Marianne Salih

The Crown applied to designate the offender as a dangerous offender following convictions for human trafficking, sexual assault with a weapon, and related offences against an intimate partner.

The court reviewed the offender's criminal history, institutional misconducts, and psychiatric assessments.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite pattern of repetitive or persistent aggressive behaviour, noting the offender's cognitive vulnerabilities, treatable substance use disorder, and strong community support.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, designated the offender a long-term offender, and imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment minus pre-sentence credit, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking and related offences, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

At trial, the complainant recanted her allegations, but the trial judge admitted her prior videotaped statements to police for their truth and relied on them to convict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no circular reasoning, no improper reliance on demeanour evidence, and no error in the application of the W.(D.) framework to the rejected exculpatory testimony.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's violent conduct was intractable despite psychiatric evidence suggesting his risk could potentially be managed in the community under strict contingencies.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.5 metric tonnes of cocaine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking, receiving a 16.5-year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by anchoring his sentence to the 19-year sentence imposed on the scheme's organizer pursuant to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the co-accused's sentence as a starting point and failing to adequately account for the appellant's subordinate role, lack of prior record, and cognitive limitations.

The sentence was reduced to 12 years' imprisonment.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that ss. 119(1)(c) and 120(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act violate ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that because pre-sentence custody is not recognized in calculating parole eligibility, offenders denied bail are arbitrarily delayed in their day parole compared to those released on bail.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the right to apply for parole engages a liberty interest, the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad given the distinct purposes of pre-trial custody and the conditional release regime.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related offences for firing shots at a female acquaintance, striking her twice.

The sole issues at trial were the identity of the shooter and intent to kill.

The trial judge rejected direct identification evidence and limited-weight photo identification evidence, instead relying almost entirely on circumstantial evidence including GPS data from the suspect vehicle, security camera footage with timestamps, and DNA evidence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in accepting the accuracy of security camera timestamps without proper authentication and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no legal error in the trial judge's application of the law regarding measurement devices in common usage and concluding that the verdict was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, discharging a firearm with intent to prevent arrest, reckless discharge of a firearm, killing a service animal, and possession of a loaded firearm.

The offences occurred over approximately 24 hours: the accused shot and killed the victim in his daughter's apartment after a physical altercation; the following day, he fired at a police officer attempting to arrest him; and subsequently shot and killed a police service dog during his apprehension.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for a 14-year global sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission while providing detailed sentencing analysis for each offence, explaining how the principle of totality reduced what would otherwise have been a 23-year sentence.

The appellant, Preston Woods, appealed his 7-year sentence for drug offences on the basis that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to adjourn the sentencing hearing to allow him to obtain records of time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not allowing the adjournment, which prevented consideration of a possible sentence reduction (Duncan credit) for harsh pre-sentence conditions.

The Court allowed the appeal, admitted the lockdown records as fresh evidence, and substituted a sentence of 6 years and 9 months.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered the appeals of Rushawn Anderson and Nicholas Rhoden from convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements, in his rulings on Charter violations, in instructing the jury on fabrication, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The majority dismissed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction sufficient and the verdicts reasonable.

In dissent, Gomery J.A. would have allowed the appeals, finding the fabrication instruction flawed and the verdicts unreasonable, and would have substituted acquittals.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal in part, setting aside his designation as a dangerous offender and substituting a designation as a long-term offender, while upholding the determinate sentence and 10-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The court found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider intractability at the designation stage, as required by R. v. Boutilier, but found no reviewable error in the trial judge’s findings regarding the patterns of behaviour or assessment of the criminal record.

The court considered whether A.O.'s post-arrest statement to police was voluntary, given his mental health history and evidence of psychosis.

After reviewing the circumstances of the arrest, A.O.'s mental state, and the content of the police interview, the court found that A.O. had the capacity to understand what he was saying and that his statement could be used against him.

The application to admit the statement was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Malcolm Copeland’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

The appeal centered on whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.

The court held that there was no air of reality to the defence of provocation, as the evidence did not support that Copeland lost self-control and acted on the sudden before his passion could cool.

The court found that the evidence was consistent with self-defence, not provocation, and that the trial judge properly applied the law.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals of Corey and Curtis Murray, who were convicted of second degree murder in the death of Trevor Seraphine.

The main issues on appeal concerned the police failure to preserve certain surveillance video evidence and the Crown’s late disclosure of the loss of this evidence.

The court found that while the loss of evidence breached the appellants’ Charter rights, the trial judge’s remedial jury instructions were adequate and a stay of proceedings was not warranted.

The court also upheld the 20-year parole ineligibility periods, finding them fit in the circumstances.

The appellant, Isaiah Todd, appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge’s finding that the confidential informant’s information was compelling and corroborated, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the Crown’s application for the complainant to testify via CCTV in a sexual assault and assault by choking prosecution.

The court grants the application, finding that the complainant’s concerns about testifying in the presence of the accused and before a jury are reasonably held and that testifying via CCTV will facilitate a full and candid account of her evidence.

The decision reviews the legislative amendments to section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, clarifies that necessity is no longer the standard, and emphasizes the importance of balancing the interests of the complainant and the accused’s right to a fair trial.

The respondent, Mark Jeffrey Buckley, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered drugs in an apartment during a home takeover.

As a permanent resident of Canada originally from Jamaica, Buckley faced deportation as a collateral immigration consequence of his conviction.

The Crown sought a two-year prison sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence to preserve Buckley's immigration appeal rights and support his rehabilitation.

The court ultimately sentenced Buckley to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, finding that the threat of deportation and strict conditions would sufficiently deter him.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting firearm evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite s. 8 and s. 9 breaches.

Police stopped his vehicle for a Highway Traffic Act violation and arrested him based on an Alberta warrant, which was later found to be geographically restricted.

A firearm was discovered during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found the police conduct inadvertent and not in bad faith, and that the seriousness of the charges weighed in favour of inclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, deferring to her assessment of police conduct as being on the less serious end of the spectrum and emphasizing the seriousness of the firearm charges.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence of motive to fabricate and by engaging in improper propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons regarding motive to fabricate, deeming them adequate when read against the record.

The court also rejected the claim of improper propensity reasoning, clarifying that the trial judge used evidence of controlling behaviour as a contextual factor to assess competing narratives, not as proof of propensity to commit the assaults.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, setting aside a motion judge's order that had granted certiorari with mandamus in aid.

The motion judge had compelled a Justice of the Peace to complete a bail hearing that the Justice of the Peace had aborted due to a proposed surety's misconduct and subsequent false denial.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by granting prerogative relief in the absence of jurisdictional error, as the Justice of the Peace's decision to abort the hearing was a discretionary exercise based on an assessment of fairness, not a jurisdictional overreach.

The Crown brought an urgent application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to strike a bail hearing under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Justice of the Peace struck the hearing after the proposed surety made a profane remark and then lied about it, deeming it unfair to the accused.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace lacked jurisdiction to strike the proceeding, as the witness's conduct, while unexpected, did not impair the accused's right to a fair hearing or engage principles of fundamental justice.

The court emphasized that a bail hearing is not subject to a "do-over" simply because a release plan falters.

The application was granted, quashing the decision and ordering the bail hearing to be completed.