Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-5-192 DATE: 20181129
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - SHELDON TINGLE - and - JERMAINE DUNKLEY
Counsel: Elizabeth Nadeau and Marco Cuda, for the Crown Scott Reid and Marianne Salih, for the accused, Sheldon Tingle Jeff Hershberg and Brian Ross, for the accused, Jermaine Dunkley
HEARD: October 5 and 9, 2018
K.L. Campbell J.:
Ruling
Directed Verdict Application
A. Overview
[1] The two accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged with first-degree murder in connection with the November 24, 2013 killing of Neeko Mitchell, which took place just outside the front entrance of the North Kipling Community Centre in the city of Toronto.
[2] That night there were a series of men’s recreational basketball games scheduled to be played in the gymnasium of the Community Centre. Mr. Mitchell attended the Community Centre to watch one of the games. The Crown alleges, essentially, that at the request of Jermaine Dunkley, Mr. Mitchell was lured from the gymnasium and outside the Community Centre by Sheldon Tingle, and shortly thereafter Mr. Mitchell was shot to death by Reshane Hayles-Wilson. The murder was captured on a video recording from a camera located right at the entrance of the Community Centre. This recording shows how Mr. Mitchell was repeatedly shot by Mr. Hayles-Wilson, from close range, with a semi-automatic handgun.
[3] Mr. Hayles-Wilson has already been tried and convicted of second-degree murder in connection with his role in the killing. The Crown alleges that the two accused are parties to the murder and are guilty of first-degree murder on the basis that it was a “planned and deliberate” murder on the part of Mr. Tingle and Mr. Dunkley.
[4] The Crown contends further that the murder of Mr. Mitchell was committed in retaliation for the earlier killing of Ricky Dunkley, Jermaine Dunkely’s brother. On July 28, 2013, Ricky Dunkley was shot to death, from close range, at the Brampton Banquet Hall, by Rico Gayle. Mr. Mitchell had spent much of that evening in the company of Mr. Gayle, was standing next to him in the minutes just before Mr. Gayle walked over to Ricky Dunkley and killed him and, the Crown contends, was believed by Jermaine Dunkley to have been involved in the killing of his brother. The Crown also contends that the killing of both Ricky Dunkley and Neeko Mitchell were part of the overall rivalry between two urban street gangs – the “Monstarz,” led at least in part by Jermaine Dunkely, and the “Lanes,” the gang to which Rico Gayle was connected. These two killings were alleged to be just the most recent spate of violence in the long-standing feud between these two criminal organizations.
[5] At the close of the Crown’s case, defence counsel for Mr. Tingle moved for a directed verdict of acquittal with respect to the charge of first-degree murder. Defence counsel argued that there is no evidence in support of this charge. This application was not joined by defence counsel for Mr. Dunkley. The Crown argued that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to consider the evidence and return its verdict.
[6] After hearing the submissions of counsel, I advised the parties that the directed verdict application was dismissed. I indicated briefly that, in my view, there was at least some evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find Mr. Tingle guilty of first-degree murder in connection with the killing of Mr. Mitchell. I also advised the parties that I would subsequently provide reasons in support of these conclusions. These are those reasons.
B. Directed Verdict Motions – The Applicable Legal Standard
[7] In earlier rulings on similar directed verdict motions in other cases, I have sought to outline the legal standard that must be applied on such applications. See, for example, R. v. Abdo, 2016 ONSC 7957, at paras. 4-11; R. v. Tello, 2018 ONSC 385, at paras. 4-12. Again, my understanding of the law on this subject is as follows.
[8] The law is well-settled that on a directed verdict motion brought by an accused at the close of the Crown’s case, the limited responsibility of the trial judge is to determine whether or not there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty upon the charges against the accused. This legal standard applies on all applications for a directed verdict, regardless of whether the case against the accused is based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both kinds of evidence. Moreover, on any such motion the trial Judge must refrain from assessing the credibility of witnesses, weighing the testimony, considering the quality or reliability of the evidence, drawing factual inferences from the evidence, or making any determinations of fact. Those are all functions that are strictly reserved for the trier of fact – in this case, the jury. See United States of America v. Shephard, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1067, at pp. 1079-1080; R. v. Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, at pp. 836-845; R. v. Monteleone, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 154, at p. 160-161; R. v. Morabito, [1949] S.C.R. 172, at p. 174; R. v. Charemski, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679, at paras. 2-4.
