Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-1-261 DATE: 20230425

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING - and - SAAID MOHIADIN

Counsel: Tim DiMuzio and David Parry, for the Crown Dirk Derstein and Laura Remigio, for the accused

Heard: April 24, 2023

K.L. Campbell J.:

Ruling

Directed Verdict Application

A. Overview

[1] The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, is currently charged with the first-degree murder of Jerome Belle. The offence is alleged to have taken place in Toronto, on the afternoon of March 19, 2019. The trial proceedings in this matter started on March 21, 2023 and, after some pre-trial motions were resolved, have been unfolding before the jury in the days and weeks since then. The Crown has just closed its case.

[2] Defence counsel for the accused now brings a directed verdict application, arguing that there is no evidence suggesting that the accused is guilty of first-degree murder, as there is no evidence that the murder of Jerome Belle was “planned and deliberate.” Accordingly, defence counsel contends, the accused should only stand trial henceforth on a charge of second-degree murder. In response, the Crown contends that there is ample evidence that the accused is guilty of the crime of first-degree murder, as his killing of the deceased was both “planned and deliberate.”

B. The Basic Factual Background

[3] It seems relatively clear from the evidence that Jerome Belle was shot to death on the afternoon of March 19, 2019, at approximately 3:25 p.m., near the intersection of Randolph Avenue and Bloom Street in the city of Toronto. This happened while Mr. Belle was in the company of another individual, Ryan Garballa, who was out walking his dog, and who was physically unharmed in the shooting, notwithstanding the fact that he was right beside Mr. Belle when the shooting commenced.

[4] It seems equally clear from the evidence that the killer was a man dressed in a “white hoodie” sweater, with the hood pulled up over his head, and the hood drawn tightly around his face so that little of his face can be seen. This individual is, fortuitously, seen getting out of a white Mercedes Benz vehicle parked relatively close to the geographic location of the killing just minutes before the shooting, and then quickly returning to it just minutes after the gun shots were fired, killing Jerome Belle. Indeed, this part of the case was recorded on a surveillance camera attached to a passing Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) “Wheel Trans” bus – but the actually killing happened outside the scope of this surveillance video camera.

[5] Mr. Garballa testified, through his preliminary inquiry testimony, which was admitted (on consent) in evidence during the Crown’s case, that the man wearing the “white hoodie” approached he and Mr. Belle and, immediately, shot Mr. Belle, from relatively close range, numerous times. The shooter then quickly returned in the direction of the parked white Mercedes Benz vehicle. Mr. Belle was pronounced dead a short time later at a Toronto hospital, despite the speedy medical efforts of the paramedics who arrived on the scene. There can, obviously, be no suggestion that the killing was provoked, or accidental, or was done in self-defence. In short, it is beyond question or realistic dispute that the killing of Mr. Belle was intentional by the man wearing the “white hoodie.”

[6] The driver of the white Mercedes Benz vehicle was a young woman named Sagal Abdi. So far, Ms. Abdi has provided the only direct evidence in this case clearly identifying the accused as the man wearing the “white hoodie,” and who is seen getting out of, and then getting back in to, her car.

[7] Ms. Abdi has testified, essentially, that she was a close personal friend of the accused at the time of the shooting, that she communicated with him on a daily basis, and that she often drove him to and from his nearby home and around to various different locations, around the time of the shooting.

[8] Ms. Abdi testified that, on the afternoon of March 19, 2019, she picked up the accused at his nearby home at the foot of Bloom Street, at his request, and she then followed his directions to where she parked her vehicle, near the intersection of Perth Avenue and Randolph Avenue. She understood, from what the accused told her, that he was going home to retrieve something he forgot to bring with him. While Ms. Abdi had offered to drive him home for this purpose, the accused told her to just wait in her car for his return. She did.

