Tom Lissaman

The accused, Mylo Barreto, was charged with assault causing bodily harm, robbery, and unlawful confinement against Allan Howe, his landlord.

The incident arose from a rent dispute and pending eviction.

Howe testified to a prolonged, violent attack by Barreto and two friends, resulting in significant injuries and theft of money.

Barreto admitted causing injuries but claimed self-defence, denying the involvement of his friends, confinement, or theft.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses and the validity of the self-defence claim.

The court found Howe's testimony compelling and corroborated by physical evidence, while Barreto's self-defence claim was inconsistent with the extensive injuries inflicted and lacked credibility.

The court rejected Barreto's evidence and found the Crown proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused were charged with second-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, two of the accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence of a street encounter with police the day after the homicide, arguing their rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the accused were psychologically detained when four officers approached them, separated them, and questioned them without advising them of their right to counsel.

The court held that the officers' failure to properly record the encounter and their attempts to minimize it as a 'social call' exacerbated the breach.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the court also noted the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements due to the lack of a reliable record.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the Crown's case.

The moving parties argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to directed verdict applications involving circumstantial evidence.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the test remains whether a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict, which involves only a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

Finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of identity and murderous intent for both moving parties, the court dismissed the directed verdict applications.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application for bail.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the accused on his mandatory affidavit filed in support of the application.

The accused objected, arguing that compelled cross-examination would violate his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court held that the Crown is entitled to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit, as any evidence obtained could only be used for impeachment at trial, not for substantive guilt, per Supreme Court precedent.

The accused then sought to withdraw his affidavit to avoid cross-examination and proceed with the hearing using other evidence.

The court permitted the withdrawal but dismissed the bail application, ruling that it could not proceed without the mandatory affidavit required by the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms and drug offences after police executed a telewarrant at his apartment and seized an unregistered rifle, an over-capacity magazine, ammunition, and marijuana.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging the warrant was invalid due to insufficient grounds and improper editing of the information to obtain (ITO) relating to a confidential informant.

The court reviewed the warrant under the Garofoli framework, addressed disclosure issues arising from informer privilege, and considered the sufficiency of the judicial summary and investigative corroboration.

Although the informant lacked a proven track record and had self-interested motivations, the tip was detailed, recent, and based on articulated means of knowledge, and was partially corroborated by police investigation.

Applying the totality of the circumstances test from DeBot and related authorities, the court held the issuing justice could reasonably have found reasonable and probable grounds for the search.