Colin Still

The applicant sought an order for the partition and sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent opposed this and brought a cross-motion for exclusive possession, retroactive child and spousal support, and an order to include pre-marriage co-habitation in pension valuation.

The court granted the applicant's motion for partition and sale, finding that the respondent's arguments for delaying the sale, including the children's attachment to the home and the "joint family venture" claim, were insufficient to defeat the prima facie right to sale.

The respondent's motion for exclusive possession was dismissed, but other aspects of her cross-motion were preserved for future determination.

The court ordered the matrimonial home to be listed for sale with a closing date not before June 26, 2020, and for a portion of the proceeds to be held in trust.

This decision addresses costs following a trial concerning child support.

The Applicant (Mother) sought full recovery costs of $24,882.29, while the Respondent (Father) argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the Applicant had marginal success on the substantive child support issues but awarded her $10,000 in costs due to the Respondent's unreasonable behaviour, including failure to provide disclosure and obfuscation of income.

The award was deemed proportionate to the issues and outcome, and enforceable as an incident of child support.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change seeking retroactive child support and contribution to special and extraordinary expenses for two children.

The respondent father, who was self-employed, had failed to provide timely financial disclosure and his income had significantly increased in recent years.

The court found no blameworthy conduct to justify a retroactive variation prior to November 2016, but imputed the father's income for 2016 onwards.

The court ordered the father to pay retroactive table support, ongoing table support for one child, and his proportionate share of special and extraordinary expenses, including clothing for a child with special needs residing in a treatment centre.

The parties settled their family law dispute regarding spousal support and property on the eve of trial, leaving only the issue of costs to be determined.

The respondent sought costs based on an early offer to settle, while the applicant argued for no costs or a nominal amount due to the respondent's late disclosure of her job loss.

The court found that both parties had withheld important productions and acted unreasonably at times.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court ordered the applicant to pay $5,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant wife appealed an order granting her an equalization payment of $60,000 following a short marriage with less than five years of cohabitation.

She argued the motion judge erred by not adopting a mathematical formula for unequal division and by misstating her alternative position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge was not required to use a mathematical formula and properly applied s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act to determine that equal division would be unconscionable based on the parties' respective contributions.

The estate trustee sought clarification of a prior costs order arising from estate litigation between the trustee and a beneficiary.

The issue was whether the respondent beneficiary was required to pay the ordered costs to the trustee personally or in her representative capacity as estate trustee.

Applying the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, which generally follows ordinary civil costs principles unless public policy considerations apply, the court reaffirmed that the losing party must bear the costs personally.

The court concluded that the respondent beneficiary must pay the awarded costs directly to the applicant in her personal capacity.

The applicant brought a motion challenging the validity of several clauses in a will that conditioned her inheritance on compliance with certain directives of the testator.

The court considered whether a clause prohibiting any challenge to the will constituted an in terrorem clause and whether other conditional gifts were void for uncertainty or contrary to public policy.

The court held that the clause forbidding any litigation against the estate was void as an impermissible in terrorem clause because it imposed a bare forfeiture without a gift over.

One condition that disinherited the beneficiary if she were merely investigated or charged with inappropriate care was also declared void as contrary to public policy.

Other conditions relating to hospital admission and life‑prolonging treatment were upheld, and a clause giving the executrix discretion to distribute the estate if the beneficiary breached the conditions was not invalidated.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent successfully brought a motion against three non-party corporations seeking financial disclosure required by a business valuator to determine the applicant’s income.

After the motion succeeded and disclosure was ordered subject to a confidentiality agreement, the parties returned to court to resolve disputes over the confidentiality terms and costs.

Both sides sought substantial indemnity costs and relied on offers to settle under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that neither party met the burden of proving that the result was as favourable as their respective offers and therefore assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Applying the factors in Rule 24 and considering the respondent’s substantial success on the disclosure motion, the court ordered the non-parties to pay costs.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol (over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood).

The Crown relied on expert toxicology evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, as the breath tests were taken more than two hours after the alleged offence and the statutory presumption of identity could not be applied.

The defence raised evidence of bolus drinking—specifically, that the accused consumed 1 to 2 ounces of Sambuca liqueur (38% alcohol) immediately before driving.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no large quantities of alcohol were consumed within 15 minutes of driving, creating a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit at the time of operation.

The accused was acquitted.

The moving party sought an order under Rule 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the defendants and a non-party to pay into court any monies arising from a prospective dealership transaction, alleging entitlement to commission as an independent contractor.

The court considered whether the requirements for payment into court of a specific fund were satisfied, including the existence of a specific identifiable fund, a proprietary claim, a serious issue to be tried, and the balance of convenience.

The evidence showed that only a non-binding letter of intent existed and no binding agreement or completed transaction had occurred.

The court held that a contractual claim for potential commissions does not constitute a proprietary claim to a specific fund and that no identifiable fund existed.

The motion was dismissed as speculative and unsupported by the evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing his defamation action for delay at a status hearing.

The appellant argued the delay was justified because he was waiting for criminal charges of sexual assault to be resolved, but the Master found the criminal charges related to a different incident than the one pleaded in the defamation action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master correctly applied the law, properly rejected the appellant's excuse for delay, and reasonably found actual prejudice to the respondents.

In a family law proceeding, the responding spouse brought a motion seeking disclosure from three non-party corporations connected to the applicant spouse’s business interests.

The requested documents were required by the moving party’s business valuator to assess the value of the applicant’s corporate interests and income for matrimonial property purposes.

The corporations resisted disclosure citing confidentiality concerns and sought to redact information relating to other shareholders.

The court applied Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and held that it would be unfair for the moving party to proceed without the requested information.

The court ordered production of the outstanding documents without redactions, subject to litigation privilege and a confidentiality agreement.

A dispute arose over the interpretation of a bonus provision in an independent consultant agreement between a brokerage manager and an insurance brokerage.

The plaintiff argued that once the contractual production threshold was met, the bonus percentage applied to total production, while the defendants argued it applied only to production above the threshold.

The court interpreted the contract as granting a bonus calculated on total production once the threshold was achieved, emphasizing the wording of the agreement and the factual matrix.

In the alternative, the court held that any ambiguity would be resolved against the drafter under the doctrine of contra proferentem.

The plaintiff recovered unpaid bonus commissions but was denied additional damages for lost income due to failure to mitigate.

The defendants’ counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty and solicitation was dismissed for lack of evidence.

In a family law motion following separation, the respondent sought temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and primary residence of the children.

The parties continued living under the same roof after separation, while serious behavioural issues had emerged for one child amid parental conflict.

Applying s. 24(3) of the Family Law Act, the court held that the best interests of the children—particularly the need to reduce household conflict affecting the child—justified granting exclusive possession.

Evidence indicated the respondent had historically been the primary caregiver, supporting an order that the children reside primarily with her.

The court also ordered guideline child support based on the applicant’s income but declined to award temporary spousal support.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting a non-suit.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred because there was probative evidence of the oral contract contended for by the appellant.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and judgment was ordered for the appellant with costs.

The appellant failed to appear for his appeal despite receiving notice, resulting in the appeal being dismissed as abandoned.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the trial judge made mathematical errors in calculating retroactive spousal support and the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding no clear errors and concluding that the overall award was generous and did not warrant interference.

Costs of $12,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Starr Toof, appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a used printing press to the respondent, J B Printing Limited.

During a pre-purchase inspection, Starr Toof's representatives made positive statements about the press's condition and failed to disclose damage to an important component.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct legal principles and that his findings of mixed fact and law regarding duty of care, reasonable reliance, and misrepresentation were entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

A dissenting opinion argued that no duty of care existed and that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact.