CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 2118

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-30000661

DATE: 20260430

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

– and –

Japkirat Singh

Defendant

Levi Vandersteen, for the Crown

Charn Gill, for the Defendant

HEARD: March 2-6 and 10, 2026

NISHIKAWA j.

1The defendant, Japkirat Singh, stands charged with dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm contrary to ss. 320.13(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 respectively.

2The Crown’s theory is that shortly after midnight on December 18, 2021, Mr. Singh and a co-worker, Nazir Abdulqayoum, left work in their respective vehicles and were racing along Lawrence Avenue East when Mr. Abdulqayoum’s vehicle struck the vehicle of the deceased, Lynda MacIver, who was making a left turn onto Pharmacy Avenue. Mr. Singh’s vehicle did not strike Ms. MacIver’s vehicle.

3The defence’s position is that Mr. Singh was not racing Mr. Abdulqayoum but was driving home along Lawrence Avenue East. He did not know that Mr. Abdulqayoum was driving in the same direction as he was until after the collision, when he went to assist the people involved. It was only then that he realized that the occupants of the vehicle were his co-workers, Mr. Abdulqayoum and the passenger, Nishan Arampu.

4The issue to be determined is whether Mr. Singh drove in a manner that was dangerous, thereby causing the death of Ms. MacIver and bodily harm to Mr. Arampu.

5On April 10, 2026, the date scheduled for judgment on the trial, Mr. Singh was not present in the courtroom and defence counsel advised that Mr. Singh wished to appear by videoconference. Mr. Singh had apparently returned to India because of his father’s illness, the details of which were not provided. Because Mr. Singh was not in the jurisdiction, I permitted him to appear by videoconference. I adjourned the appearance to April 21, 2026 for judgment to allow Mr. Singh to appear in person. I advised counsel that in the event that Mr. Singh was not back in Canada on that date, the appearance could be converted to a virtual appearance for an update.

6On April 21, 2026, Mr. Singh again appeared by videoconference because he was still in India. Defence counsel advised that Mr. Singh would not be permitted to return to Canada because his work permit had expired in June 2025 and his application for renewal was rejected in February 2026. I issued a bench warrant for Mr. Singh’s arrest, adjourned the hearing to April 30, 2026 for judgment and required Mr. Singh to appear in person on that date.

7On April 30, 2026, Mr. Singh did not appear in court. Defence counsel advises that he remains in India. Having issued a warrant for Mr. Singh’s arrest and adjourned the trial to await his appearance, on that date, I found that is no longer in the interests of justice to await Mr. Singh’s appearance: Code, s. 475(1)(b)(ii).

Agreed Facts

8The following facts were agreed to between the Crown and the defence.

The Motor Vehicle Collision

9At 12:13 a.m. on December 18, 2021, a motor vehicle collision occurred at the intersection of Pharmacy Avenue (“Pharmacy”) and Lawrence Avenue East (“Lawrence”) in Toronto, Ontario. The motor vehicle collision was between two vehicles: a white 2010 Toyota Corolla being operated by Nazir Abdulqayoum (the “Toyota”) and a blue 2007 Nissan Versa being operated by Linda MacIver (the “Nissan”).

10This motor vehicle collision is depicted from six different camera angles at 1:58, 2:24, 2:47, 3:31, 3:58, and 6:15 of the video compilation made by the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”). The video compilation, and the video clips which comprise it, are true and accurate. The time stamps in the video clips which comprise the video compilation are either accurate or are different from real time by the amount indicated by the police.

11There were no mechanical defects to either the Toyota or the Nissan or their accessories, including their tires, that contributed to the collision.

12At the time of the motor vehicle collision, Mr. Singh was operating a 2014 Ford Fusion vehicle (the “Ford”) which, in the video compilation, can be seen directly following the Toyota driven by Mr. Abdulqayoum into the intersection.

13At the time of the motor vehicle collision, the posted speed limit on Lawrence was 50 kilometres per hour. The weather was approximately one degree Celsius. The roads were dry. The road surface was in good repair. The traffic lights were in good working condition. The intersection was demarcated appropriately and illuminated by properly functioning overhead streetlamps as well as ambient lights from commercial businesses located on all four corners of the intersection.

Linda MacIver

14On the video compilation, a person is visible running across Lawrence northbound towards Ms. MacIver’s motor vehicle. The person is Voula Artemakis, an unrelated civilian who heard the motor vehicle collision. Ms. Artemakis immediately attended Ms. MacIver’s vehicle and found her, in the driver’s seat, unresponsive, with her eyes opening and closing, unable to speak.

15Ms. MacIver was extricated from the Nissan by emergency personnel and transported to Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre, where she died from blunt force trauma to her chest and abdomen caused by the motor vehicle collision. She was 57 years of age.

16On October 16, 2023, Mr. Abdulqayoum pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a conveyance causing Ms. MacIver’s death on December 18, 2021.

Nishan Arampu

17At the time of the motor vehicle collision, Nishan Arampu was the sole passenger in the Toyota operated by Mr. Abdulqayoum. He was seated in the front passenger seat. As a result of the motor vehicle collision, Mr. Arampu suffered the following injuries:

(a) Nonsegmental left ninth and tenth rib fractures;

(b) Devascularization of the left kidney with diffuse nonenhancement and disruption of the left renal artery and left renal vein;

(d) Small splenic laceration with small volume peri splenic hematoma; and

(e) Left adrenal hematoma.

18Mr. Arampu was in the hospital for approximately seven months and was the subject of nine medical surgeries.

The Toyota Corolla

19The 2010 Toyota Corolla had two engine options: a 1.8 litre, four-cylinder engine (132 horsepower) and a 2.4 litre, four-cylinder engine (158 horsepower). Mr. Abdulqayoum owned the 1.8 litre engine variant, which he was operating at the time of the collision on December 18, 2021.

20The “Pre-Crash Data” obtained from the Toyota’s Airbag Control Module (“ACM”) is accurate.

The Ford Fusion

21The 2014 Ford Fusion had four internal combustion engine options: (i) a 1.5 litre, EcoBoost, in-line four-cylinder engine (178 horsepower); (ii) a 1.6 litre, EcoBoost, in-line four-cylinder gasoline engine (182 horsepower); (iii) the 2.0 litre, EcoBoost, in-line four-cylinder, turbocharged engine (240 horsepower); and (iv) the 2.5 litre, in-line four-cylinder engine (175 horsepower). Of the four options , the 2.0 litre, EcoBoost, in-line four-cylinder turbocharged engine had the most power.

22All variants of the 2014 Ford Fusion had engines that were more powerful than the 1.8 litre, four-cylinder 2010 Toyota Corolla when the vehicles were new.

23Both a vehicle history report dated March 5, 2026 for the Ford prepared by CarFax (the “CarFax Report”)¹ and the Ministry of Transportation “VIN by date” show that the Ford Mr. Singh purchased on September 3, 2021 had the 2.5 litre, in-line four-cylinder engine at the time it was produced by Ford in 2014.

24Because there is no mandatory requirement to report any vehicle details to CarFax, and a vehicle could have an engine change or upgrade that would not necessarily be reflected on a CarFax report, it is possible that the engine was swapped with another engine after it was sold by Ford in 2014 and it was not reported to CarFax.

25During the course of Mr. Singh’s ownership of the Ford, he had the oil changed and serviced the engine ignition coils as reported in the CarFax Report.

Preliminary Matter: Admissibility of Mr. Singh’s Statements

26At trial, the Crown brought an application to admit statements made by Mr. Singh to PC Brian Kellar, who was the first officer to attend the scene of the collision. The interaction was captured on PC Kellar’s body-worn camera (“BWC”).

27After a voir dire, during which PC Kellar testified, I ruled the portion of the statement made by Mr. Singh to PC Kellar at the beginning of their interaction admissible, with reasons to follow. The admissible portion begins with PC Kellar asking Mr. Singh how he was doing and ends with PC Kellar cautioning Mr. Singh, saying: “So you don’t have to say anything else right now if you don’t want to, but right now, I’m suspecting that you two were racing.” The remaining portion was ruled inadmissible. These are the reasons for my ruling.

28The Crown argued that once Mr. Singh became a suspect, PC Kellar cautioned him appropriately, but that Mr. Singh continued to voluntarily provide information. The Crown conceded that a portion of Mr. Singh’s statement was inadmissible because, although PC Kellar had informed him of his right to counsel, he then said, “If you would like to explain to me, go ahead” before Mr. Singh had been provided with an opportunity to exercise his right to counsel.

