Jeff Hershberg

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the accused, Martin Tinglin, experienced an unreasonable delay in his trial process, infringing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Despite the total delay being above the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, the court calculated a net delay below the ceiling after subtracting defence delay.

However, the court emphasized the Crown's failure to actively manage disclosure and case progression, which contributed significantly to the delay.

The court granted a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) Charter as a remedy for the violation, highlighting systemic issues in case management and Crown disclosure practices.

Three defendants, Levi Alexander, Vejay Alexander, and Lamar Cyrus, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a planned robbery of a modified starter's pistol resulted in the unintentional shooting death of Alex Perlmutter.

Lamar Cyrus also pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm.

The court accepted joint sentencing recommendations, emphasizing the egregious nature of the offence, the defendants' disregard for court orders (firearms prohibitions, probation conditions), and their serious criminal records.

Mitigating factors included the guilty pleas (though late) and the harshness of pre-sentencing custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The victim's family provided impact statements detailing their profound loss.

The accused, John, David, and Jonathan Pham, brought a Charter application under section 11(b) for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was nearly 28 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to an "exceptional circumstance" related to their post-ruling investigation into surveillance evidence.

The court found that the Crown's decision to investigate and introduce new evidence after a section 8 ruling (which found police misrepresentations) was not a reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable event, as the issues were central to the litigation from the outset.

Therefore, the delay was not attributable to an exceptional circumstance, and the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded without justification.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the issuance of a tracking warrant, alleging violations of their s.8 rights due to misrepresentations and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The application also included a s.7 claim for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence (CCTV footage).

The court found that the affiant made significant misrepresentations and omissions regarding a confidential human source's criminal record and surveillance observations, particularly concerning a trip to Whole Foods characterized as "counter-surveillance" driving and an alleged "drug transaction." These misrepresentations were found to be intentional or reckless, tainting the reliability of the ITO.

Consequently, the court excised the misleading portions, rendering the warrant invalid.

The s.7 application for a stay was not granted, as the s.8 remedy was deemed sufficient at this stage.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

A 17.5-year-old young person pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining whether to impose an adult or youth sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The Crown sought an adult sentence of life imprisonment, while the defence argued for a youth sentence comprising time served and conditional supervision.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the young person's background (including a toxic relationship with the victim, substance abuse, and the impact of her mother's death), and her significant rehabilitative progress while in custody.

Professional assessments unanimously recommended a youth sentence, citing the young person's developmental vulnerability and the potential negative impact of an adult correctional facility.

Applying the YCJA's principles of accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration, the court found that a youth sentence of sufficient length would hold the young person accountable.

Consequently, the Crown's application for an adult sentence was dismissed, and a youth sentence of seven years was imposed, consisting of four years in custody (crediting three years for pre-sentencing detention plus one additional year) followed by three years of conditional supervision, along with a weapons prohibition order.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on charges of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault arising from a violent street attack on September 30, 2013, outside Sang's Restaurant in Toronto.

The attack involved six assailants attacking three victims, resulting in the death of Danny La from blunt force trauma to the head.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both defendants to trial on second degree murder and aggravated assault charges, but rejected the attempted murder charge and the Crown's theory of constructive first degree murder based on forcible confinement.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after an undercover police drug buy at a shopping mall.

The central issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and money seized upon arrest.

Police witnesses described the controlled buy, continuous surveillance, and the seizure of cocaine, marked buy money, and additional cash and drugs from the accused and his backpack.

The accused testified that another individual committed the transaction and denied possessing the drugs, money, or backpack.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as not credible and found the police evidence reliable, concluding the Crown proved possession and proceeds beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of a handgun discovered in the trunk of a vehicle following a police stop.

Police officers testified they observed the accused place a firearm in the trunk before stopping the vehicle and conducting a search incident to arrest.

The court found significant credibility and reliability problems in the officers’ testimony, including material inconsistencies and implausible explanations, and concluded the Crown failed to establish that officers honestly believed they had seen a gun placed in the trunk.

The court held the search was unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and the detention was arbitrary under s. 9.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined the serious Charter breaches and impact on the accused’s rights outweighed society’s interest in adjudication on the merits, and the firearm evidence was excluded.

This is a ruling on committal for trial following a three-month preliminary inquiry into Project Marvel, a police investigation into drug and firearm trafficking by members of a criminal organization known as the Young Buck Killers (YBK).

Nine defendants faced sixty-four counts including trafficking and possession of cocaine and other drugs, trafficking and possession of firearms, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown alleged that most defendants committed these offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with the YBK criminal organization.

The court applied the test for committal established in R. v. Arcuri, requiring that there be admissible evidence which could, if believed, result in a conviction.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit most defendants to trial on the charges, though some counts were discharged where the evidence was insufficient or speculative.

The court's analysis focused on whether the predicate offences were sufficiently connected to the criminal organization and whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea.

The accused was charged with possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000, possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of a recognizance.

Police executed a search warrant at a residence co-owned by the accused and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, cash, and packaging materials.

The principal issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the residence.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised control over the drugs or knew of their presence, particularly given evidence that other individuals resided in or frequented the home and one individual occupied the bedroom where drugs were found.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to admit statements allegedly made by the accused while detained at an airport under the Customs Act after officers suspected drug smuggling.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in oppressive circumstances.

The court held the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to the absence of reliable recordings, incomplete officer notes, and interrogation conditions including prolonged detention, lack of sleep, and uncomfortable conditions.

These factors undermined the reliability and context of the alleged admissions.

The impugned statements were ruled inadmissible.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 406 grams of cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Jamaica.

At sentencing, the defence argued for mitigation based on alleged compulsion falling short of duress and repeated strip searches conducted by law enforcement.

The court rejected the claim of compulsion, finding the offender not credible and concluding she participated willingly for personal gain.

However, the court found that a second strip search conducted by police after arrest violated s. 8 of the Charter because it was carried out as a matter of routine policy without reasonable grounds.

Applying sentencing principles and the range established in appellate jurisprudence, the court reduced the otherwise fit sentence to reflect the police misconduct.

The three accused were charged with 32 armed robberies of gas stations and convenience stores.

Following their arrest after a foot pursuit, they were held for several hours before giving videotaped confessions.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings alleging police brutality, and challenged the admissibility of their statements and physical evidence seized.

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no evidence of police brutality, and upheld the lawfulness of the arrests and search warrants.

However, the court ruled the statements inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, largely due to the police's failure to video-record the critical 'pre-interviews' where the accused allegedly waived their right to counsel and agreed to confess.

Following conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing court considered constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum in s. 95(2)(a)(i).

The court held that the three-year minimum was grossly disproportionate on the facts and therefore violated s. 12, and further held the hybrid structure created arbitrariness contrary to s. 7 because of the one-year summary maximum and three-year indictable floor.

The infringements were not saved under s. 1, and the proper remedy was a declaration of invalidity under s. 52 rather than a constitutional exemption or mandamus.

Applying ordinary sentencing principles once the minimum was removed, the court imposed a one-year sentence with credits, resulting in five months to be served conditionally in the community.