Daniel J. Brodsky

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and multiple firearm-related offences following a search warrant execution at a residence in Brantford.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found in a locked bathroom near satchels containing cocaine and a handgun, and was observed wearing a similar satchel minutes before the warrant was executed.

The defence argued that the accused's connection to the residence was unclear and that the drugs and firearms could have been placed by other occupants.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Villaroman and found that while the Crown's case was superficially compelling, there remained reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the drugs and firearms, and acquitted on all charges.

This decision sets the period of parole ineligibility for Godfrey Sig-od, convicted of first-degree murder of his ex-wife and second-degree murder of his daughter.

The court reviews the facts, the character of the offender, the circumstances of the offence, the recommendations of the jury, and relevant case law.

The court imposes life imprisonment without parole for 25 years for the first-degree murder and life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 18 years for the second-degree murder, emphasizing the gravity of the offence, breach of trust, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The decision concerns the admissibility of ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Elvie Sig-od and Angelica Sig-od, in the prosecution of Godfrey Sig-od for their murders.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court utterances and statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, arguing necessity and reliability.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the statements, the relationship history, and the legal standards for necessity and threshold reliability, ultimately admitting the statements with some exclusions for prejudicial content.

The appellant, Robert Sowell, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for child luring, transmitting explicit material to a child, possessing child pornography, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The sole ground of appeal was the sufficiency of the sentencing judge's reasons for rejecting a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient and responsive to the key issue of the intractability of the appellant's risk and treatability in the community, particularly regarding his willingness and ability to take sex drive reducing medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following trial convictions for possession and accessing child pornography, the court sentenced the offender for possessing a large, organized, and highly depraved collection of child sexual abuse material obtained through peer-to-peer networks.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence are the dominant sentencing objectives for child pornography offences, treated pre-Friesen ranges with caution, and rejected the submission that the offending resulted from reckless downloading of adult pornography.

A conditional sentence was found theoretically available but inappropriate absent exceptional circumstances.

The accessing conviction was conditionally stayed under Kienapple, and a net 25-month penitentiary sentence was imposed after modest credit for lengthy bail conditions, together with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, forfeiture, and a 10-year s. 161 order.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent warrantless vehicle search, arguing breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The accused was under police surveillance for suspected drug trafficking and was pulled over after failing to signal a lane change.

The court found the detention was lawful as the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for drug possession, and the traffic stop was not a mere ruse.

Although the Crown conceded a breach of the accused's s. 10 rights because the officer asked about the contents of a bag before advising of the right to counsel, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a forensic biologist to testify by video conference at a second-degree murder trial.

The application was brought in light of the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce the risk of virus transmission.

The defence opposed the application, citing concerns about opening the floodgates for remote testimony.

The court allowed the application, finding that remote testimony was appropriate given the pandemic, the non-contentious nature of the expert's credibility, and the benefits to the administration of justice.

During a homicide proceeding, the Crown sought to admit text messages sent from the deceased's phone to her father shortly before her death.

The Crown argued the messages were admissible to show the deceased's state of mind and to help establish the date of death.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, finding the messages admissible to show the deceased's intention that the accused move out of their shared apartment, and relevant to the date of death.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, applied to be seated outside the prisoner's dock during jury selection and trial.

He argued that sitting in the dock would reflect negatively on the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the seating of the accused is within the trial judge's discretion and that the customary position in the dock does not violate Charter rights or undermine the presumption of innocence.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought a jury instruction that text messages sent from the victim's phone and handwritten notes left by the accused constituted fabricated evidence.

The court ruled that there was circumstantial evidence allowing the jury to infer the accused sent the text messages after the victim's death to deflect responsibility, which would constitute fabrication.

However, the court found the accused's handwritten denial of involvement did not rise to the level of fabrication and should be assessed under the W.(D.) principles without an adverse inference of fabrication.

The three appellants were convicted of second-degree murder following a brutal group attack on the victim, who was beaten and stabbed.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's instructions on co-principal liability and the mens rea for murder, evidentiary rulings regarding prior inconsistent statements, and the refusal to give an Oliver instruction for a co-accused.

One appellant also appealed her 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the sentence as fit.

The offender was convicted of 17 offences, including criminal harassment, uttering death threats, and extortion against his former common-law partner's family.

The Crown applied to have him designated a Dangerous Offender.

The court found that the predicate offences were serious personal injury offences and that the offender's conduct demonstrated a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, showing a failure to restrain himself and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences.

The court designated the offender a Dangerous Offender and, finding that a lesser sentence would not adequately protect the public due to his high risk of reoffending and poor treatability for Delusional Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder, imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after strangling his grandmother to death.

The accused suffered from schizophrenia and experienced severe delusions, believing his grandmother was part of a broad conspiracy to kill him.

The court accepted expert psychiatric evidence that the accused's mental illness deprived him of the capacity to know that others would view his conduct as morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences including assault with weapon, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm arising from a pattern of domestic violence against his intimate partner over seven years.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The court declined to designate the accused as a dangerous offender, finding that his violent conduct was not intractable and that there was a realistic possibility of eventual control in the community through intensive treatment offered by Corrections Canada.

The court instead designated him as a long-term offender and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order with conditions including dialectical behaviour therapy, substance abuse counselling, and intimate partner violence counselling.

The accused was charged with murder after his grandmother was found dead.

He had presented at a hospital with cuts and a bite mark, claiming his grandmother attacked him.

He made statements to police at the hospital while being treated as a victim, and later gave a video statement at the police station after being arrested and speaking to duty counsel.

On a voir dire, the court found that the statements at the hospital were voluntary and reliable, and that the video statement was voluntary, not the result of oppression or inducements, and not tainted by the earlier statements.

All statements were ruled admissible.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, instructed his counsel to disseminate Crown disclosure to the media, alleging his video statement was altered.

Defence counsel sought directions on whether he was bound by an undertaking not to disclose the materials.

The court held that whether or not Crown disclosure is subject to a written undertaking, a deemed undertaking applies restricting its use solely to making full answer and defence in the criminal proceedings.

The application to remove the undertaking was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of breaking into and assaulting a 68-year-old woman and breaking into and raping a 54-year-old woman.

He was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of DNA evidence obtained through a saliva sample, arguing his Charter rights were violated.

He also challenged the trial judge's failure to preserve evidence and appealed his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter violations in the DNA seizure, that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion regarding the destroyed evidence, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's high risk of reoffending and consistent refusal to engage in treatment.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation imposed by the trial judge on January 15, 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the designation, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the appellant met the criteria for dangerous offender status based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his conduct, and that this failure created a likelihood of causing injury to others.

The trial judge also found a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating substantial indifference to the foreseeable consequences of his actions.

The trial judge exercised her discretion to reject the long-term offender designation, concluding that the public threat could not be reduced to an acceptable level through a determinate sentence or long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's findings were open to her on the record and entitled to deference, and her determination was reasonable.