Faisal Mirza

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder for a 2009 home invasion, applied under the 'faint hope' clause (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code) for a reduction in his 25-year parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect a jury would unanimously reduce the period.

While acknowledging the applicant's completion of his high school diploma, participation in programs, and the systemic discrimination faced by Black inmates, the court found his institutional record reflected ongoing misconduct and a recent psychological risk assessment deemed him a high risk to violently reoffend.

The application was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate consistent progress and reduced risk to public safety.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from an alleged touching during a private appointment with a 12-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued, among other things, that the trial judge misapprehended the timing and content of text messages that were central to the defence theory that the complainant had a motive to fabricate in order to avoid further treatment.

The appeal court held that the trial judge repeatedly and materially misstated that the complainant disclosed the sexual touching to her friend while still at the appointment, when the actual allegation was disclosed later while driving home.

Because that error was essential to the rejection of the motive-to-lie theory and therefore central to the conviction, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking restricted and prohibited firearms, possessing proceeds of crime over $5,000, and trafficking fentanyl.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of 11 years, reduced by 2.5 years for prolonged and unacceptable pre-trial custody conditions including extensive lockdowns and triple bunking, and further reduced by Summers credit of 3.6 years for 874 non-lockdown days of pre-trial custody.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, relative youth, genuine remorse, strong rehabilitative potential, and systemic disadvantage as a Black man raised in poverty with significant personal losses.

Aggravating factors included the deadly combination of fentanyl and firearms trafficking repeated over several months for profit, and the theft of police buy money.

The court also considered the collateral consequence of likely deportation and its impact on rehabilitation and family separation.

The remaining sentence to be served is 1,791 days (approximately 4.9 years).

The accused was charged with firearm offences after a loaded prohibited firearm was discovered during a police traffic stop.

At trial, the accused brought a blended Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police conducted an arbitrary pre-text stop, unlawfully arrested the accused, failed to provide reasons for detention or rights to counsel, and used excessive force by deploying a taser.

The court also found the officers' testimony to be dishonest and symptomatic of an after-the-fact justification.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

On a Charter motion arising from a firearm prosecution, the applicant challenged an investigative detention, takedown, arrest, and subsequent seizure in an apartment building lobby and hallway.

The court held that although reasonable suspicion was conceded, the officer deliberately failed to inform the applicant of the reasons for detention, escalated force when the applicant lawfully tried to leave, and failed to provide full rights to counsel after arrest.

The court found breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and further found that the officer’s mistreatment of the applicant during key parts of the interaction was influenced by anti-Black racism.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admission of the firearm evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

The applicant was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and firearm-related offences.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter motion challenging the validity of search warrants for his residence and two vehicles, and alleging that a search of a storage locker was warrantless and unauthorized.

The Crown conceded that the storage locker search was warrantless.

The court found that the search warrants for the residence and vehicles were validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, but that the warrantless search of the storage locker violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the evidence obtained from the storage locker under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on privacy rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion claiming unreasonable delay and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm in relation to his ex-wife.

The total delay from the date of formal charges to the anticipated completion of trial was 1,179 days (approximately 38 months and 22 days).

The Crown failed to disclose critical evidence—video-recorded statements of the complainant and accused taken in Punjabi by police—and their translations for nearly two years.

The court found that the Crown's disclosure failures were unexplained and constituted a serious breach of its disclosure obligations.

After deducting legitimate defence delay periods, the net delay was 949 days (31.2 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The Crown did not establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings.

The accused was convicted after trial of possession of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown and Defence reached a joint submission for a sentence of 7.5 years, less credit for pre-trial custody and jail conditions mitigation, resulting in a net sentence of 7 years.

The court accepted the joint submission as fit, considering the gravity of the offences, the accused's personal circumstances including systemic disadvantage and social context, immigration consequences, and mitigating factors including harsh pre-trial incarceration conditions at Maplehurst.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of exportation contrary to section 11(2) of the Cannabis Act.

On September 1, 2023, the accused attended at Pearson Airport with two checked bags containing 29.77 kilograms of cannabis destined for export to the United Kingdom.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge that the bags contained cannabis.

The trial began as a jury trial but was converted to a judge-alone trial mid-trial due to disclosure issues regarding text messages.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the bags contained cannabis.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, Boysie Alexander Murray, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence of a loaded firearm and cocaine seized during a police investigation.

He argued that the police arbitrarily detained him, used excessive force, and failed to provide his rights to counsel, all influenced by racial profiling.

