Andrew Moeser

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of McSweeney J. dated July 24, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This is a panel review by the Ontario Court of Appeal of a single-judge motion decision that denied leave for a non-lawyer, Mr. Drizen, to represent the corporate appellant, GlycoBioSciences Inc. (Glyco), under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying appeals involved disputes over contracts with arbitration or forum selection clauses not favouring Ontario, and had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The motion judge had denied leave due to uncertainty regarding Glyco's financial position and concerns about Mr. Drizen's past conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glyco's motion, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision, finding no error in principle, unreasonable result, or legal error.

The court reiterated that Glyco must appoint a solicitor within 30 days, failing which its appeals would be administratively dismissed, and ordered Glyco to pay partial indemnity costs to the responding parties.

The applicant, Glycobiosciences Inc., sought leave for its non-lawyer principal, Kevin Drizen, to represent it in a separate action against the respondents.

The court dismissed the application, finding it procedurally improper as such relief must be sought by interlocutory motion within the existing action, not a new application.

The court also deemed the application an abuse of process, particularly given a recent Court of Appeal ruling denying Mr. Drizen similar leave.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the respondents.

This motion concerned an application by a non-lawyer, Mr. Drizen, for leave to represent the corporate appellant, GlycoBioSciences Inc., in an appeal, pursuant to Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding parties also brought a motion for security for costs.

The court dismissed the non-lawyer's motion for leave, emphasizing that corporate representation by a non-lawyer is exceptional and discretionary.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet the burden of establishing that leave should be granted, noting concerns about the corporation's financial affairs, past litigation conduct, and the non-lawyer's performance, which did not support an access to justice argument.

The defendant, Industria Farmacéutica Andrómaco S.A. de C.V., brought a jurisdiction motion to dismiss or stay the action commenced by the plaintiff, Glycobiosciences Inc. Andrómaco argued that the Ontario Superior Court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter, or alternatively, that Ontario was forum non conveniens, or that the dispute should be resolved by arbitration in Mexico or Texas as per existing agreements.

The court found that no presumptive connecting factors to Ontario existed, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction.

Furthermore, even if jurisdiction were established, the court determined that Texas was the more appropriate forum due to specific forum selection clauses in the parties' agreements.

The court also noted that the Statement of Claim was improperly served.

The action against Andrómaco was stayed for lack of jurisdiction, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

This complex motion involved the defendants, Dr. Saad and the Canadian Companies, seeking to set aside ex parte Mareva injunctions, Norwich orders, and receivership orders previously granted to the plaintiffs.

The defendants argued material non-disclosure by the plaintiffs, particularly regarding the political motivations behind the litigation and the legitimate commercial relationships between the parties.

The plaintiffs sought to continue and vary the orders.

The court found no material non-disclosure sufficient to set aside the Mareva order against Dr. Saad, continuing it.

However, the Norwich and Receivership orders against the Canadian Companies were set aside due to non-material but impactful non-disclosure that changed the factual landscape, making the orders overly broad.

The court also addressed the application of the deemed undertaking rule for documents obtained through Norwich orders.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant for patent infringement regarding a method of heavy oil recovery involving steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD).

The Federal Court held that the defendant's operations did not infringe the patent claims because the fluid injection volumes were insufficient to generate a large singular zone of increased mobility as required by the patent.

Furthermore, the court declared the asserted claims invalid on the grounds of anticipation by prior art and inutility.

The defendant Bank appealed a Master's decision denying its motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a film production company.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred by placing too high a burden on the Bank at the first stage of the test and by making palpable and overriding errors regarding the plaintiff's liabilities and secured debts.

The Court found the Bank established good reason to believe the plaintiff had insufficient assets in Ontario, and the plaintiff failed to prove it had sufficient exigible assets or that an order for security for costs would be unjust.

The plaintiff was ordered to post security for costs.

The plaintiffs sought to dismiss or adjourn the defendant's motion for summary trial in a patent infringement action.

The Court held that the defendant was entitled to bring the motion as of right and that the appropriateness of summary trial should be determined at the hearing itself, not pre-emptively.

The Court refused to adjourn the summary trial until after oral discovery, noting it is not a precondition.

The Court did grant an extension of the summary trial hearing from three to five days on consent.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board refusing to grant an extension of time to request a review of an earlier order.

The earlier order awarded the respondent tenant compensation for lost property and rent abatement following an eviction without notice.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice because he did not receive notice of the hearing, as the documents were served on his paralegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that service on the legal representative was proper under the Board's Rules and the Board's refusal to extend time was reasonable.

The accused was charged with assaulting his pregnant partner and threatening to kill her and their unborn child on November 25, 2013.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the credibility of the complainant, who alleged the accused pushed her onto a bed, straddled her, grabbed her arms, and applied pressure to her neck.

The accused denied all allegations and claimed the bruising on the complainant's arms resulted from consensual rough sexual activity.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility due to multiple inconsistencies, including contradictions regarding whether the accused had been drinking, whether he had previously choked her, and discrepancies between her police statement and trial testimony.

The judge found the accused's evidence consistent and credible, and acquitted him of all charges.

The plaintiffs, comprising 118 limited partnerships, brought an action against the Ontario Power Authority and Ontario for misfeasance in public office and unjust enrichment, seeking $450 million in damages related to changes in the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) program.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process because it attempted to relitigate the lawfulness of the FIT program changes, which had already been upheld by the Divisional Court in a prior judicial review application.

The court also held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for either misfeasance in public office or unjust enrichment.

The applicants, comprising 118 limited partnerships, sought judicial review of the Minister of Energy's directions to the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to change the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) Program rules.

The applicants had submitted numerous applications under the original FIT Rules 1.0 and argued that the new FIT Rules 2.0 were applied retroactively, breached their legitimate expectations, and interfered with vested rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's policy directions were subject to a reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that the applicants had no vested rights or legitimate expectations that the program rules would remain unchanged, as the FIT Program was a discretionary government policy initiative subject to modification.