29On the Crown’s application, Mr. Singh’s position was that PC Kellar delayed in providing him with a caution, rendering all of his utterances involuntary. Mr. Singh argued that once he became a suspect, he ought to have been provided a caution and rights to counsel immediately without delay, that PC Kellar ought to have assisted in the implementation of his right to speak with counsel, and that he should have refrained from eliciting information until he had an opportunity to speak with counsel.

The Applicable Principles

30In order for a statement made to a person in authority to be admissible, the Crown must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing voluntariness, the following factors are relevant:

(i) The absence or presence of inducements by means of threats and/or promises;

(ii) Whether the accused had an operating mind at the time of the statement;

(iii) Whether the accused was subjected to oppressive circumstances; and

(iv) Whether the accused was subject to police trickery.

R. v. Oickle¸ 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3.

31The Supreme Court of Canada has held that police are “well advised” to caution individuals once they become suspects: R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 33; R. v. Tessier, 2022 SCC 35, [2022] 2 S.C.R. 660, at para. 8. The test to determine when someone becomes a suspect is objective: Tessier, at paras 81-82. An officer’s subjective belief as to when they have detained someone is not dispositive of the issue. It is for the Court to determine when someone is detained: R. v. Ranhotra, 2022 ONCA 548, 2022 W.C.B. 2161, at para 36.

32In addition, s. 10(a) of the Charter guarantees every person arrested or detained the right to be informed promptly of the reasons for the detention or arrest. One aspect of s. 10(a) is to inform an individual why they are being detained; the other aspect is to inform the individual of the extent of their jeopardy so they can exercise their right to counsel in a meaningful way: R. v. Nguyen, 2008 ONCA 49, 232 O.A.C. 289, at para. 20. As a minimum requirement, individuals who are detained “must therefore be advised, in clear and simple language, of the reasons for the detention”: R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 21.

33Section 10(b) of the Charter guarantees that any person arrested or detained has the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right. In R. v. Bartle, 1994 64 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at pp. 191–92, the Supreme Court of Canada reiterated that s. 10(b) of the Charter imposes the following duties on state authorities conducting an arrest or detention:

(a) to inform the detainee of their right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel;

(b) if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances); and

(c) to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until they have had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or danger).

34The purpose of the s. 10(b) right is to “allow the detainee not only to be informed of his rights and obligations under the law but, equally if not more important, to obtain advice as to how to exercise those rights…”: R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 495, at para. 21. The right is meant “to assist detainees regain their liberty, and guard against the risk of involuntary self-incrimination.” Taylor, at para. 21.

35Where a detained person requests to speak to counsel, the arresting officer is under a duty to facilitate the requested access to a lawyer at the “first reasonably available opportunity” including providing access to a telephone: Taylor, at paras. 24 and 28.

36In addition, once a detainee has invoked the right to counsel, police must refrain from questioning the detainee “until such time as the implementational component of the right to counsel has been accommodated”: R. v. Keshavarz, 2022 ONCA 312, 413 C.C.C. (3d) 263, at para. 75. This is also known as the duty to hold off. A violation of s. 10(b) will occur when an officer attempts to elicit incriminating information, even in circumstances where the detainee declines to answer a question: R. v. Pileggi, 2021 ONCA 4, 153 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 71.

Application to the Facts

37The main issues in this application are the timing of the caution and whether the statements made by Mr. Singh were voluntary and whether PC Kellar fulfilled both the informational and implementational components of s. 10(b).

38On the BWC recording, PC Kellar approaches Mr. Singh at 12:28 a.m. after another individual tells him that Mr. Singh saw everything. PC Kellar asks if Mr. Singh happened to see anything. Mr. Singh describes the collision to PC Kellar. At 12:29 a.m., PC Kellar tasks Mr. Singh to get his identification from his vehicle.

39After Mr. Singh returns with his identification, at 12:30 a.m., PC Kellar informs him that his BWC is recording everything they say. They have a brief further exchange, during which Mr. Singh shows PC Kellar in which lanes he and the Toyota were driving. PC Kellar asks Mr. Singh how fast he was driving, to which Mr. Singh responds, “I was 40, 45.” When PC Kellar asks how fast the Toyota was going, Mr. Singh says he does not know the speed. Mr. Singh then indicates to PC Kellar where his car is parked. It is at that point, at 12:32 on the BWC recording, that PC Kellar advises Mr. Singh that he does not have to say anything further but that he suspects he and the Toyota driver were racing. At 12:33, PC Kellar advises Mr. Singh that he is detained and cannot leave.

40On the voir dire, PC Kellar testified that he asked Mr. Singh to get his identification because he was a witness to the collision and wanted his information. PC Kellar testified that he was also starting to get a “hunch” that because Mr. Singh knew the driver and passenger of the Toyota, he was more involved in the collision than he was letting on. On cross-examination, PC Kellar admitted that when he asked Mr. Singh to get his identification, he was intending to detain him. He further explained that as Mr. Singh went to his vehicle to get his identification, it gave him the opportunity to consider the information that he had to that point, and that his hunch was transitioning into a suspicion.

41In my view, PC Kellar properly cautioned Mr. Singh when he became a suspect. As noted earlier in these reasons, the question of when a person becomes a suspect is determined on an objective standard. Based on the evidence, Mr. Singh was not a suspect until he returned with his identification and then reported his speed as below the speed limit. As PC Kellar testified, when he first started to speak with Mr. Singh, he developed a hunch that Mr. Singh was more involved than as a mere witness. As Mr. Singh left to get his identification, PC Kellar had time to compile the information he had, including the extent of the collision and the fact that Mr. Singh’s car and the Toyota arrived at the intersection at the same time, and thought he would have to detain Mr. Singh. He further testified that when Mr. Singh told him he was going 40-45 kilometres per hour, he felt that was not accurate and that this inaccuracy solidified his hunch. Until that point, PC Kellar did not have enough information to suspect that Mr. Singh was involved in the collision.

42When an officer responds to a dynamic situation, efforts taken to save lives, direct civilians, and perform other duties, do not necessarily result in detention, even when they involve commands and directions which restrict those individuals’ liberty: R. v. Ranhotra, 2022 ONCA 548. Until Mr. Singh returned with his identification, he was being treated like other witnesses on scene.

43When PC Kellar suspected that Mr. Singh was involved in the collision, he advised Mr. Singh that he believed they were racing. In the circumstances, this was sufficient to inform Mr. Singh of the reason for his detention. They were at the scene of a serious motor vehicle collision, which Mr. Singh had just observed. The driver of the Nissan, Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Arampu were all being attended to by emergency personnel. Although PC Kellar told Mr. Singh he suspected him of racing and not of dangerous driving, given the context, PC Kellar provided more than sufficient information for a reasonable person in Mr. Singh’s circumstances to understand that he was being detained for conduct relating to the collision.

44Even where the caution is not given immediately upon suspicion, the Crown can still prove the utterances voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt through reference to the other Oickle factors: Tessier, at para. 80. In this case, there is no evidence of trickery, oppressive circumstances, threats, promises or other inducements. In fact, the BWC recording shows that Mr. Singh was eager to speak with PC Kellar and provide his account of the collision. Even when PC Kellar was giving Mr. Singh rights to counsel, he had to hold his hand up and tell Mr. Singh to stop speaking to allow him to inform him of his rights.

45After he detained Mr. Singh, PC Kellar complied with all of the informational components of s. 10(b). He informed Mr. Singh of his right to counsel of his choice, that he was entitled to speak with counsel immediately, and of the availability and phone number of free duty counsel. Mr. Singh responded that he understood. PC Kellar observed Mr. Singh putting the phone number for duty counsel into his cell phone.

46PC Kellar then provided Mr. Singh with a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel. After Mr. Singh entered the duty counsel phone number into his cell phone (at 12:34 a.m.), PC Kellar left him alone, giving him privacy at the roadside to speak with counsel. There was minimal impairment of Mr. Singh’s liberty. He was not handcuffed, placed in a scout car, or transported to a police station. Under the circumstances, the steps taken by PC Kellar were sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Mr. Singh be given a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.

47At 12:56 a.m., Mr. Singh approached PC Kellar and told him that when he called the number for duty counsel, there were options for police or security guards and young people. PC Kellar told Mr. Singh that he could not help him with that. PC Kellar testified that he told Mr. Singh he could not assist because he only ever selects the option for police, which is the first option. PC Kellar testified that because Mr. Singh was free to walk around and use his cell phone, he thought he could call anyone he wanted to, including another lawyer. Mr. Singh did not ask PC Kellar any further questions about contacting duty counsel.

