Norman A. Pizzale

The applicant sought to terminate his spousal support obligation retroactively to January 1, 2018, and prospectively.

The respondent sought payment of a $35,000 lump sum and significant periodic arrears.

The court found the applicant had engaged in financial nondisclosure regarding a trust fund, which impeded the assessment of his means.

The court terminated spousal support effective April 1, 2022, based on medical evidence of the applicant's inability to work, but ordered him to pay $97,536 in total arrears.

The applicant's motion for contempt against the respondent for late financial disclosure was dismissed, as the court exercised its discretion to decline a contempt finding due to extenuating circumstances.

Following a complex family law trial where the respondent was largely successful, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant failed to file costs submissions.

The court reviewed the parties' offers to settle, finding the respondent beat his offer on the equalization issue but not on all issues.

The court noted the applicant's unreasonable and obstructive behaviour throughout the litigation, which caused significant delay and wasted resources.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $125,000 on a partial recovery basis, to be credited against the equalization payment owed to the applicant.

The parties separated after a 6.5-year marriage.

The court resolved corollary issues including equalization, child support, spousal support, and property damage.

The court found the applicant to be a highly uncredible witness.

The applicant's claims for child support and ongoing spousal support were dismissed, with the court finding the respondent did not stand in the place of a parent to her son, and that her entitlement to spousal support had expired.

The court awarded the respondent $120,000 in damages in tort, finding the applicant intentionally turned off the furnaces in the matrimonial home, causing the pipes to freeze and burst.

An equalization payment of $1,544,025 was ordered payable to the applicant, subject to significant credits in favour of the respondent.

The plaintiffs sued multiple defendants over a property dispute involving a cottage, a right of way, and claims for damages due to negligence and adverse possession.

The court found Robert Moore negligent for a mudslide damaging the plaintiffs' outhouse and Howard Moore liable for exacerbating damage and spoliation of evidence.

However, the plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession over the disputed land, as they could not prove intent to exclude the true owner or effective exclusion.

The court awarded modest damages against Robert Moore and Howard Moore, but dismissed the adverse possession claim.

The defendants moved to strike portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim relating to defamation, arguing it failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because it did not set out the precise defamatory statements, who made them, or to whom.

The plaintiffs, who were suspended from the defendant club without notice or a chance to respond, argued they pleaded all available facts and that the exact statements would be revealed in discovery.

The court applied the flexible approach from Magnotta and dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs pleaded a coherent body of fact and were not on a fishing expedition.

The applicant sought costs after successfully defending a motion brought by the respondent, who was unsuccessful in obtaining enlarged access and whose conduct caused the litigation.

The respondent, who was self-represented, requested no costs.

The court awarded the applicant $8,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding that the applicant was entitled to costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and lack of credibility regarding his financial circumstances and adherence to court orders.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment under the Succession Law Reform Act that found her to be the common law spouse of the deceased, awarded her a $30,000 support order, and ordered her to pay $20,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued she should have been awarded the deceased's house, that a constructive trust should have been found, and that costs should have been paid out of the estate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact, credibility assessments, or discretionary costs award.

BMO Trust Company, as Estate Trustee and Guardian of Property, applied to pass its accounts.

The objector, Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections, leading to a contentious hearing.

Following the judgment which passed the accounts with a minor reduction in BMO's compensation, the court heard submissions on costs.

The total costs claimed exceeded $300,000, disproportionate to the summary nature of the proceeding.

The court applied principles of reasonableness, fairness, proportionality, and access to justice, limiting the costs awarded to BMO, payable by Lillian Sawchuk, to $69,000 plus disbursements, finding that an award of the full amount would be excessive and unreasonable.

No other costs were awarded.

BMO Trust Company applied to pass its accounts for the Estate of Pauline Medynski and the Guardianship of Andrew Medynski.

The adult daughters of the deceased, particularly Lillian Sawchuk, raised numerous objections.

The court found some deficiencies in BMO's administration, including a failure to claim a $3,800 benefit and communication shortcomings.

While most objections were not monetarily quantifiable, the court ordered a modest reduction in BMO's compensation, specifically $3,800 plus a 6% reduction from the remaining compensation sought.

The court emphasized avoiding turning a passing of accounts into a full trial.

In an intestate estate dispute, the legally married but long-separated spouse claimed the entire modest estate by virtue of the preferential share under s. 45(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act, while the respondent asserted status as a common law spouse and sought dependant's support and a constructive trust over the principal estate asset.