[9] Many of these preliminary events were also captured on the various surveillance cameras in the area. Viewed cumulatively and in sequence, the police-seized video recordings that show all of the following events:

• At 3:17:34 p.m., on March 19, 2019, two men can be seen coming down a staircase on the west side of the building located at 140 Perth Avenue, and they head south, down to near where Bloom Street turns the corner and changes from being a north-south road to being an east-west road (the accused lived in a residence just across the street, on the south side of Bloom Street – even though the municipal address of the building was on Perth Avenue);
• At 3:19:23, on March 19, 2019, two men can be seen walking northbound on the sidewalk on Bloom Street;
• At 3:22:07, on March 19, 2019, two men (and a dog) can be seen leaving one of the apartment buildings via the “south stairway” (this was clearly Mr. Belle and Mr. Garballa);
• At 3:22:33, on March 19, 2019, a white Mercedes Benz (matching the description of the vehicle driven by Ms. Abdi) can be seen travelling south on Bloom Street (from Randolph Avenue), heading in the direction of the accused’s residence;
• At 3:23:02, on March 19, 2019, a white automobile can be seen parked on the east-west section of Bloom Street, approximately in front of the accused’s residence;
• At 3:23:40, on March 19, 2019, the white car can be seen moving in an easterly direction along Bloom Street, towards Perth Avenue;
• At 3:24:46, on March 19, 2019, two men can be seen heading north on Bloom Street, walking a dog, and that by 3:25:13, those two men have walked northbound up beside the playground structure near the intersection of Bloom Street and Randolph Avenue (and they eventually walk north, off the screen – to the geographical area where the killing of Mr. Belle takes place); and
• At 3:31:46, on March 19, 2019, police cars and EMS vehicles begin to arrive on the scene of the killing (which happened at approximately 3:25 p.m. that day).

[10] According to Ms. Abdi, during their brief time together in her vehicle, before the accused first exited her vehicle, the accused took off his black jacket. Thereafter, he was wearing a “white hoodie” sweater. She could not recall whether he was already wearing the “white hoodie” under his black jacket, or whether he retrieved the sweater from his duffel bag in the back seat of her car, and then put it on. In any event, Ms. Abdi testified that, when the accused first left her vehicle, he was wearing a “white hoodie” and he had pulled it up over his head.

[11] Ms. Abdi explained that she did not know about the killing of Mr. Belle in advance of it happening and she testified that she did not even know that Mr. Mohiadin had killed someone after she had heard the “gun shots” from her driver’s seat in her parked car. She had thought that she was just driving the accused to a friend’s house, wherever that was located.

[12] Ms. Abdi testified that, after the accused returned to her vehicle (following the shooting), the accused told her to drive away, and he directed her, ultimately, to a parking lot in the area of Jane Street and Finch Avenue, some considerable distance away.

[13] Ms. Abdi testified that, during their travels to this location, the accused told her a number of things, including: (1) He said: “This is the hood – shootings happen every day;” (2) He told her to “get rid of [her] vehicle,” and that she could not drive the car anymore, for at least a couple of weeks; and (3) he told her that they would “have to get married so that [she] could not testify against [him].”

C. The Directed Verdict Motion – The Applicable Legal Standard

[14] In earlier rulings on similar directed verdict motions in other cases, I have sought to outline the legal standard that must be applied on such applications. See, for example, R. v. Abdo, 2016 ONSC 7957, at paras. 4-11; R. v. Tello, 2018 ONSC 385, at paras. 4-12; R. v. Alvarez-Maggiani, 2018 ONSC 4834, at paras. 5-15; R. v. Tingle and Dunkley, 2018 ONSC 7111, at paras. 8-17. Again, my understanding of the law on this subject is, essentially, as follows.

[15] The law is well-settled that on a directed verdict motion brought by an accused at the close of the Crown’s case, the limited responsibility of the trial judge is to determine whether or not there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty upon the charges against the accused. This legal standard applies on all applications for a directed verdict, regardless of whether the case against the accused is based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both kinds of evidence. Moreover, on any such motion the trial Judge must refrain from assessing the credibility of witnesses, weighing the testimony, considering the quality or reliability of the evidence, drawing factual inferences from the evidence, or making any determinations of fact. Those are all functions that are strictly reserved for the trier of fact. See: United States of America v. Shephard, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1067, at pp. 1079-1080; R. v. Mezzo, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 802, at pp. 836-845; R. v. Monteleone, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 154, at pp. 160-161; R. v. Morabito, [1949] S.C.R. 172, at p. 174; R. v. Charemski, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679, at paras. 2-4.