48At 1:14 a.m., PC Kellar returned to speak with Mr. Singh. He cautioned him once again and allowed him to make further utterances. PC Kellar did not confirm whether Mr. Singh had consulted with counsel before doing so.

49In my view, given that PC Kellar did not assist Mr. Singh when he sought the officer’s assistance with the number for duty counsel, PC Kellar ought to have confirmed before further engaging Mr. Singh whether he had in fact spoken to duty counsel. PC Kellar knew from their interaction that Mr. Singh had tried to call the number for duty counsel but did not know what to do when he heard the options. Knowing that, he should not have asked Mr. Singh further questions without first confirming that Mr. Singh had spoken to duty counsel or other counsel.

50As a result, the utterances that Mr. Singh made after 1:14 a.m. were ruled inadmissible as they were not voluntary. PC Kellar was aware that Mr. Singh wanted to speak with duty counsel, as evident in his request for assistance with the number. However, PC Kellar asked Mr. Singh if he had anything else to say without confirming that Mr. Singh had spoken with counsel.

The Crown’s Evidence

DC Milos Savkovic

51Detective Constable Milos Savkovic has been working as a collision reconstructionist with the TPS since 2021. From 2019 to 2021, he was an apprentice with the Traffic Services Collision Reconstruction Squad. DC Savkovic has been a police officer since 2016 and has taken various courses in collision investigation and reconstruction. He has been qualified as an expert in five criminal proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice. DC Savkovic’s expertise was not challenged by the defence, and I granted leave for him to provide expert opinion evidence on collision reconstruction.

52DC Savkovic testified that after he was informed of the collision, he went to the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy at approximately 3:45 a.m. on December 18, 2021 to collect evidence. DC Savkovic and his apprentice, DC Truong, mapped the scene and prepared a diagram of their findings, including tire marks, fluid spills and damage to the road and surroundings, such as the lamp post. As a collision reconstructionist, DC Savkovic was not involved in the investigation as to whether charges should be laid against anyone.

53DC Savkovic described the portion of Lawrence between the location of the Pizza Nova call centre where Mr. Singh worked and Pharmacy. The roadway has three lanes going in each direction, westbound and eastbound, with a separate left turn lane in each direction. There are sidewalks on both sides of the road, separated from the roadway by concrete boulevards. Pharmacy has two lanes of travel in each direction, north and south, and a left turn lane in each direction.

54In the area of Lawrence, between Victoria Park and Pharmacy, there is a hill, the crest of which is at approximately Townley Avenue where there is a T-intersection. The speed limit sign, showing a speed limit of 50 kilometres per hour, is clearly posted just east of the intersection of Lawrence and Victoria Park. DC Savkovic described the area of Lawrence as having sidewalks, as well as pedestrian crossings at the intersections, including the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy.

55The parking lot of the Pizza Nova call centre exits onto Curlew Avenue, a street runs northeast from Lawrence. To the south of Lawrence, the street runs southwest and has a different name, Railside Road.

56DC Savkovic testified to the video compilation that shows the Ford and the Toyota as both vehicles turn left onto Lawrence from Curlew and drive eastbound on Lawrence. At the intersection of Lawrence and Curlew, Mr. Singh stops at the red light in the left-turn lane. Approximately nine seconds later, Mr. Abdulqayoum’s Toyota stops just behind him. Both vehicles wait at the light for a while before it turns green, and when it does, they both turn left onto Lawrence.

57After both cars make the left turn onto Lawrence heading east, the Ford is driving in the middle lane and the Toyota is driving in the curb lane. Both cars drive under a bridge. Both cars stop side-by-side at a red light at Lawrence and Victoria Park.

58The video footage from the Precious Blood Church on Lawrence, east of Victoria Park and just west of Townley, shows the Toyota ahead of the Ford, with the front of the Ford almost aligned with the rear of the Toyota. They remain close to each other as they continue to drive eastbound on Lawrence. The video from Warranty Auto Sales, on the northwest corner of Lawrence and Pharmacy shows that at that point, the distance between the Toyota and the Ford opened up, with approximately one car length in between them.

59DC Savkovic testified that as Ms. MacIver was turning left from Lawrence, to go south on Pharmacy, Mr. Abdulqayoum’s Toyota struck the front right side of her Nissan, causing it to rotate counter-clockwise in an easterly direction. The Nissan mounted the southeast corner of the intersection with its rear wheels and struck a light post with its passenger side before coming to a rest.

60DC Savkovic testified that after the impact, the Toyota continued in a southeasterly direction, left the roadway over a curb on the southeast corner of the intersection. Toyota continued and struck a Honda Pilot parked in the parking lot located on the southeast corner of Lawrence and Pharmacy. The Toyota then struck two other vehicles in the parking lot of Ideal Auto Tech and pushed them east before coming to a stop.

61DC Savkovic testified that using video footage from various locations on Lawrence, he calculated the speed of the two cars at various points. He explained how the speeds were calculated. For each video camera, DC Savkovic located two reference points and calculated the distance between them and the time it took for each vehicle to travel that distance. He then used the constant velocity method to calculate the speed of each vehicle between the two reference points. The defence did not dispute the speeds as calculated by DC Savkovic.

62The speeds of each vehicle were calculated as follows:

Video Camera

Precious Blood Church (West)

Precious Blood Church (East)

Dixie Land Plaza

Warranty Auto Sales

Speed (Toyota)

74 km/h

88 km/h

116 km/h

119 km/h

Speed (Ford)

71 km/h

87 km/h

109 km/h

102 km/h

63DC Savkovic explained that the speeds calculated were the average speeds between the two reference points, meaning that the vehicles were travelling both faster and slower at various times between the two reference points.

64DC Savkovic testified, and it is visible from the video compilation, that just before the intersection of Pharmacy and Lawrence, the Ford’s brakes were applied, and its speed decreased from 109 to 102 kilometres per hour. By contrast, over the same stretch, the Toyota’s speed increased from 116 to 119 kilometres per hour. The Toyota’s brakes were not applied. On cross-examination, DC Savkovic confirmed that at all times, the Toyota was driving faster than the Ford. He also confirmed that at the point of collision, the Toyota was accelerating.

65DC Savkovic testified that the driver of the Ford slowed down, entered the intersection, changed lanes from the middle lane to the passing lane, and avoided colliding with the Nissan. The Ford then stopped in the passing lane east of the intersection. Mr. Singh eventually parked the Ford in a nearby parking lot.

66DC Savkovic calculated that the Ford applied the brakes approximately 60 metres from the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy and that it travelled for a total of 160 metres before coming to a complete stop.

67The TPS obtained data from the Toyota’s Airbag Control Module (“ACM”), which was the event data recorder. The ACM recorded five seconds of pre-crash data, before the airbags were deployed. The ACM showed that 0.1 seconds before the system was triggered, the Toyota was travelling at a rate of 124 kilometres per hour. At 4.1 seconds before the trigger was enabled, the Toyota was travelling at a rate of 110 kilometres per hour. The ACM data showed that at no point were the brakes of the Toyota applied. A photograph of the dashboard of the Toyota taken after the collision shows the speedometer stuck past 120 kilometres per hour, which DC Savkovic testified is also an indication of the speed at the time of the collision.

68On cross-examination, DC Savkovic was asked why he did not calculate the distance necessary for either vehicle to come to a stop to avoid colliding with the Nissan. He explained that he did not think it necessary to do so because the Ford did not in fact collide with the Nissan and because the Toyota did not attempt to apply the brakes to stop. On re-examination, DC Savkovic was asked to calculate the distance it would have taken for the Ford to come to a complete stop, which he estimated at approximately 60.7 metres, if the driver applied the brakes fully. Mr. Singh did not apply full brakes but drove past the intersection.

69DC Savkovic was cross-examined about the Ford and Toyota’s respective capabilities. He conceded that it is possible to know a vehicle’s capabilities by looking at the power to weight ratio. He admitted that he did not calculate the respective engine capabilities of the Toyota and the Ford. He agreed that generally speaking, a vehicle with higher engine capabilities would outperform a vehicle with lower engine capabilities.

70On re-examination, DC Savkovic identified other features that would affect a vehicle’s capabilities, beyond the power to weight ratio. These include the horsepower, torque, level of maintenance and age of the vehicle, as well as the air pressure in the tires.

71On cross-examination, DC Savkovic conceded that he did not state in his Collision Report that the actions of the Ford driver contributed to the collision because he was not 100 percent sure that they did. DC Savkovic described Mr. Singh’s conduct as “possibly” having impacted the behaviour of the Toyota driver, but that it was not a certainty.

