The mother was awarded sole custody, and the father was ordered to pay child support based on an imputed income of $52,000 per year, along with retroactive arrears.

The applicant father sought sole custody of a child born in April 2005, initially seeking joint custody with status quo access but changing his position at trial.

The respondent mother sought sole custody and child support.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother, finding that the father's evidence was unreliable and evasive, with significant concerns about his parenting choices including alcohol use, exposure to violent video games, allowing the child to handle firearms, and inadequate supervision.

The mother, while having some issues with conflict management, demonstrated a stronger commitment to the child's welfare and maintained a stable primary caregiving relationship.

The court also imputed income to the father for child support purposes based on deliberate underemployment and ordered arrears and ongoing support.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order awarding joint custody of the child to both parents and establishing a mechanism for determining private tutoring.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the joint custody order was consistent with the best interests of the child, the parties' initial separation agreement, and the recommendation of the Children's Lawyer.

The court also upheld the tutoring provision as a common-sense mechanism to identify the best educational support for the child.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement for a right-of-way over a driveway on the appellants' property.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the use was 'as of right' rather than by permission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to find on the record that the arrangement between the original owners did not amount to permission, and deference was owed to that factual finding.

The Towns of Meaford and Thornbury applied to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services for approval to amalgamate their respective police services.

The Commission reviewed the proposed amalgamation agreement, which included provisions for a joint police services board, transfer of members, assets, liabilities, and budgeting.

The Commission found that the proposed amalgamation would provide adequate and effective policing to both communities, noting benefits such as 24-hour policing for Thornbury and a modern police facility.

The Commission approved the amalgamation effective November 1, 1997, subject to the requirement that appointments to the new board comply with the Police Services Act.