Charn Gill

Two accused were jointly charged on a fourteen-count indictment involving sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, making and possessing child pornography.

The offences were alleged to have occurred over more than two decades involving multiple complainants who were children of a family member of one accused.

The court considered a similar fact application by the Crown, ultimately dismissing the application with respect to two complainants whose evidence was found to be tainted by collusion and whose allegations of involvement by one accused were only disclosed after police informed one complainant of an unrelated assault on her child.

One accused pleaded guilty mid-trial to multiple counts involving child pornography and sexual assaults on two complainants.

On the remaining counts, the court found the first accused guilty of sexual assault on one complainant and guilty of two counts of possession of child pornography, while acquitting both accused of the remaining contested charges.

The court found insufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt sexual assaults by the first accused on the other complainants, whose evidence was intertwined with collusion-tainted allegations.

This decision addresses the charge of criminal harassment under section 264(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, specifically focusing on whether the creation and content of a website by the accused, Mahyar Radmehr, constituted threatening conduct causing the complainant, Ms. K., to reasonably fear for her safety.

The Court found that while the website caused embarrassment, anxiety, and frustration to Ms. K., it was not designed as a tool of intimidation to instill fear.

The Crown failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The Court also declined to impose a common law peace bond requested by the Crown, finding no reasonable fear to justify such an order.

This decision addresses urgent motions regarding the residential schedule of four children, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and a proposed nesting arrangement following the separation of Laura Anne Fennema and Trevor William Harry Fennema.

The court found the parenting time issues urgent due to the children’s removal from their home and school, but dismissed other requests for lack of urgency.

The court declined to order exclusive possession or nesting, primarily because of the Applicant’s criminal release conditions and the practicalities of the family farm.

The court ordered the children’s immediate return to their home with the Respondent and set a detailed interim parenting schedule, emphasizing the children’s best interests and stability.

The applicant, Ramon Williams, sought to withdraw his guilty pleas to multiple counts of human trafficking, procuring, receiving material benefit from sexual services, and assault, arguing the pleas were not fully informed due to a misunderstanding of immigration consequences and appeal rights.

The court found the pleas were voluntary and fully informed, that the applicant received sound legal advice, and that his assertion of being unaware of appeal rights or immigration consequences was not credible.

The court concluded that the applicant was experiencing buyer's remorse and dismissed the application to withdraw the guilty pleas, directing the matter to proceed to sentencing.

Jahvon Taijah Powell, charged with firearm and drug trafficking offences, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of a search warrant for his residence.

He argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe a handgun would be found at his home.

The Crown conceded the initial ITO was insufficient but relied on a judicial summary from a Garofoli process.

The court dismissed Powell's application, finding that the augmented ITO, combined with police corroboration, provided sufficient case-specific information to infer the firearm would be at his residence.

The court distinguished this from cases lacking such specific links and affirmed the principle from R. v. Kalonji that a known association between an individual, a firearm, and their residence can establish reasonable grounds.

The defendant, N.M., was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his step-daughter, A.D. The Crown's case relied on A.D.'s testimony and an audio recording.

The defendant denied the allegations, and his testimony was found credible by the court.

The court identified inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant's evidence, including potential motives related to her biological father.

Applying the R. v. W.D. framework, the court found that the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all charges.

The four applicant defendants, charged with multiple residential break and enters, brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

They challenged the lawfulness of their arrests, the subsequent searches, the promptness and language of their arrest notifications, and the implementation of their right to counsel.

One applicant also alleged a s. 8 breach regarding video surveillance in his holding cell.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that police had reasonable grounds for the arrests and that the searches were lawful.

While the court found a s. 10(b) implementation breach for two applicants due to unexplained delays in contacting counsel, it declined to exclude the seized clothing under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Haiden Suarez-Noa was convicted of second-degree murder.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which must be between 10 and 25 years.

The Crown sought 17-18 years, while the defence argued for 10-12 years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the domestic nature of the murder, the victim's vulnerability, the number of stab wounds, and the offender's post-offence conduct.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, turning himself in (albeit 12 hours later), and expressions of regret for his actions' impact on his son.

The court rejected the lower end of the jury's recommendations and the defence's proposed range, finding the offender's remorse less than sincere regarding the victim's loss.

The court fixed the parole ineligibility period at 15 years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and issued a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-contact order.

The defence sought to admit expert psychiatric evidence from Dr. Julian Gojer on dissociative amnesia to explain the accused's memory loss regarding the number of stabbings, arguing it was relevant to credibility and intent in a second-degree murder trial.

The Crown opposed, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, inadmissible, confusing, and lacked probative value, especially since Dr. Gojer could not conclusively state the accused experienced dissociation or link it to intent.

The court, applying the Mohan and White Burgess tests for expert evidence admissibility, found that the evidence had limited probative value and was not necessary to assist the jury, as the issue of memory loss for the number of stabs was within the jury's common sense.

