R. v. Javid Ahmad, 2015 ONSC 652
COURT FILE NO.: 13-90000334
DATE: 2015/03/13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
R. V. JAVID AHMAD
Accused
David Morlog, for the Crown
Jeff Hershberg, for the Accused
HEARD: December 19, 2014
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
B.A. ALLEN J.:
THE PROCEEDING
[1] Javid Ahmad (“the applicant”) applies for a stay of proceedings on the basis that the police entrapped him to commit the offences with which he was charged. On April 19, 2012, the applicant was arrested and charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime. The Crown withdrew the trafficking charge at the preliminary hearing.
THE LAW ON ENTRAPMENT
Principles
[2] Before an application for a stay can be brought the Crown must at the first stage discharge its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the accused’s guilt of the offences charged. The Crown succeeded at the first stage and a conviction was entered.
[3] At the second stage a judge considers whether entrapment occurred. The onus in proving entrapment is on the defence on a balance of probabilities. Guilt has already been determined so the question of innocence is not in issue. It is the conduct of the state that is at issue. The law frowns on state conduct that induces a person to commit an offence they would not otherwise commit. This has been referred to as the prohibition against unreasonable intrusion into our lives through “randomly testing virtue”: R. v. Mack, 1988 24 (SCC), [1988] S.C.J. No. 91, at para. 79.
[4] The remedy with a finding of entrapment is a judicial stay. This is an extraordinary remedy that puts a weighty burden of proof on the defence. This remedy is acknowledged as the most drastic of remedies available to a court and is only imposed in “the clearest of cases”. As Lamer, J. and Major, J., as they then were, held in R. v. Pearson:
One of the most distinguishing features of entrapment is that it does not bring into play the presumption of innocence. Unlike other defence protections, entrapment is not related to the innocence of the accused but to the faulty conduct of the state. Once the accused is found guilty of the offence, the accused alone bears the burden of establishing that the conduct of the Crown and/or the police amounted to an abuse of process deserving of a stay of proceedings, a standard this Court has held will arise only in the clearest of cases.
[R. v. Pearson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 620, at para. 12]
[5] A stay of proceeding expresses the court’s disapproval of unacceptable police or prosecutorial conduct in investigating crimes: R. v. Pearson, at para. 15. The doctrine is necessary to maintain the integrity of the court, to preserve the purity of the administration of justice, to prevent abuse of its process, and to maintain the repute of the administration of justice: R. v. Mack, at para. 141, (S.C.C.).
[6] R. v. Mack sets out two forms of entrapment: (a) when authorities provide an opportunity to persons to commit an offence without acting on reasonable suspicion that this person has already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant to a bona fide enquiry; or (b) although having a reasonable suspicion or acting in the course of a bona fide enquiry, the police go beyond proving an opportunity and induce the commission of an offence.
[7] The applicant does not allege the police engaged in an improper inducement, the second form of entrapment. His challenge to police conduct is based on the first scenario, that the police provided an opportunity for him to commit a crime without acting on a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide enquiry.
[8] The law of entrapment is concerned with whether the investigative and enforcement techniques employed by the police would diminish confidence in the criminal justice system, whether the police have improperly exercised the power conferred on them.
The absence of a reasonable suspicion or a bona fide inquiry is significant in assessing the police conduct because of the risk that the police will attract people who would not otherwise have any involvement in a crime, and because it is not a proper use of the police power to simply go out and test the virtue of people on a random basis.
[9] To succeed in establishing entrapment under the first scenario in R. v. Mack, there must be findings that the police provided an opportunity to commit an offence and did so without reasonable suspicion: [R. v. Imoro, [2010] ONCA 122, at para. 13, (Ont. C.A.)].
[10] Finding whether police conduct amounts to entrapment is a fact-driven exercise based in the particular factual context of a case. Where a conversation has taken place between an undercover officer and a suspected drug dealer, the entirety of the conversation, not just individual words, must be viewed in the totality of the evidence. No two cases will be identical. But cases with similar facts can provide guidance.
