Brian Ross

The young person pleaded guilty to 10 counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of accessory after the fact to reckless discharge of a firearm.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a maximum three-year youth sentence, but disagreed on whether the young person should receive credit for presentence custody.

The court considered the young person's personal circumstances, including diagnoses of PTSD and ADHD, and his commendable progress in custody.

The court accepted the joint submission and exercised its discretion to award six months' credit for the 24 months spent in presentence custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 20 months' custody and 10 months of community supervision.

The accused, charged with murder as a co-principal in the beating death of a fellow inmate, challenged the constitutional validity of s. 17 of the Criminal Code insofar as it excludes murder from the statutory defence of duress.

He submitted that the court should read down the section to strike the exclusion.

The court noted that common law duress does not apply to a principal charged with murder and that the Court of Appeal in Aravena had indicated, in obiter, that the murder exception in s. 17 must be found unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, the court concluded that Parliament's deliberate choice to maintain the exclusion, most recently reaffirmed in 1983, was justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter, drawing a bright line that a threat of potential harm cannot outweigh the certain taking of a life.

The motion was dismissed.

The third parties brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the defendant's third party claim against them in a negligence action arising from a cottage fire allegedly caused by a firepit.

Applying the factors from Malik v. Attia, 2020 ONCA 787, the court declined to permit the partial summary judgment motion to proceed.

The court found that proceeding with the motion would not reduce judicial resources already allocated for the upcoming trial, the trial was less than four months away, and there was a real risk of inconsistent findings between the motion and trial given that the third parties' liability was dependent upon causation issues to be determined in the main action.

This decision addresses a section 11(b) Charter application by three co-accused seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in a large-scale drug importation and trafficking prosecution.

The court found the total delay (41 months) far exceeded the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances or case complexity to justify the delay.

The court found the Crown’s late addition of a key witness, failure to promptly seek additional hearing dates, late disclosure, and strategic choices in evidentiary applications all contributed to the delay.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings for all accused.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of statements made by Malik Essue, who is charged with first-degree murder, to police.

The central issue was the police's failure to provide a proper primary caution and their use of trickery during the interview.

The court found that Essue was a suspect in law, despite police assertions to the contrary, and that the partial caution given was inadequate.

The police also failed to inform Essue that the interview was being recorded and falsely told him he was not a suspect.

The court concluded that the police's deliberate omissions and deception undermined the fairness of the statement-taking process and Essue's ability to make a meaningful choice.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, and Essue's statement was ruled inadmissible at trial.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Sangita Sharma, in a murder trial against three defendants.

The statements concerned Ms. Sharma's business dealings and disputes with an alleged orchestrator of her contract killing, Mian Afzalaqif.

The court ruled on the admissibility of these statements under traditional hearsay exceptions (state of mind, statement of intention) and the principled approach to hearsay (necessity and threshold reliability).

The court found the statements admissible, deeming them relevant to motive and identity, and satisfying the reliability criteria despite defence concerns regarding the witness's credibility.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Garofoli application challenging a production order for his cell phone records, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the affiant made several errors due to inexperience and negligence, there was no intent to mislead.

After excising the errors and amplifying the ITO, sufficient reliable evidence remained to justify the production order.

The court concluded there was no section 8 violation and noted that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of evidence.

The court admitted antemortem statements of the deceased and evidence that one of the accused was a marijuana dealer, finding the latter's probative value in establishing narrative and identity outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded rap lyrics found on the other accused's phone, ruling that their limited probative value as circumstantial evidence of participation was outweighed by significant moral and reasoning prejudice.

Mr. Thakur pleaded guilty to one count of theft under $5,000.

The offence involved him sharing $5,000 of DRPS money, obtained by a co-accused police officer (Husen Aswat) through a sting operation, to purchase a fishing boat.

The Crown sought a conditional discharge with probation, while the defence sought an absolute discharge.

The court considered Mr. Thakur's exemplary career as a police officer, his undiagnosed PTSD and depression at the time of the offence, and the significant collateral consequences he suffered, including the loss of his career and public stigma.