[9] In R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 828, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that this same legal standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, but noted that the task of the judge is somewhat more complicated in cases of circumstantial evidence as, in such cases, the judge must determine what potential inferences are reasonably open to the jury from the circumstantial evidence. More particularly, McLachlin C.J.C., delivering the judgment of the court, stated, at para. 23, that answering this question, about available inferences, “inevitably requires the judge to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence,” in the sense of “assessing whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the inferences that the Crown asks the jury to draw.” In short, the judge asks only “whether the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.” Further, and importantly, at paras. 25-32, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “continuing validity” of the “traditional common law rule” articulated in United States of America v. Shephard. McLachlin C.J.C. stated, at para. 30:
In performing the task of limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge does not draw inferences from facts. Nor does she assess credibility. Rather, the judge’s task is to determine whether, if the Crown's evidence is believed, it would be reasonable for a properly instructed jury to infer guilt. Thus, this task of “limited weighing” never requires consideration of the inherent reliability of the evidence itself. It should be regarded, instead, as an assessment of the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.
[10] In addition, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at paras. 18 and 25 (2), this limited weighing process does not involve choosing amongst competing reasonable inferences, which is the sole jurisdiction of the trier of fact, but rather involves determining only the field of potential factual inferences that could reasonably be drawn in the circumstances. See also R. v. Dubois, [1986] S.C.R. 366, at p. 380; R. v. Campbell (1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 164 (Ont.C.A.), at paras. 6-9; R. v. Montour, [2002] O.J. No. 141 (C.A.), at paras. 3-4; R. v. Bogiatzis, [2002] O.J. No. 736 (S.C.J.), at para. 25.
[11] Further, the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence need not be “compelling” or even “easily drawn” in order to be reasonable. If an inference is a reasonable and logical one, the question of whether or not it should ultimately be drawn must be left for the trier of fact. See R. v. G.W. (1996), 93 O.A.C. 1 (C.A.), at para. 62; R. v. Katwaru (2001), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 433 (Ont.C.A.), at paras. 37-41; R. v. Munoz (2006), 86 O.R. (3d) 134 (S.C.J.), at paras. 18-22.
[12] Accordingly, at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial, the trial judge must proceed on the basis that all available reasonable inferences might be drawn in favour of the Crown by the trier of fact. As Doherty J.A. stated, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Jackson, 2016 ONCA 736, at para. 7:
In conducting this limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge takes the case for the Crown at its highest, meaning she accepts the credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Crown and assumes the reasonable inferences from the primary facts that are most favourable to the Crown: R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at para. 18; R. v. Foster (2008), 76 W.C.B. (2d) 769 (Ont.S.C.), at para. 31; and R. v. Howells, 2009 BCCA 460, 85 W.C.B. (2d) 370, at paras. 13-14.
If the preliminary inquiry judge decides that on a view of the evidence most favourable to the Crown, the circumstantial evidence could reasonably support the inferences necessary to establish guilt, she must commit the accused for trial. It is irrelevant that the evidence also supports inferences inconsistent with guilt.
[13] In other words, the rule in Hodge’s Case (1838), 168 E.R. 1136, has no application at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial. Of course, a trial judge will often be required to instruct a jury that, before they find an accused guilty of an offence on the basis of circumstantial evidence, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that his or her guilt is the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence. That standard does not apply, however, at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial. At the directed verdict stage, if the evidence is equally capable of supporting two reasonable inferences, one consistent with guilt and the other inconsistent with guilt, the case must be left with the trier of fact to determine what inference should be drawn in all of the circumstances of the case. See R. v. Russell, 2001 SCC 53, at paras. 48; R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, at paras. 17-22, 32-34; R. v. Jackson, at paras 9-15; R. v. Collins and Pelfrey (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at paras. 22-30.
[14] The trial judge must remember, however, that while it is for the jury to choose amongst reasonable inferences available from the evidence, the jury cannot be invited to draw “speculative or unreasonable inferences.” See R. v. Figueroa, 2008 ONCA 106, at para. 35.
[15] In short, as Binnie J. stated, in delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368, at para. 48, a directed verdict of acquittal is not available if there is “any admissible evidence, whether direct or circumstantial which, if believed by a properly charged jury acting reasonably, would justify a conviction.” See also R. v. E.B., [2004] O.J. No. 3528 (C.A.), at paras. 10-17.
[16] More recently, in R. v. Kelly, 2017 ONCA 920, Doherty J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, summarized the legal test on a directed verdict motion as follows, at para. 19:
When the defence moves for a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of the Crown’s case, the trial judge must decide whether there is a basis in the evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict. In performing that task, the trial judge does not make findings of fact or credibility, but considers whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could, on the entirety of the evidence, favourable and unfavourable to the accused, conclude that the Crown has established guilt. The trial judge must view the evidence in the reasonable light that is the most favourable to the Crown … [citations omitted].