Effect of Accused Testifying to his Innocence at Trial
[11] This case presents an interesting issue. The applicant testified at trial and denied involvement in a telephone conversation with D.C. Limsiaco. He denied selling drugs to him and alleged the police planted the cellphone used in the transaction on him. The applicant’s evidence in fact points to his friend “Mikey” being the culprit. Perhaps predictably, the applicant did not testify on this application and the defence called no other witnesses. I think it fair to comment on this in an entrapment proceeding where the presumption of innocence is not at play as it is at trial and where the burden to prove entrapment entirely rests on the applicant.
[12] Defence counsel argued the applicant is entitled to found his application on the factual underpinnings of the court’s findings of guilt. The defence provided no legal authority for that proposition. What I understand the defence argument to be is that the court found there was telephone communications between the applicant and D.C. Limsiaco that resulted in a drug deal and the applicant on the court’s findings is entitled to argue the police’s conduct amounted to entrapment.
[13] The Crown argued that because the applicant denied involvement in the drug deal at trial, he is now foreclosed from taking the opposite position that he was involved in the drug deal and was entrapped by the police. The Crown relied on the old Latin maxim qui approbat non reprobate, meaning “one who accepts cannot reject”.
[14] The Crown cited a 2011 Manitoba Court of Appeal decision which involved a search warrant on a residence: R. v. Farrah (D), 2011 MBCA 49 (Man. C.A.). A pre-trial Charter, s. 8 voir dire was held where in order to establish standing to challenge the warrant the defence took the position the accused was an occupant of the residence. The accused did not testify on the voir dire but rather relied in establishing residence on the evidence given through Crown witnesses.
[15] At trial to avoid the inference of possession of the firearm found at the residence, the accused testified that he no longer lived at the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. Citing the Latin maxim, the Manitoba Court of Appeal asked the question: “How can [the accused] then be allowed to withdraw from his earlier position and argue that he had no privacy interest in suite 16 and thus cannot be linked to the gun found?” The accused was unsuccessful at trial.
[16] A 2000 Ontario Court of Appeal case considered the issue of the inherent contradiction of a not guilty plea preceding an entrapment claim: [R. v. Ahluwalia, [2000] C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.)]. That case involves the accused selling drugs to an undercover police agent. At a first trial that ended in a mistrial the accused pleaded not guilty. At the second trial the accused pleaded guilty and raised an entrapment claim. Like the case before me, the accused did not testify at the entrapment hearing. Transcripts from both trials were filed at the entrapment hearing. It appears the Crown raised no question at the entrapment hearing about the inconsistency in the not guilty plea at the first trial. The trial judge dismissed the entrapment application. The accused appealed.
[17] In R. v. Ahluwalia Doherty, J.A. addressed the contradiction between an assertion of innocence and a claim of entrapment. By way of background to that case there were conversations between the accused and the police agent. The issue in that case centred on which date drugs were first mentioned in the conversations, whether in February or in March. The accused’s position at trial rested on drugs not being mentioned in February but rather in March when his life was allegedly threatened. The accused’s claim at the entrapment hearing, however, was that he was entrapped in February.
[18] Doherty, J.A. commented:
…Counsel found himself in the difficult position of arguing that the appellant was entrapped on February 19th or 20th, despite the appellant’s own evidence that there was no mention of drugs until the meeting in early March when Makdesion threatened his life.
I find it hard to give any credence to a submission that the appellant established entrapment on the balance of probabilities based on a version of events which is directly contrary to his own evidence and places the entrapment some weeks before the appellant says there was any mention of drugs. The appellant’s argument comes down to this: O’Connell J. erred in failing to find that the appellant had established entrapment on the balance of probabilities based on events which the appellant insisted never happened! The futility of that submission is self-evident.
On any reasonable view, the appellant’s entrapment claim at trial rested on his evidence that Makdesion threatened his life in early March and on later occasions. Without his testimony, the entrapment argument was untenable. The Trial Judge rejected the appellant’s testimony that he was threatened. He had very good reason on the record before him to do so and the appellant cannot challenge that assessment on appeal.
[R. v. Ahluwalia, paras. 34 – 36]
[19] In R. v Ahluwalia the defendant was not foreclosed at his second trial from advancing an entrapment claim where he had previously professed his innocence. In the second trial, the trial judge heard the evidence and dismissed the entrapment claim on the facts before the court. The Court of Appeal did not appear to question the availability of the entrapment claim in view of the appellant’s prior testimonial claim to innocence. The Appeal Court however spoke to the difficulty, absent the appellant’s own testimony, of him succeeding to meet his onus in the entrapment claim.
