Karen N. Vigmond

The minor applicant was struck by a dump truck while in a stroller in 2010.

He sought statutory accident benefits for various treatment plans, which the respondent insurer denied based on insurer examinations.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the applicant was entitled to optometric services, speech language therapy, and certain assistive devices (a curved monitor and wobble stool), preferring the evidence of the applicant's treating practitioners over the respondent's paper reviews.

However, the Tribunal denied funding for a gaming computer and a YMCA summer camp/membership, finding them not reasonable and necessary.

Interest was awarded on the overdue benefits.

The appellant sought statutory accident benefits after suffering a spinal cord hemorrhage and paraplegia following a stressful incident involving aggressive driving by motorcyclists and her driver.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied benefits, finding the incident did not meet the causation test for an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

On appeal and judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Tribunal's analysis of the expert medical evidence unreasonable and its application of the intervening cause and dominant feature tests legally flawed.

The matter was remitted for a fresh hearing.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, specifically claiming expenses for social rehabilitation counselling, Botox injections, and a massage chair.

The respondent denied the benefits based on reports from its section 44 assessors.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent's assessors failed to adequately address the rationale provided by the applicant's treating practitioners.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant met her burden of proving the treatments and expenses were reasonable and necessary, and ordered the respondent to pay the disputed amounts along with interest on overdue payments.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The respondent initially paid IRBs but later claimed an overpayment and reduced the quantum to nil after the applicant received a retroactive lump sum payment from a successful wrongful termination grievance and began receiving long-term disability and CPP Disability benefits.

The Tribunal found that the retroactive lump sum payment constituted gross employment income under the Schedule, not an award of damages.

Consequently, the applicant's pre-accident income was sufficient to maintain his IRB entitlement at $400.00 per week despite the receipt of collateral benefits.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the withheld IRBs with interest and dismissed the respondent's claim for repayment of the alleged overpayment.

The applicant's claim for an award under s. 10 of Regulation 664 was dismissed due to lack of submissions.

Following a five-day jury trial where the plaintiffs were awarded a net judgment of $18,000, the court addressed the parties' submissions on pre-judgment interest and costs.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $114,000 in partial indemnity costs plus disbursements, while the defendant argued against any costs award, contending the recovery fell within Small Claims or Simplified Rules jurisdiction, and sought costs for abandoned claims.

The court found that both parties' litigation strategies were inconsistent with the trial outcome, particularly noting the defendant's "no liability" stance and lack of a Rule 49 offer.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $50,000 in costs plus HST and $18,677.42 in disbursements, emphasizing that a defendant's failure to realistically assess risk can lead to a costs award even for a low judgment.

The defendant's request for costs on abandoned claims was denied.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found she was not involved in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule when her pre-existing spinal AVM or aneurysm ruptured, causing paraplegia.

The applicant argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by allowing the respondent's expert to provide new opinion evidence at the hearing and erred in its causation analysis.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no procedural unfairness as the expert's hearing evidence flowed from his reports and was subject to cross-examination.

The adjudicator also found no errors of fact or law in the Tribunal's intervening act and dominant feature analyses, concluding the pre-existing condition, not the vehicle, was the dominant feature of the injury.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after suffering lower limb paraplegia following a car ride where the driver engaged in aggressive driving to avoid a group of motorcyclists.

The applicant argued the stress of the incident caused a blood pressure spike that ruptured a spinal aneurysm.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was not involved in an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the Schedule.

Preferring the respondent's medical evidence, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant's congenital spinal arteriovenous malformation (AVM) likely ruptured spontaneously, making the AVM the dominant feature and 'but for' cause of the impairment, with the vehicle merely being the location of the injury.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice on a provisional basis, arguing that the backlog of civil jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic would result in prejudicial delay.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that a jury was best positioned to assess liability, credibility, and medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's alleged traumatic brain injury.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were no available dates for either jury or non-jury trials in 2023, making it speculative whether a non-jury trial would proceed substantially sooner.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.