[17] See also R. v. Johnson, 2018 ONSC 1089, at paras. 2-6.
C. Analysis
1. Party Liability as an Aider
[18] In order to be guilty of any offence as an “aider,” within the meaning of s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, the Crown must prove that the accused: (1) intentionally engaged in some conduct that actually assisted the principal in committing the offence; and (2) intentionally engaged in that conduct for the purpose of aiding the principal in the commission of the offence. Accordingly, as the governing jurisprudence reveals, the mens rea requirement for an “aider,” as reflected in the term “purpose,” has two components: intention and knowledge. The alleged “aider” must have both: (1) intended to assist in the commission of the offence; and (2) known that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime, although the “aider” need not know precisely how the offence will be committed. See R. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (1974), 3 O.R. (2d) 629 (C.A.), at p. 640; R. v. Hibbert, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 973, at pp. 994-997; 1001-1004; R. v. Maciel, 2007 ONCA 196, at para. 87-89; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, at paras. 14-18. In the present case, of course, the offence which Mr. Tingle is alleged to have aided is the first-degree, planned and deliberate murder, of Neeko Mitchell.
[19] Mere physical presence at the scene of a crime, and passive acquiescence in its commission, is never enough, standing alone, to justify a conclusion that an accused is a party to the offence as an aider of that offence. Mere passive physical presence does not establish the culpable participation of an accused in the crime committed by another. Sometimes people are just in the wrong place at the wrong time. However, presence at the scene of the crime can be evidence of aiding if it is accompanied by other factors, such as prior knowledge of the principal offender’s intention to commit the offence. Where it may reasonably be inferred that the accused was acting in concert with the principal offender, then it may also reasonably be inferred that the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime was for the purpose of intentionally aiding the principal offender in the crime committed. See R. v. Dunlop and Sylvester, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 881, at pp. 896-897; R. v. Coney, (1882), 8 Q.B. 534, at pp. 539, 557; R. v. Preston, [1949] S.C.R. 156, at pp. 159-160; D.P.P. v. Maxwell, [1978] 3 All E.R. 1140 (H.L.), at p. 1144; R. v. Sparrow (1979), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 443 (Ont.C.A.), at pp. 457-458; R. v. Thatcher, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 652, at p. 668; R. v. Wood (1989), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 201 (Ont.C.A.), at pp. 220-221, leave denied, [1990] S.C.C.A. No. 73; R. v. Sauvé and Trudel (2004), 182 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (Ont.C.A.), at para. 136, leave denied, [2005] 1 S.C.R. xv; R. v. Arias-Jackson, 2007 SCC 52, at paras. 3, 9.
[20] There must be some connection between the offence committed by the principal and the alleged acts or aiding or abetting, but that connection need not be a causal connection. Indeed, any act or omission committed by the alleged party to the offence, that occurs before or during the offence, and which “somehow and to some extent furthers, facilitates, promotes, assists or encourages” the principal offender in the commission of the offence is sufficient to establish party liability. See R. v. Dooley, 2009 ONCA 910, at para. 118-124, leave denied, [2010] S.C.C.A. Nos. 83 and 179; R. v. Alcantara, 2015 ABCA 258, at paras. 9, 11-15, affirmed, R. v. Knapczyk, 2016 SCC 10; R. v. Mariani, 2007 ONCA 329, at paras. 52-56, 62.
2. The Court of Appeal Decision on the Certiorari Appeal
[21] Significantly, the general sufficiency of the evidence against Mr. Tingle in relation to the charge of first-degree murder has already been passed upon by the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
[22] On April 19, 2017, at the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry into this matter, Mr. Justice Budzinski of the Ontario Court of Justice, committed the accused to trial on the charge of first-degree murder. Mr. Tingle challenged that decision by way of prerogative remedy application, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of Budzinski J. That application was heard by Mr. Justice A.J. O’Marra of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and was dismissed. See R. v. Dunkley, 2018 ONSC 224. Mr. Tingle then brought an appeal against that decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. That appeal was heard by Justices Sharpe, Roberts and Trotter, and it too was dismissed. See R. v. Tingle, 2018 ONCA 572. These proceedings are, of course, relevant to the present matter as the legal standard to be applied in relation to a committal for trial is the same as the legal standard to be applied in relation to a directed verdict application. To the extent that the evidence at the preliminary inquiry is the same as the evidence at the trial, the application of the identical legal test should result in the same conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
[23] In its decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at the preliminary inquiry in this matter, the Court of Appeal made a number of important observations. More particularly, the Court of Appeal stated, at paras. 3-4, 7:
The Crown led evidence capable of supporting the inference that the appellant [Sheldon Tingle] was closely associated with his co-accused Dunkley and Hayles-Wilson, that Dunkley led a criminal organization, and that Dunkley had a motive to kill the victim. The shooting of the victim by Hayles-Wilson was captured on video surveillance. The appellant was standing nearby at the time of the shooting. Surveillance videos also show interaction between the appellant, the victim, and his co-accused at the recreational centre immediately prior to the shooting. The Crown’s theory is that at the direction of Dunkley, the appellant lured the victim outside the recreational centre where he was immediately shot by Hayles-Wilson.