[20] There may also be a principled basis for not precluding an entrapment claim where there has been an assertion of innocence during a trial. I think this can be elicited from the lesson in R. v. Mack that the law of entrapment is directed not to the guilt or innocence of the accused but to an examination of the use of state power. Lamer, J. stated:
Since I am of the view that the doctrine of entrapment is not dependent upon culpability, the focus should not be on the effect of the police conduct on the accused’s state of mind. Instead, it is my opinion that as far as possible an objective assessment of the conduct of the police and their agents is required.
Since guilt or innocence is not at issue and it is police conduct that is under review, it is reasonably arguable that entrapment can be assessed on the police conduct that underpinned my finding of guilt at trial. Although it may seem counter intuitive to consider entrapment with a previous assertion of innocence, this approach appears in accord with the R. v. Mack principle.
THE FACTS OF THE DRUG TRANSACTION
[21] D.C. Limsiaco testified there was no investigation of the information D.C. Wallace provided to him from the tipster. The following is D.C. Limsiaco’s memo notes of the telephone exchange between himself and the applicant. On April 19 at 3:36 p.m., D.C. Limsiaco called the cellphone number provided by D.C. Wallace for a contact ‘Romeo’:
Male: Hello
Officer: Hey, It’s Mike, Matt said I can give you a call, this is Romeo?
Male: He did, did he?
Officer: Yeah, said you can help me out?
Male: What do you need?
Officer: 2 soft
Male: Hold on, I’ll get back to you.
Officer: Alright.
[22] The male then called D.C. Limsiaco back on the same day at 3:51 p.m. and the following communication occurred:
Officer: Hello
Male: So what do you need again?
Officer: 2 soft, where you at?
Male: Can meet you at Yorkdale.
Officer: Sure, $160 good an hour?
Male: $140, hours good, go by theatres
Officer: Cool
[23] D.C. Limsiaco testified his notes of the conversation are not verbatim. At this hearing he stated that he made the notes 20 to 30 minutes after the second phone call. Defence counsel cross-examined him about the accuracy of his notes given the delay in writing them. I am satisfied however by D.C. Limsiaco’s testimony that his notes of the conversation reflect the substantial elements of his verbal exchange with the applicant.
[24] D.C. Limsiaco testified the applicant went along with the conversation without hesitation as it progressed. The applicant did not query who D.C. Limsiaco’s contact, ‘Matt’, was when D.C. Limsiaco used that name at the start of the first call. Instead of questioning the name Matt (which was a made up name) he simply went along in the conversation and said, “He did, did he?” The conversation moved along.
[25] D.C. Limsiaco was given the name ‘Romeo’ as a name to connect on the phone with the prospective drug dealer. D.C. Limsiaco asked if it was Romeo he was talking to. The applicant did not confirm or deny he was Romeo. The conversation continued without the applicant enquiring about the name.
[26] The conversation progressed and D.C. Limsiaco was able to tell the applicant why he called.
[27] D.C. Limsiaco explained in testimony that the words: “Yeah, said you can help me out?” is a common drug trade request for drugs. The conversation moved along to the applicant asking: “What do you need?” which D.C. Limsiaco explained is also common street drug trade parlance asking what kind of drug the person wants. D.C. Limsiaco responded: “Two soft” which refers in the drug trade to two ounces of powder cocaine.
[28] D.C. Limsiaco testified the applicant did not query what “two soft” meant. He said: “Hold on. I’ll get back to you” and ended the conversation. Fifteen minutes later, the applicant called D.C. Limsiaco back. In the second conversation, the applicant confirmed the amount and type of drug D.C. Limsiaco wanted. They agreed on the price of $140. They set the time to meet and the location at the theatres at Yorkdale.