72The defence did not challenge DC Savkovic’s expertise or ability to give his opinion on how the collision took place. Rather, the defence challenged certain areas that DC Savkovic did not examine, some of which were detailed above. The defence objected to DC Savkovic proffering any opinion on the question of whether or not Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were racing, which I agreed was a question for the court to determine.

73I accept DC Savkovic’s evidence about the speeds of the respective vehicles and how the collision took place. DC Savkovic was careful in opining on only those aspects of the collision for which he had concrete evidence. His calculations about the speed of the two vehicles, which was not disputed by the defence, were supported by the data from the Toyota.

Stephanie Skrypnyk

74In December 2021, Stephanie Skrypnyk was the manager of the Pizza Nova call centre where Mr. Singh, Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Arampu worked, a role she had since 1997. Ms. Skrypnyk testified that on the night of December 17, 2021, there were approximately 15-30 employees working. On that day, the employer prepared and provided a holiday meal for all the employees who worked each shift. Ms. Skrypnyk testified that no alcohol was provided at the party. Ms. Skrypnyk testified that the evening shift ended at midnight.

75Ms. Skrypnyk testified that Mr. Singh began working at the call centre in May 2021. Mr. Abdulqayoum had previously worked for the call centre when it was at its previous location on Midland Avenue. Mr. Abdulqayoum then returned to work at the new location on Lawrence shortly before the incident. Mr. Arampu had been working at the call centre since approximately 2019. She had observed Mr. Singh, Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Arampu interacting at work, because they would have to address customer complaints and other similar issues. She described their relationship as respectful and cooperative. She did not know if they interacted outside of the workplace.

76Ms. Skrypnyk testified that she became aware of the collision at Lawrence and Pharmacy because someone had posted it to social media and another employee mentioned it. After she finished work and left the call centre, Ms. Skrypnyk stopped at the scene which was on her way home. Ms. Skrypnyk is visible on PC Kellar’s BWC. She testified that she did not know who was involved in the collision before she arrived on scene.

77Ms. Skrypnyk’s evidence does not raise any credibility concerns. While Ms. Skrypnyk knew Mr. Singh, Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Arampu as employees of the call centre, she did not otherwise have a relationship with any of them. However, Ms. Skrypnyk did not witness the collision, and her evidence ultimately has little bearing on the issues to be determined.

The Defence Evidence

Japkirat Singh

78Mr. Singh began working at the Pizza Nova call centre in May 2021. Mr. Singh testified that he left work after his shift on December 18, 2021. He left the building alone and saw about four to five other co-workers standing outside. He greeted them, shook hands and went to his car.

79Mr. Singh testified that after he got into his car, he called his mother in India, as he often does on his way home from work. After exiting the Pizza Nova parking lot, he first turned right onto Curlew toward Victoria Park to go to his cousin’s house as he often did after work. While speaking with his mother, he realized that it was the weekend, changed his mind and decided to go home. He testified that he did a U-turn on Curlew to go back in the opposite direction toward Lawrence.

80Mr. Singh testified that when he stopped at the red light at the intersection of Curlew and Lawrence, he did not realize that Mr. Abdulqayoum was in the car behind him. Mr. Singh turned left and drove eastbound on Lawrence while talking to his mother on the phone. He did not notice the Toyota driving beside him or the occupants of the Toyota. Mr. Singh testified that he was keeping pace with the traffic and did not know how fast he was going. He did not look at the speedometer to check his speed. Mr. Singh testified that a car passed him on the right-hand side.

81Mr. Singh testified that as he approached the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy, he saw a car coming from the other direction making a left turn. He realized that he was over the speed limit, so he lifted his foot from the gas pedal to allow the turning car to go. He then saw a second car enter the intersection to turn left. At that point, Mr. Singh applied the brakes. He also changed lanes from the middle to the very left lane. Mr. Singh testified that he changed lanes for safety. Mr. Singh testified that he would have been able to go through the intersection without any problems but changed lanes to be “extra cautious”.

82Mr. Singh testified that he then heard the collision beside him on the right side of his vehicle. He applied the brakes fully and came to a complete stop. Mr. Singh testified that he was still on the phone with his mother at this time and told her he had to go. He testified that he stopped because he realized that something horrible had happened and he wanted to help. Mr. Singh testified that he then ran to the white car and saw other people trying to pull the door open. When he looked inside, he realized the driver was Mr. Abdulqayoum. He then went around to the passenger side of the vehicle and saw that it was Mr. Arampu. Mr. Singh testified that he asked Mr. Arampu if he was OK, and Mr. Arampu responded yes. Mr. Singh then called 911.

83In cross-examination, Mr. Singh admitted that he was familiar with the stretch of Lawrence between Curlew/Railside and Victoria Park because he drove it many times before. He conceded that there were residential buildings, pedestrian crossings and foot traffic even at nighttime. He did not know whether any of the commercial establishments were open late. Mr. Singh was also aware of the crest on the hill.

84In cross-examination, Mr. Singh did not dispute that his speed reached 109 kilometres per hour. He testified that he did not notice his speed. When asked about his evidence that he was just keeping pace with traffic, Mr. Singh admitted that there was only one other car in front of him, the Toyota. He admitted that he did not notice that the distance between his car and the vehicle behind him, an SUV, was getting larger. Although Mr. Singh testified that he was looking in the rearview mirror from time to time, he testified that he could not judge how fast the cars behind him were going. At some point during cross-examination, Mr. Singh testified that he was “keeping pace with myself” because there was no one in front of him.

85Mr. Singh testified that he braked as soon as he realized he was going over the speed limit. When it was put to him on cross-examination that he did not brake but took his foot off the accelerator when he realized he was speeding, he agreed. Mr. Singh admitted that he did not brake until he saw the Nissan turning left.

86Mr. Singh was cross-examined about his statement to PC Keller that he applied the emergency brake when he saw the Nissan turning left at the intersection. Mr. Singh clarified that he meant that he was proactive and applied brake pressure, not that he used the emergency or parking brake. Mr. Singh explained that he accidentally told PC Kellar that he applied the emergency brake because he was nervous and in shock.

87Mr. Singh testified that after the collision he went to the Toyota first because it was on his path. He maintained that he did not know it was Mr. Abdulqayoum in the car.

88Mr. Singh testified that he told PC Kellar that he did not know how fast he was going because he was nervous, in shock and being “stupid” at the time. Mr. Singh admitted that he “lied” to the officer not to mislead him but because he did not want to be in trouble with the police.

89In response to PC Kellar’s question about how fast Mr. Abdulqayoum was going, Mr. Singh testified that although he knew Mr. Abdulqayoum was speeding, based on the extent of the collision, he did not want to comment on Mr. Abdulqayoum’s speed. He denied intentionally withholding information from the officer.

90Mr. Singh testified that he bought the Ford in September 2021 from Mr. Grewal, a person who fixes and sells cars. Mr. Singh testified that when he expressed doubt about the vehicle because it had over 200,000 kilometres of mileage on it, Mr. Grewal told him that he had changed the engine in the Ford to a 2-litre, turbocharged engine and that he would have to fill it with premium fuel. The statement made by Mr. Grewal is hearsay and is not admitted for the truth of its contents. Mr. Singh paid $9,000 for the car and kept it for five years. Mr. Singh testified that in April 2025, he sold the Ford for scrap.

91Mr. Singh also testified that when he brought the Ford in for oil changes and other service, he bought parts for it and advised the service personnel of the engine specifications, but was never told that he was mistaken about the engine being a 2-litre, turbocharged engine.

92On cross-examination, Mr. Singh was challenged on his testimony that the Ford had a 2.0 litre turbo engine. It was put to Mr. Singh that the engine was in fact a 2.5 litre inline four-cylinder engine. Mr. Singh stated that he never looked at the engine and it was never mentioned to him. He conceded that he did not know what engine was in the Ford. However, on re-examination, Mr. Singh testified that on one occasion, he lifted the hood and saw “2.0” on the engine.

93Mr. Singh obtained his G1 licence in April 2021 and his G2 licence in June 2021. He had a driver’s licence in India, where he previously lived.

94I will address my findings regarding the credibility and reliability of Mr. Singh’s evidence in the analysis section of these reasons.

William Jennings

95The defence called William Jennings, who is a collision reconstructionist, as an expert witness. Mr. Jennings is a professional engineer and has a degree in mechanical engineering. He specializes in engine and chassis design and worked for General Motors from 1994 to 2009. Mr. Jennings has been qualified to give expert testimony on collision reconstruction approximately 15 to 20 times in mainly civil proceedings. He has been qualified as an expert witness in two or three criminal proceedings. He has completed approximately 1,400 collision and failure investigations to date. The Crown did not dispute Mr. Jennings’ expertise. I found him qualified to testify on the issue of collision reconstruction.