[16] In R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 828, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that this same legal standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, but the court noted that the task of the judge is somewhat more complicated in cases of circumstantial evidence as, in such cases (like the present case), the judge must determine what potential inferences are reasonably open to the jury from the circumstantial evidence. More particularly, McLachlin C.J.C., delivering the judgment of the court, stated, at para. 23, that answering this question, about available inferences, “inevitably requires the judge to engage in a limited weighing of the evidence,” in the sense of “assessing whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the inferences that the Crown asks the jury to draw.” In short, the judge asks only “whether the evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.” Further, and importantly, at paras. 25-32, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “continuing validity” of the “traditional common law rule” articulated in United States of America v. Shephard. McLachlin C.J.C. stated, at para. 30:

In performing the task of limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge does not draw inferences from facts. Nor does she assess credibility. Rather, the judge’s task is to determine whether, if the Crown's evidence is believed, it would be reasonable for a properly instructed jury to infer guilt. Thus, this task of “limited weighing” never requires consideration of the inherent reliability of the evidence itself. It should be regarded, instead, as an assessment of the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.

[17] In addition, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at paras. 18 and 25 (2), this limited weighing process does not involve choosing amongst competing reasonable inferences, which is the sole jurisdiction of the trier of fact, but rather involves determining only the field of potential factual inferences that could reasonably be drawn in the circumstances. See also: R. v. Dubois, [1986] S.C.R. 366, at p. 380; R. v. Campbell (1999), 140 C.C.C. (3d) 164 (Ont.C.A.), at paras. 6-9; R. v. Montour, [2002] O.J. No. 141 (C.A.), at paras. 3-4; R. v. Bogiatzis, [2002] O.J. No. 736 (S.C.J.), at para. 25.

[18] Further, the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence need not be “compelling” or even “easily drawn” in order to be reasonable. If an inference is a reasonable and logical one, the question of whether or not it should ultimately be drawn must be left for the trier of fact. See: R. v. G.W. (1996), 93 O.A.C. 1 (C.A.), at para. 62; R. v. Katwaru (2001), 153 C.C.C. (3d) 433 (Ont.C.A.), at paras. 37-41; R. v. Munoz (2006), 86 O.R. (3d) 134 (S.C.J.), at paras. 18-22.

[19] Accordingly, at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial, the trial judge must proceed on the basis that all available reasonable inferences might be drawn in favour of the Crown by the trier of fact. As Doherty J.A. stated, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Jackson, 2016 ONCA 736, at para. 7:

In conducting this limited weighing, the preliminary inquiry judge takes the case for the Crown at its highest, meaning she accepts the credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Crown and assumes the reasonable inferences from the primary facts that are most favourable to the Crown: R. v. Sazant, 2004 SCC 77, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 635, at para. 18; R. v. Foster (2008), 76 W.C.B. (2d) 769 (Ont.S.C.), at para. 31; and R. v. Howells, 2009 BCCA 460, 85 W.C.B. (2d) 370, at paras. 13-14.

If the preliminary inquiry judge decides that on a view of the evidence most favourable to the Crown, the circumstantial evidence could reasonably support the inferences necessary to establish guilt, she must commit the accused for trial. It is irrelevant that the evidence also supports inferences inconsistent with guilt.