We agree that the case presented by the Crown against the appellant is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Crown’s case depends upon the trier of fact drawing a number of inferences regarding the nature of the group led by Dunkley, the appellant’s association with Dunkley, and the appellant’s participation in the shooting. We also agree that competing inferences are possible and that it is by no means obvious that the trier of fact will draw the inferences required to convict the appellant of first-degree murder. However, we do not agree that the decision to commit the appellant was arbitrary or made without any support in the evidence.
The application judge proceeded to provide a detailed review of the evidence led by the Crown and the reasons of the committing judge. Of particular significance is the videotape … showing the movements and interactions between the victim and the three accused in the four minutes up to and including the shooting. When viewed in the context of the evidence of Dunkley’s motive and the rap music videos of Dunkley’s group in which the appellant participated, the videotape evidence provides some evidence capable of implicating the appellant in the first degree murder. In our view, on the totality of the evidence, the trier of fact could infer that the appellant lured the victim outside the gym knowing of Dunkley and Hayles-Wilson’s plan to shoot the victim.
Both the application judge and the preliminary inquiry judge understood that there were other competing inferences that could be drawn to explain the nature of the group led by Dunkley, Dunkley’s motive vis-a-vis the victim, and the actions of the appellant at the time of the shooting. In our view, the application judge did not err by rejecting the submission that the committal was made arbitrarily and without an evidentiary basis or that there was an entire absence of evidence upon which a proper judicial finding of guilt could be made.
[24] While the evidence led at the preliminary inquiry and at the trial in this matter are, predictably, not identical, in my view, these conclusions by the Court of Appeal in relation to the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary inquiry remain equally valid in relation to the evidence that has been called during the Crown’s case at the trial of this matter.
3. The Evidence Supporting Party Liability in the Present Case
[25] More particularly, the following evidence provides, in my view, a sound evidentiary basis upon which to instruct the jury that they could find the accused, Mr. Tingle, guilty of the offence of first-degree murder, by virtue of the combination of ss. 21(1)(b) and 231(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, chap. C-46, on the basis that, at the direction of Jermaine Dunkley, Mr. Tingle intentionally lured Neeko Mitchell outside the Community Centre for the purpose of aiding Mr. Hayles-Wilson in his murder of Mr. Mitchell, knowing that the killing of Mr. Mitchell was both “planned and deliberate:”
Monstarz – The Criminal Organization: The parties have agreed that Monstarz is a criminal organization that started sometime in mid-2011. It is a subset or clique of the Mount Olive Crips. Between 2011 and 2015, Monstarz was heavily involved in drug trafficking and other criminal activity. It is also agreed by the parties that Jermaine Dunkley is one of the leaders of this criminal organization.
Street Gang Enemies: Det. Steven Kerr, an expert witness in urban street gangs (including Monstarz), their nature, culture, characteristics, identifiers, behavior and activities, testified that the Mount Olive Crips/Monstarz had gang enemies, including the Jamestown Crips, IDS (In Da Streets), and The Lanes. As a result of this gang rivalry, there have been numerous shootings over the years between the Mount Olive Crips/Monstarz and their other rival gangs, including The Lanes.
The Gang-Related Killing of Ricky Dunkley: The evidence supports the reasonable conclusion that the July 28, 2013 murder of Ricky Dunkley was a gang-related killing over “street politics,” even though Ricky Dunkley was not associated with any gang. Members of a Monstarz rival gang (The Lanes), were present in the Brampton Banquet Hall and Rico Gayle, who is alleged to have committed the murder, was a member of that rival gang. Neeko Mitchell had been in the company of Mr. Gayle earlier in the evening, and spent some time talking closely with Mr. Gayle in the minutes just before Mr. Gayle murdered Ricky Dunkley.