96In essence, Mr. Jennings testified that had the Ford been accelerating at full capacity it would have been going faster than the Toyota because its engine had greater capacity. Mr. Jennings based his analysis on the information provided to him by defence counsel which was that engine in the Ford was 2.0 litre turbocharged four-cylinder engine and that the engine in the Toyota was a 1.8 litre four-cylinder engine. Mr. Jennings opined that because the Ford had a more powerful engine and was behind the Toyota when the collision took place, the driver of the Ford, Mr. Singh, was not accelerating at maximum capacity. In his report, Mr. Jennings concluded as follows: “it is evident by the above noted comparisons, the 2014 Ford Fusion could have accelerated much faster than the 2010 Toyota Corolla, thereby pulling away from the Toyota by significant margin, whether accelerating from a stopped position or from a rolling start.

97Mr. Jennings also critiqued certain aspects of DC Savkovic’s report, opining that the report lacked analyses on relevant matters such as “gap acceptance” and collision avoidance.

98On cross examination, Mr. Jennings conceded that the information about the Ford and Toyota was provided to him by defence counsel. He obtained further specifications for the particular vehicles from Consumer Reports and did not conduct any inspection of the vehicles. He conceded that the Consumer Reports information such as horsepower pertained to those vehicles when they were new. Mr. Jennings conceded that modifications or damage to the vehicles could affect the power of the engine, weight and aerodynamic qualities. While he had limited information about the Toyota from the TPS Collision Report, he did not have any information about the Ford, because it was not involved in the collision.

99In addition, all of Mr. Jennings’ calculations were based on the vehicle at 100 percent throttle. Mr. Jennings conceded that without knowing the degree of throttle, he would not be able to conclude how fast a vehicle would accelerate to a certain speed or the distance it would take for the car to get to a certain speed.

100Mr. Jennings’ evidence does not raise any credibility concerns. However, as further explained in these reasons, his evidence is of limited assistance to the issues to be determined.

Nishan Arampu

101The defence called Mr. Arampu as a witness. Mr. Arampu testified that in December 2021, he was an employee at the Pizza Nova call centre and had been working there for approximately six years. On December 17, 2021, he worked the 5:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. shift. He testified that he interacted briefly with Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum that evening. Mr. Arampu testified that Mr. Abdulqayoum offered him a ride home. At the time, Mr. Arampu lived near Markham Road and Ellesmere Avenue.

102On cross-examination, Mr. Arampu testified that Mr. Abdulqayoum had driven home approximately 10-15 times.

103Mr. Arampu testified that he left work at midnight and went to the parking lot with a friend, Kabir. He saw Mr. Abdulqayoum in his vehicle, and saw Mr. Singh drive across the parking lot, closer to Mr. Abdulqayoum’s vehicle. He then saw Mr. Singh’s car leave the parking lot. Mr. Arampu testified that he got into Mr. Abdulqayoum’s vehicle and they left about one minute later.

104On cross-examination, Mr. Arampu was asked about his testimony at the preliminary inquiry that he saw Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Singh talk to each other “for a minute or something”. He admitted that he saw them communicating with each other from their respective vehicles in the parking lot before leaving. He did not hear what they were talking about.

105On cross-examination, Mr. Arampu was shown the video recording of the intersection at Lawrence and Curlew, where Mr. Singh approaches the intersection and Mr. Abdulqayoum drives to the intersection approximately nine seconds later. Mr. Arampu then agreed that the time between their departures was closer to nine seconds than the minute that he had testified to earlier.

106Mr. Arampu described Mr. Abdulqayoum as a co-worker and friend and described Mr. Singh as a co-worker with whom he was friendly. He did not know of any relationship between Mr. Abdulqayoum and Mr. Singh, other than as co-workers. He had seen them talking at work about “girls and stuff”.

107Mr. Arampu testified that as Mr. Abdulqayoum drove out of the parking lot and eastbound on Lawrence, they talked about school, because he had just finished his term at Durham College. Mr. Arampu testified that he had no concerns about Mr. Abdulqayoum’s driving and that he was not aware of where Mr. Singh was. He did not recall discussing Mr. Singh with Mr. Abdulqayoum as they were driving.

108Mr. Arampu testified that approximately four to five minutes after they left the parking lot, he heard a loud boom and that after that, they hit a car. After hitting that car, they hit another car parked in a lot at a car dealership. Mr. Arampu testified that he recalled Mr. Singh come running to the vehicle and asking if they were OK. Mr. Singh then told them that he would call 911.

109Mr. Arampu testified that after the collision, he was in and out of consciousness. He recalled that the jaws of life were used to take him out of the vehicle and that he was in a lot of pain. He also recalled receiving blood in the ambulance. He testified that he did not give a statement to the police because he was in an induced coma for one month after the collision. The first time Mr. Arampu was formally questioned about the collision was at the preliminary inquiry in September 2023, which was almost two years after the incident. On cross-examination, Mr. Arampu admitted that his memory has suffered as a result of the collision because he also had a brain injury. He testified that his memory of the collision is vague. He did not recall how fast Mr. Abdulqayoum was driving immediately before the collision. He agreed that he does not recall how Mr. Abdulqayoum was driving and that his memory is too vague to recall what caused the collision. Mr. Arampu does not have a memory of what Mr. Abdulqayoum or Mr. Singh was doing just before the collision.

110Mr. Arampu testified that as a result of the collision, his ribs were fractured and he lost his left kidney, as well as parts of his small and large intestine.

111Mr. Arampu testified that he has brought civil proceedings against Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum. While his testimony raises no concerns about his credibility, given Mr. Arampu’s his admission that his memory has been affected by the injuries he suffered, I have concerns about the reliability of his recollection. Ultimately, Mr. Arampu’s evidence does not shed a lot of light on the collision or the events leading up to it.

Analysis

The Applicable Principles

General

112Before assessing the evidence, it is helpful to set out the applicable legal principles. First, Mr. Singh is presumed innocent. Second, the Crown bears the burden of proving the elements of the offences charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not sufficient to prove that the defendant is probably guilty. However, the Crown is not required to prove its case to the point of absolute certainty, which would be impossibly high.

113In assessing the evidence, the court must follow the approach set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.(D.), 1991 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 at p. 758. The following analysis applies:

(a) If the court believes the defendant’s evidence, he must be found not guilty;

(b) If the court does not believe the defendant’s evidence, but it leaves the court with a reasonable doubt, he must be found not guilty; and

(c) Even if the defendant’s evidence does not leave the court with a reasonable doubt, the court may only find the defendant guilty if the court is persuaded that the Crown proves the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

114At the first step of the W.(D.) analysis, a defendant’s evidence should not be considered in isolation but in the context of all the evidence: R. v. Hoohing, 2007 ONCA 577, 74 W.C.B. (2d) 676, at para. 15. Thus, if the defendant’s account is believed or leaves the court with a reasonable doubt about what happened, within the context of the totality of the evidence, he must be found not guilty.

115In considering Mr. Singh’s testimony, I am mindful that a trial judge should avoid assuming that an accused would lie to secure an acquittal, which would be contrary to the presumption of innocence: R. v. Laboucan, 2010 SCC 12, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 397, at para. 14.

116In weighing the evidence, I must assess the credibility and reliability of each witness’s testimony. This involves a consideration of the internal consistency of each witness’s testimony and its consistency in the context of the evidence as a whole. I am mindful that in assessing credibility and reliability, I must be careful not to place too much emphasis on the demeanour of any particular witness in court.

Dangerous Driving

117The parties agree on the applicable legal principles.

118The essential elements of the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 320.13(3) of the Code are that: (i) Mr. Singh operated a motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public; and (ii) Mr. Singh’s operation of the motor vehicle caused Ms. MacIver’s death.

119Similarly, for the offence of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Singh operated a motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public and that his operation of the motor vehicle caused bodily harm to Mr. Arampu.

120In respect of the actus reus of the offence of dangerous driving, the trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, viewed objectively, the accused was, in the words of the section, driving in a manner that was “dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place”: R. v. Beatty, 2008 SCC 5, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 49, at para. 41; R. v. Roy, 2012 SCC 26, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 60, at para. 28.

121In Beatty, at para. 46, Charron J. held that the court must conduct a meaningful inquiry into the manner of the driving because it is the manner of the driving, and not the consequences, which is at issue. She went on, in the same paragraph, to caution that “[t]he court must not leap to its conclusion about the manner of driving based on the consequence.”

