Amanda C. McLachlan

The appellant challenged an order holding that a dispute over vested options to acquire shares in a related corporate entity had to be resolved in Delaware rather than under the mediation-arbitration clause in his Ontario employment agreement.

The court held that the competence-competence principle did not require referral to an arbitrator because arbitral jurisdiction could be determined through a superficial review of the contractual record.

Reading the employment agreement, option agreement, and incorporated equityholders agreement together, the court held that the options dispute was not contemplated by or connected with the employment agreement and was instead governed by the Delaware forum selection clause.

The court also rejected the argument that the forum selection clause was unconscionable, finding no improvident bargain or evidence that the chosen forum placed a remedy out of reach.

Katanga Mining Limited applied under section 17 of the Securities Act for permission to disclose confidential documents obtained during an Ontario Securities Commission investigation to its parent company, Glencore plc, for use in civil proceedings in the United Kingdom.

The Capital Markets Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that Katanga did not establish that the disclosure was in the public interest.

The Tribunal held that disclosure of information protected by section 16 for use in private civil proceedings is generally not in the public interest, and a foreign court order requiring production cannot alone satisfy the statutory public interest analysis.

Katanga Mining Limited applied under s. 17(1) of the Securities Act to disclose confidential documents from an Ontario Securities Commission investigation to the internal and external counsel of its parent company, Glencore.

Glencore is a defendant in a UK civil claim and the UK Court ordered disclosure of these documents.

The Capital Markets Tribunal granted the application, finding it in the public interest to permit narrow disclosure to Glencore's counsel for the purpose of assessing relevance to the UK claim, provided the counsel sign undertakings to be bound by the confidentiality provisions of s. 16 of the Act.

This is a costs endorsement following motions regarding refusals on cross-examinations in a proposed class action.

The plaintiff's motion for refusals was largely dismissed, while the Solart defendants' cross-motion regarding the plaintiff's refusals was allowed.

The court considered various factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, emphasizing that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for "reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct." While the plaintiff's counsel's conduct was deemed unreasonable, it did not generally meet this high threshold, except in the case of Martin Yockell, where class counsel's conduct during cross-examination was found to be reprehensible, warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The court also addressed the recoverability of costs for pro bono counsel and costs thrown away.

The plaintiff in a proposed class action brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused by various defendants during cross-examinations on affidavits filed for a certification motion.

The Solart defendants brought a cross-motion to compel the plaintiff to answer questions he refused during his cross-examination.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding the questions posed to the defendants were irrelevant, unanswerable, or sought legal opinions.

The court granted the defendants' cross-motion, ordering the plaintiff to re-attend and answer questions related to the common issues, as they were relevant to testing the certification requirements.

In an enforcement proceeding, the moving parties (Cormark and Kennedy) sought a summons directing a non-party (Canopy) to produce documents listed in privilege logs previously provided to Staff.

The Capital Markets Tribunal found that the documents appeared relevant to the moving parties' ability to make full answer and defence, particularly regarding Canopy's state of mind.

The Tribunal issued the summons and ordered that the documents be produced to a third-party referee to conduct a privilege review, as the logs raised questions about the validity of the solicitor-client privilege claims.

The defendants (Moving Parties) sought an order for the issuance of two letters of request to judicial authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to compel the examination of two witnesses, Yasir O. Al-Rumayyan and Fahad Nasser Alarfaj.

The Moving Parties argued these witnesses had relevant evidence for their motion to set aside Mareva orders, particularly regarding alleged contradictory positions taken by the plaintiffs (controlled by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund) in this action versus unrelated U.S. litigation (LIV Golf Litigation) concerning PIF's independence from the KSA government.

The motion was unopposed by the plaintiffs.

The court found the proposed witnesses had prima facie relevant evidence and that the requirements under Rules 39.03 and 34.07(2) for examining non-parties and issuing letters of request for witnesses outside Canada were met.

The order for letters of request was granted.

The defendants appealed an interlocutory order regarding the admissibility and production of compelled evidence in a civil contempt motion arising from alleged breaches of a Mareva order.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the motion judge's decision that answers to undertakings and further document production could not be compelled while the contempt motion was outstanding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that evidence compelled prior to the contempt motion was admissible and did not violate sections 7, 11(c), or 13 of the Charter.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in prematurely ruling on the admissibility of future answers to undertakings and in deferring the production motion.

The court held that the obligation to comply with the Mareva order continues despite the contempt motion, and admissibility should be determined when the evidence is tendered, based on whether the contempt motion is predominantly coercive or penal.

This ex-parte motion was brought by the plaintiffs for a Mareva injunction and an Anton Pillar order in aid of litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The plaintiffs alleged a complex fraud perpetrated by the defendants, involving falsified investment schemes and forged documents.