The court held that the domestic contract executed years earlier released only possessory rights and did not bar the married spouse's statutory intestacy claim.

The respondent established, by a very thin margin, that she was a spouse and dependant for Part V purposes, but her financial disclosure was found seriously deficient and unreliable, limiting her entitlement to a lump sum support award of $30,000.

Her unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims were dismissed for lack of proof of enrichment, deprivation, juristic reason, or a joint family venture.

Administration of the estate was committed to the married spouse, subject to payment of the support award.

The moving party (respondent in the family proceeding) brought a motion to reopen a final order made in default, arguing that his severe illness prevented him from participating in the litigation and instructing counsel over a three-year period.

The court found that the moving party had engaged in a history of delay and obstructive behaviour, including actively resisting the sale of family property, which contradicted his claims of incapacity.

The court held that disagreement with findings of fact does not constitute a 'mistake' under Family Law Rule 25(19) and dismissed the motion, awarding costs to the responding party.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's findings regarding net family property deductions, imputed income for child support, and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proving his date of marriage deductions due to a lack of documentation.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's imputation of income, including capital gains, for child support purposes, nor in the modest spousal support award granted to the respondent.

Following a lengthy family law trial involving equalization, child support, and spousal support, the court determined outstanding issues of costs and pre‑judgment interest.

The court exercised its discretion under ss. 128 and 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to set a prejudgment interest rate of 2.6% on the equalization payment, starting from the date of separation and adjusted for advance payments.

In determining costs under the Family Law Rules, the court found both parties had engaged in bad faith conduct, but the respondent’s conduct—particularly repeated failures to provide financial disclosure and breaches of court orders—had significantly prolonged the litigation.

The court therefore awarded full recovery costs for the early phase of the litigation while reducing recovery for issues affected by the applicant’s own bad faith conduct.

Costs were fixed globally with a portion designated as a support order enforceable under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.

The applicant sought child support for a minor child and requested that the support order be retroactive as well as include contribution toward extraordinary expenses.

The respondent acknowledged paternity following late DNA testing but argued that his limited income, debt, and obligations to other children justified a lower amount based on undue hardship.

The court held that undue hardship under s. 10 of the Child Support Guidelines requires exceptional circumstances and that the respondent had not met this high threshold.

His income of $21,440 yielded table support of $171.50 per month, which the court ordered together with a 50% contribution to any future extraordinary expenses.

Child support was ordered retroactive to January 1, 2012.

Following the parties’ divorce after a lengthy marriage, the court determined outstanding corollary relief issues including equalization of net family property, retroactive and ongoing child support, spousal support, and post‑secondary education expenses.

Numerous disputes arose regarding valuation of assets, alleged undisclosed property, rental income, and the payor spouse’s income for support purposes.

The court rejected several claims of hidden assets and imputed income in certain years where financial disclosure was unreliable.

Equalization was recalculated with various adjustments, and retroactive child support was ordered based on actual annual income including capital gains for child support purposes but not for spousal support.

Ongoing spousal support was reduced after the recipient spouse’s remarriage and imputed earning capacity.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the respondent's motion to change a final order, seeking security for costs and an order barring further motions without leave, due to the respondent's failure to pay nearly $40,000 in prior judgments and costs.

The court found that while allowing the motion to change to proceed was an abuse of process given the respondent's willful non-compliance, a stay would cause an injustice because the respondent's motion had prima facie merit regarding spousal support overpayment.

The court denied the stay and the request to bar further motions, but ordered the respondent to post security for costs in the amount of $15,139.38, representing the total of outstanding costs awards.

The appellants were convicted of four offences under the Building Code Act related to constructing a building without a permit and ignoring stop-work orders.

They appealed, arguing a permit had been issued and never revoked, and that the fourth conviction violated the rule against multiple convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a permit was issued, the municipality effectively revoked it under s. 8(10) of the Act when it returned the application due to non-payment.

The court also held the fourth conviction was based on continued construction on a different date, so the rule against multiple convictions did not apply.

The City of London sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that redivided the city's ward boundaries into 14 wards following an elector petition.

The City argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by effectively altering the composition of city council, a power reserved for the municipality under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision, as the Board had explicit statutory authority to redivide wards despite any other Act, and did not explicitly order a change to the number of councillors per ward.