122The trier of fact must also be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s objectively dangerous conduct was accompanied by the required mens rea. In making the objective assessment, the trier of fact should be satisfied on the basis of all the evidence, including evidence about the accused’s actual state of mind, if any, that the conduct amounted to a marked departure from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the accused’s circumstances.

123In Roy, at para. 36, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that in respect of the mens rea for the offence of dangerous driving, the questions to be answered are as follows:

(a) whether a reasonable person, in light of the circumstances, would have foreseen the risk and taken steps to avoid it if possible; and

(b) whether the accused person’s failure to do so is a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

124The presence of objective mens rea is determined by assessing the dangerous conduct as against the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver. If the dangerous conduct constitutes a “marked departure” from that norm, the offence will be made out. What constitutes a “marked departure” from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver is a matter of degree. A mere departure or carelessness is not sufficient. The lack of care must be serious enough to merit punishment.

125If the trier of fact is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the objectively dangerous conduct constitutes a marked departure from the norm, the trier of fact must consider evidence about the actual state of mind of the accused, if any, to determine whether it raises a reasonable doubt about whether a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have been aware of the risk created by this conduct. If there is no such evidence, the court may convict the accused.

126In respect of causation, the defendant’s driving must be a significant contributing cause of the death or bodily harm. Where a court concludes that two motorists mutually race each other, both drivers can be recognized in law to have caused the death or injury of an innocent third party harmed by a collision in which only one of two vehicles is involved: R. v. Rotundo (1993), 20 W.C.B. (2d) 409, 47 M.V.R. (2d) 90 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Menezes (2002), 2002 49654 (ON SC), 53 W.C.B. (2d) 49, 23 M.V.R. (4th) 185 (Ont. S.C.) at paras. 102-103. In Rotundo, at para. 2, the defendant’s participation in the race was found to have created a grave risk of death or injury to other users of the highway and therefore a contributing cause of the collision, even though his vehicle did not come into contact with the victim’s car. Similarly, in R. v. Williams, 2020 ONCA 30, 161 W.C.B. (2d) 54, at para. 15, the Court of Appeal stated that “the law is clear that, absent an intervening event, when two motorists engage in street racing, both are considered in law to have caused injury to an innocent third party who is harmed because of their racing.”

Findings

Credibility

127There were many aspects of Mr. Singh’s testimony that were not credible. First, regarding his speed, I do not accept Mr. Singh’s explanation that he did not know how fast he was going because he was simply keeping pace with traffic. When challenged with the video compilation, Mr. Singh admitted that the only traffic in front of him was Mr. Abdulqayoum’s Toyota. In other words, Mr. Singh was keeping up with Mr. Abdulqayoum, and not with traffic. When the video showed the Ford and the Toyota beside each other and no one in front of him, Mr. Singh testified that he was keeping pace with himself. This use of “keeping pace” does not make sense and is not a reasonable explanation of Mr. Singh’s speed.

128Mr. Singh testified that it was only when the car in front of Ms. MacIver’s Nissan turned left that he realized he was going too fast. I do not find it credible that Mr. Singh simply accelerated to a speed of 109 kilometres per hour in a zone where the speed limit was 50 kilometres per hour without noticing his speed or without ever looking at his speedometer. He ought to have realized at some point before he saw the car making the left turn that he was driving far in excess of the speed limit.

129In addition, Mr. Singh gave inconsistent testimony about when he first noticed the Toyota. In examination in chief, he testified that he first noticed the white car when it passed him after the intersection of Lawrence and Victoria Park. When challenged on cross-examination, however, he said that he noticed the headlights of the white car near the bridge west of Victoria Park. However, when asked whether he noticed the white car stopped in the lane next to him at the red light at the intersection of Victoria Park and Lawrence, Mr. Singh testified that he did not recall the white car beside him because he was busy talking to his mother on the phone.

130Mr. Singh also gave inconsistent testimony about his knowledge of the type of engine in his Ford. In chief, he testified that he understood that the engine in the Ford was a 2.0 litre, four-cylinder, turbo-charged engine because that is what he was told by the person from whom he purchased the vehicle, Mr. Grewal. On cross-examination, the Crown put to Mr. Singh that the engine was in fact a 2.5 litre, inline four-cylinder engine. Mr. Singh responded that he never looked at the engine and that this was never mentioned to him, including when he brought the Ford in for service. It was only on re-examination that Mr. Singh testified that he opened the hood of the Ford and saw the numbers “2.0” on the engine. I do not believe this evidence because it directly contradicts his earlier testimony on cross-examination that he never looked at the engine. Moreover, had Mr. Singh observed “2.0” on the engine as he claimed on re-examination, this would have been the most direct evidence of the type of engine in the Ford. He did not have had to testify about what Mr. Grewal had told him when he purchased the Ford or that he was never told that the engine was not a 2.0 litre turbocharged engine when he had it serviced.

131Ultimately, based on the Crown’s admission that all versions of the Ford engine were more powerful than the engine in Mr. Abdulqayoum’s Toyota, very little turned on the issue of the type of engine in the Ford. Mr. Singh’s contradiction on a relatively insignificant piece of evidence, however, causes me to question his credibility as a whole.

132There are other aspects of Mr. Singh’s evidence that are not credible. I do not accept his testimony that he did not know who the occupants of the Toyota were until after the collision. Mr. Singh explained that he parked his car and went to check on the occupants of the Toyota, not because he knew they were his co-workers, but because something terrible had just happened and he felt he had a duty to assist. Mr. Singh testified that he went to the Toyota, as opposed to the Nissan, because it was on his path from his own vehicle.

133I do not find this explanation to be convincing. On his own evidence and based on the video compilation, Mr. Singh parked his car and ran to the Toyota. On the video compilation, he tries to open the door of the Toyota but is unsuccessful. He is then seen on his cell phone and remains near the Toyota until the video compilation ends. In my view, he ran to check on the occupants of the Toyota because he knew who they were, and not simply because the Toyota was on his path. Based on where Mr. Singh parked his car, the Toyota was not any closer to Mr. Singh than the Nissan. Moreover, the video compilation does not show Mr. Singh checking on the occupant of the Nissan, who had suffered a similarly horrific collision.

134Mr. Singh’s testimony at trial was also inconsistent with his statements to PC Kellar at the scene of the collision. At trial, Mr. Singh testified that he did not leave work with Mr. Abdulqayoum or Mr. Arampu, that they did not leave the parking lot at the same time and that he did not even know that Mr. Abdulqayoum was in the vehicle behind him as he waited at the red light to turn onto Lawrence.

135The statements that Mr. Singh made to PC Kellar after the collision belie Mr. Singh’s testimony that he was not aware that Mr. Abdulqayoum was driving next to him. Mr. Singh repeatedly used the word “we” when describing what happened. Mr. Singh told PC Kellar that “we just ended a shift, we were working together. So we were coming down…[.]” When PC Kellar asked who he was referring to, Mr. Singh indicated he was referring to the two men in the Toyota. He further stated, “we were walking [sic] down” and “we both had a green light.” When PC Kellar asked which direction Mr. Singh was travelling, he answered “like we had to go Brimley.” At a further point, PC Kellar asks Mr. Singh, “So you guys left together?” To which Mr. Singh answered, “Yeah.” At trial, Mr. Singh explained that when he said “we” left work, he meant that he saw Mr. Abdulqayoum leave work, not that they left at the same time. Given Mr. Singh’s statements to PC Kellar, this explanation is not credible.

136Moreover, when Mr. Singh spoke to PC Kellar immediately after the collision, he volunteered information that portrayed a certain version of the collision. For example, Mr. Singh told PC Kellar that, “even I had to brake an emergency brake because we were like, coming down, right?” which implied that he had to apply the emergency brake to avoid colliding with the Nissan. At trial, Mr. Singh testified that he did not apply the emergency brake but that what he meant when he spoke to PC Kellar was that he braked “in an emergency” manner. Yet when it was suggested to Mr. Singh on cross-examination that he would not have had to press the brakes so hard, as he told PC Kellar, if he had not been driving 109 kilometres per hour, Mr. Singh responded that he did not in fact have to brake that hard and that he was able to drive through the intersection.

