Only sufficiently familiar witnesses may give recognition evidence from video.
In a youth prosecution for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting at Dundas Square, the Crown brought a Leaney application seeking leave to adduce recognition evidence from several non-expert witnesses based on surveillance footage and images recovered from seized mobile phones.
The court applied the threshold admissibility principles governing recognition evidence, focusing on the witnesses' prior acquaintance and whether they were in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the persons depicted.
The court permitted recognition evidence from one investigating officer as to the accused and another individual, and from another officer as to a third individual, but excluded the proposed recognition evidence of three other witnesses for insufficient familiarity.
The ruling distinguished threshold admissibility from ultimate reliability, leaving reliability to the trier of fact.
Pre-trial evidentiary rulings admit deceased's antemortem statements and accused's drug dealing, but exclude accused's rap lyrics.
In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the Crown sought to admit several pieces of evidence.
The court admitted antemortem statements of the deceased and evidence that one of the accused was a marijuana dealer, finding the latter's probative value in establishing narrative and identity outweighed its prejudicial effect.
However, the court excluded rap lyrics found on the other accused's phone, ruling that their limited probative value as circumstantial evidence of participation was outweighed by significant moral and reasoning prejudice.
Charter challenge to search warrant dismissed; cell phone examination not bound by warrant entry window.
The young person, charged with second degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.
He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish he resided at the address, the warrant was overly broad, the search of seized cell phones occurred outside the warrant's time limit, and the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice.
The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient surveillance evidence linked the young person to the residence, the seizure of multiple phones was necessary, the forensic examination of the phones did not need to occur within the warrant's entry window, and there was no evidence of deliberate deception by police.
Charter motion to exclude mobile phone evidence dismissed due to lack of standing and valid warrant.
The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the search of a co-accused's mobile phone.
The applicant sought to exclude photographic and video evidence found on the device.
The court held that the applicant lacked standing, as there was no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in images taken by another person in a group setting.
Furthermore, the court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.
The application was dismissed.
Summary conviction appeal for sexual assault dismissed; trial judge's credibility findings and evidence scrutiny upheld.
The appellant, an unlicensed practitioner of Traditional Chinese Medicine, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a patient.
He argued the trial judge misapprehended text message evidence regarding the evolution of their relationship and applied uneven scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainant's.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were supported by the evidence, any misapprehension was not central to the conviction, and the scrutiny of the evidence was balanced and fair.
Summary conviction appeal dismissed; trial judge made no palpable and overriding error assessing child's evidence.
The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a seven-year-old complainant.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the offences occurred within the six-month limitation period, alleging a failure to resolve reliability concerns with the child's evidence.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis was sufficient and revealed no palpable and overriding error.
Appeals from convictions for importing cocaine dismissed; circumstantial evidence supported jury's finding of knowledge.
The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine hidden in food items.
On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the importation was complete before they handled the package, and that the circumstantial evidence did not prove they knew the package contained drugs.
They also argued the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the ultimate domestic recipient was the importer, the circumstantial evidence supported the jury's inference of knowledge, and the inherently suspicious circumstances justified the wilful blindness instruction.
The court granted the accused's bail review and ordered her release on strict house arrest.
The accused, Danna Millan, sought a bail review after being detained on tertiary grounds for serious charges including drug trafficking, firearms offences, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and extortion.
The application was based on a material change in circumstances, specifically the COVID-19 crisis and the addition of a third surety.
The court found that the proposed release plan, including three sureties and strict house arrest, sufficiently addressed the tertiary grounds, and granted release.
The court sentenced the offender to four years' imprisonment for sexual assault, balancing denunciation with pandemic-related collateral consequences.
The defendant was convicted of sexual assault and failure to comply with probation.
The Crown sought five years' imprisonment while the defence sought 18 months plus two years' probation.
The court imposed a sentence of four years for the sexual assault and four months concurrent for the breach of probation, resulting in an additional 879 days beyond presentence custody.
The court considered the defendant's prior sexual assault conviction, history of violence, failure to comply with court orders, and the serious impact on the victim.
The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a collateral consequence affecting the defendant's incarceration, but determined that public safety could not be sacrificed.
The Court of Appeal reduced a robbery sentence to account for uncredited pre-sentence custody.
The appellant, Zi-Yue Huang, appealed a 12-month sentence for three counts of robbery, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting pre-sentence custody and by treating his mental health as an aggravating factor.
The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in failing to credit pre-sentence custody without providing reasons, which impacted the sentence.
However, the court found no error in how the sentencing judge considered the appellant's mental health.
The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was adjusted to reflect credit for pre-sentence custody.
Evidence excluded and acquittal directed due to arbitrary detention and systemic right to counsel delay.
The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds.
The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel.
Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence.
The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.
The Court of Appeal upheld the sexual assault convictions and 51-month sentence of a fashion photographer.
The appellant, a former fashion photographer, appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and one count of sexual exploitation involving four young women, and his subsequent 51-month imprisonment sentence.