The court found a strong prima facie case, a real risk of asset dissipation and destruction of evidence by the defendants, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the orders.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction to grant such equitable relief in aid of foreign proceedings.

Mareva injunction, Anton Pillar order, and a sealing order were granted.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision to assume jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a complex international fraud and conspiracy case.

The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that a Toronto resident orchestrated a scheme to misappropriate billions of dollars from Saudi Arabian corporations and dissipate them globally, with the assistance of family members and various corporate entities.

The appellants (foreign defendants) challenged Ontario's jurisdiction, arguing a lack of real and substantial connection.

The motion judge found jurisdiction based on contracts made in Ontario (including a gift deed central to the alleged scheme), property located in Ontario, and the tort of conspiracy being committed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding factual errors or legal errors in applying the Van Breda test for jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendants and plaintiffs both brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding the admissibility of evidence in a civil contempt proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on four issues concerning the application of sections 7 and 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to evidence compelled pursuant to a Mareva order and undertakings.

The court directed that the defendant be the appellant and the plaintiffs be the cross-appellants.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt against the defendants, alleging they breached a Mareva injunction by using frozen assets to pay for living and legal expenses.

In response, the defendants brought several procedural motions.

Dr. Saad moved to strike compelled evidence from the plaintiffs' contempt motion record, arguing it violated his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that a contempt motion is not 'other proceedings' under s. 13 and that ss. 7 and 11(c) did not apply to previously compelled evidence.

Dr. Saad also moved under Rule 21 to exclude prior judicial rulings made in the civil action from the contempt motion.

The court granted this motion, holding that findings made on a civil standard are inadmissible in a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to answer undertakings and produce documents.

The court ordered Dr. Saad to answer undertakings but ruled the answers could not be used in the contempt motion, and declined to order further document production that would conscript the defendants to assist in their own prosecution.

The court also limited the plaintiffs' disclosure obligations to the alleged breach, refusing broad discovery on the underlying fraud.

Finally, the court dismissed Mohammed's motion to stay the contempt proceedings pending his appeal on jurisdiction.

The moving party defendants brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay the action against them, arguing the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs alleged a massive international fraudulent scheme involving the misappropriation of $3.5 billion USD, with funds allegedly traced to the moving parties.

The court applied the Van Breda test and found a real and substantial connection to Ontario based on contracts formed in the province, property located in Ontario, and the necessity of hearing the claim as a whole in a single jurisdiction.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs obtained a Mareva injunction against the defendant, Dr. Al Jabri, requiring him to disclose his worldwide assets and submit to cross-examination.

During the cross-examination, disputes arose regarding the scope of permissible questions, particularly concerning assets held prior to the Mareva order, assets gifted to his son, and assets transferred to others.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions.

The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to examine the defendant on former assets, gifted assets, and transferred assets to test whether he retains any continuing interest in or control over them, as such assets would be captured by the Mareva order.

The court provided a framework for the permissible scope of cross-examination and ordered the defendant to re-attend.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in a brief endorsement.

The moving party was ordered to pay costs to the responding parties in the agreed amount of $10,000.

Katanga Mining Limited applied to vary a 2018 settlement order requiring an external review of its accounting practices, which was substantially complete but delayed by the pandemic.

Staff of the Commission consented to the variation.

The Commission waived service on the individual respondents, dismissed a former investor's request for intervenor status, and granted the variation, allowing the review to conclude on terms acceptable to Katanga and the consultant.

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The plaintiff, a warehouse attendant at a dairy distribution center, was terminated for cause after being caught on video vaping inside the facility.

The employer argued this violated company policies, food safety regulations, and the Smoke Free Ontario Act, 2017.

The court found that the employer failed to establish the plaintiff knew vaping was prohibited under the general no-smoking policy, as the policy did not explicitly mention vaping and the required statutory signage had not yet been posted.

The court concluded that termination was a disproportionate response and that progressive discipline should have been applied.

The plaintiff was awarded four months' pay in lieu of notice, less mitigation earnings.

Following a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff succeeded against the corporate defendant and one individual defendant (Brar) for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation, but failed on the fraud claims against the other individual defendant (Sharma), the court determined costs.

The plaintiff was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $55,000 against Brar due to the finding of fraud.

The corporate defendant was held jointly and severally liable for $40,000 of those costs on a partial indemnity basis.

No costs were awarded to or against Sharma due to divided success.

The plaintiff, a factoring company, sought summary judgment against a transport company and its directors for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation related to uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted summary judgment for breach of contract against all defendants and for fraudulent misrepresentation against one director (Brar).

However, the fraud claims against the other director (Sharma) were dismissed due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge or recklessness.

The court also addressed the principles of summary judgment, partial summary judgment, and piercing the corporate veil.