Robert Nuttall

A young person was charged with dangerous driving causing death under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The defendant was driving a rental car in a mall parking lot when he struck a pedestrian with his vehicle, resulting in the pedestrian's death.

The defendant admitted to the dangerous driving but claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the defendant reasonably believed force was being used against him and acted for the purpose of self-protection, the force used was not reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court convicted the defendant of dangerous driving causing death, finding that the defendant overreacted to a limited use of force by immediately employing maximum force without considering alternative options.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The offender was convicted of aiding and abetting an aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, following a pre-planned attack on a fellow inmate in a detention centre.

The Crown sought a sentence of 3 to 4 years.

The court considered the offender's youthful age, lack of prior penitentiary sentences, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in a provincial facility, followed by 30 months of probation, declining to give credit for pre-trial custody to achieve this specific sentence structure.

Pre‑trial evidentiary rulings in a first‑degree murder prosecution concerning the admissibility of the accused’s statements and post‑offence conduct.

The accused attempted to plead guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown rejected the plea and pursued first‑degree murder based on an alleged killing during or in connection with sexual assault.

The court held that a rejected guilty plea and unaccepted defence admissions do not remove issues from the jury unless the Crown agrees to a formal admission under s. 655 of the Criminal Code.

Evidence of post‑offence conduct remained relevant to actus reus and identification issues but could not be used to determine the level of intent between manslaughter and murder.

The accused’s statement to police was admitted, subject to limited redactions and jury instructions, while a statement to a friend about “going to jail for life” was excluded for minimal probative value and high prejudicial effect.

Following conviction after trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the court determined the appropriate sentence for an offender found with approximately 69 grams of crack cocaine, digital scales, and packaging consistent with commercial distribution.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of two and a half to three years, emphasizing the quantity of drugs and the offender’s prior trafficking convictions.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence in light of four years spent under strict pre‑sentence house arrest without breach and strong evidence of rehabilitation and community support.

Applying the principles in ss. 718–718.2 and 742.1 of the Criminal Code and considering pre‑sentence house arrest as a mitigating factor, the court imposed a sentence of two years less a day.

The sentence was ordered to be served in the community under strict conditional sentence terms, including house arrest.

The accused were charged with sexual assault following an incident involving alleged non-consensual sexual activity after a night of drinking.

During the jury trial, the defence brought a mid‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking to cross‑examine the complainant about a prior incident involving discussion of “threesomes” and a kiss with one accused months earlier.

The court held the prior incident constituted “sexual activity” within the meaning of s. 276.

Although the evidence was a specific instance of sexual activity and had some relevance to credibility after questioning in the Crown’s examination‑in‑chief, the court concluded its probative value was minimal and substantially outweighed by prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The proposed evidence risked inviting stereotypical reasoning about sexual history and did not meaningfully assist in determining the central issue of consent.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking exclusion of drugs and other evidence seized during the execution of a telewarrant at his residence.

He argued that the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds, the authorization for a night search was unjustified, the dynamic entry with a distraction device was unreasonable, and police conduct during the search breached s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that the information from the confidential informant was sufficiently compelling, credible, and corroborated to support the issuance of the warrant, and that the Garofoli step‑six procedure could properly be used to review the redacted ITO.

The court further found that exceptional circumstances justified the night search and that exigent circumstances supported the dynamic entry and use of a distraction device.

No Charter breach was established and, in any event, the Grant analysis would favour admission of the evidence.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision on a charge of first-degree murder in the death of Leanne Freeman on November 29, 2011.

The Crown sought to commit both accused for trial on first-degree murder charges.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for second-degree murder but argued insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on first-degree murder charges, relying on two alternative theories: (1) planning and deliberation, and (2) murder committed during unlawful confinement under Criminal Code section 231(5)(e).

The defendant was charged with multiple firearms-related offences and assault of a police officer following a police pursuit that ended on an on-ramp to the Gardiner Expressway in Toronto.

The central factual dispute concerned whether the defendant threw a loaded handgun over a guardrail or whether a co-occupant of the vehicle did so.

The Crown relied on eyewitness testimony from two civilian bystanders who observed the defendant throw the gun, while the defence argued the gun was thrown by another occupant and the civilians misperceived the events due to their temporal and spatial coincidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of ten counts, including nine weapons-related offences and one count of failure to comply with a probation order, but acquitted him of assaulting a police officer.