[20] In other words, the rule in Hodge’s Case (1838), 168 E.R. 1136, has no application at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial. Of course, a trial judge will often be required to instruct a jury that, before they find an accused guilty of an offence on the basis of circumstantial evidence, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that his or her guilt is the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence. That standard does not apply, however, at the directed verdict stage of a criminal trial. At the directed verdict stage, if the evidence is equally capable of supporting two reasonable inferences, one consistent with guilt and the other inconsistent with guilt, the case must be left with the trier of fact to determine what inference should be drawn in all of the circumstances of the case. See: R. v. Russell, 2001 SCC 53, at para. 48; R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, at paras. 17-22, 32-34; R. v. Jackson, at paras 9-15; R. v. Collins and Pelfrey (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at paras. 22-30.

[21] The trial judge must remember, however, that while it is for the jury to choose amongst reasonable inferences available from the evidence, the jury cannot be invited to draw “speculative or unreasonable inferences.” See: R. v. Figueroa, 2008 ONCA 106, at para. 35; R. v. Morrissey (1995), 97 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont.C.A.), at p. 209; R. v. Newman, 2010 ONSC 6009, at para. 29.

[22] In short, as Binnie J. stated, in delivering the judgment of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Barros, 2011 SCC 51, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 368, at para. 48, a directed verdict of acquittal is not available if there is “any admissible evidence, whether direct or circumstantial which, if believed by a properly charged jury acting reasonably, would justify a conviction.” See also: R. v. E.B., [2004] O.J. No. 3528 (C.A.), at paras. 10-17.

[23] More recently, in R. v. Kelly, 2017 ONCA 920, Doherty J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, summarized the legal test on a directed verdict motion as follows, at para. 19:

When the defence moves for a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of the Crown’s case, the trial judge must decide whether there is a basis in the evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict. In performing that task, the trial judge does not make findings of fact or credibility, but considers whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could, on the entirety of the evidence, favourable and unfavourable to the accused, conclude that the Crown has established guilt. The trial judge must view the evidence in the reasonable light that is the most favourable to the Crown … [citations omitted].

[24] See also R. v. Johnson, 2018 ONSC 1089, at paras. 2-6.

D. Planned and Deliberate First-Degree Murder

[25] For the accused to be found guilty of first-degree murder on the basis that he was involved in a murder that was both planned and deliberate, the Crown must prove: (1) that the accused unlawfully caused the death of Mr. Belle; (2) that the accused had the state of mind required for the offence of second-degree murder; and (3) that the accused also caused the death of Mr. Belle after having both planned and deliberated over this murder.

[26] The only issue on this application is whether the Crown has led any evidence of “planning and deliberation” on the part of the accused in this case. But, to be sure, in order to prove that the killing of Jerome Bell was first-degree murder on the part of the accused, the Crown must prove not only that the accused murdered Mr. Belle, but also that the murder was both planned and deliberate. It is not enough for the Crown to prove that the murder was planned or deliberate – the Crown must prove that the murder was both planned and deliberate.

[27] As juries are typically instructed, the words “planned” and “deliberate” mean different things. “Planned” means a calculated scheme or design that has been carefully thought out. The consequences of it have been thought over, weighed and considered. The plan does not have to be complicated, or sensible. Indeed, it may be a very simple plan, one that is quite easy to set up. An important factor is the time it took to develop the plan, not how much or little time it took between developing it and carrying it out. One person may prepare a plan and carry it out immediately. Another person may prepare a plan and wait a while, even quite a while, to carry it out. A planned murder is one that it is committed as a result of a scheme or plan that has been previously formulated or designed. It is the implementation of that scheme or design. There is no requirement that a plan must take hours or days to prepare – in short, there is no minimum period of time required. However, a murder committed on a sudden impulse and without prior consideration, even with an intention to kill, is not a planned murder. “Deliberate” means “considered, not impulsive”, “carefully thought out, not hasty or rash”, “slow in deciding”, “cautious.” A deliberate act is one that the accused has taken time to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of. The deliberation must take place before the murder starts. A murder committed on a sudden impulse, and without prior consideration, even with an intention to kill, is not a deliberate murder. See, for example: David Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions (2023), at pp. 729-740; R. v. Widdifield (1961), 6 Crim.L.Q. 152 (O.H.C.J.), at pp. 153-154; R. v. Reynolds (1978), 44 C.C.C. (2d) 129 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Smith (1979), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 381 (Sask.C.A.); R. v. Droste, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 208; R. v. Nygaard, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1074, at p. 1084; R. v. Aalders, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 482, at pp. 489-491, 502-504; R. v. Ayotte, [1998] O.J. No. 4700, at paras. 64-65; R. v. Weese, 2010 ONSC 3589, at para. 17; R. v. Banwait, 2011 SCC 55, reversing: 2010 ONCA 869, at paras. 178-189; R. v. Robinson, 2017 ONCA 645, at para. 34.

