Daniel J. Brodsky

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and multiple firearm-related offences following a search warrant execution at a residence in Brantford.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found in a locked bathroom near satchels containing cocaine and a handgun, and was observed wearing a similar satchel minutes before the warrant was executed.

The defence argued that the accused's connection to the residence was unclear and that the drugs and firearms could have been placed by other occupants.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Villaroman and found that while the Crown's case was superficially compelling, there remained reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the drugs and firearms, and acquitted on all charges.

This decision sets the period of parole ineligibility for Godfrey Sig-od, convicted of first-degree murder of his ex-wife and second-degree murder of his daughter.

The court reviews the facts, the character of the offender, the circumstances of the offence, the recommendations of the jury, and relevant case law.

The court imposes life imprisonment without parole for 25 years for the first-degree murder and life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 18 years for the second-degree murder, emphasizing the gravity of the offence, breach of trust, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The decision concerns the admissibility of ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Elvie Sig-od and Angelica Sig-od, in the prosecution of Godfrey Sig-od for their murders.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court utterances and statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, arguing necessity and reliability.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the statements, the relationship history, and the legal standards for necessity and threshold reliability, ultimately admitting the statements with some exclusions for prejudicial content.

The appellant, Robert Sowell, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for child luring, transmitting explicit material to a child, possessing child pornography, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The sole ground of appeal was the sufficiency of the sentencing judge's reasons for rejecting a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient and responsive to the key issue of the intractability of the appellant's risk and treatability in the community, particularly regarding his willingness and ability to take sex drive reducing medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent warrantless vehicle search, arguing breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The accused was under police surveillance for suspected drug trafficking and was pulled over after failing to signal a lane change.

The court found the detention was lawful as the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for drug possession, and the traffic stop was not a mere ruse.

Although the Crown conceded a breach of the accused's s. 10 rights because the officer asked about the contents of a bag before advising of the right to counsel, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with weapon, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm arising from a pattern of domestic violence against his intimate partner over seven years.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The court declined to designate the accused as a dangerous offender, finding that his violent conduct was not intractable and that there was a realistic possibility of eventual control in the community through intensive treatment offered by Corrections Canada.

The court instead designated him as a long-term offender and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order with conditions including dialectical behaviour therapy, substance abuse counselling, and intimate partner violence counselling.

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation imposed by the trial judge on January 15, 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the designation, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the appellant met the criteria for dangerous offender status based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his conduct, and that this failure created a likelihood of causing injury to others.

The trial judge also found a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating substantial indifference to the foreseeable consequences of his actions.

The trial judge exercised her discretion to reject the long-term offender designation, concluding that the public threat could not be reduced to an acceptable level through a determinate sentence or long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's findings were open to her on the record and entitled to deference, and her determination was reasonable.

Nancy Gandhi brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of her right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted 33 weeks (approximately 8 months) of delay attributable to the defence, including periods of explicit waiver, counsel unavailability, and change of counsel.

This reduced the net delay to just over 27 months, falling below the presumptive ceiling.

Applying the Jordan framework and its transitional approach, the court found no s. 11(b) violation, as the defence did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite proceedings, and the delay was not markedly longer than reasonably required under the prior Morin framework.

The application was dismissed, and the case was ordered to proceed to trial.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit similar fact evidence of the accused's prior manslaughter conviction in a first-degree murder trial.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.

While some similarities existed between the current murder charge and the prior manslaughter (gambling debt, use of a meat cleaver), the court found significant dissimilarities in the circumstances and a substantial time gap of over 13 years.

The court determined that the evidence's probative value on issues such as situation-specific propensity, planning, intent, mental disorder, accident, or self-defence was insufficient to outweigh the profound moral and reasoning prejudice to the accused.

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the similar fact evidence was deemed inadmissible.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of a 64-year-old woman.

The Crown sought committal on first-degree murder on two bases: (1) planning and deliberation, and (2) constructive first-degree murder under section 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code (murder during forcible confinement).

The accused conceded committal on second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on motive and concealment of identity, but rejected the constructive first-degree murder theory as the evidence did not establish that confinement was distinct from the act of killing.

The offender pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual misbehaviour involving two child victims and two counts of disobeying court orders.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender (determinate) designation or, alternatively, a long-term offender designation.

The court rejected the dangerous offender application but imposed a long-term offender designation.

The offender received a global custodial sentence of 1,725 days (approximately 4 years 9.5 months) following credit for guilty plea and pre-sentence custody, followed by a 7-year long-term supervision order.

The court considered the offender's prior sexual conviction, the pattern of abuse spanning multiple victims and years, and the psychological harm to the victims in determining sentence.

Two accused were jointly tried for the homicide of a young teenager.

The principal accused admitted causing the death but contested whether the killing constituted first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.

The co‑accused was alleged to have participated in a plan to lure the victim to the residence and assist in the killing.

The trial involved numerous evidentiary rulings, including admissibility of a fictional story written by the co‑accused as potential motive evidence, disclosure and partial admission of the victim’s diary, admission of edited autopsy photographs, and applications concerning prior consistent statements under the Edgar doctrine.

The jury ultimately convicted the principal accused of first degree murder and acquitted the co‑accused.

The decision records extensive reasons on pre‑trial and mid‑trial evidentiary and procedural rulings made throughout the proceeding.

On a voir dire, the Crown sought admission of several post‑arrest utterances made by the accused following arrest for alleged sexual offences against his stepdaughter.

Some statements were audio recorded during transport, booking, and an initial interview, while additional statements were allegedly made after the interviewing officer turned off the recording device.

Applying the common law voluntariness rule from R. v. Oickle, the court held that the recorded statements were voluntary and admissible.

However, the unrecorded conversation occurred after the accused requested to contact duty counsel and followed a question likely to elicit incriminating responses, despite recording equipment being readily available.

Due to the inadequate record and unsatisfactory explanation for failing to record the exchange, the Crown failed to prove voluntariness of the unrecorded utterances.

In a dangerous offender rehearing following appellate intervention, the court addressed whether a long term offender designation and supervision order could adequately control community risk under the Criminal Code.

The responding party conceded the statutory dangerous offender criteria, leaving the residual discretion analysis focused on realistic risk management, treatment compliance, and evidentiary reliability rather than optimism or speculation.

The court found persistent non-participation in treatment, conditional commitment to medication, entrenched institutional history, and expert evidence indicating a continuing high risk of sexual recidivism absent intensive custodial management.

The court concluded that community-based controls, including long term supervision, could not reduce risk to an acceptable level at the time of decision.

A dangerous offender designation with indeterminate detention was therefore imposed.