Karen J. Sanchez

The moving party sought leave to amend his statement of defence and counterclaim to add a new defendant to the counterclaim.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the claims against him were statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The court found that it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired, as there was a reasonable argument regarding when the claims were discoverable.

The motion was granted, with leave for the new defendant to plead a limitation defence.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was entitled to insurance coverage under his policy with Security National Insurance Company following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant had been driving with an expired driver's license at the time of the accident, which occurred after he suffered a sudden medical episode.

Security National denied coverage on the basis that the applicant was not authorized by law to drive.

The applicant argued he had established the defence of due diligence to the offence of driving without a valid license, alternatively seeking relief from forfeiture.

The court granted the application, finding that the applicant had demonstrated due diligence and was entitled to insurance coverage.

The plaintiff estate sought costs following a trial where it recovered a portion of the $30 million claimed from the defendant, including an 80% interest in a property.

The defendant counterclaimed for sexual abuse, which was dismissed.

Both parties sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff was the more successful party and entitled to costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to either party based on unproven allegations of fraud and sexual abuse, finding the allegations did not amount to reprehensible conduct warranting chastisement.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $800,000 on a partial indemnity basis, reflecting its divided success.

The court considered an application by Bob Alan Barker to remove his sister, Catherine Elizabeth Barker, as Estate Trustee of their late brother John Joseph Barker’s estate, and to disqualify her from receiving a share of the estate due to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and misappropriation.

The decision addresses requests for production of financial records, including Catherine’s line of credit and her mother’s bank accounts, and analyzes inconsistencies in Catherine’s explanations regarding the handling of estate assets, the sale of a condominium, and life insurance proceeds.

The court granted some of the requested orders, including production of specific financial documents and an examination under oath, and awarded costs personally against Catherine.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering it to reimburse the tenant for rent overcharges, as well as the Board's subsequent refusal to review the decision after the landlord failed to attend the hearing.

The landlord argued the Board cited the wrong statutory provision regarding parking fees and erred in rejecting its explanation of a computer glitch for missing the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test despite citing the wrong section, and that the Board's finding on the landlord's lack of reasonable diligence was an unappealable question of mixed fact and law.

The Estate of William Waters sought the return of over $30 million advanced by the deceased to his wife's personal support worker, Gillian Henry, over a ten-year period.

The Estate argued the funds were investments held on resulting trust, while Henry maintained they were gifts made during a secret intimate relationship.

The court found that the deceased, a sophisticated businessman, intended most of the advances as gifts, except for funds invested in a horse stable business (King of Hearts), which were held on resulting trust.

The court also found that the deceased improperly gifted $2.85 million of his incapacitated wife's money to Henry, which constituted unjust enrichment and must be returned.

Henry's counterclaim for sexual battery was dismissed due to lack of credibility and absence of corroboration required under the Evidence Act.

This endorsement concerns a costs award following the settlement of a motion to set aside a noting in default and a motion for default judgment.

The parties had resolved the substantive issues, leaving only costs for determination.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $11,961.05, arguing the defendants exhibited a "troubling pattern" of ignoring orders.

The defendants acknowledged some costs were due but disputed the plaintiff's characterization of their conduct and the quantum sought, arguing the plaintiff's response was unduly aggressive.

The court applied the principles from section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the general principles for assessing costs from Apotex Inc. v. Eli Lilly Canada Inc. The court found the plaintiff's costs excessive, noting the plaintiff's aggressive pursuit of default judgment despite the self-represented defendants' prompt attempts to resolve the matter.

The court awarded the plaintiff $900 plus HST on a partial indemnity basis, finding this amount to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff estate to produce unredacted solicitor files of the deceased, William Waters, arguing that the "wills exception" to solicitor-client privilege should extend to determine the deceased's intent regarding inter vivos transfers.

The estate claimed the transfers were impressed with a resulting trust, while the defendants asserted they were gifts.

The court found that the previous order allowed for disputes over privilege and that applying res judicata to informal case management directions would inhibit the process.

The court extended the "wills exception" from Geffen v. Goodman Estate to this case, finding ambiguity in the deceased's will regarding the nature of the transfers.

It ordered the production of all information shedding light on whether the transfers were gifts, including information on the deceased's capacity and susceptibility to undue influence, subject to a protective order to prevent a fishing expedition for claims against the solicitor.

The appellants, beneficiaries of an estate, appealed a Superior Court order that declared they had no interest in a property, ordered them to vacate, and required them to pay occupation rent.

Their appeal primarily argued that the motion judge erred by failing to grant them an adjournment and by providing insufficient reasons for the denial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The court noted that it was not the appellants' first adjournment request, they had received legal advice, and the ongoing delay prejudiced other beneficiaries of the estate.

Costs were awarded against one appellant.

This decision addresses the costs of a successful motion for judgment brought by the plaintiffs (Sub-Prime Mortgage Corporation and Elle Mortgage Corporation) to enforce minutes of settlement.

The court determined the liability, scale, and quantum of costs for both the plaintiffs and Terry Walman, a defendant to the counterclaim who also participated in the motion.

The plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs as per their mortgage terms, while Mr. Walman was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The defendants were ordered to pay costs to both the plaintiffs and Mr. Walman.

