Andrew Clark Murray

The plaintiff sued his former lawyer for negligence, alleging that a 1999 settlement of his accident benefits and tort claims was improvident.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known within five years of the settlement that his income was inadequate to meet his needs, which would give rise to a plausible inference of liability.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured during a recreational tug-of-war game at a campground.

The defendants previously moved for summary judgment, which was granted but subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding vicarious liability.

The defendants brought a second motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the second motion, holding that the defendants were precluded by the doctrine of issue estoppel from relitigating the Court of Appeal's finding that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate's appeal decision regarding a catastrophic impairment determination under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Delegate had overturned an arbitrator's finding that combining impairment ratings for a physical brain injury and a separate psychological disorder constituted impermissible 'double counting'.

The Delegate also remitted the issue of medication impairment back to arbitration and upheld a 4% rating for scarring.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's interpretation of the AMA Guides and the Schedule fell within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order determining that claims for recovery of legal expenses incurred in connection with a coroner's inquest into the death of a family member were potentially recoverable under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in answering the question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) without proper pleadings raising the issue.

The pleadings predated the inquest and contained no reference to legal expenses.

The motion judge's answer that the expenses were "potentially recoverable" if they qualified as pecuniary loss did not advance the litigation or satisfy the purposes of Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to determine, before trial, whether legal expenses incurred for their participation in a coroner's inquest into the death of Jonathan Dew are potentially recoverable as pecuniary loss under section 61(1) of the Family Law Act.

The court found the motion was properly brought, as the relevant facts were not in dispute and the determination could shorten the trial or save costs.

Applying the "but for" test and principles from Macartney v. Islic, the court concluded that such legal expenses are indeed potentially recoverable.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that the Coroners Act provides a complete code for costs, finding no conflict with the Family Law Act in this context.

The defendant law firm brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 2006 action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The action involved allegations of knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty.

The court reviewed the litigation history, noting periods of delay but also cooperative efforts between counsel and interlocutory motions.

The court found that the delay was not inordinate or inexcusable, and that the defendant failed to establish a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible, as discoveries on liability were complete and documentary evidence was preserved.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of legal questions concerning entitlement to attendant care benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule for Accidents on or after September 1, 2010 (SABS-2010).

The issues were whether expenses for attendant care provided by the plaintiff’s mother and roommate were “incurred” within the meaning of s. 3(7)(e) and whether attendant care services could be provided remotely through electronic communication such as telephone calls, texting, and FaceTime.

The court held that the services provided by the mother and roommate did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the provider be acting in the course of the employment, occupation, or profession in which they would ordinarily have been engaged, because neither sustained an economic loss nor was working in the relevant profession at the time.

However, the court concluded that attendant care services may be provided remotely through electronic means where reasonable and necessary supervision is involved.

The defendant brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of an action for specific performance and damages arising from a failed real estate transaction, and alternatively sought discharge of a certificate of pending litigation.

The purchaser failed to close on the contractual closing date due to a series of unforeseen issues beyond its control, though the vendor refused to close the following day.

The court held that allegations that the vendor acted in bad faith by relying on the “time of the essence” clause to terminate the contract raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

However, the court concluded the property was acquired for investment purposes and the purchaser failed to establish that the property was unique.

The certificate of pending litigation was therefore discharged while the underlying action proceeded.

The moving defendants sought dismissal of the action on the basis that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement in May 2007.

The court considered whether the correspondence and negotiations between the parties constituted a legally binding settlement, applying the two-step analysis for determining intention to create legal relations and agreement on essential terms.

The court found the evidence vague and concluded that the parties’ discussions amounted only to an attempt to reach an agreement, with essential terms unresolved.

However, the court held that an earlier unequivocal offer to discontinue the action against one individual defendant personally had been accepted.

The motion was therefore granted only to the extent of discontinuing the claim against that defendant personally, with the remainder of the motion dismissed.

The applicant sought indemnification from an insurer for defence costs incurred in a slip and fall action where the applicant had been added as an additional insured under a contractor’s liability policy.

The respondent insurer argued that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that it had no duty to defend the applicant for claims outside the contractor’s policy coverage.

The court held that where there is no clear and unequivocal denial of coverage, the limitation period for a claim for indemnity for defence costs begins when the underlying action is resolved by judgment or settlement.

Applying the “true nature of the claim” analysis to the pleadings and discovery evidence, the court found the essence of the underlying action was negligence in snow and ice removal performed by the insured contractor.

As a result, the insurer owed a duty to indemnify the additional insured for its defence costs.

The appellant defaulted on a loan from a business associate, who subsequently assigned the debt to the respondent.

The respondent successfully sued the appellant for the balance of the loan.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the loan agreement was unenforceable due to the law against champerty and maintenance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the assignment of a debt is not a champertous transaction and is valid under section 53 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against a defendant law firm.

The respondent conceded the motion judge erred in concluding the claim did not plead a cause of action, as the claim pleaded 'knowing assistance' in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the motion judge's order, and granted the appellant leave to amend the statement of claim to provide sufficient particulars regarding the law firm's actual knowledge of the trust and participation in the breach.

The appellants were convicted of four offences under the Building Code Act related to constructing a building without a permit and ignoring stop-work orders.

They appealed, arguing a permit had been issued and never revoked, and that the fourth conviction violated the rule against multiple convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a permit was issued, the municipality effectively revoked it under s. 8(10) of the Act when it returned the application due to non-payment.

The court also held the fourth conviction was based on continued construction on a different date, so the rule against multiple convictions did not apply.

The appellants, contractors and their employees, were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace accident during an expansion project at Pearson International Airport.

A justice of the peace quashed the charges, finding the appellants' work was integral to a core federal aeronautics undertaking and thus immune from provincial legislation.

The application judge granted certiorari and mandamus, setting aside the decision and directing a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' normal operations as going concerns were not integral to the federal undertaking, and the application of provincial workplace safety standards did not impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

The appellant was acquitted of Occupational Health and Safety Act charges at trial.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, where the appeal judge permitted the Crown to rely on a new theory of liability regarding supervisor status and raised additional dispositive issues on her own motion without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal, holding that it is improper for the Crown to advance a new theory of liability on an appeal against acquittal, and that the appellant was denied a fair hearing when the appeal judge decided the case on unargued grounds.

A new hearing was ordered.

The appellant, a former director and shareholder of a company, appealed a summary judgment enforcing his personal guarantee of the company's line of credit.

The appellant argued that the bank's restructuring of the loan from a revolving line of credit to a term loan without notice to him materially altered the credit agreement, relieving him of liability.

He also argued the bank failed to protect its security interest in the company's inventory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the restructuring was an enforcement measure contemplated by the original agreement, not a material alteration.

Furthermore, the guarantee was unconditional, and the bank had no duty to protect the security interest.

In an addendum to its previous reasons, the Court of Appeal corrected a calculation error by the trial judge, reducing the damages owing to the respondents for building loss by $152,262.67 to account for payments made to mortgagees.

The Court also dismissed the respondents' late application for prejudgment interest on the $50,000 aggravated damages award, noting that while aggravated damages are compensatory and ordinarily attract prejudgment interest, the issue was raised too late in the proceedings.

The appellant insurance company denied the respondents' claims for fire loss, alleging arson.

A jury found in favour of the respondents, awarding compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages, and finding the insurer acted in bad faith.

The insurer appealed on multiple grounds, including the admissibility of settlement offers, character evidence, and the availability of punitive damages to an estate under the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability and punitive damages, holding that the Trustee Act permits an estate to recover punitive damages.

However, the Court reduced the aggravated damages award from $175,000 to $50,000, finding the original amount grossly excessive.