Nina Butz

This decision concerns a motion to quash an appeal of a "Transition Order" that converted a proposed class action into multiple joinder actions.

The moving parties (defendants) argued the Transition Order was interlocutory and thus appealable only to the Divisional Court with leave.

The responding parties (plaintiffs) contended the order was final in some aspects or, alternatively, so interrelated with other appeals (refusal of class certification and dismissal of action against certain parties) that the Court of Appeal should hear it under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion to quash, finding a significant interrelationship between the appeals, which meant leave would have inevitably been granted, allowing the Court of Appeal to assume jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal stemming from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellant, Davide Giacomodonato, appealed the damages award, contending the trial judge erred by applying the second employment contract instead of the first.

The court dismissed his appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of fresh consideration for the second contract, including a $40,000 payment and additional vacation time.

The respondents, PearTree Securities Inc. and PearTree Financial Services Ltd., cross-appealed the costs award.

Their motion for leave to appeal costs was dismissed, as the court found no error in principle in the trial judge's discretionary costs award, which was justified by the respondents' litigation conduct.

The parties appeared before the court to settle the terms of an Order approving a Section 7 Plan under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, following the dismissal of a certification motion.

The court resolved three minor disputes regarding the form and content of the Order.

The court declined to immediately name Epiq as the Administrator, allowed class counsel to receive potential plaintiffs' contact information to facilitate notice, and agreed with the defendants that the Order should refer to a 'section 7 Plan' rather than an 'individual issues protocol'.

This decision concerns Phase 4 of a motion to settle a Section 7 Order under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The original proposed class action, brought by former and current major junior hockey players alleging abuse, was not certified.

The Section 7 Plan aims to transition the proposed class action into up to 60 individual joinder actions.

The court approved Version 4 of the Draft Section 7 Plan, which outlines procedures for notice, opt-in, commencement of actions, case management, and discovery.

A key contentious issue resolved in this phase concerned the staying of third-party claims until the completion of the main actions.

The plaintiff, Davide Giacomodonato, sought costs after successfully prosecuting his wrongful dismissal claim and defending a counterclaim brought by his former employer, PearTree Securities Inc. and PearTree Financial Services Ltd. The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $830,761.75, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court found that PearTree's counterclaim was meritless and tactical, and that PearTree engaged in inappropriate conduct, including late disclosure of documents, which unnecessarily increased the costs of the proceeding.

PearTree's Rule 49 offer was not given significant weight as the plaintiff achieved a better result.

This decision is Phase 3 of a motion to settle a Section 7 Order under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court is finalizing the Draft Section 7 Plan, which facilitates the transition of a proposed class action, previously denied certification, into up to 60 individual joinder actions against various hockey leagues and teams.

The plan addresses notice dissemination, the approval of contingency fee agreements, the management of third-party claims by staying them under Rule 29.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the potential for severance of actions.

The court also proposes a consensual settlement track for modest claims as an alternative to litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to settle a Rule 7 Order pursuant to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, following the dismissal of their certification motion for a proposed class action regarding systemic abuse in amateur hockey.

The court reviewed and settled the revised Draft Section 7 Plan, which transitions the proposed class action into up to 60 joinder actions against the defendant hockey teams and leagues.

The court approved the notice plan, opt-in procedures, and case management provisions, with minor revisions to protect player privacy and ensure efficient administration.

Following the dismissal of a proposed class action regarding systemic abuse in the Canadian Hockey League, the plaintiffs brought a motion under section 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to approve a plan to transition the proceeding into multiple joinder actions.

The court reviewed the competing Section 7 Plans submitted by the plaintiffs and defendants and found both to be procedurally flawed and overreaching.

The court proposed its own Draft Section 7 Plan designed to facilitate the commencement of up to 60 joinder actions while respecting the court's jurisdictional limits and the parties' procedural rights.

The motion was adjourned to a second phase for the parties to revise and discuss the court's draft plan.

The plaintiff, an investment banker, sued his former employer for wrongful dismissal and unpaid compensation.

The employer counterclaimed, alleging the plaintiff breached non-competition and non-solicitation clauses by joining a competitor.

The court found that the parties entered into two successive binding employment contracts.

The court made specific findings on how the plaintiff's variable compensation should be calculated under the second contract.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages because the employer improperly withheld amounts admittedly owed to him.

The employer's counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety, as the restrictive covenants were found to be overly broad, unreasonable, and unenforceable.

The plaintiffs, former major junior hockey players, brought a proposed class action against the Canadian Hockey League, its three member leagues, and 60 individual teams, alleging systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability for widespread hazing, bullying, and abuse.

The out-of-province defendants brought a motion challenging the court's jurisdiction, which was dismissed as the court found they carried on business in Ontario.

The defendants also brought a Ragoonanan motion, which was granted because the representative plaintiffs only had personal causes of action against five of the 60 teams.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the claims failed the cause of action, common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff criteria, primarily because there was no basis for collective liability among the independent teams.

