Philippa G. Samworth

The court dismissed the defendants’ motion to strike or dismiss the plaintiff’s claim to set aside a settlement of statutory accident benefits on the basis of unconscionability.

The court found that its jurisdiction was not ousted by section 280 of the Insurance Act, as the claim was not about entitlement to benefits but about the unconscionability of the settlement itself.

The court also held that the issue of repayment of settlement funds should not be determined on a motion to strike, and that the plaintiff’s pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The claim was not scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This decision concerns a Rule 2.1 review initiated by the court regarding the plaintiff's action.

The court dismissed the action against most defendants (insurers and lawyers) due to a lack of jurisdiction over claims related to SABS benefits (which fall under the Licence Appeal Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction) and the frivolous nature of claims against lawyers based on professional obligations.

The action was allowed to proceed only against two medical doctors.

No costs were awarded.

This endorsement concerns a Rule 2.1 review initiated by defendants' counsel to dismiss a proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found that claims against medical professionals, alleging negligence related to drug prescription, contained sufficient questions to survive a Rule 2.1 review, reserving dismissal for Rules 20 or 21 motions.

However, claims against the insurer for statutory accident benefits were found to be outside the court's jurisdiction, belonging to a statutory tribunal.

Claims against opposing counsel were deemed an abuse of process, as the law does not recognize a cause of action against adversary lawyers without a duty of care, and such suits undermine the administration of justice.

The court ordered a Rule 2.1 notice for dismissal against all defendants except the medical professionals, staying the proceeding pending submissions.

A pedestrian struck by a vehicle in 2008 received statutory accident benefits for attendant care and housekeeping until the insurer terminated them in 2010.

In 2015, after receiving a catastrophic impairment designation, the claimant reapplied for benefits.

The Tribunal and Divisional Court found the claim was out of time based on a two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the limitation period was subject to the rule of discoverability and was not a hard limitation period.

The court held that applying a hard limitation period would be contrary to the consumer protection purposes of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and would produce an absurd result by barring claims before the claimant was eligible to make them.

Intact Insurance Company brought an application seeking a declaration on the interpretation of s. 44(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS), specifically whether an insured is required to sign any consent form dictated by the insurer for a s. 44 examination.

The respondent, Anne Beaudry, argued that such consent forms must be "reasonable and justifiable." The court found that any required consent form must be "reasonable," based on the language of s. 44, the insurer's duty of utmost good faith, and the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Regulation.

The court dismissed Intact's request to unilaterally dictate consent terms, emphasizing the need for reasonableness and negotiation.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21 motion seeking determination of legal questions concerning entitlement to attendant care benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule for Accidents on or after September 1, 2010 (SABS-2010).

The issues were whether expenses for attendant care provided by the plaintiff’s mother and roommate were “incurred” within the meaning of s. 3(7)(e) and whether attendant care services could be provided remotely through electronic communication such as telephone calls, texting, and FaceTime.

The court held that the services provided by the mother and roommate did not satisfy the statutory requirement that the provider be acting in the course of the employment, occupation, or profession in which they would ordinarily have been engaged, because neither sustained an economic loss nor was working in the relevant profession at the time.

However, the court concluded that attendant care services may be provided remotely through electronic means where reasonable and necessary supervision is involved.