Justin Tetreault

An appeal from a summary judgment decision concerning the entitlement of a wrongfully dismissed employee to exercise stock options and restricted share units during the reasonable notice period.

The employer argued that contractual language prevented vesting after dismissal, relying on precedent.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the employee was entitled to damages for lost opportunity to exercise awards that would have vested during the notice period, distinguishing the controlling precedent on the basis that the contractual language lacked sufficient clarity to unambiguously remove common law rights.

The employee's cross-appeal regarding damages calculation was also dismissed.

The court provided supplementary reasons for decision regarding the quantification of damages for the loss of Restricted Share Units (RSUs) and stock options following the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff was awarded a 24-month reasonable notice period.

The central issue was determining the appropriate timeframe for calculating the value of these equity instruments, specifically how long after vesting the plaintiff would have sold them.

The court rejected both the plaintiff's claim of immediate sale and the defendant's proposal of 13.7 months based on pre-termination sales activity.

Instead, by examining the plaintiff's actual sales activities during the notice period, the court determined that damages should be calculated on the basis that the plaintiff would have sold the shares five months after their vesting date.

The plaintiff, a senior executive with 22 years of service, was terminated without cause by the defendant.

He brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for wrongful dismissal.

The court granted summary judgment, fixing the reasonable notice period at 24 months.

The court held that the plaintiff's entitlement to commissions was not reduced by 50% under the employer's commission plan, as the reduction clause only applied to voluntary resignations.

The court also awarded damages for lost stock options, restricted share units, pension contributions, and certain benefits that would have accrued during the notice period, deferring the exact quantification of damages to a later date.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action, claiming constructive dismissal due to a temporary layoff after 23 years of employment.

The court found that the temporary layoff constituted constructive dismissal as there was no contractual right for the employer to implement such a layoff.

However, the court also found that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by refusing a bona fide recall offer from the employer, which included assurances of no reprisals and substantially similar terms of employment.

The plaintiff's subjective belief of embarrassment or degradation was not objectively supported.

Consequently, the plaintiff's damages were limited to the period between the layoff and the recall offer.

The defendant employer brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, arguing the dispute fell within the scope of an arbitration clause in the employment agreement.

The plaintiff opposed the stay, arguing the arbitration clause was void for lack of consideration and that subsequent amendments to the agreement conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the courts.

Applying the competence-competence principle, the court found it was arguable that the claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause and that the plaintiff had not established a clear case of invalidity.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was granted, leaving the jurisdictional challenge to be resolved first by the arbitrator.

The plaintiff, terminated after 9 years of employment, sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages, arguing that AVL Manufacturing Inc. and its related corporate entities (VDC Manufacturing Inc., Hamilton Metalworks Inc., and ECO-H Technologies Inc.) constituted a common employer.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish a common employer relationship, noting the formal separation in corporate structures and dealings with the plaintiff, despite shared ownership and directors.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The applicant brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal an order denying his motion to set aside a consent order for discontinuance of his wrongful dismissal action against the respondent bank.

The applicant claimed he had consented to the discontinuance with prejudice due to mistake, mental health issues, and misunderstanding.

He also alleged the judge improperly gave legal advice, that court transcripts were fabricated, and that there was a conspiracy involving the judge and others.

The chambers judge denied the extension of time, finding the appeal had no real chance of success.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's motion for review, finding the chambers judge properly exercised her discretion and that the applicant's allegations were entirely without evidentiary support.

An employer sought declarations that a senior executive’s employment agreement requiring six months’ written notice of resignation was valid and enforceable.

The employee resigned and intended to join a competitor before the notice period expired, arguing the contract violated the Employment Standards Act, lacked consideration, functioned as an unlawful non‑compete, and that he had “Good Reason” to resign without notice.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the executive had accepted the promotion and contract, the notice provision did not breach the ESA, and the clause was not equivalent to a non‑competition covenant because the employee remained employed and paid during the notice period.

The employee also failed to establish a material alteration of duties or to comply with contractual procedures for asserting “Good Reason.” The court declared the contract binding and confirmed the six‑month notice period applied.

The defendant brought a motion seeking production of invoices issued by the plaintiff to a third party for consulting services during a period when the plaintiff was also billing the defendant.

The plaintiff resisted production on the basis that the documents were irrelevant and not within his possession or control.

The court held that the requested invoices had potential relevance to the interpretation of the parties’ contractual billing arrangement and could inform whether the plaintiff customarily billed on a fixed-fee basis.

The court concluded that, had the documents remained in the plaintiff’s possession, they would have been producible and directed that the plaintiff not object to the third party producing the documents.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge but fixed at $3,000.