Adam Forbes

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography after police found over 18,000 images and 300 videos on his devices.

The Crown sought 27 months in custody, while the defence sought 15 to 16 months.

The court weighed the significant size of the collection and the prolonged period of offending against the offender's guilty plea, lack of criminal record, pro-social background, and low risk of re-offending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as paramount for offences involving the abuse of children, the court sentenced the offender to two years in custody along with ancillary orders.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent drove his vehicle onto a sidewalk, colliding with multiple objects and fatally striking a pedestrian.

The trial judge found the respondent had suffered a momentary lapse of attention and that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea.

The sole ground of appeal concerned whether the respondent's status as a suspended G1 driver who violated the conditions of his licence by driving unaccompanied and during prohibited hours was relevant to establishing mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the G1 licence restrictions were irrelevant to the modified objective test for dangerous driving unless they indicated an incapacity to appreciate or avoid the specific risk involved.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Eric Brown, concerning drug consumption and cell phone use prior to a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of Mr. Brown's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and (b).

The court found that the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to the police's failure to caution Mr. Brown about the use of his statements and the full extent of his jeopardy, especially after the victim's death was known.

Furthermore, the court determined that Mr. Brown was detained when placed in the police vehicle and that the police breached his ss. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights by not promptly informing him of the reasons for his detention or his right to counsel, nor of the victim's death.

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing conduct was serious, the impact on Mr. Brown's rights significant, and that admitting the statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Consequently, both the statements made to police and the recorded telephone conversation with his mother were excluded from evidence at trial.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of statements, blood samples, and evidence relating to a breath demand following a motor vehicle collision.

The court found that police failed to provide the accused with the right to counsel immediately upon arrest and improperly treated an equivocal request to speak with counsel as a waiver.

As a result, the taking of blood samples and the subsequent breath demand were causally connected to the breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held that admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The utterances were also excluded as involuntary or lacking sufficient context.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for possession of child pornography and accessing child pornography under ss. 163.1(4)(a), 163.1(4)(b), and 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.

Police discovered child pornography on multiple electronic devices after a member of the public observed the accused viewing images of young girls on a laptop in a public library.

The collection included over 160 images and several videos, including a number of hardcore depictions involving sexual acts with young children.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for offences involving the abuse and exploitation of children.

The accused was sentenced to eight months’ incarceration less one month credit for pre‑trial custody, followed by two years’ probation and several ancillary orders including DNA sampling, sex offender registration for life, forfeiture of digital devices, and a five‑year prohibition order under s. 161.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his laptop at a public library, arguing that his consent to the search was not informed and therefore violated his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police officers had asked for permission to search the laptop while investigating a report that the accused was viewing images of young girls.

The court applied the consent criteria from R. v. Wills and found that the accused voluntarily and knowingly consented to the search, understanding the nature of the investigation and the potential consequences.

The court rejected the argument that the officer fabricated the consent process and found the accused’s evidence less credible.

Even if a minor deficiency in the consent process existed, the court held the evidence would not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of failing to provide the necessaries of life to her young children after feeding them a highly restricted raw vegan diet that resulted in severe malnutrition, osteopenia, and rickets.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the children, the breach of parental trust, and the life‑threatening nature of the harm.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, participation in parenting and nutrition programs, and psychological evidence indicating low risk of reoffending.

Applying the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for offences involving child victims under the Criminal Code, the court determined that a custodial sentence was warranted but could be served conditionally in the community.

A six‑month conditional sentence with strict conditions and three years’ probation was imposed.