Despite his status as a police officer being an aggravating factor, the court found that the unique circumstances, including his mental health and the profound impact of the proceedings, warranted an absolute discharge, concluding that probation would serve no meaningful purpose and offend the principle of proportionality.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

Domenico Scopelliti was found guilty of manslaughter for shooting his father-in-law, Rocco Zito.

The jury found provocation, reducing the charge from first-degree murder.

The Crown sought an 11-year sentence, while the defence requested 7 years, with the accepted range being 8 to 12 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence due to the use of a firearm and the defendant's involvement in organized crime activities, despite mitigating factors like no prior criminal record and expressed remorse.

The court imposed a 10-year sentence, reduced by pre-trial custody.

The defendant, C.W., was charged with second-degree murder or, alternatively, manslaughter, following the death of his 14-month-old niece, C.L., while she was in his care.

The Crown alleged that C.W. inflicted blunt force trauma to the child's head, possibly combined with violent shaking, due to stress and the child's crying.

C.W. testified that the injuries were caused by an accidental drop.

The court, applying the R. v. W.(D.) instruction, found C.W.'s testimony, despite inconsistencies and admitted lies, raised a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.

Medical experts could not definitively exclude the possibility that the injuries, including a skull fracture, extensive retinal hemorrhages, and retinoschisis, were caused by an accidental fall from a caregiver's arms, acknowledging the evolving nature of medical knowledge in this controversial area.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove unlawful causation beyond a reasonable doubt and found the defendant not guilty.

The Crown sought to admit a video statement made by the accused, Chak-Lam Wong, in a second-degree murder trial concerning the death of his 14-month-old niece.

The defence contested its admissibility, arguing it was not voluntary due to inadequate cautioning, misleading information from police regarding the right to silence, and an accusatorial interview style, despite the accused not being under arrest or detention.

The court found that Wong was objectively a suspect at the time of the interview and was not properly cautioned.

Despite speaking with duty counsel, the police officer's erroneous advice about the right to silence created confusion and misled Wong about his jeopardy.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the prolonged and aggressive questioning, the court found a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statement and dismissed the Crown's application for its admission.

The offenders, both youthful members of a street gang, were convicted of second-degree murder following a planned, gang-related shooting that resulted in the death of an unarmed victim.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period near the 25-year maximum, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years, arguing systemic discrimination should mitigate the sentence.

The court rejected the systemic discrimination argument, finding the gravity of the offence eclipsed such factors.

Weighing the egregious nature of the planned shooting against the offenders' youth, the court sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

This pre-trial application addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on urban street gangs, evidence of prior violent incidents, and YouTube videos in a murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce this evidence to establish motive related to inter-gang rivalry.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and a cost/benefit analysis, ruling that expert evidence on general gang phenomena and specific incidents was admissible, but with limitations on ultimate issues and hearsay.

Initially, some videos were admitted, but this ruling was reversed after the accused made admissions regarding gang existence and membership, as the videos' probative value was then outweighed by their prejudice.

A subsequent application by the Crown to re-admit videos during cross-examination of an accused was also refused, upholding the principle against compelling an accused to put character in issue.

The Crown sought to admit expert testimony on urban street gang slang to interpret intercepted communications in a murder trial.

While the defence conceded the general admissibility criteria, the judge raised concerns about the expert opining on the precise meaning of communications, which could trench on the ultimate issue.

Despite conflicting authorities, the judge permitted the expert to interpret the communications directly, as all counsel uniformly preferred this approach over hypotheticals.

Dellan McMorris was found guilty of first-degree murder in the 2012 killing of Delano Coombs.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the planned and deliberate murder, the profound impact on the victim's family, and the defendant's background, including his prior criminal record and efforts to complete high school while in custody.

The mandatory sentence for first-degree murder is life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 25 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The court emphasized general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and the societal abhorrence for gun violence.

The defendant, Dellan McMorris, brought a motion for a directed verdict in a first-degree murder trial, arguing insufficient evidence regarding his identity as a perpetrator.

The court reviewed the legal framework for directed verdicts, which requires determining if a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence presented by the Crown, including telephone records, witness testimony, and DNA evidence on a discarded hoodie.

The motion was dismissed, as the court found that a reasonable jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.