Danielle Scott

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for bail.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the accused on his mandatory affidavit filed in support of the application.

The accused objected, arguing that compelled cross-examination would violate his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court held that the Crown is entitled to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit, as any evidence obtained could only be used for impeachment at trial, not for substantive guilt, per Supreme Court precedent.

The accused then sought to withdraw his affidavit to avoid cross-examination and proceed with the hearing using other evidence.

The court permitted the withdrawal but dismissed the bail application, ruling that it could not proceed without the mandatory affidavit required by the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of failing to provide the necessaries of life to her young children after feeding them a highly restricted raw vegan diet that resulted in severe malnutrition, osteopenia, and rickets.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the children, the breach of parental trust, and the life‑threatening nature of the harm.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, participation in parenting and nutrition programs, and psychological evidence indicating low risk of reoffending.

Applying the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for offences involving child victims under the Criminal Code, the court determined that a custodial sentence was warranted but could be served conditionally in the community.

A six‑month conditional sentence with strict conditions and three years’ probation was imposed.

The applicant sought prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari or mandamus to quash a justice of the peace’s endorsement under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code, which stated that detention was primarily due to a previous conviction and thereby barred enhanced pre‑sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1).

The Superior Court held that mandamus was unavailable because it cannot compel a judicial officer to exercise jurisdiction in a particular manner.

The court further held that certiorari could be available where there is either a jurisdictional error or an error of law on the face of the record, even outside the preliminary inquiry context.

However, the alleged errors relating to the test applied, the record of the detention decision, and the interpretation of s. 515(9.1) were not established.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for multiple firearms offences arising from possession of a loaded restricted handgun in a motor vehicle while subject to several weapons prohibition orders.

The court considered sentencing ranges for possession of loaded handguns and emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the dangers posed by firearms in the Greater Toronto Area.

Significant aggravating factors included the accused’s extensive criminal record, repeated breaches of court orders, and possession of the loaded firearm in a vehicle with other occupants.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, family support, and employment prospects.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence of five years consisting of four years for the firearms offences and a consecutive one-year term for breach of a weapons prohibition order, with ancillary orders including DNA collection and forfeiture.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms offences after police stopped a vehicle following a radio report that a rear passenger was possibly armed.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9, arguing the vehicle stop constituted arbitrary detention and that a flashlight examination of the vehicle interior was an unlawful search.

The court held the accused was not detained in the brief period between the vehicle stop and the observation of a firearm and that the flashlight observation did not constitute a search under s. 8.

The Charter application was dismissed.

Accepting the evidence of police officers that the accused was holding a loaded restricted firearm in his lap before it fell to the floor of the vehicle, the court found possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted the accused on all counts.