The Superior Court of Justice issued supplementary reasons regarding the terms for a 90-day stay on the enforcement of a writ of possession, previously granted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs (mortgagees) sought to impose conditions on the defendants (mortgagors) during this stay, including monthly payments for accruing debt and realty tax arrears, proof of property insurance, and appraisal inspections.

The defendants opposed, arguing these constituted new substantive relief beyond the original consent judgment.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 1.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, imposed terms requiring the defendants to pay $3,000 monthly towards realty tax arrears and to provide immediate evidence of property insurance.

The request for appraisal inspections was denied.

The court also clarified the duration of the stay in light of the termination of the provincial state of emergency.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for judgment to enforce minutes of settlement in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendants failed to make the required $2,100,000 settlement payment by the agreed deadline, triggering a default provision for a $2,700,000 judgment and possession of the property.

The defendants argued they could not secure refinancing due to existing encumbrances and claimed the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns frustrated the agreement.

The court rejected the frustration argument, noting the pandemic was a known factor when the settlement was signed, and granted the plaintiffs' motion for judgment.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on loans due and payable by the Defendants, who were engaged in a real estate business.

The loans, totaling $70,000 in principal, plus 12% annual interest, were evidenced by promissory notes.

The Defendants did not dispute the existence of the loans but raised concerns about the interest rate and the priority of these claims relative to a separate, related action (Piccioni v. Viktyuk).

The court found no real controversy regarding the 12% interest rate, as one defendant assumed it and the other definitively admitted it.

The court granted full summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, concluding that the issues of liability were distinct from the Piccioni action and that a priority dispute at the enforcement stage did not preclude judgment on the loans.

Enforcement of the judgment was stayed pending resolution of the priority issue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his professional negligence action against a lawyer and an accounting firm on summary judgment.

The appellant had sold his software company to Microsoft in 1999 and received approximately $4.8 million through a family trust.

The Canada Revenue Agency reassessed him for approximately $2.4 million in taxes, interest and penalties, claiming section 75(2) of the Income Tax Act applied.

The appellant obtained rectification orders and ultimately had his tax liability reduced to approximately $57,000 after the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that section 75(2) did not apply.

The appellant claimed damages from the respondents for professional negligence, alleging they failed to advise him of the CRA's position and the likely expenses of disputing it.

The motion judge dismissed the claim against the lawyer for lack of evidence of retainer regarding the trust, and dismissed the claim against the accounting firm for failure to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the expert evidence requirement for professional negligence claims.

The appellant purchased a commercial property from the respondents and gave a vendor take back mortgage.

The respondents remained as tenants.

The appellant sued in Small Claims Court for unpaid rent and property removal costs, while the respondents counterclaimed.

During the trial, the respondents' counsel withdrew, and the Deputy Judge ordered the appellant to pay the outstanding mortgage balance of $59,235.31 into court to obtain a discharge and avoid prejudice from the delay.

The Deputy Judge ultimately awarded the appellant $25,000 plus costs, but ordered the remaining funds in court paid to the respondents, failing to account for agreed-upon rent set-offs that were not formally pleaded.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the Deputy Judge exceeded Small Claims jurisdiction by ordering the $59,235.31 payment, the Superior Court had jurisdiction under s. 134(1) of the Courts of Justice Act to correct the unintended consequences.

The appeal was allowed, and judgment was granted to the appellant for $53,505 plus costs, to be paid from the funds in court.

The plaintiff, James Rausch, sued the City of Pickering for damages arising from alleged trespass, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and negligence related to the enforcement of by-laws concerning her wild boar farming operation.

The court dismissed the claims for trespass due to de minimis damages, and abuse of process and malicious prosecution for lack of improper purpose and causation.

While the City was found negligent for failing to train its by-law officers on the Farming and Food Production Act, the plaintiff's claim for damages for loss of animals and business revenue was dismissed because her actions in killing the wild boars were deemed unreasonable and she failed to adequately prove the quantum of damages.

The respondent non-profit housing cooperative requested reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found it failed to adequately address serious and persistent harassment directed at the applicants.

The respondent argued that the Tribunal erred by applying the reasonableness standard from employment jurisprudence without accounting for the unique nature of volunteer-run housing cooperatives.

The respondent also challenged the remedial orders, which included monetary compensation and requirements to post the decision and notify members.

The Tribunal dismissed most of the reconsideration request, finding no conflict with established jurisprudence and noting that the respondent failed to propose an alternative legal standard.

However, the Tribunal removed the requirement to post the decision on the cooperative's bulletin board, finding it redundant given the requirement to send notices directly to members.

The applicant filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking to increase the monetary remedies claimed to $92,812.03 and to add UNIFOR as a respondent.

The respondent Quinte Healthcare Corporation took no position, and UNIFOR did not file submissions.

Applying the three-part test from Smyth, the Tribunal found that the allegations could support a Code violation and that it was fair to add UNIFOR.

The Tribunal granted both requests, amending the monetary remedies and adding UNIFOR as a respondent.

The moving party brought a motion to rehear an appeal that had previously been dismissed in part.

The moving party argued that the appeal panel erred in law and fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the moving party was merely attempting to re-argue the same points.

The court also prohibited the moving party from bringing further motions without leave.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her human rights application for delay.

She argued that the delay was justified because she was awaiting the conclusion of an internal investigation by the respondent.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for reconsideration, reaffirming established case law that waiting for an internal investigation to conclude does not generally constitute a valid explanation for delay in filing an application.