Mr. Tingle is Part of the Core Group of Monstarz: According to the expert evidence of Det. Steven Kerr, Reshane Hayles-Wilson and Sheldon Tingle are both closely connected with the Monstarz criminal organization. They both appear in gangster rap music videos produced by Jermaine Dunkley and appear to be close personal friends of Jermaine Dunkley. Indeed, Det. Kerr testified that Mr. Tingle was one of the “core group” of the Monstarz criminal organization.
Violence “On-Sight” for the Killing of Ricky Dunkley: Mr. Tingle appeared in a gangster rap music video with Jermaine Dunkley and others, in which Mr. Dunkley raps: “Seen my little brother die, tell them that it’s on sight.” Det. Kerr explained that the term “on sight” means that if one gang member meets a rival gang member, there will be acts of violence “on sight” – as soon as they are seen – without any further permission necessary. One reasonable inference from this evidence is that anyone involved in the killing of his brother would be dealt with violently by the Monstarz criminal organization “on-sight.”
Mr. Dunkley and Mr. Tingle are “Agreed On It”: In a tweet by Jermaine Dunkley, received by Sheldon Tingle, on October 10, 2013, there is photograph of Jermaine Dunkley and Sheldon Tingle shaking hands that is captioned “Agreed on it!” One reasonable inference from that post, in all of the circumstances of this case, is that the two men had agreed on killing whoever was responsible for the murder of Ricky Dunkley.
The Planned and Deliberate Killing of Neeko Mitchell: Based on the surveillance/security video recordings inside the Community Centre, Neeko Mitchell arrived at the Community Centre just after 8:03 p.m. He was shot to death by Reshane Hayles-Wilson just 4½ half minutes later. During this short intervening time, Mr. Mitchell greeted Mr. Hayles-Wilson and Mr. Dunkley, and then went inside the gymnasium where a basketball game was being played. About two minutes after Mr. Mitchell went into the gymnasium, Mr. Tingle also went into the gymnasium. Mr. Tingle was only inside the gymnasium for about 20 seconds before exiting again. Immediately after leaving the gymnasium, Mr. Tingle walked through the lobby and went outside the front doors of the Community Centre. Mr. Mitchell exited the gymnasium about 15 seconds after Mr. Tingle and similarly made his way outside the front doors of the Community Centre, where he immediately greeted Mr. Tingle. Within 20 seconds, Mr. Reshane Hayles-Wilson, who had been standing just inside the Community Centre by the front doors, followed Mr. Mitchell outside and quickly shot him to death. From the speed and the manner in which these events unfolded, and that activities of all of the various individuals, the jury could reasonably infer that the killing of Mr. Mitchell was planned and deliberate.
The Gesture Calling Neeko Mitchell Outside: David Griffith was engaged in one of the basketball games when Mr. Mitchell entered the gymnasium. Mr. Griffith and Mr. Mitchell were friends, and Mr. Mitchell came over to one of the player’s benches and sat down beside Mr. Griffith. According to Mr. Griffith, their brief conversation ended when “somebody called him [Mr. Mitchell] over.” Mr. Griffith explained that he saw somebody, standing by the doors of the gymnasium, raise their hand in the air and make a gesture toward Mr. Mitchell calling him over. Mr. Mitchell was facing in that direction and, after the gesture was made, Mr. Mitchell got up from the bench and walked toward the person who had “called him” with the gesture. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence, in combination with the video recording evidence, that it was Sheldon Tingle who entered the gymnasium and, with the observed gesture, “called over” Mr. Mitchell. The jury could also reasonably conclude that Mr. Tingle engaged in this conduct with the intention of luring Mr. Mitchell outside so that he could be killed by Mr. Hayles-Wilson.
[26] In my view, from this body of evidence, a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could conclude that the accused was a party to the planned and deliberate murder of Neeko Mitchell and, accordingly, is guilty of first-degree murder.
[27] There may be, of course, other inferences and conclusions that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, might draw from the evidence that I have outlined (and from other evidence which I have not outlined). However, as Doherty J.A. indicated in R. v. Jackson, at para. 7, on any directed verdict application, the trial judge “takes the case for the Crown at its highest” in that the trial judge notionally “accepts the credibility of the evidence relied on by the Crown and assumes the reasonable inferences from the primary facts that are most favourable to the Crown.”
D. Conclusion
[28] In conclusion, for these reasons, and as I have already advised the parties, I am satisfied that the application, brought on behalf of Mr. Tingle, for a directed verdict of acquittal, should be dismissed.
Kenneth L. Campbell J.
Released: November 29, 2018
COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-5-192 DATE: 20181129 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - SHELDON TINGLE and JERMAINE DUNKLEY Ruling Directed Verdict Application K.L. Campbell J. Released: November 29, 2018