ANALYSIS
Opportunity to Commit a Crime or a Legitimate Investigative Step
[29] An initial call based on information from an unknown tipster has been held to be a legitimate first investigative step where a bona fide enquiry confirms the information. In R. v. Bogle, Wein, J. for the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found entrapment was not established in a situation where the officer had little specific information before the drug deal. An unknown tipster gave the officer information that a drug dealer could be contacted on a specific pager number. The officer called the number and left a phone number where he could be reached to see if his call would be returned. The court held:
…that the police are entitled to rely on untested informants as the basis for the first step in making a bona fide enquiry and where the bona fide enquiry confirms the information, the police are entitled to continue the investigation…
[30] D.C. Limsiaco testified that the tipster was unknown to him. He did not investigate the tip or tipster before calling the applicant. The defence argued the officer was obligated to investigate the credibility and reliability of the tipster before embarking on the phone conversation and making the offer.
[31] I find as the courts in R. v. Bogle and R. v. Olazo did that D.C. Limsiaco was entitled to move ahead with the investigation on unconfirmed information as a first step in his investigation particularly because, as discussed below, information from the ensuing enquiry was confirmatory of information in the tip.
[32] In R. v. Imoro, Laskin, J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the officer’s words in setting up a drug deal with a suspect, “Can you hook me up?” were words asking the offender whether he was a drug dealer. The court found these words signified a legitimate step in the investigation and were not words offering an opportunity to commit a crime: [R. v. Imoro, at para. 16].
[33] In R. v. Meech the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld Dunnet, J.’s trial decision. The trial court had found that a conversation between an officer and a suspect did not involve entrapment. A conversation where the police officer says, “I’m looking for a key”, in answer to the suspect’s words: “Hey man, what’s up?, together with his words “Great but can you do two keys?”, were found not to encourage the suspect to do something that he would not otherwise engage in: [R. v. Meech, [2013] ONCA 338, at para.11, (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Meech, [2011] O.J. 5758, at para.47, (Ont. S.C.J.)].
[34] In R. v. Townsend an officer received a tip and contact information from an informer that he passed on to an undercover officer. The undercover officer called the pager number provided and left a message for the suspect. The suspect called the officer back. In that call the suspect answered to the name the officer provided but did not recognize the name the officer provided for himself. The officer told the suspect a third party had told him [the officer] that the suspect “could help me out.” The suspect indicated he did not know “Vinnie” the name the officer used for himself. The suspect ended that call saying he had to speak to the third party first.
[35] In a further three-way call initiated by the suspect involving the officer, the accused and the third party, the officer confirmed with the third party that he had told “Vinnie” [the officer] to call the suspect. The accused then said “okay. The undercover officer said “[accused], are we going to do it?” The three-way call ended and in a further call by the accused to the officer the officer asked: “Are we going to do it?” The accused then said “I’ll call you back in two minutes.” Drug transactions followed where the police purchased various amounts of cocaine.
[36] Sharpe, J.A. in R. v. Townsend held that the threshold of reasonable suspicion was not met by the sole fact the accused responded to the name provided by the tipster. This information provided only an investigative step. The officer did not meet the threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect just because the accused responded to the name the tipster provided and to the name of the third party. However, those facts together with the suspect returning calls to the officer, particularly regarding confirmation of the pager number, were held to provide reasonable grounds to suspect: [R. v. Townsend, [1997] O.J. No. 6516, at paras 9 – 14, 44 - 47 (Ont. C.J. Gen. Div.)].
[37] In R. v. Ralph, Rosenberg, J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the finding of entrapment by Belobaba, J. In that case, the court considered the specificity of the tip; the absence of a query by the accused about the source of the officer’s information; and the lack of surprise by the accused when the officer said, “I need product.” The accused’s response, “What are you looking for? What do you need?” was consistent with and in furtherance of a drug deal.
[38] Similar to the court’s view of the words in R. v. Imoro, “Can you hook me up?”, the court in R. v. Ralph found a legitimate investigative step in the words “... if I want anything to call this number and this guy [referring to the accused] would link me up”: [R. v. Ralph, [2011] O.J., at para. 31, (Ont. C.A.)]
[39] In the case before me, as in R. v. Ralph, I find significant that the applicant did not query or act surprised or puzzled at D.C. Limsiaco’s reference to the applicant as ‘Romeo’ or to the contact as ‘Matt’. I find this would have been a critical point for the applicant to become suspicious and raise a question or abandon the conversation if he was not familiar with the code name ‘Romeo’. He expressed no doubt or hesitation.
