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The accused was acquitted of sexual assault because his plausible testimony of consensual sex raised a reasonable doubt.
The court acquitted R.C. of sexual assault, finding that the evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether the sexual activity was non-consensual.
The decision reviews the evidence of both the complainant and the accused, as well as the testimony of a third-party witness, and applies the W.(D.) framework and other credibility assessment principles.
The court found the accused's version plausible and supported by some corroborative evidence, while the complainant's evidence contained inconsistencies and omissions.
The court emphasized the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the need to avoid prohibited reasoning based on myths and stereotypes in sexual assault cases.
Two first-time offenders were sentenced to six years in prison for a brutal, hate-motivated assault.
This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing Janis and Adem Corhamzic, who were found guilty of aggravated assault and assault.
The incident involved a brutal, hate-motivated attack on two victims, Mohammad Abu Marzouk and Fuat Yucel, in front of their families.
Mr. Abu Marzouk suffered severe traumatic brain injuries.
The court considered aggravating factors, including the anti-Arab hate motivation, the severe and lasting impact on the victims and their families, and the sustained violence, particularly the kicking of an unconscious victim.
Mitigating factors included the offenders' lack of prior criminal records, expressions of remorse, stable employment, and family support.
The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation for hate-motivated crimes while also applying the principle of restraint for first-time offenders.
Necessity defence left to jury where evidence showed accused may have helped child escape danger.
During a criminal jury trial involving allegations connected to the use of forged travel documents to bring a minor from Sri Lanka to Canada, the court was required to determine whether there was an air of reality to the common law excuse of necessity.
The alleged peril related to a third party, a young Tamil male who later obtained refugee protection in Canada due to risks of detention, disappearance, or torture in Sri Lanka.
The court reviewed the governing legal framework for necessity from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence and considered whether the evidence could support findings of imminent peril and absence of reasonable legal alternatives.
Although the accused did not testify, circumstantial evidence suggested they may have acted to help the child escape danger rather than for profit.
The court concluded that the evidentiary record was capable of supporting the inference required and that the defence of necessity should be left with the jury.
Change of venue granted in first-degree murder trial due to cumulative pre-trial prejudice and facility issues.
The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code.
They argued that a fair trial in Sarnia was impossible due to the small community size, extensive pre-trial publicity regarding their alleged sexual practices, the overwhelming community response to the victim's death, the victim's father's employment at the local courthouse, and inadequate courthouse facilities.
The court granted the application, finding that the cumulative effect of these factors created a reasonable probability of prejudice and impacted the applicants' fair trial rights.
Conviction and sentence appeal dismissed; no material misapprehension of evidence.
The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from incidents involving his intimate partner, as well as the resulting intermittent custodial sentence and probation order.
The appeal argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly relied on the rule in Browne v. Dunn when assessing credibility.
The court held that the trial judge was largely correct in finding that several aspects of the appellant’s testimony had not been properly put to the complainant in cross-examination and was entitled to reduce the weight of that evidence.
Any minor factual errors were insignificant and did not materially affect the reasoning or outcome.
The sentence was also found to be within the appropriate range given the seriousness of the injuries and the domestic context.