D. Salmers

The plaintiff, a former high school student, brought an action for damages against her former music teacher, Royce Galon Williamson, for sexual abuse, and against the Trillium Lakelands District School Board (the School Board) for vicarious liability and direct negligence/breach of fiduciary duty.

Williamson did not attend the trial, and his statement of defence was struck.

The court found Williamson liable for sexual assault, battery, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The School Board was found vicariously liable for Williamson's conduct and directly liable for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty due to its inadequate response to the plaintiff's disclosure, including failure to provide support and immediately remove Williamson from the school.

Damages were awarded for general and aggravated damages, loss of competitive advantage, past and future care expenses, and punitive damages against Williamson.

The accused was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated assault after stabbing his mother and stepfather.

The Crown applied for a finding that the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, and subsequently for a high-risk accused designation.

The court found that the accused suffered from schizophrenia, rendering him incapable of knowing his acts were wrong, and granted the NCR application.

Furthermore, given the accused's history of violence, lack of insight into his illness, and the substantial likelihood of future violence if untreated, the court designated him a high-risk accused and ordered his detention in a hospital.

The applicant, a licensed paralegal, applied for a declaration that licensed paralegals are 'officers of a court of justice' under s. 3(1)(6) of the Juries Act and are therefore ineligible to serve as jurors.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither the Juries Act nor the Law Society Act explicitly designates licensed paralegals as officers of the court, unlike barristers and solicitors.

The court concluded that it is up to the legislature to clarify whether policy considerations warrant making licensed paralegals ineligible for jury duty.

The defendants moved to stay a civil action and an Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT) proceeding, arguing that concurrent proceedings alongside an Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) prosecution for by-law infractions would prejudice their right to a fair trial and against self-incrimination.

The court temporarily stayed the civil action to avoid duplicative proceedings, noting the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek double recovery.

However, the court dismissed the motion to stay the ERT proceeding, finding that existing statutory protections and undertaking rules were sufficient to protect the defendants' rights in the OCJ prosecution.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, applied for release on bail.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and a confession made to the applicant's former common-law spouse.

The court found that the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds under s. 515 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant was released on a recognizance with two sureties pledging significant equity, strict house arrest conditions, and GPS electronic monitoring.

The plaintiffs and defendant settled a motor vehicle accident claim for $732,835 just prior to trial, leaving costs to be determined by the court.

The plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $572,000, while the defendant proposed approximately $394,000.

The court noted that liability was clear from the outset, yet the defendant failed to admit liability and delayed making an offer to settle until two weeks before trial, unnecessarily increasing the plaintiffs' costs.

After adjusting for excessive hourly rates for students/clerks and some excessive preparation time, the court fixed the plaintiffs' partial indemnity costs at $310,000 plus HST for fees and $160,000 inclusive of HST for disbursements.

Following a jury trial where the plaintiffs recovered $68,250 in damages, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded under Rule 76.13 because the recovery was under $100,000.

The court rejected this argument, finding it was reasonable to use the ordinary procedure given the substantial loss of income claim advanced at trial.

The court reduced the plaintiffs' claimed costs due to the failure of the loss of income claim, excessive rates, and duplication of work.

The court also allowed the plaintiffs' disbursement for costs insurance, noting it promotes access to justice.

The plaintiffs were awarded $58,000 in fees and $28,000 in disbursements, plus HST.

This is a further endorsement on a motion for approval of the settlements of tort and accident benefit claims for a minor who sustained catastrophic injuries.

The court expressed concerns regarding proposed payments from the minor's settlement funds to her father for debts and home improvements, citing insufficient evidence and potential conflict of interest.

The court also reviewed the requested legal fees, reducing the contingency fee for the accident benefits claim from 30% to 15% to ensure fairness and reasonableness.

The proposed settlement was not approved as submitted, but the court outlined specific terms under which a revised settlement would be approved, prioritizing the minor's best interests.

The plaintiff, James Rausch, sued the City of Pickering for damages arising from alleged trespass, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and negligence related to the enforcement of by-laws concerning her wild boar farming operation.

The court dismissed the claims for trespass due to de minimis damages, and abuse of process and malicious prosecution for lack of improper purpose and causation.