The court concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, including potential confusion and disproportionate weight, substantially outweighed its probative value.

The application to admit the expert opinion was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order to allow a race-based challenge for cause using a multiple-choice question format during jury selection.

The Crown did not oppose the race-based challenge itself, but objected to the proposed multiple-choice format, advocating for the standard "Parks question" approach.

The court granted the applicant's request to conduct a race-based challenge for cause but denied the use of the specific multiple-choice format.

The judge ruled that the standard open-ended Parks question was sufficient and that the proposed format would unduly prolong the process and potentially confuse prospective jurors without being more effective.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a roadside stop and breath testing.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath evidence under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple breaches: a seven-minute delay in providing rights to counsel, denial of access to counsel of choice, arbitrary detention contrary to section 9, and failure to provide a further opportunity to consult counsel following the decision to detain for a show cause hearing.

The court found a breach of the right to counsel of choice but dismissed all applications for stay or exclusion of evidence, finding the accused guilty as charged.

The accused, Mark Ahye, was tried without a jury on two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a collision on September 6, 2014.

Mr. Ahye was driving a black Acura at approximately 90 kph in a 50 kph zone when he struck a Toyota Prius, injuring its occupants.

The Crown alleged dangerous driving, including competitive driving with another vehicle.

The defense argued that the evidence of aggressive driving was conflicting and that the collision was unavoidable due to the other driver's unsafe entry onto the road.

The court found conflicting witness accounts regarding whether Mr. Ahye was racing or driving aggressively.

Preferring the evidence of a witness who had a better and more continuous vantage point, the court found a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ahye was driving in a manner dangerous to the public.

Consequently, Mr. Ahye was found not guilty on both counts.

Peter Brooks was found guilty of second-degree murder.

This decision concerns his sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the attack, the vulnerability of the victims, and the planned nature of the offence as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included Brooks' progressive neurocognitive disorder (dementia) and lack of prior criminal record.

Both Crown and defence jointly submitted for the minimum parole ineligibility period of 10 years.

The court accepted this, emphasizing public protection and denunciation while acknowledging the limited impact of rehabilitation and specific deterrence due to the offender's cognitive impairment.

The offender was convicted of participating in an armed home invasion where victims were unlawfully confined, beaten, and robbed.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors of the planned, violent intrusion against the offender's positive family support and recent employment history.

The offender was sentenced to 6.5 years in custody, less 7 months of pre-sentence credit.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after fatally stabbing his father.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the accused was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from a psychotic disorder with hallucinations and persecutory delusions causing him to believe his father was possessed by the devil and turning into a serpent.

The court accepted the expert opinion that the accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The presumption of criminal responsibility was rebutted on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was charged in relation to a violent home invasion involving robbery and unlawful confinement.

None of the victims could identify the intruders, and the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including taxi driver identification, a fingerprint recovered from a taxi window, security camera footage showing multiple intruders approaching the residence, and cell phone tower data tracking the accused’s movements consistent with the route taken to and from the crime scene.

A witness initially stated there were six intruders but later testified there were four; the court admitted the earlier videotaped police statement as a prior inconsistent statement under R v B (K.G.) and accepted it as more reliable.

Considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence and the doctrine of party liability under s. 21 of the Criminal Code, the court concluded the accused was one of the participants in the joint enterprise.

The accused was convicted of robbery and unlawful confinement.

During a trial for an armed home invasion, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit portions of a witness's police interview for the truth of their contents.

The defense conceded the statements met the requirements of reliability and necessity.

However, the defense sought to also admit the witness's preliminary inquiry testimony as a prior consistent statement to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The court admitted the police interview but excluded the preliminary inquiry testimony, finding no evidence that the preliminary inquiry statements were made before the alleged motivation to fabricate arose.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of Xhuljeta Vlashi on August 27, 2012.

The Crown sought to establish that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court heard evidence over five days from approximately thirty witnesses, reviewed agreed statements of fact, forensic reports, and eleven exhibits.

The accused suffered from documented schizophrenia and killed the one person in his life who was caring for him while she was on a video call with her niece.

The court found that while the evidence clearly established the accused killed the victim intentionally, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for first degree murder.

The killing appeared impulsive, rash, and irrational, with no prior animosity, threats, or rational motive.

The court committed the accused to stand trial on the lesser charge of second degree murder.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm, leaving the scene of an accident, and theft of property following an incident on January 22, 2012.

The defendant was hired to transport a photo booth for two business partners.

A dispute arose over compensation.

When the defendant attempted to leave with the booth, a friend of the business partners placed himself on the hood of the vehicle.

The defendant drove slowly to escape, and the friend fell off and was injured.

The court found the defendant not guilty of all charges, accepting the necessity defence for the dangerous driving charge and finding the defendant had an honest colour of right claim regarding the booth.