[40] I do not accept the defence’s position that because the applicant did not acknowledge being Romeo, the officer’s ensuing words offered the applicant an opportunity to commit a crime he would have not otherwise committed. I find in the context of the entire conversation that the fact the applicant did not deny being Romeo or query the name is significant and reasonably permitted D.C. Limsiaco to proceed in the conversation. However, similar to R. v. Townsend [where the suspect acknowledged the code name] I find the lack of denial of being Romeo was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. The officer’s words testing the code names were a legitimate investigative step.
[41] Also, I find the words the applicant used, “Can you help me out?” to be comparable to the words “Can you hook me up?” in R. v. Imoro; “He said you could help me out” in R. v. Townsend; and “…this guy [the accused] would link me up…” in R. v. Ralph. Similar to the words in the other cases, I find D.C. Limsiaco’s words to be a bona fide investigative step that legitimized him proceeding further with the investigation. As the court found in R. v. Imoro, I find the words D.C. Limsiaco used constituted a reasonable step to determine if the male he was speaking to was a drug dealer. Confirmation came with the applicant’s reply to the question.
[42] The conversation moved on consistent with the progress of a drug deal with the applicant asking “What do you need?” The officer responded “Two soft”. Similar to the reaction to the officer’s words in R. v. Ralph, “I need product”, the applicant did not act surprised or ask the officer what he meant. After the officer’s request, the applicant said “Hold on. I’ll get back to you.”
[43] I find as Trotter, J. did in R. v. Silverthorn in relation to the suspect’s words, “Yeah, what you looking for?” that the applicant’s words, “What do you need?” show “a willingness to engage in what he understood to be a drug-related conversation”: R. v. Silverthorn 2012 ONSC 6784, at para. [8], (Ont. S.C.J.).
[44] I find D.C. Limsiaco formed a reasonable suspicion when the applicant asked “What do you need”. I find those words confirmed the male D.C. Limsiaco was speaking to was a drug dealer. Importantly, the conversation reached that point before the offer was made.
[45] Further confirmation came with the second phone call. Similar to R. v. Townsend, I find it critical that the accused took the initiative to call the officer back as he said he would. He did not have to do that. The applicant had the opportunity during the 15 minutes between the two calls to disengage and abandon the conversation with D.C. Limsiaco if he did not understand what was going on: [See R. v. Townsend, at para. 44] Instead, in the second call the applicant confirmed the type and amount of drugs the officer had requested. The applicant took the initiative to suggest the meeting place. A price was negotiated and a time to meet was agreed upon.
[46] I find the case before me is distinguishable from cases counsel presented to the court. In both R. v. Marino-Montero and R. v. Williams the undercover officer moved to the offer before establishing the suspect was a drug dealer: R. v. Marino-Montero, [2012] O.J. 1287 (Ont. S.C.J) and R. v. Williams 2014 ONSC 2370 (Ont. S.C.J.).
[47] In R. v. Marino-Montero, McMahon, J., for the Ontario Superior Court, found that while the officer attempted to confirm the tipster’s information by calling the number provided, he failed to confirm before he made the offer to buy drugs that the male on the other end of the call was the drug dealer. The court found that if the officer would have obtained confirmatory information about the code name before the offer, together with the specificity of the tip, reasonable suspicion would have been established: [R. v. Marino-Montero, at para. 29].
[48] In R. v. Williams (April 9, 2014) Trotter, J. found the fact the suspect answered to his code name was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Further, the undercover officer did not wait for the answer to his question, “Are you around?” before he went on to make the offer to buy drugs. The court found it might have made a difference to establishing reasonable suspicion had the officer done this: [R. v. Williams, at para. 23].
[49] As I have found, looking at the conversation between D.C. Limsiaco and the applicant on a whole, the applicant was established as a drug dealer when the applicant asked “What do you need?” and was further confirmed to be a drug dealer when he did not query D.C. Limsiaco’s response, “Two soft”. The steps in the conversation that preceded the offer were legitimate investigative steps that led to a reasonable suspicion, not opportunities for the applicant to commit a crime he would not have committed otherwise.
[50] The facts do not establish D.C. Limsiaco manufactured the drug deal or that he engaged in the forbidden practice of random virtue testing. The applicant is therefore not entitled to a stay of proceedings.
Connection between Police Conduct and the Possession Charges
[51] The parties each raised alternative arguments for my consideration if I were to find entrapment.