E. Analysis and Conclusions

[28] The directed verdict application by the defence must be dismissed. In my view, the Crown has led at least some evidence, from which, the jury could reasonably infer that the accused committed a planned and deliberate first-degree murder in killing Jerome Bell.

[29] First, there is the issue of identity. Sagal Abdi clearly testified that the accused is the man who was wearing the “white hoodie,” pulled up over his head, and drawn tightly around his face, just before the killing – and just afterwards, when he quickly returned to her car after the killing. While defence counsel will, no doubt, suggest to the jury that her evidence should be rejected as unreliable and/or incredible, the jury is legally entitled to accept her evidence in this regard. In other words, the jury could reasonably find that it was the accused who killed Jerome Belle. Defence counsel does not suggest otherwise.

[30] Second, based upon all the evidence, including the evidence of Ryan Garballa, there can be no question that the speedy execution-style killing of Jerome Bell, was at least a second-degree murder. In short, there is no doubt that the accused intentionally killed Mr. Belle, without any evidence of potential provocation, accident, intoxication, or self-defence. Again, defence counsel does not suggest otherwise.

[31] Mr. Garballa testified that, he and Mr. Belle eventually walked northbound on the Bloom Street “laneway,” with his dog, until they were near the intersection of Bloom Street and Randolph Avenue. At that point, according to Mr. Garballa, he saw a man wearing a “white hoodie,” with the hood up over his head, come “running” toward them on the sidewalk. He was coming from the direction of Perth Avenue (where the Mercedes Benz had just parked), and he was running toward the “laneway.” According to Mr. Garballa, Mr. Belle said nothing, and neither did the man in the “white hoodie,” but the man in the “white hoodie” just started shooting Mr. Belle. Mr. Garballa heard “a lot” of gun shots, and he instinctively ran toward the nearby Red Cross building, intending to try to hide behind a parked car. Mr. Garballa testified that, at the time of the shots, he was just “a couple of inches” away from Mr. Belle. However, Mr. Garballa was left physically unharmed by the shooting. Mr. Garballa testified that, when the shooting was over, the man in the “white hoodie” just ran back in the direction of Perth Avenue, from whence he had come. Mr. Garballa was not able to see the face of the man wearing the “white hoodie.” However, Mr. Belle was left on the ground, by a lamp post, “gasping for breath.” Subsequently, after all medical efforts to save him proved unsuccessful, Mr. Belle was pronounced dead at a Toronto hospital.

[32] Third, in my view the jury could reasonably infer that the accused had earlier planned and deliberated over the killing of Mr. Belle, and then, on the afternoon of March 19, 2019, he saw an opportunity to put his earlier plan into action – and he then executed that plan. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that some of the strongest pieces of evidence, from which a trier of fact may reasonably infer the necessary “planning and deliberation” for the crime of first-degree murder, are the circumstances surrounding the killing itself. Such circumstances may, of course, disclose the existence of an earlier plan and a deliberate execution of it. See, for example: R. v. Hassan, 2018 ONSC 732, at paras. 14-15.

[33] It is worthwhile recalling that the accused had made arrangements earlier that day (March 19, 2019) to have Ms. Abdi come and pick him up in her car. Accordingly, she could, unwittingly, provide the accused with the necessary “getaway” car following the killing. Indeed, based upon her evidence, that is, in fact, exactly what the accused did. He took advantage of her friendship, and her willingness to drive him to different locations around the city, as he wished, to enlist her unknowing assistance in escaping from the scene of the murder. The jury could, in my opinion, reasonably drawn all of these conclusions.

