Donna Maria Killalea Kellway

Allan Rajmoolie pleaded guilty to possessing a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, possessing a firearm while prohibited, and breaching recognizance.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4 to 4.5 years, while the defence sought 3.5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years (48 months), less 25 months for time served, resulting in a further 23 months to be served.

The court denied additional credit for harsh conditions of incarceration (Duncan credit), finding no adverse effect on the offender.

Ancillary orders for DNA sample and a lifetime firearm prohibition were also imposed.

The defendant, Philip Grandine, was sentenced for manslaughter after administering lorazepam to his pregnant wife, Karissa Grandine, who subsequently drowned in a bathtub.

The court found the defendant's actions were planned and premeditated, motivated by a desire for freedom from his marriage to pursue an affair and pornography, and constituted a deceptive and effective assault.

Despite the absence of extreme physical violence, the court emphasized the domestic violence, vulnerability of the victim (who was also pregnant), and breach of trust as aggravating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 years in penitentiary, less 37 months for pre-trial custody and house arrest, resulting in a further 11 years and 11 months to be served.

This decision addresses three pre-trial motions in a re-trial for manslaughter.

The Crown sought rulings on the admissibility of the accused's police statements and the deceased's ante mortem statements.

The defence sought to exclude evidence based on issue estoppel, arguing it contradicted the accused's prior acquittal for murder.

The court allowed the Crown's motions, finding the police statements admissible due to conceded voluntariness and abandoned Charter issues, and the ante mortem statements admissible under traditional hearsay exceptions or the principled exception for reliability.

The defence's issue estoppel motion was dismissed, as the court clarified that issue estoppel prevents relitigation of specific issues decided in the accused's favour (lack of intent to kill for murder), but does not bar evidence relevant to the elements of manslaughter (unlawful act, causation, objective foresight of bodily harm), provided the Crown's intended use does not contradict the prior finding.

Peter Brooks was found guilty of second-degree murder.

This decision concerns his sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victims, and the planned nature of the offence as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included Brooks' progressive neurocognitive disorder (dementia) and lack of prior criminal record.

Both Crown and defence jointly submitted for the minimum parole ineligibility period of 10 years.

The court accepted this, emphasizing public protection and denunciation while acknowledging the limited impact of rehabilitation and specific deterrence due to the offender's cognitive impairment.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit similar fact evidence of the accused's prior manslaughter conviction in a first-degree murder trial.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

While some similarities existed between the current murder charge and the prior manslaughter (gambling debt, use of a meat cleaver), the court found significant dissimilarities in the circumstances and a substantial time gap of over 13 years.

The court determined that the evidence's probative value on issues such as situation-specific propensity, planning, intent, mental disorder, accident, or self-defence was insufficient to outweigh the profound moral and reasoning prejudice to the accused.

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the similar fact evidence was deemed inadmissible.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of a 64-year-old woman.

The Crown sought committal on first-degree murder on two bases: (1) planning and deliberation, and (2) constructive first-degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code (murder during forcible confinement).

The accused conceded committal on second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on motive and concealment of identity, but rejected the constructive first-degree murder theory as the evidence did not establish that confinement was distinct from the act of killing.

The applicants sought to exclude text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider, arguing that the messages constituted private communications requiring a wiretap authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted that text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy but held that the statutory regime governing interceptions applies only to contemporaneous surveillance of communications.

The retrieval of stored text messages from a service provider after the communication had occurred did not amount to an interception.

The court found that the use of a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code was the proper legal mechanism and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.