137Mr. Singh admitted that he knew the difference between the emergency brake and the brake. He explained that his English proficiency is not one hundred percent and estimated his English proficiency at 80 to 90 percent. Mr. Singh explained that sometimes words come out of his mouth that are different from what he means. I understand that there was somewhat of a language barrier, for example, when Mr. Singh told PC Kellar that he and his co-workers were “walking” down when they were clearly driving. However, Mr. Singh assessed his English language proficiency at a relatively high level. While his reference to using the emergency brake could have been a mistake, it is also consistent with the version of the collision that he was trying to convey, which was that Ms. MacIver turned left abruptly and was at fault.

138When PC Kellar asked how fast he was going, Mr. Singh estimated his speed at 40-45 kilometres per hour, which was a vast under-estimation of his speed. It was, however under the speed limit. At trial, Mr. Singh admitted that he “lied” to PC Kellar about his speed. He explained that he lied because he was in a state of shock from the collision and was scared because he had never interacted with the police. He further explained that police in India are corrupt and can put a person in danger without any reason, so he was afraid to admit something that he “should not have done”. When asked what he should have admitted, Mr. Singh stated that he should have told PC Kellar that he did not know how fast he was going but that he was speeding.

139I accept that Mr. Singh was likely unsettled by the collision he had just witnessed and that he was nervous about speaking to a police officer, based on his perception of police in India. This could explain some discrepancies in his account. However, at various points in their interaction, Mr. Singh was keen to volunteer information to PC Kellar, to the point that PC Kellar had to interrupt him to give him rights to counsel. Mr. Singh was not simply avoiding saying anything that could get him in trouble but was actively attempting to communicate his version of the collision. He repeatedly told PC Kellar that when Ms. MacIver turned left, she was following someone and suggested that she did not see the Toyota or Ford. In fact, there was a gap of four seconds between the first car that turned left and the Nissan.

140In summary, despite Mr. Singh’s explanation, his admission that he lied to PC Kellar, in circumstances where it was clear to him that the officer was trying to obtain accurate information about the collision, gives rise to concerns about his credibility. The inconsistencies in his statements to PC Kellar and his testimony at trial also give rise to a concern that Mr. Singh has a tendency to say what he thinks will serve his purpose in the moment. I did not find him to be a credible witness.

141In the circumstances, given my findings regarding Mr. Singh’s credibility, I need not make a finding on the Crown’s argument that Mr. Singh’s untruthful statement to PC Kellar regarding his speed is evidence of consciousness of guilt. See: R. v. Coutts (1998), 1998 4212 (ON CA), 40 O.R. (3d) 198, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 545 (C.A.).

142Based on my concerns about the credibility of Mr. Singh’s testimony, I do not rely on his evidence unless it is otherwise corroborated by other evidence.

Did Mr. Singh operate his motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances?

143In Menezes, at para. 83, Hill J. identified the hazards entailed by racing. He identified that racing on a roadway involves a “competitive movement of speed, a concerted effort to maintain a moving situation with an aspect of rivalry”. At the same time, Hill J. cautioned that:

It is important not to be hyperfocused on whether the drivers’ conduct actually amounted to a race within the exact definitional contemplation of a dictionary or the provincial highway traffic legislation. Frequently, there is no racetrack, no agreed-upon finish line, and certainly no regard for the hazards created. We have come to accept, as a matter of common sense, that the synchronized or in-tandem movements of two motor vehicles marked by high speed and close proximity over a material distance, often accompanied by abrupt lane changes, blocking, or bold maneuvers in and out of traffic, amounts to racing behaviour even though all the trappings of a drag race may not be present. Whether by express arrangement or tacit agreement, the joint venture involves mutual incitement and encouragement toward a rivalry or demonstration of motor speed.

144In addition, it is not necessary to find an agreement to race made in advance. An agreement to race can be “tacit” or inferred from the conduct of the drivers: R. v. Paul, 11 W.C.B. (2d) 178 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at paras. 13, 15-17.

145In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum agreed in advance to race. While Mr. Arampu observed them speaking from their respective vehicles before they left the parking lot, he did not hear what was said. While there was no evidence to support that they agreed in advance, Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum’s conduct supports a finding that they were racing. The video footage shows the Toyota and the Ford driving in tandem, side by side in neighbouring lanes along Lawrence after they make the turn from Curlew, accelerating at speeds that mirrored each other over a distance of approximately 450 metres. For the most part, the two cars are practically neck-in-neck and are travelling in excess of the speed limit. While the Ford is in the lead at first, after stopping at the red light at Victoria Park, the Toyota passes the Ford. Until just before the intersection at Pharmacy, the Ford is less than one car length from the Toyota.

146Moreover, Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were co-workers around the same age and had just finished working the same shift at the call centre, where they just had a holiday meal. Mr. Arampu recalled that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum spoke about matters other than work.

147It is also noteworthy that based on the Toyota ACM data, Mr. Abdulqayoum did not at any point apply the brakes. Had he seen Ms. MacIver’s vehicle or the vehicle in front of her making a left turn onto Pharmacy, he would have attempted to brake to avoid colliding with her, as Mr. Singh did. However, the fact that no attempt was made to brake suggests that Mr. Abdulqayoum was not looking forward toward the intersection he was approaching. There is a reasonable available inference that he was looking at Mr. Singh’s vehicle, either through the rearview mirror or over his shoulder.

148Mr. Singh was operating his vehicle far in excess of the posted speed limit. At its highest average speed, the Ford was driving at 109 kilometres per hour in a zone where the posted speed limit was 50 kilometres per hour. Speeds around or less than two times the speed limit have been found to support an inference of racing: Menezes, at paras. 39, 41, 114; R. v. Elphick (1995), 14 M.V.R. (3d) 61, 28 W.C.B. (2d) 34 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 2-3.

149The defence’s expert evidence does not undermine my finding that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were racing. Mr. Jennings’ conclusion that had the Ford been driving at its full capabilities, it would have been ahead of the Toyota at all times does not preclude a finding of racing. A race does not mean that both drivers will at all times be driving at full throttle. The extent to which they exert the engines of their vehicles will depend on a variety of factors, including the type of roadway, visibility, whether there are stop lights and potential hazards. The Toyota ACM shows that it was not driving at full throttle. It would therefore be consistent that the Ford was not driving at full throttle. The video compilation and DC Savkovic’s evidence show that the two cars were driving at similar speeds and accelerating at a similar rate. Until the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy, they were driving at speeds within one to three kilometres per hour of each other.

150Mr. Jennings’ analysis was also based on the Ford and Toyota’s respective capabilities when they were new. Factors such as the vehicle maintenance, among others, would affect their performance. Moreover, there is an absence of evidence to be able to determine that the Ford was equipped with a 2.0 litre, turbocharged engine. Mr. Jennings did not conduct the analysis for the 2.5 litre, inline four-cylinder engine that the Ford was initially equipped with. As a result, even if the Ford had greater capabilities than the Toyota, it is not possible to conclude that the Ford would have accelerated significantly faster than the Toyota.

151The defence attempts to draw a distinction between moderate speeding and excessive speeding to argue that Mr. Singh was speeding excessively for a maximum of 55 metres, which was a momentary lapse. I reject this distinction. The circumstances must be examined as a whole. To accept the defence’s would be to parse Mr. Singh’s conduct in an unreasonable manner. In R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 17-19, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge erred in law in finding that the defendant’s dangerous conduct was limited to a one block span where he accelerated to three times the speed limit and then collided with the victim’s vehicle. It was an error of law to fixate on the momentariness of the speeding and to fail to compare the defendant’s actions to what a reasonable person would have foreseen and done in the circumstances.

152In this case, to focus on the final 55 metres would be to disregard Mr. Singh’s acceleration along Lawrence, beside Mr. Abdulqayoum’s vehicle and mirroring his speed, for a distance of 400 metres. In any event, this argument disregards Mr. Singh’s admission on cross-examination that his speed was dangerous.

153Even if I accepted the defence’s distinction, dangerous driving can be based on driving limited to a period of seconds. In R. v. Willock (2006), 2006 20679 (ON CA), 212 O.A.C. 82, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 60 (C.A.), at para. 31, Doherty J.A. found that conduct occurring in a two to three second interval can amount to a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable person and demonstrate a wanton or reckless disregard for the life or safety of others.”

154I also reject the defence’s argument that because Mr. Singh was able to brake and avoid colliding with the Nissan, he was not driving dangerously. Avoiding a collision does not mean that a person was driving safely. Not only did Mr. Singh have to brake abruptly and strongly because of his speed, he had to change lanes to ensure he would not hit Ms. MacIver’s Nissan. Because he was driving in the middle lane, he had greater flexibility than Mr. Abdulqayoum, who was driving in the curb lane. However, Mr. Singh could not have predicted which way the Nissan would go once struck and his options were also limited.