[52] As noted earlier, Crown counsel withdrew the trafficking charge before trial. The applicant was therefore left with the two possession charges. The Crown argues if I were to find entrapment in relation to trafficking, a stay would not be available for the possession charges.
[53] The defence raises the alternative argument that, with a finding entrapment, the arrest of the applicant is vitiated.
[54] Although I did not find entrapment, I have decided to address the alternative arguments in case I am in error on that finding.
[55] Crown counsel argues that the possession charges that arise from the drug trafficking charge were not the consequence of or connected to entrapment and for that reason are not subject to a stay of proceedings. As the argument goes, the applicant’s possession of the drugs and the buy money cannot be seen as being impacted by police conduct in that those offences arose independently of any alleged improper police conduct.
[56] In making his argument Crown counsel relies on Trotter, J.’s decisions in R. v. Silverthorn and R. v. Williams (April 15, 2014): R. v. Williams 2014 ONSC 3005 (Ont. S.C.J.). In R. v. Williams the defence attempted to extend the scope of the entrapment finding on the drug trafficking offence to include a stay on weapons and failure to comply charges.
[57] Trotter, J. held:
The charges from Mr. Williams’ arrest on March 15, 2011 were not the product of entrapment. The police did nothing that encouraged Mr. Williams to (allegedly) arm himself with a gun and ammunition and then go out onto the street. Mr. Williams committed these offences on his own, with the assistance of no one: see R. v. Silverthorn, 2012 ONSC 6784, at para. [11]. Because the police provided Williams with opportunities to traffic in crack cocaine without having a reasonable suspicion, he was automatically entitled to the most powerful remedy known to Canadian criminal law – a stay of proceedings. Weeks later, acting independently, he is not entitled to the same remedy once again.
[R. v. Williams (April 15, 2014), at para. 8]
[58] More similar to the case before this court is R. v. Silverthorn where the accused was originally charged with drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds. The trafficking charge was withdrawn at the preliminary hearing. The accused drove with various types of drugs in his car with an undercover officer to the location pre-arranged for a drug deal.
[59] I find in the case before me, as Trotter, J. found in R. v. Silverthorn, that the applicant’s actions after the phone call in carrying drugs to the pre-arranged meeting place cannot be said to be the result of D.C. Limsiaco providing the applicant with an opportunity to commit the crimes of possession of drugs and proceeds. As Trotter, J. found, I find the applicant committed those offences “all by himself”: R. v. Silverthorn, at para. 11.. The applicant of his own free will carried a back pack with an assortment of drugs and a large amount of money to Yorkdale shopping centre where he planned to meet the person to whom he had arranged to sell drugs.
Can a Finding of Entrapment Vitiate the Arrest?
[60] The defence argued that where entrapment is found, the entrapping conduct of the police has the effect of tainting the arrest. The arrest, the defence argues, is inextricably tied to the entrapment. The extension of that argument is that entrapment automatically invalidates the grounds for arrest creating a breach under s. 9 of the Charter, protection against arbitrary detention.
[61] I agree with Crown counsel’s argument on that issue. Entrapment is a post-conviction claim. It can only be brought after the Crown has satisfied the trier of fact of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The effect of the defence’s argument would be to reach back after the accused has been convicted and undo or invalidate his arrest.
[62] The court in R. v. Mack addresses this issue succinctly:
I have come to the conclusion that it is not inconsistent with the requirement that the Crown prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to place the onus on the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct of the state is an abuse of process because of entrapment. I repeat: the guilt or innocence of the accused is not in issue. The accused has done nothing to entitle him or her to an acquittal; the Crown has engaged in conduct, however, that disentitles it to a conviction [Emphases added].
[63] A finding of entrapment after a conviction does not invalidate the arrest and entitle a defendant to an acquittal.
DISPOSTION
[64] For the reasons set out, I deny Javid Ahmad’s application for a stay of proceedings.
B.A. Allen
Released: March 13, 2015
CITATION: R. v. Javid Ahmad, 2015 ONSC 652
COURT FILE NO.: 13-90000334
DATE: 2015/03/13
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
R. V. JAVID AHMAD
Accused
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
B.A. Allen J.
Released: March 13, 2015