Natacha R. Leite

The appellant father appealed an order from an uncontested trial where his pleadings were struck for non-disclosure in a child support motion to change.

The respondent mother brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the father lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, dismissing the appeal.

The court affirmed that parties whose pleadings are struck generally lack standing to appeal an uncontested trial order, finding no exceptional circumstances.

It clarified that evolving Section 7 expenses do not constitute new heads of relief requiring amended pleadings, distinguishing the case from Freedman v. Freedman.

The court emphasized the importance of disclosure in child support matters.

Following a five-day family law trial regarding parenting time and decision-making authority, the successful applicant mother sought full indemnity costs of $148,019.00.

The respondent father argued the amount was excessive and proposed $25,000.00.

The court found that while the mother was successful and had made a comprehensive offer to settle, the father's conduct did not reach the high threshold of bad faith required for full indemnity costs.

The court determined the mother's claimed hours were excessive and awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $80,000.00.

The parties separated after 14 years of marriage and engaged in high-conflict litigation over parenting time and decision-making for their 12-year-old child.

The father sought joint decision-making and expanded parenting time, including overnights.

The mother sought sole decision-making and restricted daytime parenting time for the father.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer investigated and found the child strongly opposed overnight visits due to the father's behaviour and conflict.

The court gave significant weight to the child's independent views and preferences, awarding the mother sole decision-making and restricting the father's parenting time to daytime visits.

In a family law motion following separation, the respondent sought temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and primary residence of the children.

The parties continued living under the same roof after separation, while serious behavioural issues had emerged for one child amid parental conflict.

Applying s. 24(3) of the Family Law Act, the court held that the best interests of the children—particularly the need to reduce household conflict affecting the child—justified granting exclusive possession.

Evidence indicated the respondent had historically been the primary caregiver, supporting an order that the children reside primarily with her.

The court also ordered guideline child support based on the applicant’s income but declined to award temporary spousal support.