Derek Ross Greenside

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) which found her accident benefits claim statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed both, stating judicial review was only available in "exceptional circumstances" given the statutory appeal right.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, clarifying that while judicial review is always available, it is a discretionary remedy and will only be exercised in rare cases where alternative remedies (like reconsideration and statutory appeal) are inadequate.

The Court affirmed the LAT's finding on the limitation period as reasonable and provided guidance on handling concurrent appeal and judicial review proceedings.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the scope of judicial review when a limited statutory right of appeal exists.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to intervene to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC), finding they offered unique perspectives on the implications of the Divisional Court's decision for other statutory schemes.

The motion for leave to intervene by the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) was dismissed as its submissions were largely duplicative of the appellant's and granting a third intervener would be unfair to the respondent.

The appellant sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision that found the appellant in higher priority to pay accident benefits to an injured non-occupant.

The core issue was the interpretation of "spouse" under the Insurance Act, specifically whether the injured party and the appellant's insured had "lived together in a conjugal relationship" for the requisite three years.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the arbitrator's interpretation, which had relied on family law definitions of "spouse" and a holistic approach.

The court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable for failing to distinguish the policy context of the Insurance Act from the Family Law Act, and for applying a non-literal interpretation of "live together" without proper justification in the insurance context.

The appeal was allowed, the arbitrator's decision quashed, and the respondent declared in priority.

The appellant, Unifund Assurance Company, sought judicial review of an arbitration award that found its vehicle to be the "striking vehicle" under the "transmission of force" doctrine, making it responsible for a pedestrian's accident benefits.

The Superior Court reviewed the arbitrator's application of the legal principle of transmission of force, particularly in the context of two moving vehicles.

The court found that the arbitrator erred by not applying the reasoning from Trahan v Royal Insurance Co. of Canada, concluding that the ACE vehicle, despite being deflected, maintained its own independent force and propulsion.

Consequently, the court set aside the arbitration decision, finding ACE INA Insurance Company to be in highest priority and responsible for the claimant's statutory accident benefits, and ordered ACE to reimburse The Personal Insurance Group.

Following an earlier ruling on the merits of an appeal, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The responding party argued that costs of the appeal should be deferred to the arbitrator.

The court rejected that submission and held that the moving party had succeeded on the appeal, even though the remedy granted differed from what had been proposed.

Costs were therefore awarded to the successful party.