Patrick Woods

The accused, Yu-Lan He, was convicted of dangerous driving causing death after running a red light due to prolonged inattention, resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The Crown sought a one-year jail sentence and a five-year driving prohibition, while the defence argued for a suspended sentence, probation, or a conditional sentence.

The court found the accused's moral blameworthiness to be at the lower end of the spectrum for such offences, noting the absence of high-risk behaviours like speeding or impairment.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and considering the availability of a conditional sentence following R. v. Sharma, the court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, including six months of house arrest, followed by twelve months of peace and good behaviour, and a 3.5-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death after driving her vehicle through a red light and striking a pedestrian in a crosswalk.

The accused argued she was in a momentary 'dreamlike state' due to grief over a friend's recent death, which she claimed negated the necessary fault element.

The court rejected this explanation, finding that the accused experienced a prolonged period of inattention that constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a Garofoli application challenging a production order for his cell phone records, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while the affiant made several errors due to inexperience and negligence, there was no intent to mislead.

After excising the errors and amplifying the ITO, sufficient reliable evidence remained to justify the production order.

The court concluded there was no section 8 violation and noted that, even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of evidence.

The court admitted antemortem statements of the deceased and evidence that one of the accused was a marijuana dealer, finding the latter's probative value in establishing narrative and identity outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded rap lyrics found on the other accused's phone, ruling that their limited probative value as circumstantial evidence of participation was outweighed by significant moral and reasoning prejudice.

The defendant, Philip Grandine, was sentenced for manslaughter after administering lorazepam to his pregnant wife, Karissa Grandine, who subsequently drowned in a bathtub.

The court found the defendant's actions were planned and premeditated, motivated by a desire for freedom from his marriage to pursue an affair and pornography, and constituted a deceptive and effective assault.

Despite the absence of extreme physical violence, the court emphasized the domestic violence, vulnerability of the victim (who was also pregnant), and breach of trust as aggravating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 years in penitentiary, less 37 months for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a further 11 years and 11 months to be served.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after his pregnant wife drowned in a bathtub.

Because the jury's route to the verdict was ambiguous, the court was required to make findings of fact for sentencing.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused surreptitiously administered lorazepam to his wife to incapacitate her, allowing him to pursue an extramarital affair and access pornography.

The court rejected the defence theory that the victim knowingly took the drug, concluding the accused's actions directly contributed to her incapacitation and death.

This decision addresses three pre-trial motions in a re-trial for manslaughter.

The Crown sought rulings on the admissibility of the accused's police statements and the deceased's ante mortem statements.

The defence sought to exclude evidence based on issue estoppel, arguing it contradicted the accused's prior acquittal for murder.

The court allowed the Crown's motions, finding the police statements admissible due to conceded voluntariness and abandoned Charter issues, and the ante mortem statements admissible under traditional hearsay exceptions or the principled exception for reliability.

The defence's issue estoppel motion was dismissed, as the court clarified that issue estoppel prevents relitigation of specific issues decided in the accused's favour (lack of intent to kill for murder), but does not bar evidence relevant to the elements of manslaughter (unlawful act, causation, objective foresight of bodily harm), provided the Crown's intended use does not contradict the prior finding.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a fatal shooting in a barbershop.

The Crown alleged the accused aided or abetted the deceased in confronting the shooter, relying entirely on circumstantial evidence of their interactions before the incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court granted the application, finding no evidence beyond speculation that the accused knew the deceased had a loaded handgun or that he possessed the requisite knowledge and intent for the unlawful act.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter right.

The total delay was approximately 54.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling under R. v. Jordan.

The court found certain periods of defence delay and identified three discrete exceptional circumstances related to the preliminary inquiry: a last-minute election for a preliminary inquiry, the illness of the assigned justice, and underestimation of the preliminary inquiry's length.

The court also determined the case was particularly complex due to voluminous disclosure, numerous witnesses, and multiple co-accused, and that the Crown had a concrete plan to manage this complexity.

Additionally, the transitional exceptional circumstance was applied, finding that the institutional delay was acceptable under the previous Morin framework and that the Crown reasonably relied on the prior state of the law.

No actual prejudice to the accused was found.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The three defendants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 for making fraudulent claims for statutory accident benefits after a motor vehicle accident in which they were not present.

All first-time offenders and immigrants from Haiti, two of whom are landed immigrants whose immigration status would be jeopardized by a sentence of six months or more.

The Crown sought a one-year jail sentence for each, while defence counsel sought a conditional sentence of less than six months.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including general deterrence and rehabilitation, and the mitigating factors of the offenders' difficult economic circumstances, lack of prior record, and their role as minor players in a scheme instigated by another individual.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of five months and 29 days of house arrest, followed by two years of probation, and 150 hours of community service for each defendant, with partial restitution of $1,000 from one defendant.

This sentence was chosen to avoid deportation and promote rehabilitation while still denouncing the conduct.

The accused were charged with fraud over $5,000 for making false claims for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown alleged they were not occupants of the vehicle.

The court found the accused's claims to be entirely dishonest and fraudulent, based on eyewitness testimony and inconsistencies in their statements and the driver's accident report.

The court concluded that the accused were not in the vehicle and that the Jevco Insurance Company was deprived of over $5,000 in each case.

All three accused were convicted of fraud over $5,000.

Three young women pleaded guilty to forcible confinement and assault causing bodily harm after luring their friend from her home, blindfolding her, forcing her into a vehicle, beating her, and abandoning her unconscious at the roadside.

The Crown sought nine months' imprisonment, while defence counsel argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 195 days in custody followed by two years of probation, finding that while the offenders demonstrated strong rehabilitation potential and remorse, the gravity of the offences and egregious aggravating circumstances required actual imprisonment to satisfy denunciation and general deterrence objectives.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether police complied with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code when demanding an approved screening device sample.

The officer formed reasonable suspicion at 12:25 a.m. but did not make the demand until 12:32 a.m., and the approved screening device was not administered until 12:44 a.m., resulting in a 19-minute delay.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement and breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2), and the charge was dismissed.