M. Norman Grosman

An employer sought declarations that a senior executive’s employment agreement requiring six months’ written notice of resignation was valid and enforceable.

The employee resigned and intended to join a competitor before the notice period expired, arguing the contract violated the Employment Standards Act, lacked consideration, functioned as an unlawful non‑compete, and that he had “Good Reason” to resign without notice.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the executive had accepted the promotion and contract, the notice provision did not breach the ESA, and the clause was not equivalent to a non‑competition covenant because the employee remained employed and paid during the notice period.

The employee also failed to establish a material alteration of duties or to comply with contractual procedures for asserting “Good Reason.” The court declared the contract binding and confirmed the six‑month notice period applied.

The defendants moved to set aside ex parte Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions obtained by the plaintiff in a fraud action involving alleged misappropriation of corporate funds and improper commissions.

The court reviewed the strict legal requirements for such extraordinary remedies and emphasized the obligation of full, fair, and frank disclosure on without‑notice motions.

It found the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts, including ongoing communications with certain defendants, repayment negotiations, employment relationships, and other contextual facts that could have influenced the original decision.

The court also found insufficient evidence that certain defendants possessed incriminating documents or posed a real risk of asset dissipation.

As a result, the Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions were set aside against all defendants.

A related motion by one defendant to strike portions of the statement of claim was dismissed.

Following a lengthy commercial dispute involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, misuse of confidential information, wrongful dismissal, and fraudulent conveyances, the court determined the allocation and scale of costs arising from two trials and related proceedings.

The litigation involved numerous parties and mixed results, with certain defendants fully successful and others partially liable.

The court concluded that the complexity of the litigation and the magnitude of the claimed costs warranted referral of most quantification issues to an assessment officer under Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded in several instances, including where unproven allegations of fraud or serious misconduct had been advanced, while partial indemnity costs applied to others depending on conduct and settlement offers.

The court also considered the appropriateness of Bullock and Sanderson orders in allocating responsibility among defendants.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee and awarding damages including amounts for broker warrants and interest on capital.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of constructive dismissal, agreeing that the employer's demand that the employee share his role as head of the corporate finance department constituted a fundamental change to his employment contract.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the damages awarded for broker warrants because they had no value on the termination date, and setting aside the award of interest on the employee's capital because the shareholder agreement expressly precluded it.

The respondent, a public servant, was released from his employment when his position was declared surplus under s. 22(4) of the Public Service Act.

He brought an action for wrongful dismissal in the Superior Court of Justice, alleging bad faith.

The appellant employer brought a motion to dismiss the action, arguing the Public Services Grievance Board had exclusive jurisdiction, or alternatively, that the court should defer to the Board.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the Board and the courts had concurrent jurisdiction, the courts should not defer to the Board because the statutory grievance procedure was not mandatory and did not explicitly abrogate the employee's right to access the courts for breach of contract.