Amy Sherrard

The appellant landowner sued a municipality alleging constructive taking of approximately 965 acres of vacant land, claiming the municipality's refusal to initiate a secondary planning process — combined with alleged encouragement of public use of the lands as a park — amounted to a de facto expropriation without compensation.

The majority (5-4) held that the CPR test for constructive taking requires only that a public authority acquire a 'beneficial interest' understood broadly as an 'advantage' (not necessarily a proprietary interest), and that the municipality's intention may be a relevant material fact.

The majority restored the motion judge's order allowing the constructive taking claim to proceed to trial, finding genuine issues of material fact.

The four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, holding that CPR requires acquisition of a proprietary interest and that intention is irrelevant to the de facto taking analysis.

The applicants subscribed for flow-through shares in mining companies, which renounced Canadian exploration expenses to them.

The CRA later reassessed the companies and the applicants, disallowing the expenses.

The applicants sought immediate indemnification from the respondent under their subscription agreements for the taxes paid under the reassessments.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the indemnities were not payable until the amount of taxes was 'definitively determined' or 'determined', which had not yet occurred as the respondent's appeal of the CRA reassessment was still pending.

The plaintiffs brought motions to compel the examination of a defendant on behalf of a corporate defendant and for further and better affidavits of documents from several defendants.

The parties agreed to dismiss the examination motion and portions of the production motion without prejudice.

The court ordered one defendant to produce certain financial documents relevant to personal enrichment and an itemized Schedule B list, but dismissed the remaining requests for further documents and better email descriptors, finding insufficient evidence of missing documents and that the current descriptors were proportionate.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed costs for both the appeal and the underlying summary judgment motion.

The parties agreed to no costs for the appeal due to divided success.

For the summary judgment motion, the court declined to award costs to the primary appellants (Bistricer) or respondents (Rubner), citing reasons such as new arguments on appeal and divided success.

However, the litigation guardian for Eda Rubner, who was aligned with the original applicants, was awarded partial recovery of costs for the summary judgment motion.

This appeal concerns a financial dispute among adult siblings over entitlement to distributions from a valuable investment in a residential development in Oakville, Ontario.

The investment, originally a 10% interest in the Lower Fourth Joint Venture purchased by the father in 1969, was held by the mother in trust for three children in equal shares.

The daughter disclaimed her interest for tax reasons.

When distributions began in 2014, they were deposited into bank accounts opened in the mother's name.

The central issue was whether the mother held the distributions as bare trustee for the daughter or whether the daughter had received only individual gifts.

The Court of Appeal found that a bare trust existed over the bank account contents for the benefit of both the daughter and one son in equal shares, reversing the trial judge's finding that the mother held the funds beneficially.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.