The appeal raised four grounds: the application judge's refusal to sever charges, the trial judge's decision to admit cross-count similar fact evidence, alleged errors in the jury charge, and the fitness of the sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the lower court's decisions regarding severance, similar fact evidence admissibility, or jury instructions, and concluding the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range for the offences committed.
The appeal of a conviction for sexual exploitation was dismissed as the trial judge correctly assessed mens rea and sexual purpose.
The appellant, Daniel Palmer, appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor (J.P.), who was his youth advisor.
The trial judge found Palmer guilty, disbelieving his testimony and concluding that the elements of sexual exploitation, including sexual purpose, were met.
Palmer argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in assessing mens rea by not considering J.P.'s testimony about punitive intent, and improperly considered a defence concession.
The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding sexual purpose, which does not require the accused's sexual gratification, and properly assessed the evidence and mens rea.
The Court of Appeal upheld convictions for sexual offences and uttering threats, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of a third party records application.
The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering threats to cause death, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence of three years' imprisonment.
The sole ground of appeal from conviction concerned the sequence in which the trial judge disposed of a constitutional challenge to section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and a third party records application under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred by first dismissing the third party records application and then treating the constitutional application as moot.
The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the appellant failed to demonstrate the extrajudicial measures record was potentially relevant, and therefore the Crown's duty to inquire was not triggered.
The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors.
A youthful first offender with mental health issues was sentenced to 18 months custody for an unprovoked stabbing.
The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm following an unprovoked attack on two strangers outside a Tim Hortons coffee shop in Richmond Hill.
The offender stabbed both victims with a blade, causing serious injuries including stab wounds to vital organs.
The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence for aggravated assault and a concurrent 6-month sentence for assault causing bodily harm, with credit for pretrial custody, lockdowns, and restrictive bail conditions.
The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and non-communication order.
The Court of Appeal upheld convictions for criminal organization and drug offences, clarifying rules on expert evidence, jury selection, and pre-sentence custody credit.
Four accused were convicted of drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization (the Five Point Generals), conspiracy to traffic controlled substances, and firearms offences following a three-month jury trial based largely on intercepted communications.
The appellants challenged their convictions on five grounds: jury selection procedures, cross-examination limitations of the Crown's expert witness, exclusion of defence expert evidence, admission of extrinsic misconduct evidence, and alleged imbalance in the jury charge.
They also appealed their sentences, primarily challenging the credit awarded for pre-sentence custody.
The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and three of four sentence appeals, allowing only Shane Evans' sentence appeal based on inadequate credit for pre-sentence custody.
Firearm photos found during an unlawful cellphone search were excluded due to multiple Charter breaches.
The accused was charged with firearm offences and obstructing a police officer following a shooting.
The police detained the accused and others in an apartment under exigent circumstances.
After the accused provided false names, he was arrested for obstruction of justice.
The police subsequently conducted a warrantless search of his cellphone, discovering photos of him holding a firearm used in the shooting.
The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).
The court found multiple Charter violations, including an unlawful cellphone search, an unreasonable strip search, failure to file a Report to Justice for the cellphone extraction, and unreasonable delays in informing the accused of his firearm charges and facilitating his right to counsel.
Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court concluded that the admission of the photos would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.
Handgun and drugs excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to grossly negligent police conduct in obtaining search warrants.
The accused were charged with firearm and narcotic offences after police executed search warrants on a vehicle and a residence, discovering a handgun and drugs.
The court previously found that the search warrants were invalid because the information to obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, violating the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.
In this decision, the court applied the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter and concluded that the police conduct was grossly negligent and misleading.
Given the seriousness of the breach and the impact on the accused's privacy interests, the court excluded both the handgun and the drugs from evidence.
The Court of Appeal held that Criminal Code provisions governing pre-trial custody credit do not violate the Charter, as parole eligibility is determined by separate correctional legislation.
The appellant was convicted of importing almost two kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to six years imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody on a 1.5:1 basis plus an additional 90-day credit for harsh conditions in remand custody.
The appellant appealed, arguing that sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 12 by effectively requiring her to spend significantly longer in custody before becoming eligible for parole than an offender who had received bail.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that parole eligibility questions are not a component of the determination of a fit sentence, and that neither section 719(1) nor 719(3.1) delays parole eligibility or requires offenders denied bail to serve longer sentences than those granted bail.
The court also found no material misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's remorse.
The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of cocaine evidence, finding the search warrant deficiencies were minor and the Grant factors favoured inclusion.
The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights regarding the search of two vehicles, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).
The appellant argued the trial judge erred in characterizing the breach as technical, failed to consider misleading information in the Information to Obtain, failed to consider the unlawful resort to a telewarrant, and incorrectly balanced the Grant factors.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the breach was minor and made in good faith, the impact on the appellant's rights was relatively low, and the evidence was highly reliable and central to the Crown's case.