While the City was found negligent for failing to train its by-law officers on the Farming and Food Production Act, the plaintiff's claim for damages for loss of animals and business revenue was dismissed because her actions in killing the wild boars were deemed unreasonable and she failed to adequately prove the quantum of damages.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, alleging a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 40 months and one week.

The court attributed only two weeks of this delay to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 39 months and 3 weeks, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption by demonstrating exceptional circumstances, as the court found that neither lengthy defence cross-examination nor an unsuccessful certiorari application constituted defence delay or exceptional circumstances, particularly given the Crown's own disclosure issues and the simplicity of the case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The applicant, HMI, brought a motion to refer a consolidated construction lien action, involving seventeen liens totaling over $42 million, to a single private arbitration and to stay the court proceedings.

The consolidated action was divided into three streams (A, B, C) based on contractual relationships.

The motion was opposed by various lien claimants and other parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a consolidated arbitration could not be ordered due to significant conflicts in arbitration clauses across the different contracts, the inclusion of third parties who had not consented to arbitration, the failure to follow contractual dispute resolution protocols (including mediation), and potential for increased costs and delays for some parties.

The court emphasized the consensual nature of arbitration and declined to impose non-consensual amendments to contracts or stay the court action.

Following the release of reasons for decision in a civil proceeding, counsel alerted the court to misstatements contained in several paragraphs of the judgment.

The court reviewed the concerns raised in correspondence and agreed that errors existed in the previously released reasons.

The judge confirmed that the misstatements had not been identified despite multiple proofreadings prior to release.

The court ordered that the errors be corrected and that a corrected version of the reasons be circulated to counsel.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the validity of several clauses in a will that conditioned her inheritance on compliance with certain directives of the testator.

The court considered whether a clause prohibiting any challenge to the will constituted an in terrorem clause and whether other conditional gifts were void for uncertainty or contrary to public policy.

The court held that the clause forbidding any litigation against the estate was void as an impermissible in terrorem clause because it imposed a bare forfeiture without a gift over.

One condition that disinherited the beneficiary if she were merely investigated or charged with inappropriate care was also declared void as contrary to public policy.

Other conditions relating to hospital admission and life‑prolonging treatment were upheld, and a clause giving the executrix discretion to distribute the estate if the beneficiary breached the conditions was not invalidated.

The estate trustee sought directions regarding whether certain payments under a mediated consent judgment resolving family law claims could be distributed from the estate ahead of unrelated tort claims arising from aviation litigation.

The court considered the priority of equalization and dependant support claims under the Creditors’ Relief Act, the Family Law Act, and the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court held that the former spouse’s lump sum payment, characterized as an equalization payment and global settlement of retroactive and ongoing support, had priority over competing civil claims against the estate.

The court also held that the deceased’s common-law spouse’s lump sum dependant support award had priority over those claims.

However, the adult children failed to establish that they were dependants under the Succession Law Reform Act or that the amounts claimed were justified as support, and therefore their entitlements did not receive priority over the aviation claims.

The moving party bank sought summary judgment dismissing claims alleging that its registered mortgage formed part of a fraudulent land transaction scheme.

The plaintiffs alleged that a prior partial discharge of their charge and subsequent transfers were fraudulent and that the bank had knowledge of the fraud through its solicitors or should have conducted further inquiries.

Applying the summary judgment framework articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The record established that the bank had no actual, deemed, or constructive knowledge of fraud and was entitled to rely on the land titles register.

The plaintiffs’ failure to understand the acknowledgment authorizing the discharge and their failure to register notice of their interest for more than two years contributed to any alleged losses.

The applicant sought a declaration that his home insurer owed both a duty to defend and indemnity exposure in an underlying Family Law Act action arising from a fatal drug overdose on his property.

Applying the three-step framework from Supreme Court of Canada authority, the court characterized the pleaded claims as genuinely grounded in negligence rather than merely relabelled intentional or criminal wrongdoing.

The court held the negligence claims were non-derivative and potentially within policy coverage for negligent acts.

The insurer was therefore required to provide a defence and coverage for non-excluded negligent claims in the underlying action.