155In a criminal negligence case, R. v. Durani, 2022 ONCA 17, 2022 ONCA 17, 85 M.V.R. (7th) 1, at para. 11, the Court of Appeal stated as follows:

The appellant’s submission that he slowed down and was in control of his car is an attempt to draw a fine distinction between his own driving and Mr. Lewis’ in the split-second before the fatal accident. This is an attempt to artificially parse out the appellant’s actions at one moment during the race. In our view, the trial judge found that the appellant’s overall driving reflected both a wanton and reckless disregard for the safety of others and a marked and substantial departure from the norm. The race started well before the collision and the portion captured by the surveillance video. The crash was a direct result of both men deciding to race each other at speeds of up to 125 km to 130 km per hour in a 50 km zone, at times driving in tandem, other times trying to overtake each other in close pursuit, cutting off motorists and veering in and out of lanes.

156Similarly, I do not accept the defence’s argument that because DC Savkovic calculated that the Ford could come to a complete stop in 60.7 metres, Mr. Singh would have been able to brake in sufficient time to avoid a collision. The fact that Mr. Singh could have braked does not lead to the conclusion that he was not driving dangerously. The hazards were created by virtue of the racing and excessive speeds at which both he and Mr. Abdulqayoum were travelling.

157Moreover, I do not accept Mr. Singh’s evidence that he changed lanes not because he would not otherwise have been able to avoid the Nissan, but to be “extra cautious.” Based on the spinning of the Nissan after it was struck by the Toyota, Mr. Singh could not be assured that he could remain in the same lane and avoid being caught in its path.

158The defence relies on R. v. Romano, 2021 ONCA 211, 2021 ONCA 211, 403 C.C.C. (3d) 381 to argue that DC Savkovic ought to have but failed to conduct certain analyses about what each party perceived as the risks. In Romano, at para. 46, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the law permits consideration of the consequences to assist in assessing or to “verify” the risk involved. I do not interpret Romano as importing into the analysis the necessity for each party to adduce evidence of the perceived risks and an assessment of those specific risks. The question is whether the consequence that occurred was a foreseeable one.

159Turning to the circumstances, the stretch of Lawrence along which Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were driving consisted of three lanes in each direction and left-turn lanes at the intersections. The area included residential and commercial buildings. There were pedestrian crossings at every intersection. There is a crest at Townley, which reduces the visibility of oncoming traffic to a vehicle attempting to make a left turn at the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy. The collision took place shortly after midnight. The road was lit by streetlights and lighting from the businesses along Lawrence. On the video compilation, there were other vehicles on the road travelling in both directions and approximately five vehicles at the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy. There were also a few pedestrians, including at the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy and a pedestrian who jay-walked across Lawrence Avenue near the Precious Blood Church, just before the Toyota and Ford drive by.

160Mr. Singh’s conduct endangered and created a risk of serious injury or death to the drivers and pedestrians present in the area that night.

161Another relevant circumstance is that Mr. Singh did not have a “G” driver’s licence, but only a “G2” licence, which he obtained less than six months before the collision. He was only permitted to drive after midnight or on the highway since he obtained his “G2” licence.

162Based on my finding that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were racing, in a well-travelled stretch of Lawrence where other vehicles and pedestrians were present and where it was foreseeable that oncoming vehicles could turn left at the intersection, Mr. Singh operated his vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public.

Did Mr. Singh’s conduct constitute a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver?

163In my view, a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the risk of a collision from driving over twice the speed limit while heading toward an intersection where the view from the oncoming traffic was limited because of a crest in the hill. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the risk of not being visible to a left-turning vehicle and taken steps to avoid it, including driving at or near the speed limit. Mr. Singh’s conduct was a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver. A reasonably prudent driver would not be racing, would not be driving at such high speeds through an area where other vehicles and pedestrians are present, particularly along the portion of Lawrence where there was a crest.

164The relevant circumstances included that it was nighttime, that Mr. Singh did not have a G licence but only a G2 licence, which he had for only six months. Moreover, Mr. Singh was so engrossed in a telephone conversation with his mother about his father’s illness that he failed to notice his speed and his surroundings. In the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would not be driving at 109 kilometres per hour a short distance from the intersection. While the defence argues that Mr. Singh was only briefly driving at excessive speeds, conduct that occurs over a brief period of time that creates foreseeable and immediate risks of serious consequences can still be a marked departure from the norm: R. v. Chung, 2020 SCC 8, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 405, at para. 22. Unlike Beatty and Roy, this was not a momentary lapse, rather, this was a continuation of the acceleration that began 400 metres earlier.

165The defence also relies on Menezes to argue that like the defendant in that case, Mr. Singh slowed down before reaching the intersection of Lawrence and Pharmacy and therefore, even if he had been racing before that point, withdrew from the race. Being slightly behind does not constitute withdrawing from a race: Williams, at paras. 17-18. Nor does applying the brakes or easing off the gas at the last minute: Menezes, at paras. 94-95, 123-25. In my view, Mr. Singh did not disengage from the race. He took his foot of the gas pedal and braked because he had to in order to reduce the risk of colliding with the left-turning vehicles. Moreover, in Menezes, the defendant was acquitted of the charge of criminal negligence causing death but was found guilty of dangerous driving even though Hill J. found that he had withdrawn from the race.

166My finding that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were racing is not undermined by Mr. Arampu’s testimony that he had no concerns about Mr. Abdulqayoum’s driving and that they did not discuss Mr. Singh. Given that Mr. Abdulqayoum was driving 124 kilometres per hour in a zone where the speed limit was 50 kilometres per hour, it is odd that Mr. Arampu did not have any concerns. Moreover, Mr. Arampu admitted that because of a brain injury, his memory of the incident was vague.

167The defence argues that there are reasonable inferences other than that Mr. Singh and Mr. Abdulqayoum were racing that night. See: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 55. I note that the Crown does not have to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that they were racing. I have rejected Mr. Singh’s testimony that he was keeping up with traffic. I see no other reasonable inference than that Mr. Singh was driving at such excessive speeds because he was racing Mr. Abdulqayoum.

168On the W.D. analysis, given my concerns with Mr. Singh’s credibility, I do not believe the defendant’s evidence and it does not leave me with a reasonable doubt. I am satisfied that based on the totality of the evidence, including the defendant’s testimony, the Crown had proven the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

Causation

169As noted earlier, where two motorists mutually race each other, both drivers can be recognized in law to have caused the death or injury of an innocent third party harmed by a collision in which only one of the two vehicles is involved. At the same time, it is not necessary to find that Mr. Singh was in fact racing to find that he was driving dangerously. While racing supports causation, it is not a precondition to causation: Williams, at paras. 19-20.

170In the circumstances, Mr. Singh’s participation in the race with Mr. Abdulqayoum created a grave risk of death or injury to other users of the road because of the high speed at which they were driving. A reasonable person in Mr. Singh’s position would recognize the foreseeable risk of immediate and substantial harm that driving in the manner that he did posed to not only himself, but to other drivers and to innocent third parties. Mr. Singh’s driving was therefore a significant contributing cause of Ms. MacIver’s death and the serious bodily harm suffered by Mr. Arampu.

Conclusion

171Based on the foregoing analysis and having considered the totality of the evidence and circumstances, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Singh drove in a manner that was dangerous, thereby causing the death of Ms. MacIver and bodily harm to Mr. Arampu. Mr. Singh is therefore found guilty of Count 1, dangerous driving causing death and Count 2, dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

“Nishikawa J.”

Released: April 30, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 2118

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23- 30000661

DATE: 20260430

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King

– and –

Japkirat Singh

Defendant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Nishikawa J.

Released: April 30, 2026

Footnotes

The CarFax Report itself was not admitted into evidence. The parties agreed only to certain information contained in the CarFax Report.

His Majesty the King v. Japkirat Singh, 2026 ONSC 2118

Case Summary

Agreed Facts

The Motor Vehicle Collision

Linda MacIver

Nishan Arampu

The Toyota Corolla

The Ford Fusion

Preliminary Matter: Admissibility of Mr. Singh’s Statements

The Applicable Principles

Application to the Facts

The Crown’s Evidence

DC Milos Savkovic

Stephanie Skrypnyk

The Defence Evidence

Japkirat Singh

William Jennings

Nishan Arampu

Analysis

The Applicable Principles

General

Dangerous Driving

Findings

Credibility

Did Mr. Singh operate his motor vehicle in a manner that was dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances?

Did Mr. Singh’s conduct constitute a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver?

Causation

Conclusion

Footnotes