However, the court utilized sections 7, 12, and 25 of the Class Proceedings Act to permit the action to continue as individual joinder actions, ordering the plaintiffs to prepare an Individual Issues Protocol.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to discontinue a proposed employment class action against the defendant.

The representative plaintiffs were found to be unsuitable or in conflict with the class, and no replacement plaintiffs could be found.

The court granted the discontinuance without costs and without prejudice, finding no prejudice to putative class members as the limitation period had been tolled and notice would be provided to those who had come forward.

The appellant, Glenn Winder, appealed a motion judge's decision that his claim for the intentional tort of intrusion upon seclusion against Marriott International, Inc. did not disclose a cause of action.

The lawsuit stemmed from a data breach of Marriott's Starwood hotels reservation database.

Winder argued that Marriott's collection and storage of personal information, in a manner that did not meet its representations and legal obligations regarding security, constituted an invasion of privacy, vitiating consent.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion requires an actual intrusion into private affairs, not merely a failure to safeguard information from third-party intrusion.

The court found no facts pleaded to support that Marriott itself disclosed or caused disclosure of the information, distinguishing it from a failure to protect against external hacking.

This appeal addresses whether an Ontario court should recognize and enforce a "ricochet judgment" – a British Columbia judgment that itself recognized and enforced a foreign judgment from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

The appellant, H.M.B. Holdings Limited, sought to enforce a Privy Council judgment (compensation for expropriated property in Antigua and Barbuda) in British Columbia, obtaining a default judgment.

After an unsuccessful attempt to register this BC judgment in Ontario under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, H.M.B. commenced a common law action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the BC judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no real and substantial connection between British Columbia and the underlying Antiguan dispute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, but on the principled basis that the common-law test for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments does not extend to ricochet judgments, as such judgments are local in scope and enforcing them in another jurisdiction would improperly circumvent local laws, such as limitation periods.

The plaintiffs, in a class action against various hockey leagues and teams, brought a motion seeking an advance ruling on the admissibility of an Independent Review Panel (IRP) Report for their certification motion.

They also requested directions for cross-examinations of the IRP members, including the issuance of interprovincial summonses.

The court dismissed the requests for advance rulings on the admissibility of evidence and the conduct of cross-examinations, finding no precedent or jurisdiction for such preliminary determinations in civil proceedings.

However, the court granted the request for an interprovincial summons certificate, which the defendants did not oppose, allowing the IRP members to be cross-examined under normal rules of procedure.

The appellant sought to register in Ontario a default judgment obtained in British Columbia to enforce a Privy Council judgment awarding compensation for expropriation of its property by the respondent.

The application judge and majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the application on the basis that the respondent was not carrying on business in British Columbia under s. 3(b) of Ontario's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the interpretation of "carrying on business" and no palpable and overriding error in the factual conclusion that the respondent lacked any actual presence in British Columbia.

Côté J. concurred but wrote separately to address the open question of whether recognition (derivative) judgments fall within the REJA's definition of "judgment", concluding that they do.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to recognize and enforce a British Columbia default judgment in Ontario.

The B.C. judgment had recognized a Privy Council judgment against the defendant.

The defendant argued that the B.C. judgment was a 'ricochet judgment' and that B.C. lacked a real and substantial connection for the purposes of extra-provincial enforcement.

The court agreed, finding that while B.C. legislation provided a presumption of jurisdiction for local enforcement, it did not satisfy the common law real and substantial connection test required for enforcement outside of B.C. The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought motions to compel the examination of a defendant on behalf of a corporate defendant and for further and better affidavits of documents from several defendants.

The parties agreed to dismiss the examination motion and portions of the production motion without prejudice.

The court ordered one defendant to produce certain financial documents relevant to personal enrichment and an itemized Schedule B list, but dismissed the remaining requests for further documents and better email descriptors, finding insufficient evidence of missing documents and that the current descriptors were proportionate.

The defendants brought motions across five Canadian jurisdictions to address overlapping multijurisdictional class actions regarding a data breach.

The parties reached a settlement to proceed only with the Ontario national class action and stay the actions in British Columbia, Alberta, Québec, and Nova Scotia.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice approved the consent order dismissing the stay motion in Ontario, allowing the action to proceed subject to bi-annual reporting requirements to the case management judges in the other jurisdictions.

Following a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff succeeded against the corporate defendant and one individual defendant (Brar) for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation, but failed on the fraud claims against the other individual defendant (Sharma), the court determined costs.

The plaintiff was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $55,000 against Brar due to the finding of fraud.

The corporate defendant was held jointly and severally liable for $40,000 of those costs on a partial indemnity basis.

No costs were awarded to or against Sharma due to divided success.

The plaintiff, a factoring company, sought summary judgment against a transport company and its directors for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation related to uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted summary judgment for breach of contract against all defendants and for fraudulent misrepresentation against one director (Brar).

However, the fraud claims against the other director (Sharma) were dismissed due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge or recklessness.

The court also addressed the principles of summary judgment, partial summary judgment, and piercing the corporate veil.