The court found multiple serious Charter breaches, including shocking physical violence involving repeated taser use to the applicant's genital region.

Consequently, the court granted the Charter motion and excluded all seized evidence under section 24(2).

The court allowed the appeal of Arlene Hastick from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the renewal of her Community Treatment Order (CTO) under the Mental Health Act.

The court found that the Board denied Ms. Hastick procedural fairness by repeatedly preventing her from asking relevant questions of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Banik, and by relying on evidence about her 2016 hospitalization while refusing to allow her to challenge or clarify that evidence.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The court ordered a mistrial in a sexual assault case after finding that the accused, RE, did not receive effective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that defence counsel's lack of competence in questioning, knowledge of law, and submissions resulted in an unfair trial and compromised the reliability of the verdict.

The decision details the evidence, procedural history, and legal principles regarding the right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, ultimately concluding that no remedy short of a new trial could address the prejudice to the accused.

This decision addresses whether the owner of a vehicle (Floyd Thomas) provided implied consent to his son (Robert Thomas) to possess and operate the vehicle, which was involved in a serious accident.

The court found that there was no implied consent, based on clear evidence that Robert knew he did not have permission, and that Floyd had a consistent history of restricting access.

The court declined to dismiss the action entirely, as other negligence issues remained for trial.

The appellant's vehicle was towed and stored by the respondents following an accident.

A dispute arose over a $2,500 contract cancellation fee, prompting the appellant to apply under section 24 of the Repair and Storage Liens Act (RSLA) for the return of the vehicle.

Before the dispute was resolved, the respondents sold the vehicle without providing the mandatory statutory notice under sections 15 and 17 of the RSLA, relying instead on their standard contract.

The Small Claims Court upheld the respondents' actions under section 23(1)(e).

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the decision, finding the respondents illegally contracted out of the RSLA's mandatory notice provisions and improperly used section 23(1)(e) to circumvent the appellant's section 24 rights.

The court acquitted TM of all charges, including assault, sexual assault, and assault with a weapon, after a judge-alone trial.

The decision turned on significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies, omissions, and changes over time, as well as a lack of corroboration.

The court also found that the evidence supported a plausible case of self-defence in relation to the alleged assault causing bodily harm to CW.

The ruling provides a detailed analysis of the law on credibility, reasonable doubt, and self-defence, and addresses the impact of trauma and racial context on the assessment of post-offence conduct.

The decision concerns the extradition of Adeyanju Olaniyan, Rachel O’Connor, and Timothy Balogun to the United States to face prosecution for an alleged fraud scheme involving the use of spoofed calls to obtain and resell medical supplies.

The court reviews the evidence, including voice identification, financial records, and circumstantial evidence, and finds that the evidence is sufficient to justify committal for extradition under the Extradition Act.

The court addresses the reliability of voice identification evidence and the legal standards for committal, ultimately granting the extradition applications.

The decision addresses the admissibility and weight of evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on the negligent loss of a police entry video documenting the state of the apartment before a search.

The court finds a breach of section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence but declines to exclude the evidence, instead giving reduced weight to the testimony of the officers responsible.

The accused is found guilty on the drug trafficking counts but acquitted on the proceeds of crime count.

The court found S.P. guilty of one count of sexual interference, accepting the complainant's evidence and the accused's own admissions in text messages as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable doubt as to a second alleged incident, citing inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and corroborating evidence from other witnesses and the Agreed Statement of Facts.

The decision provides a detailed analysis of the law on credibility, reasonable doubt, motive, and the assessment of child witness evidence in sexual offence cases.

The court acquitted R.C. of sexual assault, finding that the evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether the sexual activity was non-consensual.

The decision reviews the evidence of both the complainant and the accused, as well as the testimony of a third-party witness, and applies the W.(D.) framework and other credibility assessment principles.

The court found the accused's version plausible and supported by some corroborative evidence, while the complainant's evidence contained inconsistencies and omissions.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the need to avoid prohibited reasoning based on myths and stereotypes in sexual assault cases.

This decision addresses a section 11(b) Charter application by three co-accused seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in a large-scale drug importation and trafficking prosecution.

The court found the total delay (41 months) far exceeded the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances or case complexity to justify the delay.

The court found the Crown’s late addition of a key witness, failure to promptly seek additional hearing dates, late disclosure, and strategic choices in evidentiary applications all contributed to the delay.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings for all accused.