Marianne Salih

Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams sought to exclude gun and drug evidence seized under search warrants, alleging s. 8 Charter violations due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that a traffic stop leading to information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) violated Mr. Hibbert's s. 9 Charter rights, leading to the excision of that paragraph.

Furthermore, the court determined that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds that the items would be found in Mr. Hibbert's BMW or Ms. Williams' residence three months after the alleged shooting, primarily due to the staleness of the information and speculative inferences regarding ongoing criminal activity or gang feuds.

Consequently, both Mr. Hibbert's and Ms. Williams' s. 8 Charter rights were violated, rendering the search warrants invalid.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.

Two Crown witnesses gave conflicting evidence: one victim initially denied recognizing the shooter but later identified the appellant at trial, while the appellant's former co-accused initially identified the appellant but later testified that he himself was the shooter.

The trial judge admitted the co-accused's preliminary inquiry testimony for its truth under the principled exception to hearsay.

The trial judge failed to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the exculpatory identification evidence of both witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury required proper instruction on how to use the conflicting exculpatory evidence in assessing whether a reasonable doubt existed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to five months in custody, applied for bail pending his appeal.

The court found that the applicant posed a negligible risk to public safety and flight, and that his ground of appeal regarding uneven scrutiny of the evidence clearly surpassed the 'not frivolous' threshold.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, brought a Garofoli application to exclude the seized evidence.

Prior to step five of the application, they sought to amplify the Information to Obtain (ITO) based on cross-examination of the affiant and an email.

The court allowed certain amplifications to correct good-faith errors in the ITO, but declined to add omitted information, noting that omissions could still be raised during the substantive argument on the warrant's validity.

The applicants, charged with firearm and drug offences following the execution of search warrants, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) under step five of a Garofoli application.

The court applied the Garofoli test, assessing whether there was a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit the preconditions for the warrants.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on specific issues, including the omission of information regarding the shooter's name and the use of conclusory statements in the ITO, but denied leave on several other grounds where cross-examination was unlikely to assist or where the issues were better suited for argument at the Garofoli hearing.

The applicants challenged the issuance of three search warrants and sought disclosure of a confidential informant's (CI) handler's notes under step five of the Garofoli process.

They argued that the CI handler was a co-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) or, alternatively, that the notes were relevant to demonstrate material omissions or deliberate/reckless falsehoods in the ITO, which could lead to the warrants being set aside.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CI handler was not a co-affiant and that the applicants had not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the disclosure of the handler's notes would assist in challenging the issuance of the search warrants.

The applicants, Demetre Hibbert and Raquel Williams, challenged search warrants that led to the seizure of a firearm and drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

They requested judicial summaries of redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO), specifically Appendix "D" and other paragraphs, which were withheld based on Confidential Informant (CI) privilege.

The court, acting as case management judge for pre-trial Charter applications, ordered the Crown to provide judicial summaries under step two of the Garofoli process.

The court emphasized that a mere assertion of CI privilege was insufficient; the summaries needed to enable applicants' counsel to meaningfully participate in the editing process.

The court also prepared a judicial summary comparing different drafts of Appendix "D" as requested by the applicants.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of robbery with a firearm, three counts of forcible confinement, and one count of breaking and entering with intent to commit robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including text messages discussing obtaining a firearm, cell phone tower evidence placing the "Flyd" phone near the robbery location, fingerprint evidence linking Miles to the scene, and Miles' prior employment at the store.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, finding that despite a hearsay error regarding the post-it note evidence linking Miles to the phone, the curative proviso applied as the evidence against Miles was overwhelming.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged Tingle was a party to the planned and deliberate murder of Neeko Mitchell, having lured him from a community centre at the direction of Jermaine Dunkley, where Reshane Hayles-Wilson then shot him.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty.

The ruling reiterated the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the trial judge's role is limited to determining if any evidence could support a conviction, taking the Crown's case at its highest, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

The court also noted that a prior Court of Appeal decision had affirmed the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial, applying the same legal standard.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

The accused brought applications to stay their charges of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, and assault under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The total delay was estimated at 45 to 46 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court dismissed the applications, finding that the case was 'particularly complex' due to multiple accused, voluminous disclosure from three jurisdictions, and numerous pre-trial applications.

The court also found the delay reasonable under the transitional framework for cases instituted pre-Jordan.

The appellant appealed from a judgment denying certiorari to quash an order committing him to trial on charges of first-degree murder and participating in a criminal organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's refusal to grant certiorari.

The preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence and correctly determined that the Crown had met the minimal threshold required to justify committal.

The reviewing court's task was solely to consider whether there was any evidence upon which the committing justice could form an opinion that the evidence was sufficient to put the accused on trial.

Appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a probation order.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's pre-trial ruling dismissing his application to exclude evidence arising from alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The key issues were whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, whether the vehicle was lawfully seized and searched, and whether the appellant was arbitrarily detained.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on all grounds, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving an eight-year-old child.

At trial, an agreed statement of fact containing the evidence of the complainant's father was filed as an exhibit but was subsequently lost and could not be recreated.

The trial judge had relied on this missing exhibit as independent evidence of the complainant's post-event emotional state to confirm her testimony and reject the appellant's denial.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the incomplete appellate record made it impossible to determine if the trial judge erred in his reliance on the father's statement.

Finding a serious possibility that the missing exhibit deprived the appellant of a ground of appeal, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in a safe inside an apartment.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, finding that while there was some circumstantial evidence of control via a key found on a keychain used by the accused, there was no evidence from which a jury could infer the accused had knowledge of the cocaine hidden in the safe.

The motion was granted and a directed verdict of acquittal was ordered.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application seeking disclosure of the identity of a confidential source.

The accused argued the source acted as a police agent rather than a confidential informant by engaging in drug transactions during the investigation.

After applying the Garofoli Step 6 procedure and holding an in camera hearing, the court concluded the source acted solely as a confidential informant and was entitled to informer privilege.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly assessed threshold reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly in light of the complainant's developmental and psychological circumstances.

The court found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge properly deferred to the trial judge's findings and was entitled to review the entirety of the evidence, including expert evidence and inconsistent statements, when assessing threshold reliability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault-related charges involving his daughter and stepdaughter.

He appealed on four grounds: (1) the trial judge's refusal to sever the counts; (2) the admission of the "teaching" comment as similar fact evidence while excluding the underlying acts; (3) alleged errors in the jury charge; and (4) the exclusion of expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's rulings on severance, similar fact evidence, jury instructions, or the exclusion of the psychological report.