[34] Just shortly before the arrival of Ms. Abdi and her vehicle, Mr. Belle and Mr. Garballa were walking quite near the accused’s residence, and they could easily have been seen by the accused from his home. When Ms. Abdi arrived at the accused’s residence, and parked her car in her usual location, waiting for him to come outside and enter her car, the accused called her on the phone, and told her to move her car forward. Ms. Abdi then pulled her car forward a relatively short distance. The accused had never done that before. However, this can be reasonably explained by a desire in the accused that he not be seen (certainly not by Mr. Belle and/or Mr. Garballa) leaving his residence. Indeed, in my view, the accused had to have seen them from his home, as within a couple of minutes of being picked up by Ms. Abdi, the accused directed Ms. Abdi to drive to a location (and park her car) geographically near where he anticipated Mr. Belle would be – if Mr. Belle and Mr. Garballa continued walking northbound on Bloom Street (in the direction they were headed when they must have been seen by the accused).

[35] Further, the accused clearly had a loaded gun in his possession when he left his residence – the very firearm he used to kill Mr. Belle just a few minutes later (according to the combined testimony of Ms. Abdi and Mr. Garballa). There is no evidence to suggest that the accused usually, typically, or habitually, carried a loaded firearm on his person, or that he could lawfully do so. Accordingly, the fact that the accused had possession of a loaded firearm in the few minutes before he used that same loaded firearm to intentionally kill Mr. Belle also supports the reasonable inference, open to the jury, that the accused had earlier planned and deliberated over the killing of Mr. Belle, and he had seen the opportunity to put his plan into action on the afternoon of March 19, 2019.

[36] In addition, while the accused was in the white Mercedes Benz, and while he was directing Ms. Abdi where to drive and park her vehicle, he took off his black jacket, that he had been wearing when he left his residence, and he pulled his “white hoodie” sweater up over his head, and pulled it tightly over his face, in a way that the jury could easily and reasonably conclude was designed to hide his true identity. Of course, if he was intending to murder Mr. Belle shortly thereafter, in furtherance of his plan to do so, one could easily understand why the accused would want to take such steps to try to conceal his identity while he was engaged in such heinous criminal conduct.

[37] Finally, Ms. Abdi testified that, towards the end of their “escape” from the scene of the crime, just before she dropped the accused off, as he directed, in the area of Jane Street and Finch Avenue, the accused told her that they would “have to get married so that [she] could not testify against [him].” Apparently, that was the last thing that he said to her before getting out of her car. This evidence also suggests that the accused had planned and deliberated over the killing of Mr. Belle. There is no evidence in this case that the accused knew about the legal rule of spousal incompetence, or that he sought to learn about that evidentiary rule during their trip away from the scene of the crime. Accordingly, in my view, the jury could reasonably interpret this evidence as indicating that, at some point prior to the killing of the deceased, the accused sought legal information and/or advice, in some form, electronic or otherwise, about the operation of the rule of spousal incompetence, so that Ms. Abdi would not be able to testify against him in relation to his killing of Mr. Belle. See: R. v. MacKinnon (1999), 43 O.R. (3d) 378 (C.A.), at pp. 383-384; R. v. Rogerson, 2015 SCC 38, at para. 27; R. v. Robinson, at para. 59.

F. Result

[38] In the result, for these reasons, I am satisfied that the application, brought on behalf of Mr. Mohiadin, for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder against him, must be dismissed. The trial will, accordingly, continue on the charge of first-degree murder.

Kenneth L. Campbell J. Released: April 25, 2023

COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-1-261 DATE: 20230425 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HIS MAJESTY THE KING - and - SAAID MOHIADIN Ruling Directed Verdict Application K. L. Campbell J. Released: April 25, 2023